Opinion
Case No. 6:04-cv-1021-Orl-28KRS.
March 14, 2005
ORDER
In their ten-count First Amended Class Action Complaint, Plaintiffs accuse Defendants Florida Hospital Healthcare Systems, Inc. ("Florida Hospital") and American Hospital Association ("AHA") of unfair billing and collection practices. In response, Defendants have filed motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss possess merit as to the federal claims contained in the Amended Complaint and must be granted, and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims based on state law.
The last two counts of the Amended Complaint are both labeled "Count Nine." The last count for Injunctive Relief (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 101-104) is referred to as Count Ten.
Florida Hospital Healthcare System, Inc. does business as Florida Hospital and is owned by Defendant Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc.
"Defendants Florida Hospital Healthcare System, Inc. and Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc.'s Motion To Dismiss First Amended Complaint" (Doc. 70) and "Defendant The American Hospital Association's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint" (Doc. 77).
At the core of Plaintiffs' Complaint are three claims based on federal law. In Count One, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached a contract with the United States Government which provided that Florida Hospital would "operate as [a] charity provider of health care for the uninsured" in consideration for receiving tax-exempt status as a not-for-profit corporation under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). Plaintiffs contend that they are intended third-party beneficiaries of the alleged contract and are, therefore, entitled to enforce it. In Count Six, Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated provisions of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA") by determining Plaintiffs' ability to pay prior to providing medical services. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 79-82. In Count Four, Plaintiffs allege in their final federal law claim that, by accepting federal tax exemptions under § 501(c)(3), Defendants "created and entered into a public charitable trust to provide mutually affordable medical care to their uninsured patients." Id. ¶ 66.
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violated Florida law in connection with their billing practices. In Count One, Plaintiffs claim to be beneficiaries of a third-party contract between Defendants and the State of Florida, pursuant to which Defendants agreed to provide charity medical care "in return for substantial state income, [and state] property and sales tax exemptions."Id. ¶ 50. Count Two is a common law breach of contract claim in which Plaintiffs allege that they entered into an agreement directly with Defendants for medical services and that Defendants breached that agreement by charging them unreasonably excessive fees. Id. ¶ 55. Count Three is a claim for a breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing in regard to the alleged contracts. Id. ¶ 60-62.
Count Four of the Amended Complaint also charges that Defendants breached a charitable trust by accepting state and local tax exemptions under Florida statutory law and the Florida Constitution. Id. ¶ 66. In Count Five, Plaintiffs accuse Defendants of violating the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 70-77. In Count Seven, Plaintiffs allege a claim of unjust enrichment and constructive trust against Defendants on the basis that their wrongful conduct yielded "tax savings, profits and other assets [that] they should not be entitled to retain." Id. ¶ 86.
Counts Eight and Nine form the basis of Plaintiffs' claims against the AHA. The AHA is a national trade association for nonprofit hospitals which assists its hospital members in their billing and collection practices in relation to uninsured patients. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. In Count Eight, Plaintiffs allege that the AHA conspired with Florida Hospital in carrying out unfair business practices which discriminate against uninsured patients and in falsely reporting to the United States Department of Health and Human Services Secretary that Florida Hospital was required to charge its uninsured patients at an inflated rate.Id. ¶¶ 87-91. Similarly, Count Nine alleges that AHA aided and abetted Florida Hospital in the wrongful conduct described throughout the Amended Complaint. Id. ¶¶ 93-100.
In Count Ten, the final count in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief. Id. ¶¶ 101-04. They request entry of an order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) ordering Defendants to cease charging Plaintiffs and members of the purported class non-discounted rates for medical care and to cease using "aggressive, abusive and harassing collection practices. . . ." Id. ¶ 103. Plaintiffs also seek a mandatory injunction including an order requiring Defendants to provide Plaintiffs and members of the purported class "affordable medical care" at a rate no higher than that charged for the care of insured patients. Id. ¶ 104.
