Opinion
No. 5:17-cv-00268-TES-CHW
10-10-2018
CARLOS JEAN-PIERRE, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Warden CLAY, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint filed by Defendants Clay and McIntyre. Doc. 18. It is RECOMMENDED that the Defendants' motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint on July 30, 2018. Doc. 17. As a plaintiff may amend his complaint once as a matter of course, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1), the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff Jean-Pierre's motion to amend. Defendants recognized this fact in their motion to dismiss by responding only to Plaintiff's amended complaint in the motion. Doc. 18-1, p. 3. Although Plaintiff filed a memorandum in support of his motion to amend on September 6 (Doc. 22), the motion to amend included the amended complaint itself. The Court will, however, treat the September memorandum as a response to Defendants' motion to dismiss, as it appears it was filed in response to the Court's order requiring Plaintiff's response to Defendants' motion (Doc. 20).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Carlos Jean-Pierre, a Muslim, was an inmate at Burruss Correctional Training Center in Forsyth, Georgia. He has since been transferred to Washington State Prison in Davisboro, Georgia. Doc. 10 (notice of change of address). All of the alleged incidents occurred at Burruss, and Plaintiff does not claim that he has been treated in a similar manner at Washington State Prison.
This is a civil action brought under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff argues that Defendants Clay and McIntyre substantially burdened his free exercise of religion by restricting his prayer time during Ramadan and by prohibiting him from leading prayers and other religious instruction. Plaintiff also asserts that McIntyre violated his First Amendment free exercise rights by removing him to isolation in retaliation for continuing to pray during Ramadan.
Plaintiff is a "practicing Muslim" and has been for the past ten years. Doc. 17, p. 4. In October 2016, he was selected by the Muslim community and Imam Saddiq Muhaymin to lead all Islamic functions at Burruss prison. Id. The role allowed him to be a "go between" when prison officials had any questions concerning the practices and programs of the prison's Islamic community. Id.
In May 2017, Plaintiff made an agreement with prison officials regarding the month-long Ramadan fast, in which participating inmates would be allowed one hour in the morning and evening to pray and eat. Id. During the first week of Ramadan, beginning May 26, "everything went smoothly," with prisoners meeting at the designated area for the allotted time to pray and to learn about different aspects of Islamic prayer and fasting from Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff would also use the time to distribute information pertaining to Ramadan. Id. At these meetings, Plaintiff offered the salatul taraweeh prayer, which, according to Plaintiff, is a "very important and a vital aspect of Ramdahan" and lasts approximately twenty minutes. Id. at pp. 4-5. Once the salatul taraweeh was completed, the participating inmates would then partake in the morning meal and subsequently offer the Fajr prayer, which marks the fasting period for the day. Id. at p. 5. The events were supervised by Deputy Warden Clay. Id.
On June 4, 2017, Clay shortened the time the inmates were allowed to pray, effectively leaving Plaintiff and the other inmates with less than ten minutes to pray, considering the time it took for everyone to arrive at the designated worship area. Id. Plaintiff states that Clay shortened the time "because she did not want to sit with us for an hour for a whole month." Id. When Plaintiff approached Clay about the matter, Clay allegedly threatened to prohibit the juvenile attendees from praying and fasting with the group during Ramadan. Id. From June 5, the group had to "rush through everything" and had difficulty offering the taraweeh prayer. Id.
On June 6, Deputy Warden of Security McIntyre allegedly informed Plaintiff that he was no longer to advise, teach, or offer any extra prayer, and that "to make sure of that he would be cutting [the group's] time short." Id. When Plaintiff requested that McIntyre consult with Imam Saddiq, McIntyre refused. Id.
On June 7, after the taraweeh prayer had been offered, McIntyre allegedly told the group that "he was going to do something about [their praying]," and when Plaintiff attempted to discuss the matter with him, McIntyre told him to "be qui[et] and eat [his] food." Id. at p. 6.
On the morning of June 8, officials arrived at Plaintiff's cell, told him to pack his belongings, and escorted him to the segregation area "w[h]ere Warden McIntyre waited." Id. Plaintiff claims that McIntyre said "didn't I tell you about praying," which Plaintiff asserts confirmed that he was in fact being placed in isolation for praying. Id. After four days in isolation, Plaintiff was released. Id. Upon release, Plaintiff discovered that officials had shortened their prayer time to "stop[] us from praying." Id. McIntyre later came to Plaintiff's dorm and "told [him] tauntingly" about shortening the group's time and preventing them from praying. Id. Plaintiff alleges that "before [he] could start reasoning with him[, he] was place[d] in segregation for the remainder of the fast." Id.
