Opinion
Civil No. 3:04-CV-0109-H.
May 17, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Frozen Food Express Industries, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), filed March 8, 2004; Plaintiff's Response, filed March 29, 2004; and Defendant's Reply, filed April 13, 2004. Also before the Court are Defendant Frozen Food Express Industries, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 8, 2004; Plaintiff's Response, filed March 29, 2004; Defendant's Reply with Appendix, filed with permission of the Court on April 13, 2004; and Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Summary Judgment Reply Appendix or in the Alternative Motion for Leave to File Summary Judgment Sur-Reply Appendix, filed April 23, 2004. In this Title VII sexual harassment employment discrimination suit, both of Defendant's motions are premised on the fact that Plaintiff Glenda Jeters ("Jeters") filed her complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") more than 300 days after the alleged sexual harassment occurred. The Court will address the two motions separately below. Upon review of the pleadings, briefs, and relevant authorities, the Court is of the opinion for the reasons stated below that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be DENIED, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be GRANTED.
In light of the Court's Order of April 16, 2004, directing Plaintiff to file a Sur-Reply no later than April 26, 2004, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Summary Judgment Sur-Reply Appendix is DENIED as moot. The Court will consider Plaintiff's Sur-Reply.
I. MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO RULE 12(b)(1)
Defendant Frozen Food Express Industries, Inc. ("FFE") moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff's sexual harassment claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2001) ("Title VII"), and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab. Code. Ann. § 21.001 et seq. (Vernon 1996 Supp. 1998) ("TCHRA"). FFE argues that Plaintiff's Original Petition fails to allege grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction and should be dismissed. FFE's motion is premised on the argument that failure to timely file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC in cases brought under Title VII and TCHRA is a jurisdictional requirement. The Court disagrees.
The Supreme Court has held that "filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). Therefore, dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not proper. Defendant FFE's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
The Court notes that exhaustion of administrative remedies in Title VII cases is only a jurisdictional prerequisite when the case involves federal employees. See Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that "[e]xhaustion occurs when the plaintiff files a timely charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory notice of right to sue" and that the filing of a charge with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but a precondition to filing suit in federal court). See also Julian v. City of Houston, 314 F.3d 721, 725 n. 3 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the receipt of a notice of right to sue is not a jurisdictional prerequisite but a condition precedent to filing suit in federal court). But see Randel v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 157 F.3d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a federal employee must exhaust administrative remedies under Title VII as a precondition to filing suit in federal court and that failure to do so deprives the federal court of jurisdiction); Barnes v. Levitt, 118 F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a federal employee must file an administrative complaint under Title VII as a jurisdiction prerequisite to filing suit in federal court).
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Background
Plaintiff Jeters originally filed suit in state court on December 22, 2003. Defendants FFE and Clifton removed to this Court on January 21, 2004.
Jeters was an employee of FFE from February 13, 2002, to February 19, 2002. She was apparently training to drive 18-wheel trucks. After attending orientation for three days, Jeters began her on-the-road training. She was assigned to drive with Clifton as her trainer. Jeters claims that on February 18, 2002, while driving with Clifton, Clifton "began to rub [her] hand and said `we will sleep together.'" (Pl.'s App. at 6.) Jeters claims that after she refused him, Clifton later kissed her and again demanded that they sleep together. ( Id.) Jeters informed FFE personnel of the incidents and left training to return to her home in Florida. ( Id.) On September 3, 2003, Jeters filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. ( Id.)
It is unclear from the evidence whether Jeters filed the charge with the EEOC on September 3, 2003, as she claims in her affidavit and is reflected on the questionnaire included in her appendix, see Pl.'s App. at 18-24, or if she filed on September 25, 2003, as is reflected on her charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC, see Pl.'s App. at 15. Because the difference of 22 days is immaterial to the Court's analysis, the Court will use the earlier date.
B. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where the facts and law as represented in the pleadings, affidavits, and other summary judgment evidence show that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party as to any material fact. FED.R.CIV.P. 56; Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Innovative Database Systs. v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1993). "The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery in the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but is not required to negate elements of the nonmoving party's case." Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25). If the movant fails to meet its initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
If the movant does meet its burden, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1998). A party opposing summary judgment may not rest on mere conclusory allegations or denials in its pleadings unsupported by specific facts presented in affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888; Hightower v. Texas Hosp. Assn., 65 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1995).
In determining whether genuine issues of fact exist, "[f]actual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that a controversy exists." Lynch, 140 F.3d at 625; see also Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992). However, in the absence of any proof, the Court will not assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts. Lynch, 140 F.3d at 625. A party must do more than simply show some "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "If the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Friou v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 948 F.2d 972, 974 (5th Cir. 1991).
C. Analysis
FFE argues that because Jeters filed her charge of discrimination with the EEOC more than 300 days after the alleged discrimination occurred, her claims are time barred. Because Texas "provides [an] administrative mechanism to address complaints of employment discrimination, a [T]itle VII plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days after learning of the conduct alleged." Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238 (5th Cir. 1998). However, because this requirement is in the nature of a statute of limitations, it is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393. See also, Cruce v. Brazosport Independent School District, 703 F.2d 862, 863 (5th Cir. 1983).