This suit is indistinguishable from many class action suits brought throughout the country charging that hospitals are violating a contract with the Government by accepting tax-exempt status as charities while, at the same time, seeking to recover inflated bills from uninsured patients. As in other cases, the named Plaintiffs seek to represent a class consisting of uninsured patients who received medical treatment at nonprofit hospitals. Id. ¶ 35. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has rejected motions to transfer and consolidate similar cases, leaving the cases pending in district courts around the country. See In re Not-For-Profit Hosps./Uninsured Patients Litig., 341 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1355-56 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 19, 2004). All of the district judges addressing substantive challenges to these cases have dismissed the claims.
See, e.g., Sabeta v. Baptist Hosp. of Miami, Inc., No. 04-21437 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2005); Schmitt v. Protestant Mem'l Med. Ctr., No. 04-00577 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2005); Peterson v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 04-2973, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1962 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2005); Kolari v. New York Presbyterian Hosp., No. 04-5506 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2005); Washington v. Med. Ctr. of Cent. Ga., No. 5:04-185 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2005); Shriner v. ProMedica Health Sys. Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 894 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 2005); Hudson v. Central Georgia Health Servs., No. 5:04-301 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2005); Lorens v. Catholic Health Care Partners, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1043, No. 1:04-1151 (E.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 2005); Ferguson v. Centura Health Corp., No. 04-1285 (D. Col. Dec. 29, 2004); Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 347 F. Supp. 2d 486, 2004 WL 2790624 (E.D. Mich. 2004);Darr v. Sutter Health, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24592, 2004 WL 2873068 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2004); Amato v. UPMC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26348, No. 04-1025 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2004).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, Edward C. Jellison and Nicholas Arzate were patients of Florida Hospital who were uninsured at the time of their treatment. Mr. Jellison was hospitalized at Florida Hospital from February 3, 2002 to February 21, 2002 and, thereafter, received a bill from Florida Hospital in the amount of $116,634. Am. Compl. ¶ 28. Mr. Arzate underwent an emergency appendectomy at Florida Hospital on August 1, 2003 and was charged $16,060 for his treatment. Id. ¶ 32. Both Plaintiffs contend that the amounts they were billed far exceed the amounts insured and medicare patients would have been billed for the same treatment and that such disparate treatment is inconsistent with Florida Hospital's designation as a tax-exempt charity. Plaintiffs do not allege that they were denied treatment or that they paid for the medical care they received at Florida Hospital.II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To warrant dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it must be "clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994); Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1484 (11th Cir. 1994).
III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
A. Breach of third-party contract based on 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt statusIn Count One, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants "entered into an express and/or implied Agreement with the United States Government pursuant to § 501(c)(3)" which stipulated that, in return for a substantial income tax exemption valued in the millions of dollars, Defendants would provide charitable and affordable medical care to Plaintiffs as third-party intended beneficiaries. Am. Compl. ¶ 49. For Count One to survive, Plaintiffs must be able to establish that the qualification for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code creates a legally binding contract and that they have standing to enforce the terms of the resulting contract. Plaintiffs' cause of action fails in both respects.
1. Acceptance of tax-exempt status pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) does not create a contract
Plaintiffs do not suggest in Count One that they entered into an oral or written contract with Florida Hospital. Rather, they contend that a contract was created between the Government and Florida Hospital when the Government accepted the hospital's application for tax-exempt status as a § 501(c)(3) charity. Plaintiffs argue that, by accepting tax-exempt status, the hospital agreed to operate exclusively for charitable purposes and to provide affordable medical care without regard to a patient's ability to pay. Plaintiffs also argue that the contract prohibited Florida Hospital from pursuing outstanding debts for medical treatment of uninsured patients in an "aggressive, abusive, and humiliating" manner. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 49-50.
The basis for Plaintiffs' assertion that the granting of tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) creates a contractual relationship between the Government and the tax exempt entity is unclear. Whether legislation creates a private contract right turns on legislative intent and this intent must be clearly expressed. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Athchison, Topeka, Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 466 (1985) ("[T]o construe laws as contracts when the obligation is not clearly and unequivocally expressed would be to limit drastically the essential powers of a legislative body.") (citation and internal quotation omitted). It is well established that "absent some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that a law is not intended to create private contractual vested rights. . . ." Id. at 465-66 (citation and internal quotation omitted). On numerous occasions, courts have applied this principle to the tax code. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Comm'r of IRS, 832 F.2d 986, 987 (7th Cir. 1987) ("The notion that the federal income tax is contractual or otherwise consensual in nature is not only utterly without foundation but . . . has been repeatedly rejected by the courts.").
