Summary
In Jarman v. State, 178 Miss. 103, 172 So 869 (1937), the court held that where the accused is entitled to a directed verdict, judgment can be rendered by the trial court without the useless formality of having the jury return the verdict.
Summary of this case from People v. GallasOpinion
No. 32548.
March 8, 1937.
1. HOMICIDE.
In murder prosecution, evidence held to entitle defendant to directed verdict of not guilty on ground of self-defense.
2. CRIMINAL LAW.
Where defendant was entitled to a directed verdict on the evidence, the court should have granted defendant's request for a directed verdict of not guilty without going through the formality of having the jury retire and find the verdict directed.
APPEAL from circuit court of Sunflower county. HON. S.F. DAVIS, Judge.
Neill Townsend, of Indianola, for appellant.
We take it that the law is so well settled in this land, as to require the citation of no authorities to the effect that a man's home is his castle, and that no man may enter without invitation, or without due process of law; and that it is a place where both the occupant, his family, and his guest are protected from any unlawful unauthorized entry by anyone, except an officer in the discharge of his official duty, armed with process authorizing him so to do; and that a man may protect it from unlawful entry to the extent of taking life, if a felony is either threatened or attempted therein, and that no man is required to flee his home under any circumstances.
Bowen v. State, 144 So. 230; Patty v. State, 126 Miss. 94, 88 So. 498.
What took place in his own home, after the defendant had re-entered it at the point of a gun held by the deceased, is told by the defendant, and is uncontradicted by any witness, or any circumstances, and must be accepted as true.
Sec. 988, par. (e) Code of 1930; Bowen v. State, 144 So. 230.
Except for the testimony of the state's witness, Nellie Roby, the court would have been forced at the conclusion of the state's testimony, to exclude same and direct a verdict for the defendant. This same witness then on cross-examination was emphatic in her statements to the effect that she was not looking at the deceased, and did not know anything about what he did to make the defendant shoot him, because she was looking at the defendant all the time.
We respectfully submit that if by reason of any strained construction this Honorable Court should say that the verdict of the jury in this case and the judgment of the court below should be affirmed on the facts, then in our deliberate opinion it would be the equivalent of saying, "there is no right of self defense, or any right to defend habitation in the State of Mississippi in a case where a negro kills a white man." Webb M. Mize, Assistant Attorney General, for the state.
It appears that no matter what happened on the inside of the house at first that deceased had abandoned the difficulty and was attempting to leave the premises of defendant, but defendant came out and renewed the contest and shot deceased down when he (the defendant) was in no danger, real or apparent. This clearly shows murder and the instructions on murder are therefore not erroneous.
Tatum v. State, 169 So. 841; Eaton v. State, 163 Miss. 130, 140 So. 729; Ransom v. State, 149 Miss. 262, 115 So. 208; Callas v. State, 151 Miss. 617, 118 So. 447.
It is the province of the jury in the final analysis to determine the reasonableness of defendant's plea of self defense. Under the facts in this case the jury was well warranted in not believing the plea of self defense as deceased was shot from the rear when he was leaving defendant's premises and after the affray was apparently over. There was no provocation at all for appellant to shoot when Woodruff was leaving.
There were six instructions granted on behalf of defendant, which cover all the rights that he had. These instructions were clearly more favorable to him than he was entitled to receive. From what we have said above the lower court was correct in refusing the peremptory instruction requested by defendant and was correct in overruling the motion for a new trial as the verdict of the jury is supported by the law and the evidence.
Hays v. State, 130 Miss. 381, 94 So. 212; Calvin v. State, 175 Miss. 699, 168 So. 75; Brown v. State, 169 So. 837; Carter v. State, 140 Miss. 265, 105 So. 514.
Argued orally by S.D. Neill, for appellant.
The appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to the penitentiary for life. His complaint is that the court below refused to direct the jury to find him not guilty.
The appellant, a negro, was living on a plantation managed by the deceased, a white man. On the day of the homicide he procured a wagon from a neighboring plantation for the purpose of removing thereto, and drove it to the house in which he was then living. He then entered the house and closed the door. The house was a two-room cabin with a porch in front. Immediately after the appellant entered the house, the deceased approached it, walking rapidly, went upon the porch and knocked at the door, which was immediately opened. What then occurred, in the language of the appellant, who testified in his own behalf, was this: "He (the deceased) asked me (the appellant) what I was doing bringing the team on his place like that and I opened my mouth to reply and he hit me with the pistol and I went out of the house and he throwed a piece of iron at me." The only other witness to what occurred, Nellie Roby, who testified for the state, corroborated the appellant's testimony, except that she said nothing as to what the deceased then said to the appellant. She did not, however, negative the appellant's statement thereof. The deceased then, according to the evidence both for the state and the appellant, ordered the appellant, at the point of a pistol, to return, saying that, "He wanted to show him what a man was." Both the deceased and the appellant then re-entered the house, and what occurred there is disclosed only by the testimony of the appellant himself, which was, in substance: The deceased then said to the appellant, "Get down here, I am going to give you a lesson." The appellant proceeded to "get down" in obedience to this command, when the deceased struck him with an iron poker. The appellant then started to get up, when the deceased again struck him with the poker, and then shot at him, but missed him because of appellant's attempt to grab the pistol. The appellant then started toward the corner of the room against the wall of which a shotgun was standing. To make a long story short, the deceased shot the appellant three times before appellant secured the gun, and, upon getting possession of it, the appellant left the house by the back door thereof, carrying the gun with him. The deceased then, unharmed, left the house by the front door. According to the appellant, after both had left the house, the deceased again attempted to shoot him, whereupon the appellant shot and killed the deceased. So far, the evidence discloses a perfect case of self-defense. Nellie Roby, however, testified that when the deceased came out of the house he was walking away therefrom without doing anything when shot by the appellant. On cross-examination she specifically stated that she was not looking at the deceased when he was shot by the appellant, but was looking at the appellant and did not then see what the deceased was doing.
Assuming that Nellie's first statement negatived the appellant's claim that at the time he shot the deceased he was acting in self-defense, that statement is obliterated by the further statement that she did not see the deceased at the time, and did not know what he was doing. The deceased, when shot, fell and died instantly, and immediately thereafter the appellant went to his body and picked up the deceased's pistol and left the scene, but some hours thereafter he voluntarily surrendered to a police officer. There is nothing in other portions of the evidence that would warrant the jury in rejecting the appellant's version of what occurred; consequently, the court below should have granted the appellant's request for a directed verdict of not guilty; and without going "through the useless formality of having the jury to retire and actually find the verdict directed, . . . should . . . have rendered judgment as if upon verdict found." Hairston v. Montgomery, 102 Miss. 364, 59 So. 793, 794; Yazoo M.V.R. Co. v. Pope, 104 Miss. 339, 61 So. 450.
The judgment will be reversed, and in accordance with section 3378, Code 1930, the judgment which the court below should have, will be here, rendered, i.e., a judgment discharging the appellant. Authorities, supra.
Reversed and appellant discharged.