Opinion
Civil Action 4:19-CV-2130
08-31-2021
RICKEY JEFFERSON, 2ND, Plaintiff v. TIM BETTI, et al., Defendants
BRANN, C.J.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DOC. 33
William I. Arbuckle U.S. Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
County prisoner Rickey Jefferson 2nd (“Plaintiff”) initiated this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RFRA”) alleging that Muslim inmates at Lackawanna County Prison did not have access to an Imam to conduct group religious services. The undisputed material facts confirm that there was a two and one-half week period when Plaintiff first arrived that there was no Imam willing to conduct services at the facility. However, a short time later, an Imam was located and conducted weekly one-hour prayer services every Friday with the Muslim inmates.
Defendants have shown, and Plaintiff does not dispute, Plaintiff was not eligible to attend these group prayer sessions due to his behavior and disciplinary history, which included: throwing urine and feces at staff members; threatening to kill staff members, refusing orders, tampering with locking devices and restraints, attempting to take medication that was not his, and attempting to strangle a prison nurse with her own stethoscope. (Doc. 35, ¶ 7). Plaintiff's claims, however, concern the availability of an Imam to all Muslim inmates, and not his own eligibility to attend the group prayer sessions. It is not clear from Plaintiff's complaint whether Plaintiff was aware that an Imam began holding weekly hourlong group prayer services each Friday on October 16, 2018.
For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED due to Plaintiff's failure to oppose Defendants' motion for summary judgment despite multiple orders directing him to do so; or in the alternative,
(2) Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 33) be GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff alleges that on September 30, 2018, shortly after he entered Lackawanna County Prison:
Tha Lackawanna County Prison doesn't have an Imam for the Muslims but the Christians have their priests, and max block doesn't allow the Muslims to attend Jumah services nor do they provide a alternative means for the Muslims to have Jumah services but allow the Christians to have services on Saturdays. Their inmate handbook states clearly that all general population inmates are allowed to attend religious services w/o security or administration limitations.Id. (errors in original)
Plaintiff also alleges:
The warden Tim Betti and the Dept Warden Mr. Langan are responsible for making sure their rules and regulations are being enforced once they are notified Jumah is a religious obligation for a Muslim to attend Jumah services it states in the holy Quran in chapter #62 verse #9 “o you who believe when the call is proclaimed for the Friday Jumah prayer come to the remembrance of Allah and leave off business and every other thing that is better for you if you did but know verse #10 then when the Jumah prayer is ended you may disperse though the land and seek the beauty of Allah by working and remember Allah much that you may be successful. But the Muslims are not allowed to go to Jumah services in spite of what their policy states but the christens are provided religious services on Saturdays and have a priest to conduct religious services but the Muslims are not provided no services nor do we have a Imam like the Christians have a priest how is that fair.(Doc. 3, p. 5) (errors in original).
On December 31, 2019, Plaintiff lodged a civil rights/RLUIPA complaint written on a pre-printed form. (Doc. 3). As Defendants, Plaintiff named Tim Betti (the Warden of Lackawanna County Prison) and D. Langan (the Deputy Warden of Lackawanna County Prison). Id. In Section II. B. of the preprinted complaint form, Plaintiff was asked to identify the federal constitutional, or statutory rights he believes were violated by Defendants. (Doc. 1, p. 3). In response to that inquiry, Plaintiff wrote, “Equal Protections rights discrimination; violation of the RLUIPA.” Id.
Attached to the complaint is an excerpt from the Lackawanna County Prison Inmate Handbook which states, in relevant part:
Religious services are available to all inmates without security or administrative limitations. General Housing inmates are encouraged to attend scheduled services and programs. Segregated Housing inmates may participate in one-on-one programs. A schedule of services is posted in all General Housing Units.(Doc. 1, pp. 13-14).
As relief, Plaintiff requests:
I like for their policy to be enforced by allowing inmates to attend Jumah services or to be provided alternative means in the least restricted manner to have services like the Christians are provided religious services. I also like for the prison to employ a Imam like the Christians have their priest I also like to receive 70, 000 seventy thousand dollars in punitive, compensatory, and nominal damages the cost of this law suit as well as for the segregated housing units to receive services like their policy states cause they are being deprived of religious services too.(Doc. 1, p. 6).
On January 2, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and specially appointed the Clerk of Court to serve waiver of service forms on Defendants. (Doc. 8). On January 21, 2020, Defendants returned signed waiver forms. (Docs. 11, 12).
On February 25, 2020, Defendants filed their answer to Plaintiff's complaint. (Doc. 16).