The plain language of § 503(c)(3) clearly does not reflect legislative intent to create a contract between the Government and tax-exempt not-for-profit hospitals. Indeed, Plaintiffs have failed to cite a single source which would indicate that Congress intended § 503(c)(3) to create contractual rights and, further, concede that no court has ruled in their favor on this point.
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argue that the presumption against legislative creation of a contract is overcome by cases which have held that Congress intended to provide medical patients enforceable third-party contract rights under the Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 et. seq. See, e.g., Flagstaff Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan, 962 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1992); Saine v. Hosp. Auth. of Hall County, 502 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1974); Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972); Organized Migrants in Cmty. Action, Inc. v. James Archer Hosp., 325 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970). Plaintiffs maintain that, because courts have determined that hospitals receiving federal funds under the Hill-Burton Act were contractually bound to provide medical services to those in need, § 501(c)(3) must be similarly construed. This argument is unavailing.
As Plaintiffs point out, § 501(c)(3) and the Hill-Burton Act are similar to the extent that Congress enacted both statutes to encourage hospitals to provide charitable medical care. That, however, is the extent of the similarity. In contrast to § 501(c)(3), the Hill-Burton Act does not grant tax exemptions but provides federal funds to states and private parties to assist in constructing and modernizing public and nonprofit hospitals.See 42 U.S.C. § 291(a). The Hill-Burton Act requires that, in consideration for the receipt of federal funds, a hospital must agree to provide a "reasonable volume" of medical services to those unable to pay. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(2). No such requirement exists for a hospital merely seeking tax-exempt status under the Tax Code.
Another, and perhaps the most important, distinction between § 501(c)(3) and the Hill-Burton Act is that the Hill-Burton Act expressly provides that enforcement of the obligations undertaken by a hospital in return for funds is not left solely to the Government but may be pursued by a private party. See 42 U.S.C. § 300s-6. The Tax Code, on the other hand, provides only a party denied § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status an opportunity to challenge such denial of exempt status, and only authorized government officials may sue to enforce its provisions. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7428. Cases construing the Hill-Burton Act are, therefore, inapposite and unpersuasive with regard to whether § 501(c)(3) gives rise to contractual rights.
There are, moreover, obvious and sound policy reasons for the presumption against construing § 501(c)(3) to create implied contracts between the Government and those receiving exemptions under the statute. For instance, in the absence of the presumption, the responsibility for determining the qualifications of an entity for tax-exempt status would be shifted from the IRS to the courts, resulting in a morass of confusion. As one judge has remarked, "If courts possessed the power, as plaintiffs suggest, to go behind the IRS's designation and proceed to make their own independent determinations, on a case-by-case basis, of an entity's substantive classification according to section 501(c)(3), the uncertainty not only for the entity itself, but for all persons or parties dealing with it, would be almost boundless." Zimmerman v. Cambridge Credit Counseling Corp., 322 F. Supp. 2d 95, 100 (D. Mass. 2004).
Additionally, a determination that the Government has bound itself to a contract by granting tax-exempt status would undermine the Government's ability to unilaterally revoke or change the requirements of tax exemption. Application of Plaintiffs' theory would mean that the Government, by granting tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3), would be contractually binding itself to honor an entity's continued entitlement to that status. As Defendants point out, such a result would be contrary to authority holding that the Government may unilaterally change or revoke the requirements for tax-exempt status as it deems fit.See generally, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974) (refusing to enjoin the IRS to withdraw the university's tax-exempt status); United States v. Maryland Sav.-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 5-6 (1970) (upholding Congress' decision to discontinue tax exemption for savings and loan associations).