The following is a summary of Plaintiff's remaining claims:
(1) Under RLUIPA, Defendants Clay and McIntyre substantially burdened Plaintiff's free exercise of religion by restricting his prayer time during Ramadan and by prohibiting him from leading prayers and other religious instruction; and
(2) Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendant McIntyre retaliated against Plaintiff when he removed him to an isolation cell for praying during Ramadan in violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.
Plaintiff requests the following relief:
(1) Punitive damages in the amount of $ 30,000 against Deputy Warden Clay;Id. at p. 7.
(2) Punitive damages in the amount of $ 30,000 against Deputy Warden McIntyre;
(3) An injunction allowing him to "be compensated with such pun[i]tive relief to deter such behavior which is prevalent throughout the [G]eorgia penal system"; and
(4) An injunction "allowing the Muslim community to freely sign up and be provided with our own Islamic dorm."
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as true. Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1056-57 (11th Cir. 2007). "[A] court should only grant a motion to dismiss where the defendant demonstrates that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 1057 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not constitute a sufficient claim, and the court is not obligated to accept as true any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff's claim, the court must make reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, but the court is not required to draw the plaintiff's inferences. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). "[U]nwarranted deductions of fact in a complaint are not admitted as true for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of [the] plaintiff's allegations." Id. at 1260 (internal quotations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
The Court will address Defendants' motion to dismiss in two parts. First, Plaintiff brings suit under RLUIPA claiming that Defendants Clay and McIntyre substantially burdened his free exercise rights. Second, Plaintiff brings a civil action under Section 1983 against Defendant McIntyre claiming that McIntyre violated his free exercise rights by removing him to isolation in retaliation for praying. Defendants have moved to dismiss both claims. For the reasons stated in this Section, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for damages and injunctive relief under RLUIPA should be GRANTED, and Defendant McIntyre's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims should be DENIED as to Plaintiff's claims for nominal damages and GRANTED as to his claims for punitive and injunctive relief.
A. RLUIPA Claims
Plaintiff argues that Defendants Clay and McIntyre substantially burdened his First Amendment free exercise rights by restricting his prayer time during the Islamic month of Ramadan and by prohibiting him from providing religious instruction during the same period. Because Plaintiff is barred from suing Defendants for damages under RLUIPA and because his claims for injunctive relief are otherwise moot, Defendants' motion to dismiss should be GRANTED and Plaintiff's RLUIPA claims should be DISMISSED without prejudice.
1. Sovereign Immunity
Irrespective of whether Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim under RLUIPA, his claims for monetary relief are barred under the principle of sovereign immunity insofar as he has brought suit against Defendants in their official capacity. In Sossamon v. Texas, the Supreme Court abrogated the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007), to the extent that it allowed a suit for damages under RLUIPA against government officials in their official capacity. 563 U.S. 277, 283 (2011). Section 2000cc-2(a) of RLUIPA states: "A person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held in Sossamon that the phrase "appropriate relief" did not unambiguously express any intent on the part of the States to waive their sovereign immunity to suits for damages. 563 U.S. at 285-88. "Without such a clear statement from Congress and notice to the States, federal courts may not step in and abrogate state sovereign immunity." Id. at 291. Ultimately, the Court held that RLUIPA does not allow suits for damages against a State. Id. at 288.
To the extent that Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their official capacity, sovereign immunity bars his damages claims against them. A government official sued in his official capacity is effectively a suit against the government entity itself, which in this case is the State of Georgia. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) ("[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity."). As the State has not expressly waived sovereign immunity, Plaintiff is barred from seeking money damages against Defendants in their official capacity.
2. Individual Capacity Suit for Damages Under RLUIPA
As monetary damages are not available in an individual-capacity suit under RLUIPA, Plaintiff is also barred from seeking damages from Defendants in their individual capacities. RLUIPA allows a plaintiff to bring a private cause of action "against a government." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). RLUIPA defines "government" as:
(i) a State, county, municipality, or other governmental entity created under the authority of a State; (ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and (iii) any other person acting under color of State law.Id. § 2000cc-5(4).