On November 23, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 33). Along with their Motion, Defendants filed a supporting brief (Doc. 34), statement of material facts (Doc. 35), and supporting exhibits (Docs. 33-1 through 33-7).
On November 25, 2020, the Court issued an order directing Plaintiff to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment on or before December 12, 2020. (Doc. 38). That order also advised Plaintiff of the consequences for failing to respond to Defendants' motion, including the possible dismissal of his case. No response was received. Plaintiff did not request additional time to respond.
On January 24, 2021, the Court issued a second order directing Plaintiff to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment on or before February 6, 2021. (Doc. 39). That order also advised Plaintiff of the consequences for failing to respond to Defendants' motion, including the possible dismissal of his case. Id. No response was received. Plaintiff did not request additional time to respond.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion.
For purposes of Rule 56, a fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. Haybarger v. Laurence Cty Adult Prob. & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). For an issue to be genuine, “all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49).
In adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). A court is not to decide whether the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363.
IV. ANALYSIS
The scope of Plaintiff's RLUIPA and Equal Protection claims are not immediately clear from the face of his complaint. I construe the complaint as alleging: (1) a RFRA claim that no Muslim inmate in Lackawanna County Prison had access to an Imam or group religious services on or around September 30, 2018; and (2) an Equal Protection claim alleging that on or around September 30, 2018 all Muslim inmates in Lackawanna County Prison were treated differently than the Christian inmates in Lackawanna County Prison because the Christian inmates had access to a priest and group religious services, while Muslim inmates did not.
If these are not the claims Plaintiff intended to assert in his complaint, he should raise the issue in objections to this Report.
A. PLAINTIFF HAS ABANDONED THIS CASE
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute, stating that: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). The United States Supreme Court has held that “[t]he authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power, ” governed not be rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in the courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases, ” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 631 (1962). Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of the Court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). That discretion, however, while broad is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis factors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its balancing of the following factors: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.
In exercising this discretion “there is no ‘magic formula' that we apply to determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore, “[i]n balancing the Poulis factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation' to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff's case..” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)). Consistent with this view, it is well-settled that “no single Poulis factor is dispositive, ” and that “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, recognizing the broad discretion conferred upon the district court in making judgments weighing these six factors, the court of appeals has frequently sustained such dismissal orders where there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not amenable to any lesser sanction. See, e.g., Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (3d Cir. 2007); Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (3d Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (3d Cir. 2007).
In this case, a dispassionate assessment of the Poulis factors weighs in favor of dismissal.
The first Poulis factor, the extent of Plaintiff's personal responsibility, weighs in favor of dismissal. As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff is solely responsible for prosecuting his claim. See Hoxorth v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1992). “As a general rule, a pro se litigant is responsible for his failure to comply with court orders.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011). Plaintiff has failed to abide by court orders and neglected to prosecute this case. Specifically, Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, despite being directed to do so by the Court on two occasions. (Docs. 38, 39).
The second Poulis factor, the prejudice to Defendants caused by Plaintiff's failure to respond to Defendants' Motion, also weighs in favor of dismissal. A finding of prejudice does not require “irremediable harm.” Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps' Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994). Rather, “the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to [effectively prepare] a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently prejudicial.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222. Plaintiff's failure to litigate this case by responding to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and failure to comply with court orders and court rules requiring him to do so, frustrates and delays the resolution of this matter. This failure can be seen to prejudice Defendants, how seek a timely resolution of this case. See e.g., Parks v. Argueta, 1:15-CV-1514, 2016 WL 7856413 at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2016) (dismissing case where a pro se litigant failed to respond to a pending motion for summary judgment).
The third Poulis factor, history of dilatoriness, weighs in favor of dismissal. In this regard, it is clear that “ ‘ [e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . ., or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.' ” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260261 (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 874). Here, Plaintiff has failed to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, has not complied with the Local Rule requiring him to respond, and has not complied with two court orders directing him to respond. Thus, Plaintiff's conduct amounts to a history of dilatoriness. See e.g. Naslanic v. Gula, 3:15-CV-2208 2018 WL 1886526 at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2018) (finding that a pro se litigant's failure to abide by the local rules requiring a response to a summary judgment motion, and failure to abide by court order directing him to respond amounted to a history of dilatoriness) report and recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 1886493 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2018).