2. Plaintiffs lack standing
Assuming for the sake of argument that Plaintiffs were able to establish the existence of a contract, the question remains whether they have standing to enforce the terms of the contract. For Plaintiffs to have standing they would have to establish that they are third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the Government and Florida Hospital and that they possess a private right of action to enforce it. They can establish neither.
a. Third-party beneficiary
To qualify as an intended third-party beneficiary, one must be able to show that the contract was entered into for that person's benefit. Plaintiffs acknowledge the necessity of showing that they "fall within a class clearly intended to be benefited" by the contract, but they argue that it is not necessary that the intended beneficiary "be specifically or individually identified in the contract." Montana v. United States, 124 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Plaintiffs maintain that, as uninsured patients, they are members of the group for which § 501(c)(3) was created and therefore qualify as third-party beneficiaries.
While it is possible that contracting parties may enter into a third-party beneficiary contract without specifically naming the third party, "[a] party is an intended beneficiary only if the parties to the contract clearly express, or the contract itself expresses, an intent to primarily and directly benefit the third party." Maccaferri Gabions, Inc., v. Dynateria, Inc., 91 F.3d 1431, 1441 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Caretta Trucking, Inc. v. Cheoy Lee Shipyards, Ltd., 647 So. 2d 1028, 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)). There is no tension between this principle and the ruling in Montana v. United States. In that case, the court held that Montana did not have to be specifically designated as a beneficiary of the contract but emphasized that "when members of the public bring suit against promisors who contract with the government to render a public service . . . [they] are considered to be incidental beneficiaries unless they can show a direct right to compensation." 124 F.3d at 1273 n. 6.
Plaintiffs are unable to point to the express language of § 501(c)(3) or any other source which supports their position that they are the intended beneficiaries of the hospital's tax-exempt status. As such, Plaintiffs cannot be considered as intended third-party beneficiaries and, therefore, they lack standing to enforce § 501(c)(3).
b. Private right of action
Plaintiffs also lack standing because there is no private right to sue for violations of § 501(c)(3). Enactment of a federal statute does not automatically give rise to a private right of enforcement. Private rights of enforcement exist only when granted by Congress. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 (1984). Accordingly, whether a private right of action exists turns exclusively on the intent of Congress. See Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs acknowledge that § 501(c)(3) does not contain language expressly granting a private right of action but, relying on the Hill-Burton Act line of cases, they argue that such a right is implied. As discussed above, this argument is disingenuous because the Hill-Burton Act, unlike the Tax Code, specifically provides for a private right of enforcement. See 42 U.S.C. § 300s-6.
Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, "[s]tatutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected create no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons." Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289 (2001) (citation and internal quotation omitted). Indeed, "[f]or a statute to create such private rights, its text must be `phrased in terms of the persons benefitted." Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002) (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692 n. 13 (1970)). Section 501(c)(3) contains no such "rights creating" language but, instead, merely identifies certain organizations that are exempt from taxes.
In summary, Florida Hospital's § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status does not constitute a contract between the hospital and the United States Government. And even if such a contract were to exist, Plaintiffs would lack standing to enforce the contract.
B. Charitable trust
In Count Four of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that "by accepting federal and local tax exemptions under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), the Florida statutes, and the Florida Constitution, Defendants created and entered into a public charitable trust to provide mutually affordable care to their uninsured patients." Am. Compl. ¶ 66. To the extent Plaintiffs claim that a charitable trust was created by Florida Hospital's receipt of tax exempt status under § 501(c)(3), the claim must be dismissed based on the earlier determination that no private right of action exists to enforce § 501(c)(3).
C. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA" or "the Act")
In their only other federal claim, Plaintiffs allege in Count Six that Defendants violated the provisions of the EMTALA. The Act generally requires a hospital to provide emergency care to those in need. To this end, the Act requires that hospitals "must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital's emergency department" to any individual who comes to the hospital seeking "examination or treatment for a medical condition." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). If the individual has an emergency medical condition, "the hospital must stabilize the medical condition, or [provide] for transfer of the individual to another medical facility." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1). In no case may a hospital deny or delay such emergency care "to inquire about the individual's method of payment [for medical treatment] or insurance status." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h). If a patient suffers "personal harm" as a result of a hospital's violation of these provisions, the patient may maintain a civil action against the hospital to recover damages for "personal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital is located. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A).