In Smith v. Allen, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted RLUIPA's provisions to preclude a private cause of action against a defendant sued in his or her individual capacity for damages. 502 F.3d at 1273-75. As discussed supra, the Supreme Court in Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 283 (2011), abrogated Smith's holding that plaintiffs "may pursue a RLUIPA action for 'appropriate relief' against [defendants] in their official capacities." Smith, 502 F.3d at 1276 (emphasis added). The Court, however, left untouched Smith's holding that RLUIPA "cannot be construed as creating a private action against individual defendants for monetary damages," 502 F.3d at 1275 (emphasis added).
In Smith, the Court of Appeals barred the inmate-plaintiff from pursuing monetary damages under RLUIPA from members of the Religious Activities Review Committee of the Alabama Department of Corrections both in their individual and official capacities. Id. at 1260-64, 1271-73. Similarly, insofar as Plaintiff in this case is attempting to sue Defendants in their individual capacities, Plaintiff is barred from bringing an individual-capacity suit against Defendants Clay and McIntyre, deputy wardens at Burruss Correctional Training Center, under RLUIPA.
Defendants also assert a qualified immunity defense against Plaintiff's individual-capacity suit against them. "Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Because Plaintiff is barred from bringing an individual-capacity suit against Defendants under RLUIPA, the Court need not address the issue of whether they would be entitled to a defense of qualified immunity. See Smith, 502 F.3d at 1275 n.11 (citing Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991)).
3. Mootness
Plaintiff seeks two injunctions in this case: an injunction allowing him to "be compensated with such punitive relief to deter such behavior which is prevalent throughout the [G]eorgia penal system"; and an injunction "allowing the Muslim community to freely sign up and be provided with our own Islamic dorm." Doc. 17, p. 7. Because Plaintiff is no longer imprisoned at Burruss Correctional Training Center—the facility in which he claims the injunctions are needed—but has since transferred to Washington State Prison in Davisboro, Georgia, his claims for injunctive relief are now moot.
Absent "evidence of efforts on the part of the defendants to evade the jurisdiction of the court," "[t]he general rule is that a prisoner's transfer or release from a jail moots his individual claim for declaratory and injunctive relief." McKinnon v. Talladega Cty., Ala., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984). Although Ramadan is a yearly event, and thus presents a dispute "capable of repetition, yet evading review," see Lofton v. Williams, No. CV415-146, 2016 WL 126408, at *5 n.7 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2016) (citing United States v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 778 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir. 2015)), Plaintiff does not allege a similar harm at his current place of imprisonment. As Plaintiff has not alleged a continuing harm that can be remedied by an injunction from this Court, his claims for injunctive relief are now moot and should be DISMISSED without prejudice.
B. Section 1983 Claims
Plaintiff argues that Defendant McIntyre violated his right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment when he placed Plaintiff in isolation allegedly in retaliation for continuing to pray during Ramadan. Although Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim that his constitutional rights have been violated, his relief is limited to nominal damages. Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim under Section 1983 should, therefore, be DENIED.
1. Sovereign Immunity
To the extent that Plaintiff is suing Defendant in his official capacity, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity principles bar Plaintiff's Section 1983 suit for damages. In suing Defendant in his official capacity, Plaintiff is effectively suing the sovereign, i.e., the State of Georgia. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) ("[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself." (citations omitted)). "[A]bsent waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal court." Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). As the State of Georgia has not waived immunity, and Section 1983 was not meant to abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, see id. at 169 n.17 (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)), Plaintiff is barred from suing Defendant for damages in this action under Section 1983.
In addition, because Defendant, in his official capacity, is not a "person[]" under the statutory language of Section 1983 as interpreted by the Supreme Court, see Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71, Section 1983 provides no remedy for Plaintiff against Defendant in his official capacity, see Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997).
2. Individual Capacity
To the extent Plaintiff is suing Defendant in his individual capacity, Plaintiff has stated a valid claim under Section 1983 that his constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment has been violated.
a. Plaintiff has stated a claim under Section 1983
It is well established that an inmate does not shed his constitutional right to free exercise of religion at the jailhouse gates. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-22 (1972). To survive a motion to dismiss a claim that a plaintiff's free-exercise rights have been violated, "a plaintiff must allege a constitutionally impermissible burden on a sincerely held religious belief." GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1256 (11th Cir. 2012). Once a plaintiff has established that prison officials have impermissibly burdened a sincere religious belief, the court must inquire whether that burden is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). If so, the limitation is valid. Id.; see also Johnson v. Brown, 581 F. App'x 777, 780 (11th Cir. 2014) ("[A] prison regulation, even though it infringes the inmate's constitutional rights, is an actionable constitutional violation only if the regulation is unreasonable." (internal quotation omitted)).