The fourth Poulis factor, whether Plaintiff's failure to respond to Defendants' motion is willful or in bad faith, weighs in favor of dismissal. In this setting, conduct is “willful” if it involves “strategic, ” “intentional or self-serving behavior, ” and not mere negligence. Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. Here, Plaintiff has violated the local rules, and has failed to comply with two separate orders directing him to take specific action in this case, the Court is compelled to conclude that Plaintiff's actions were not negligent, but instead reflect an intentional disregard for the Court's local rules and its orders. See e.g. Naslanic, 2018 WL 1886526 at *4 (finding that a pro se Plaintiff's failure to comply with instructions directing him to take specific actions reflects an intentional disregard for those instructions).
The fifth Poulis factor, the effectiveness of other sanctions, weighs in favor of dismissal. Dismissal is a sanction of last resort, and it is incumbent upon a court to explore the effectiveness of lesser sanctions before ordering dismissal. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, and there is no evidence to support a reasonable inference that he would be able to pay monetary sanctions. Moreover, Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Court's orders directing him to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment leads to an inference that further orders would not be effective. Therefore, no other sanction would be effective.
Finally, under Poulis the Court is cautioned to consider the meritoriousness of Plaintiff's claims. In my view, however, consideration of this factor cannot save this particular Plaintiff's claims since he is now wholly non-compliant with his obligations as a litigant. Furthermore, it is well-settled that “‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' Ware, 322 F.3d at 222, [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.' Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373.” Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d at 263. Therefore, the untested merits of Plaintiff's claims, standing alone, cannot prevent imposition of sanctions. Furthermore, as explained below, Defendants' arguments in their summary judgment motion are persuasive as to the RLUIPA claim. Therefore, I have recommended in the alternative that that motion be granted in part if the Court concludes that dismissal is not appropriate at this time.
B. DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED
1. All Facts Set Forth by Defendants in Their Statement of Material Facts Are Deemed Admitted Pursuant to LR 56.1
Local Rule 56.1 provides that all motions for summary judgment shall be accompanied by a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, and that the papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a separate short and concise statement responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth by the moving party. Both statements of material facts shall include references to the parts of the record that support each statement. It also provides that “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party.” LR 56.1. The moving party (Defendants) filed a statement of material facts. (Doc. 35). The opposing party (Plaintiff) failed to file a statement of material facts in response. As such, the facts set forth in Defendants' statement of material facts (Doc. 35) are deemed admitted.
Relying on these facts, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Lackawanna County prison from September 29, 2018 to March 4, 2019. (Doc. 35 ¶ 1).
There was no Imam willing to hold services at Lackawanna County Prison from September 29, 2018 to October 15, 2018. (Doc. 35 ¶ 3). On October 16, 2018, Imam Yasin Kucak routinely held one-hour Muslim prayer services on Friday (Jumar) at the Lackawanna County Prison. Id. Imam Yasin Kucak continued to hold these services until they were suspended due to COVID-19. (Doc. 33-2, p. 3).
Between October 16, 2019 and March 4, 2019, Plaintiff was not permitted to attend group prayer services. (Doc. 35, ¶ 8). It is not clear from the complaint that Plaintiff was aware that any group prayer service was held for Muslim inmates.
Lackawanna County Prison's policy states that:
21. Opportunities for religious activities are open to the entire inmate population, without regard to race color nationality or creed. Inmates shall have the opportunity to engage in practices of their religious faith that are deemed essential by the faith's judicatory, consistent with the safety, security, and the orderly operation of the facility. When necessary for the security or good order of the facility, attendance at religious activities may be limited or the activity may be cancelled. The facility may limit participation in a particular religious activity or practice, to the members of that religious group. ....
23. Inmates may make requests for accommodation of a religious practice or activity by submitting said request in writing to the Administrative Officer. All such requests shall be addressed once the Administrative Officer has had an opportunity to research the request. This process shall not take longer than ten (10) business days.(Doc. 33-6, pp. 9-10).
During his time at Lackawanna County Prison, Plaintiff was disciplined for several rule violations including: throwing urine and feces at prison staff; destroying county property; threatening prison staff with death and violence; tampering with and breaking lock mechanisms on restraints; throwing his lunch tray; attempting to steal envelopes that contained medication intended for other inmates; breaking a window after escaping from restraints; and grabbing a facility nurse and attempting to wrap a stethoscope around her neck. (Doc. 35, ¶ 7). Defendants state that it was due to these disciplinary issues, and not due to Plaintiff's Muslim faith, that Plaintiff was not eligible to attend group prayer services with the Imam.
Lackawanna County Prison has no record of Plaintiff requesting to meet privately with any Muslim cleric. (Doc. 33-2, p. 6).
2. Defendants Are Entitled to Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's RLUIPA Claim
As discussed above, I construe Plaintiff's complaint as alleging a RFRA claim that no Muslim inmate in Lackawanna County Prison had access to an Imam or group religious services.
Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) provides that:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . ., even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that the imposition of the burden on that person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
To prove a claim under RLUIPA, a plaintiff must show: (1) his exercise of religion is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief; and (2) the institution's policy or practice “substantially burdened that exercise of religion. Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2007). Once a plaintiff has made this showing, the burden shifts to the defendants to show that their policy or practice was: (1) in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest. 42 U.S.C § 2000cc-1.
A burden to religious exercise is “substantial” under RLUIPA, where:
1) a follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise available to other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; OR 2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.Washington, 497 F.3d at 280.
Defendants argue that:
Plaintiff's Complaint makes only one averment in support of his claim-that, during his incarceration, Lackawanna County did not provide any Muslim cleric to perform Muslim religious ceremonies at the Lackawanna County Prison. That allegation is demonstrably untrue. Lackawanna County Prison retained the voluntary services of Imam Yasin Kucak beginning at a time very close to the beginning of the Plaintiff's incarceration. Plaintiff's incarceration began on September 29, 2018 and Imam Kucak began administering Muslim religious services on October 16, 2018, approximately two and one half weeks later. According to the Declaration and Verifications executed by Imam Kucak and Warden Timothy Betti, Muslim religious services were consistently provided to eligible inmates on a weekly basis.
The fact of the Imam's service is confirmed by the prison records. With regard to Imam Kucak, these prison records include:
(A) Background Clearance Information;
(B) Agreement on Searches;
(C) Authorization to Obtain Information; and
(D) Support Staff Notice and Agreement relative to dangerous condition and assumption of risk.
These documents are all executed by Imam Kucak.
The undisputed evidence of record in this case conclusively defeats the Plaintiff's exclusive argument that the services of a Muslim cleric were not provided.(Doc. 34, pp. 6-7). I construe this as an argument that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment because the unavailability of an Imam and group prayer services for the first two weeks Plaintiff was housed at Lackawanna County Prison is not a “substantial” burden on Plaintiff's exercise of religion. I agree that a two-week period where there was no Imam or group worship services at the prison does not pose a substantial burden on Plaintiff's exercise of religion. See e.g. Gibson v. Heary, 2021 WL 854736 at *6 (W.D. N.Y. Mar. 5, 2021) (noting that the periodic denial of religious meals to a state inmate was not a substantial burden on the exercise of religion as required under the First Amendment and RLUIPA).
Because this two and one-half week period where no Imam came to the facility did not pose a substantial burden, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to this claim.
3. Defendants Are Entitled to Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff alleges that the Muslim inmates at Lackawanna County Prison were denied equal protection of the law because Christian inmates have access to a priest and Saturday group religious services, but Muslim inmates do not have access to an Imam or a weekly group religious service.
Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). “It is well settled that § 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, but merely ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Williams v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 870 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014)). To establish a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause does not require that all persons be treater alike, but rather directs that all similarly situated individuals be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
When stating an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must first show that he has been treated differently from similarly situated individuals. See City of Cleburne, Tex., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). A plaintiff may bring an equal protection claim under two legal theories. Margetta v. Ferguson, No. 1:17-cv-0037, 2018 WL 1430936, *3 (M.D. Pa. March 22, 2018). In a traditional case, an inmate asserts a defendant treated him differently from other similarly situated individuals because of his membership in an identifiable or protected class, such as race, religion, sex, or national origin. Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305 n. 112 (3d Cir. 2016). In a “class of one” claim, a plaintiff does not allege discrimination based on membership in a protected class or particular group, but rather, asserts a defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated for arbitrary or irrational reasons. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Phillips v. City of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 243 (3d Cir. 2008).Scott v. Kauffman, No. 3:19-CV-695, 2021 WL 426494 at *11 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2021). Plaintiff appears to be alleging a “traditional” equal protection claim: that he and all other Muslim inmates at Lackawanna County Prison were treated differently from Christian inmates because there was no Imam. The undisputed material facts show that, except for two and one-half weeks when Plaintiff first arrived at the prison, the Muslim and Christian inmates were not treated differently. Pursuant to the facts alleged in the complaint, eligible Christian inmates attended prayer services with a priest once per week on Saturday. Based on the facts deemed admitted, for the majority of Plaintiff's time at Lackawanna County Prison, eligible Muslim inmates attended prayer services with an Imam once per week on Fridays.
Because there is no dispute that, in large part, Muslim inmates were treated similarly to Christian inmates during this period, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
(1) Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED due to Plaintiff's failure to oppose Defendants' motion for summary judgment despite multiple orders directing him to do so; or in the alternative,
(2) Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 33) be GRANTED.
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.