Plaintiffs allege that they were compelled by Defendants to sign an agreement "guaranteeing payment in full for some medical care" as a condition of receiving care. Am. Compl. ¶ 81. In response, Defendants contend, first, that Plaintiffs' EMTALA claim is time-barred and, second, that Plaintiffs have not alleged and cannot allege that they sustained personal harm as a result of having been asked to sign a statement agreeing to be responsible for the cost of medical services.
Dismissal of Count Six is required for several reasons. First, mere inquiry into a patient's ability to pay prior to screening or the rendering of treatment does not necessarily result in a delay of those services. This is clearly recognized by the Regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services, which provide, in part:
Hospitals may follow reasonable registration processes for individuals for whom examination or treatment is required by this section, including asking whether an individual is insured and, if so, what that insurance is, so long as that inquiry does not delay screening or treatment.42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(4)(iv). In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs do not allege that the emergency room screening or the medical services they received were delayed, nor have Plaintiffs indicated — in either their opposition to the motion to dismiss or at the hearing on that motion — that they could, in good faith, make such an allegation if they were permitted to file a Second Amended Complaint.
Second, even if Plaintiffs were able to allege that the screening or medical services were delayed, their EMTALA claim would still fail because Plaintiffs cannot allege that they suffered "personal injury." Economic injury resulting from the collection efforts of Defendants does not qualify as "personal injury" for which damages may be sought under the law of Florida.See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Morejon, 338 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976) (refusing to construe "personal injury" to include the liability of an insured to another on a debt);see also Fla. Ry. Navigation Co. v. Webster, 5 So. 714, 720 (1889) ("The damages for personal injuries include, and are limited to, the natural and immediate consequences of the wrongful act. They include . . . expenses of surgical and medical attendance and nursing, [and] bodily pain, taking into account loss of time, the extent and probable duration of the injury, its effect on the health, the mental and physical powers, the capacity for labor, the pursuit of an occupation, and the earning of money.") (citation and internal quotation omitted). At oral argument, Plaintiffs admitted that the only harm they sustained was economic harm in connection with Defendants' efforts to collect on outstanding bills.
Finally, as Defendants argue, Plaintiffs' EMTALA claim fails because it is time-barred. The Act contains a statute of limitations which provides that "[n]o action may be brought under this paragraph more than two years after the date of the violation with respect to which the action is brought." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C). Plaintiffs acknowledge that this case was initiated more than two years after Florida Hospital provided them with emergency medical treatment. Nonetheless, they take the position that, because the damage incurred is the result of Defendants' ongoing efforts to collect on outstanding medical bills, the two-year statute of limitations has not yet run. However, because the economic injury Plaintiffs claim to have sustained as a result of Florida Hospital's efforts to collect on its bill does not constitute "personal harm" for which "personal injury" damages are available under Florida law, these efforts did not toll the running of the statute of limitations. For all of the foregoing reasons, dismissal of Count Six is required.
D. Jurisdiction over state law claims.
The only claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction are Counts One and Four to the extent that they are based on § 501(c)(3) and Count Six, which alleges a violation of EMTALA. For the reasons stated earlier in the order, all of these claims must be dismissed. The remaining claims contained in the Amended Complaint are based on state law.
A district court is granted discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims in those cases in which the court has "dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Ordinarily, when "all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) provides:
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if — (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.
In this case neither side has argued that this Court should retain jurisdiction of the state-law claims upon dismissal of the federal claims. Having considered the factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and economy, this Court determines that those factors dictate that it should relinquish jurisdiction over the state-law claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:1. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (Docs. 70 and 77) are GRANTED.
2. Plaintiffs' federal law claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
3. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' pendent state law claims. Plaintiffs' state law claims are, therefore, DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiffs are free to refile their state law claims in state court within the time constraints set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).
4. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
5. The Clerk is directed to close this file.
DONE and ORDERED.