Summary
explaining that for purposes of a procedural due process claim, "the right to the use and enjoyment of one's property—is a well-established constitutional property right"
Summary of this case from Yoshikawa v. City of HonoluluOpinion
No. 10-16459.
Argued and Submitted June 16, 2011 San Francisco, California.
July 20, 2011.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Joseph C. Spero, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. 3:08-cv-03440-JCS.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Plaintiffs-Appellants Rosemary and Randy Jensen ("the Jensens") appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County of Sonoma ("the County") on the Jensens' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims asserting various constitutional violations. The claims arise from a hearing held by the County to abate various of the Jensens' uses of 50 Sonoma Mountain Road, a "Diverse Agricultural" zoned property that the County had determined to be in violation of county zoning ordinances. Because the history of the case is familiar to the parties, we need not recount it in its entirety here.
As an initial matter, the County's claims were not barred by the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion under the holding in Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1994), because the Appellants, unlike the appellant in Miller, sought a writ of mandate under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1094.5.
The Court affirms the district court's ruling that the county ordinance at issue in this case is not unconstitutionally vague. Section 26-08-020 of the Sonoma County Code sets forth permitted uses for land zoned as "Diverse Agricultural." The code section is amply detailed and, when viewed in the context of the entire ordinance, a reasonable person can discern that the storage of non-operative vehicles, the operation of a junkyard, or a truck or equipment terminal or depot are not permitted uses for such land. See, e.g., Turning Point, Inc. v. City of Caldwell, 74 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir. 1996).
We also affirm the district court's ruling that the County did not violate the Jensens' substantive due process rights. Because the Jensens do not assert that they belong in a protected class, they must establish that: 1) they are a member of an identifiable class; 2) that they were intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated; and 3) that there