Jeters argues that the Court should apply the principle of equitable tolling to her case and allow her to proceed. (Pl.'s Br. at 3.) Federal courts, although extending relief sparingly, have allowed equitable tolling "in situations where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass." Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1992). "[E]quitable tolling may apply where the claimant has vigorously pursued his action, but has inadvertently missed deadlines due to his or her lack of sophistication with the procedural requirements of Title VII claims." Id.
Jeters also asserts that the Motion for Summary Judgment is premature, because she has been "denied the ability to conduct any discovery" that would lead to information pertinent to her equitable tolling claim. ( See Pl.'s Br. at 2.) Nowhere in her Response or in her Sur-Reply, however, does Jeters request the Court grant a continuance to allow her to conduct discovery. Additionally, Jeters does not argue that she cannot present by affidavit the facts essential to justify her opposition; she merely argues that she has not had the opportunity to take depositions. See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(f). The Court concludes that no continuance is warranted.
An employer's failure to post the language required by § 2000e-10 of Title VII may support equitable tolling of the 300-day period in which an employee must file a complaint with the EEOC. See Templeton v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 607 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1979). However, "a mere failure to post notices is not sufficient by itself to support equitable tolling when the employee has the means to learn of the existence of his Title VII rights." Pruet Production Co. v. Ayles, 784 F.2d 1275, 1280 (5th Cir. 1986). If an employee has general knowledge concerning discrimination laws, this knowledge is sufficient to defeat equitable tolling. See Clark v. Resistoflex Co., 854 F.2d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 1988) (adopting the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in McClinton v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 743 F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1984)).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10(a) reads:
Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization, as the case may be, shall post and keep posted in conspicuous places upon its premises where notices to employees, applicants for employment, and members are customarily posted a notice to be prepared or approved by the Commission setting forth excerpts from or, summaries of, the pertinent provisions of this subchapter and information pertinent to the filing of a complaint.
Jeters contends that FFE did not display the posters containing the statutory language as mandated by Title VII. ( See Pl.'s Br. at 3.) Jeters presents evidence that such posters were not displayed in the FFE building. ( See Pl.'s App. at 6.) Because of this failure, Jeters argues, the 300-day period in which she should have filed a complaint with the EEOC should be equitably tolled. ( See id.)
FFE argues that the 300-day period should not be equitably tolled because the required notices were displayed in the FFE building where Jeters was working. ( See Def.'s Reply at 6.) FFE presents evidence that it did display the required posters, both on the drivers' lounge bulletin board, and on the bulletin board at the top of the stairs leading to the truck loading and training area. ( See Def.'s Reply App. at 10.) Therefore, there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether FFE displayed the required posters.
However, FFE also argues that equitable tolling is inappropriate because Jeters had actual knowledge of the 300-day filing requirement based on a previous lawsuit she filed against the City of Ft. Myers, Florida, where she asserted claims pursuant to Title VII. ( See Def.'s Reply at 7-9.) Defendant presents evidence of pleadings filed in Jeters's case against the City of Ft. Myers and the Eleventh Circuit opinion regarding Jeters's case. ( See Def.'s Reply App. at 20-110.) In her Sur-Reply, Jeters does not dispute that she has previously filed a case asserting violations of Title VII. Jeters does, however, offer evidence that she did not know of the requirement of filing a complaint with the EEOC in Title VII actions. ( See Sur-Reply App. at 1-2.)
The Court finds that Jeters had general knowledge concerning Title VII, as evidenced by her suit against her former employer, the City of Ft. Myers. The Court also finds that Jeters had knowledge about the filing requirement, despite her assertion in her Sur-Reply. In her case against the City of Ft. Myers, Jeters filed a verified complaint which stated the "the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission rendered a decision dismissing complaint filed by Plaintiff with the EEOC." ( See Def.'s Reply App. at 53.) Jeters herself verified to the court in that case that she had read the complaint and that "the facts are true to the best of [her] knowledge and belief." ( See id. at 58.) Jeters cannot now claim that she had no knowledge regarding the requirement of filing a complaint with the EEOC. Even if she could credibly claim that she had no actual knowledge of the filing requirement, Jeters had the means to acquire such knowledge, which is all that is required to defeat an equitable tolling argument. See Pruet Productions, 784 F.2d at 1280. The Court concludes that equitable tolling is not warranted in the instant case. Because Jeters filed her complaint with the EEOC more than 300 days after the alleged discrimination occurred, the Court GRANTS Defendant FFE's Motion for Summary Judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant FFE's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED, and Defendant FFE's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Judgment will be entered by subsequent order.
Review of Plaintiff Glenda Jeters's Original Petition, filed in the 95th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, on December 22, 2003, reveals that there are no federal claims remaining. The Court concludes that there is no reason to continue its exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The state claims are REMANDED to the 95th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas.
SO ORDERED.