Opinion
EP-99-CA-394-DB.
December 8, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On this day, the Court considered Defendant Louis Caldera's "Motion to Dismiss in Part and Motion for Summary Judgment in Part," filed in the above-captioned cause on November 3, 2000. Plaintiff Willie C. Jenkins Jr. filed a one-page "Motion to Dismiss Defendants [sic] Request for Summary Judgement [sic]" on November 13, 2000, but no substantive Response to Defendant's motion.
Louis Caldera is the Secretary of the United States Army, who is the proper defendant in an action against a branch of the armed forces under these facts. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-16(c).
After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's motion should be granted for the reasons that follow.
FACTS
Plaintiff Willie C. Jenkins Jr. commenced a temporary position on July 6, 1999, with the United States Army ("Army") as an Automotive Equipment Repair Inspector at Fort Bliss, Texas. As part of his duties, Plaintiff inspected military vehicles arriving at Fort Bliss from other military outposts to determine whether any repairs were needed. After less than one month at that job, on July 27, 1999, the Chief of Support Branch, Norbert E. Brauner ("Brauner"), counseled Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff's poor penmanship. Brauner informed Plaintiff that the mechanics fulfilling any ordered repairs were having difficulty reading the orders Plaintiff filled out and wrong parts were being ordered. Brauner told Plaintiff that he would have to improve his penmanship or would be terminated. Two weeks later, and then again on August 24, 1999, Brauner again counseled Plaintiff regarding his poor penmanship and the problems and complaints his illegible writing was causing. Finally, on September 25, 1999, Plaintiff's temporary employment with the Army was terminated.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on December 1, 1999, alleging a hostile work environment ("Count One") and wrongful termination ("Count Two") in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). Plaintiff claims that such conduct was based on his race (African-American).
Plaintiff further makes reference in his Complaint to certain a disabilities. However, he never sets forth what those disabilities are and does not claim that he was discriminated against because of those disabilities. Nor does he specifically refer to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701-797b, or other applicable legislation. As best the Court can discern, Plaintiff states only Title VII claims based on race.
The instant motion followed.
STANDARDS
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim — FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss an action for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Under that rule, the Court must decide whether the facts alleged, if true, would entitle the plaintiff to some legal remedy. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is highly disfavored and is not granted routinely because of the liberal "notice pleading" requirements of the Federal Rules. See Shipp v. McMahon, 199 F.3d 265, 260 (5th Cir. 2000); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). In short, a court should not dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 102.
The Court must limit its inquiry to facts stated in Plaintiff's Complaint and the documents either attached to or incorporated in the Complaint. See Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1996). Further, the Court must accept as true all
material allegations in the complaint, as well as any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, see Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales, Inc., v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982), and must review those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995); Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. of Am., 938 F.2d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1991). The Court also may "consider matters of which [it] may take judicial notice," Lovelace, 78 F.3d at 1017-18, and matters of public record. See 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (2d ed. 1990).
Summary Judgment — FED. R. CIV. P. 56
Summary judgment should be granted only where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party that moves for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery on file, together with any affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed.2d 265 (1986). "If the moving party fails to meet this burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response." Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). If the movant does meet this burden, however, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. "If the non-movant fails to meet this burden, then summary judgment is appropriate." Tubacex, 45 F.3d at 954.
When making a determination under Rule 56, factual questions and inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1994). The party opposing a motion supported by evidence cannot discharge his burden by alleging mere legal conclusions. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Instead, the party must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. See id.
DISCUSSION
Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race. . . ." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994). Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment and was terminated because of his race.
Here, Defendant asks the Court to dismiss Count One of Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and to enter summary judgment in its favor as to Count Two pursuant to Rule 56.
A. Hostile Environment
Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not stated facts sufficient to establish a racially hostile working environment claim.
In order to establish a prima facie case for a hostile environment claim, Plaintiff must show the following: (1) that he belongs to a protected class; (2) that he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on race; (4) that the harassment affected a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment; and (5) that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. See Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Jones v. Flagship Int'l 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986)); Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1997) (sexual harassment hostile environment). Even if racially motivated, to constitute an adverse employment action, conduct must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 874 (internal quotation marks and brackets removed) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2403, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986)). "Simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)" are not enough. Id. (internal quotation marks removed) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 2283, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998)). The "challenged conduct must be both objectively offensive . . . and subjectively offensive . . ." and "must be considered in light of the totality of the circumstances." Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993)).
Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint mostly conclusory facts, such as the following: "Plaintiff was continually harassed and subjected to a hostile work environment by co-workers, work leaders and management officials . . . [;]" "Management officials . . . were extremely difficult and hostile towards Plaintiff in connection with his requests that he be allowed to complete the appointment of [his] position[;]" and "Supervisory officials failed and refused to give Plaintiff proper acknowledgement [sic] for being the liaison intake person for the 88 Mike Program . . . thereby prejudicing Plaintiff[']s job standing, promotability, and Plaintiff[']s job effectiveness. . . ." Defendant contends that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot establish that the alleged harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive to affect a term or condition of employment. First, the Court finds that a motion to dismiss is not a proper procedural vehicle for dismissing Plaintiff's claim. Being extremely generous to this pro se plaintiff in construing Plaintiff's alleged facts and drawing all reasonable inferences, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff cannot prove a set of facts which will entitle him to a remedy for the alleged hostile environment. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
However, the Court finds that it is appropriate to treat Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's first claim as a motion for summary judgment as to that claim pursuant to Rule 12(b). See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b). In that regard, Defendant has effectively demonstrated that there is no disputed issue of material fact for trial in this cause. Plaintiff claims that co-workers and managers were hostile toward Plaintiff and his supervisor refused to give him some level of acknowledgment for a position Plaintiff alleges he maintained. Although Plaintiff contends that he felt disgraced by those actions, again focusing on the severity of any alleged harassing acts, the Court finds that such actions are not sufficiently severe and pervasive to affect a term or condition of Plaintiff's employment. Moreover, there simply is no evidence that any such conduct was in any way connected to Plaintiff's race. Rather, all the facts and evidence indicate that any hostility Plaintiff may have felt was due to the problems co-workers and supervisors had with Plaintiff's handwriting. All told, Plaintiff has not stated a prima facie case for a racially hostile work environment. Hence, after due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that summary judgment is appropriate as to Count One of Plaintiff's Complaint.
On December 6, 2000, Plaintiff filed a two-page document, unrelated to the instant motion, through which Plaintiff purports to "state the grounds for the suit." Therein, among other things, Plaintiff states that he felt "dismissed or disrespected by supervisors and co-workers" and that certain actions "made [him] feel disgraced."
B. Wrongful Termination (Disparate Treatment)
Next, conceding that Plaintiff does state a prima facie case for disparate treatment discrimination based on his race, Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot rebut its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment.
In general, to state a prima facie case for disparate treatment racial discrimination, a Plaintiff must show the following: (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he was qualified for his position; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that someone outside the protected class was more favorably treated. See LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1996).
First, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden on summary judgment. In response to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff filed a one-page document partially labeled "Motion to Dismiss Defendant[']s Request for Summary Judgment," which does not contain any substantive response. When faced with a properly supported summary judgment motion, a plaintiff cannot merely sit back and rely on the allegations of his complaint. Rather, the plaintiff must affirmatively show that there is a genuine dispute about a material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. "If the non-movant fails to meet this burden, then summary judgment is appropriate." Tubacex, 45 F.3d at 954. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden and summary judgment is appropriate.
Plaintiff's one-page document is further labeled a "Motion to compel the defendants to evaluate relevant information to this particular [sic] case." In that vein, the Court notes that Defendant attaches to its Motion, for no apparent reason, certain documents relevant to Plaintiff's past employment history with the United States Government which do not flatter Plaintiff. Because not relevant to Defendant's Motion, the Court does not consider any facts not pertinent to the position Plaintiff references in his Complaint. However, by asking Defendants to "evaluate relevant information to this particular [sic] case," essentially, Plaintiff wants Defendant to stick to the facts set forth in his Complaint. In other words, to the extent that one-page document constitutes Plaintiff's response to Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff merely relies on the averments set forth in his Complaint and, therefore, does not "go beyond the pleadings."
To be fair, Plaintiff has no lawyer and perhaps does not understand the importance of responding to a summary judgment motion. However, the Court finds that Defendant would be entitled to summary judgment in any event. Where a plaintiff has stated a prima facie case for racial discrimination, an inference of discrimination is created and the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the inference by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). If the defendant articulates such a reason, the inference of discrimination drops out. See Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 967 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996)). The burden of proving the ultimate question — whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff — remains always with the plaintiff, which can be met by demonstrating that the defendant's proffered reasons were merely pretext. See Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993. At that point, to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must show that "the evidence, taken as a whole . . . creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer." Grimes v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health, 102 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996); see also id. at 142 (quoting district court, "the relevant inquiry is not whether [the employer's reasons] were wise or correct, but whether they were honestly held and free of discriminatory basis"). Thus, a plaintiff cannot simply disagree with the employer's understanding of the events. See id. Rather, the evidence must "'support a reasonable inference that the proffered reason is false; a mere shadow of doubt is insufficient.'" Bauer, 169 F.3d at 967 (emphasis added) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Louisiana Office of Cmty. Svcs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1443-44 (5th Cir. 1995)). Moreover, where the evidence demonstrates that something other than protected class motivated the employer instead of the stated reason, summary judgment can still be proper. See Grimes, 102 F.3d at 143 (upholding summary judgment where district court found that evidence of pretext suggesting that the employer's true motivation was dislike for the plaintiff did not support an inference of intentional discrimination).
Although Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that his "termination was pretext" for discrimination, Plaintiff does not state any facts to infer that his race was the true motivating factor. It is undisputed that three weeks after Plaintiff began working, his supervisor counseled him regarding his poor penmanship. Two weeks later and two weeks after that, Brauner again counseled Plaintiff regarding Plaintiff's handwriting and the problems it was causing with Defendant's workflow. Frankly, the Court has before it certain documents bearing Plaintiff's handwriting which are quite difficult to read. Defendant's exhibits to the instant motion cite specific examples of repeated complaints from individuals about Plaintiff's handwriting. Although Plaintiff complains that his employer did nothing to help him with that handwriting problem, that does not show that Defendant's proffered reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment is false. Hence, there is no evidence that the true reason for Plaintiff's termination was his race. Accordingly, after due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that summary judgment is also appropriate as to Count Two.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Louis Caldera's
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
SIGNED this 8th day of December, 2000.