Opinion
7:00-CV-216-R
June 11, 2003
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by an inmate who, at the time of filing, was confined in the James V. Allred Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") in Iowa Park, Texas. Petitioner is serving a 15-year sentence for possession of a controlled substance, Petition ¶¶ 1-4, While incarcerated in the Allred Unit, Jardina was charged with a disciplinary infraction for possession of a detailed diagram on how to build a pipe bomb. See TDCJ Disciplinary Report, attached to Petition. He was found guilty of the charge in a disciplinary hearing that was conducted on January 31, 2000. As punishment, Petitioner lost 45 days of recreation privileges, 45 days of commissary privileges and 365 days of good time credits. Petition ¶ 18. He also claims to have been reduced in classification from SAT 3 to Line 3, Id. Jardina challenged the results of the disciplinary proceeding through the prison grievance process. The grievances were denied. He then filed this action in federal court.
Petitioner presents the following grounds for habeas relief:
1. There was no competent evidence to support the finding of guilt;
2. TDCJ rules did not provide him with notice that the conduct was prohibited, and;
3. He did not receive proper notice of the charge against him.
The due process rights of prisoners are generally limited to freedom of restraint which "Imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct 2293, 2300 (1995). Restrictions which simply alter the conditions of confinement do not implicate due process. See Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 2000) (commissary and cell restrictions); Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997) (same). A prisoner has a protected liberty interest in the loss of accrued good time only if he is eligible for release to mandatory supervision. Malchi, 211 F.3d at 957-58; see also Creel v. Keene, 928 F.2d 707, 712 (5th Cir.) (finding that Texas prisoners have no protected liberty interest in early release on parole), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1210, 111 S.Ct 2809 (1991).
When a prisoner has a protected liberty interest in the loss of accrued good time credit, the revocation of such credit must comply with minimal procedural due process. Henson v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 213 F.3d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 2000); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct 2963, 2975 (1974) (holding that prisoners are entitled to "those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated"). These minimal requirements are: (1) written notice of the alleged disciplinary violation at least 24 hours prior to a hearing; (2) the ability to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when not unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (3) a written statement of the hearing officer as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for any disciplinary action taken. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66, 94 S.Ct. at 2979. Federal habeas review of the sufficiency of the evidence is extremely limited Due process requires only "some evidence to support the findings made in the disciplinary hearing." Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct 2768; see Smith v. Rabalais, 659 F.2d 539, 545 (5th Cir. 1981) (requiring the court to determine whether "any evidence at all" supports disciplinary action taken by prison officials), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 992, 102 S.Ct. 1619 (1982).
The Court initially observes that Petitioner's commissary and recreation restrictions and his reduction in classification, including any reduction in time-earning status, do not implicate due process concerns. See Malchi, 211 F.3d at 958; Madison, 104 F.3d at 768. However, Petitioner also lost 365 days of good time credit. Because Jardina is eligible for release to mandatory supervision, he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest sufficient to justify the consideration of his claims on the merits. Malchi, 211 F.3d at 958-59.
Respondent concedes that the merits of Petitioner's claims must be examined "because good time credit was taken away from Jardina and his is eligible for mandatory supervision." Respondent's Answer at p. 6.
Petitioner first claims that there was no competent evidence to support the finding of guilt on a charge that he possessed a weapon. He argues that a pipe bomb drawing is not a weapon, rather, he argues that it is art and that he never intended to use such artwork as a means to injure anyone. See Attachment to Petition at pp 7B 7C. The charging officers report reflects that Jardina was in possession of a folder containing a pipe bomb diagram, detonator instructions and maps of the Oklahoma Turnpike. Respondent's Answer, Exhibits at p. 2. He also had three bottles of glue in his possession. Id. At the hearing, the charging officer testified that she believed the glue could be used as a component to make a pipe bomb. Attachment to Petition at pp 7C. Review of the pipe bomb diagram reflects that "sylicon (sic) glue" is required to seal holes in the bomb. Respondent's Answer, Exhibit B at p. 6. Jardina does not contest the findings that he possessed these items, he only argues that it did not constitute an of Tense under TDCJ guidelines. See Petition. The items found in Jardina's possession along with the charging officer's report and testimony constitute some evidence that Jardina possessed weapon plans and at least one component needed to construct the weapon. See Hudson v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 534, 536-37 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that a prison incident report alone constitutes "some evidence" of guilt). Accordingly, this ground for relief must fail
Next, Petitioner claims that TDCJ rules did not provide him with notice that the conduct was prohibited. Jardina argues that TDCJ rules prohibit the possession of weapons but not the possession of drawings of weapons. He also claims that he was not informed that the glue would be used as evidence against him. These arguments go to the merits of Jardina's defense against the charges and, as such, are not cognizable in a habeas proceeding. "[This] court is not required to examine the entire record, make an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence." Hudson, 242 F.3d at 538 (Pogue, J., specially concurring). Federal courts hold no appellate authority over prison disciplinary proceedings and may intervene only to correct errors of constitutional magnitude, See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221, 102 S.Ct 940, 948 (1982), Federal courts "do not sit as a super state supreme court in a habeas corpus proceeding to review errors under state law." Cronnon v. State of Alabama, 587 F.2d 246, 250 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974, 99 S.Ct 1542 (1979). Additionally, state prisons are not required to conduct their disciplinary proceedings in compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence or Procedure. See Hudson v. Johnson, 242 F.3d at 538 (Pogue, I, specially concurring). Accordingly, this ground for relief must fail. Obviously, Jardina knew the glue had been found and he should have known that TDCJ officials would consider an inmates' possession of bomb making plans and materials a serious offense.
Petitioner next claims that he was not given proper notice of the charge against him. Jardina was served with notice of the disciplinary action on January 24, 2000, seven days before the hearing was conducted. Respondent's Answer, Exhibit B at p. 1. This notice more than satisfies the minimum requirements of due process. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66, 94 S.Ct at 2979. Petitioner has failed to show that the disciplinary action taken against him was constitutionally infirm.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
A copy of this order shall be transmitted to Petitioner and to Counsel for Respondent.
SO ORDERED
JUDGMENT
This action came on for consideration by the Court, and the issues having been duly considered and a decision duly rendered,IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the petition be, and it is hereby, DENIED.
The Clerk of Court shall transmit a true copy of this Judgment to Petitioner and to Counsel for Respondent.