Defendant does not challenge the sincerity of Plaintiff's religious beliefs. See Doc. 18-1, p. 8. Instead, Defendant claims that Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to show that his beliefs were substantially burdened. Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Warden McIntyre told Plaintiff that "he was going to do something about [the Islamic group's] praying," and then followed through on that statement by placing Plaintiff in isolation for four days initially and then again for the remainder of Ramadan. Doc. 17, p. 6. On the way to the isolation cell, McIntyre allegedly said to Plaintiff, "didn't I tell you about praying." Id.
Accepting these well-pleaded facts as true, Plaintiff has alleged "sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" that his constitutional rights were violated by prison officials. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Inmates must be afforded "reasonable op[p]ortunities" to exercise their constitutionally-guaranteed religious freedom "without fear of penalty." Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 n.2. Plaintiff's allegations that Deputy Warden McIntyre placed him in isolation to penalize him for continuing to pray during Ramadan are sufficient to establish a plausible claim that McIntyre impermissibly burdened his religious beliefs. Cf. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2004) (in the RLUIPA context, surveying the Supreme Court's evolving definition of "substantial burden" in its free-exercise cases, concluding that "a 'substantial burden' must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise; a 'substantial burden' is akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly").
As the Court is obligated to do when reviewing a motion to dismiss. See Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1056-57 (11th Cir. 2007).
As Plaintiff has alleged "sufficient factual matter" to state a claim that his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment were violated by Deputy Warden McIntyre, see GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., 687 F.3d at 1256, Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED as to that claim.
As noted in the initial Order and Recommendation, which was adopted in full by the District Court (Doc. 11), Plaintiff has also brought suit under a retaliation theory. Doc. 8, pp. 8-9. As Defendant has not addressed Plaintiff's retaliation claim in his motion to dismiss, Plaintiff's retaliation claim should proceed unchallenged.
b. Defendant McIntyre is not entitled to qualified immunity
Qualified immunity "shields government officials from liability to the extent their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal punctuation omitted). Qualified immunity is "typically addressed at the summary judgment stage," but it may, as here, be raised at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Id. at 1121; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 239 (2009) ("[W]hether there was a violation may depend on a kaleidoscope of facts not yet fully developed." (internal quotation omitted)).
A threshold matter in deciding whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is whether the defendant has established that "the allegedly unconstitutional conduct occurred while he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority." Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Defendant has adequately established this point, stating that "[Plaintiff's] own allegations establish that Defendants were acting within the scope of their authority as employees at [the prison] with respect to the alleged conduct." Doc. 18-1, p. 12.
Once a defendant has carried his burden as to whether he was acting within the scope of his authority, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the defendant violated clearly established law. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 157 F.3d at 1281. "To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) A right may be clearly established in one of three ways:
(1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly
establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McIntyre removed him to an isolation cell in retaliation for continuing to pray during Ramadan. Because penalizing an inmate for praying so clearly violates established law, see Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct. 2561, 2562 (2018) ("There can be no doubt that the First Amendment protects the right to pray. Prayer unquestionably constitutes the 'exercise' of religion."); Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 n.2 ("[R]easonable op[p]ortunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendment without fear of penalty." (emphasis added)); Sterling v. Sellers, No. 5:16-CV-00013-MTT-MSH, 2018 WL 4689462, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2018) (citing Saleem v. Evans, 866 F.2d 1313, 1314 (11th Cir. 1989)) (finding that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity, on the grounds that "the right of prisoners to observe Muslim holidays such as Ramadan and the Eid is clearly established"), Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim at this stage of the litigation.
c. The Prison Litigation Reform Act is not a bar to Plaintiff's claim
Plaintiff's failure to allege a physical injury, although not fatal to his claim, precludes him from recovering punitive damages. See Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2015) ("[A]n incarcerated plaintiff cannot recover either compensatory or punitive damages for constitutional violations unless he can demonstrate a (more than de minimis) physical injury." (citations omitted)). The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) bars a civil action "brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
In this civil action, Plaintiff claims punitive damages against Defendant McIntyre in the amount of $ 30,000 for violating his constitutional rights. Doc. 17, p. 7. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges, at most, emotional injury from being penalized for praying. As Plaintiff has not alleged that he has suffered any physical injury due to the alleged violation, he is precluded from recovering punitive damages against Defendant McIntyre. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1307.
A failure to show a lack of physical injury does not alone preclude a plaintiff from recovering nominal damages, however. Courts in this Circuit have held that "nothing in [the PLRA] prevents a prisoner from recovering nominal damages for a constitutional violation without a showing of physical injury." Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1307-08. Nominal damages serve a symbolic function, recognizing deprivations of "certain 'absolute' rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury." Id. at 1308 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978)). "Indeed, the very theory of such a nominal damages claim 'dispenses with any need for injury other than the deprivation of the right itself.'" Id. (quoting Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). This Circuit, therefore, interprets the PLRA to allow an inmate to pursue nominal damages for a constitutional violation even where no physical injury has been alleged.
Plaintiff does not specifically claim nominal damages in his complaint, but that omission does not prevent him from recovering such damages. Complaints by pro se plaintiffs should be liberally construed to request nominal damages, even where a prayer for nominal damages has not been specifically requested. See Logan v. Hall, 604 F. App'x 838, 840-41 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that "the district court erred in dismissing the complaint without considering whether, under the principle of liberal construction for pro se pleadings, [the plaintiff's] complaint could be construed as requesting nominal damages"); Williams v. Brown, 347 F. App'x 429, 436-37 (11th Cir. 2009) (remanding for consideration of whether the pro se complaint should be construed to include a request for nominal damages). A "broad prayer for relief" can be sufficient to support a finding that a complaint includes a claim for nominal damages, especially in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), which states: "Every other final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings." See Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 267 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that a "catch-all prayer for relief" allows a plaintiff to recover nominal damages under the PLRA).
Here, Plaintiff specifically pleaded punitive damages, as well as equitable relief, in his complaint. Doc. 17, p. 7. Furthermore, Plaintiff requested "a court injunction allowing [him] to be compensated with such pun[i]tive relief to deter such behavior which is prevalent throughout the [G]eorgia penal system." Id. Although phrased as a plea for an injunction, this request should be liberally construed as a broad prayer for relief. See Aref, 833 F.3d at 267. Also, a specific pleading for compensatory and punitive damages is not required for the Court to consider whether the complaint could be construed as requesting nominal damages. See Logan, 604 F. App'x at 840-41 (holding that even though the plaintiff failed to allege compensatory or punitive damages, the court was required at least to consider whether the complaint could be construed as requesting nominal damages). Given that Plaintiff included both a broad prayer for relief and a claim for punitive damages, the complaint is sufficient to support a finding that it also encompasses a claim for nominal damages.
Regarding Plaintiff's equitable claims, Defendant McIntyre argues that Plaintiff's requests for equitable relief are overbroad, see 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1), but that argument is premature at this point in the proceedings, see Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 531 (2011) (noting that the scope of an equitable remedy "must be determined with reference to the constitutional violations established"). The Court need not address this issue, however, in light of the finding that Plaintiff's transfer to another facility mooted his equitable claims.
Furthermore, any claim for prospective relief under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which allows federal courts to award prospective equitable relief against state officials to cure ongoing violations of federal law, is also moot given his transfer. --------
In sum, Plaintiff may proceed against Defendant McIntyre in his individual capacity for nominal damages only; therefore, Defendant's motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's damages claims should be DENIED, and Plaintiff's claims in equity should be DISMISSED without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
After a careful review of the record, it is RECOMMENDED that the Defendants' motion to dismiss be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
• Plaintiff's damages claims under RLUIPA are dismissed without prejudice because, insofar as Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their official capacities, the State of Georgia is immune from suit for money damages under the principle of sovereign immunity; and, insofar as Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their individual capacities, RLUIPA does not provide for an individual-capacity suit for damages.
• Plaintiff's damages claims under Section 1983 are allowed to proceed as to his claims for nominal damages only. As Plaintiff has not alleged that he has suffered a physical injury, Plaintiff is precluded from seeking punitive damages by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
• Plaintiff's equitable claims under both RLUIPA and Section 1983 are dismissed without prejudice because they are mooted by his transfer to another prison facility.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, "[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice."
SO RECOMMENDED, this 10th day of October, 2018.
s/ Charles H. Weigle
Charles H. Weigle
United States Magistrate Judge