Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. HG08-422308.
McGuiness, P.J.
Appellant Xuan T. James appeals from an order dismissing respondent T.H. Continental Limited Partnership (T.H. Continental) from the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. James was injured during a stay at a Minnesota Days Inn operated by T.H. Continental. She argues that California courts are justified in exercising personal jurisdiction over T.H. Continental with respect to her personal injury claim because she made her hotel reservation in California on an interactive website operated by Days Inn. She also claims the trial erred in declining to issue a statement of decision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 632. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
James fell and injured herself at a Days Inn in Bloomington, Minnesota on August 28, 2007. On November 25, 2008, she filed a lawsuit against “Days Inn Airport” and “Days Inn Headquarters,” alleging causes of action for general negligence, intentional tort, premises liability, and breach of contract. She alleges she was injured as a result of a dangerous condition at the hotel, inaccurate instructions from hotel employees, and an unclear map of the hotel.
T.H. Continental, which operates the “Days Inn Airport” at which James was injured, moved to quash the summons and complaint on the ground it lacks sufficient contacts with the state of California for personal jurisdiction to be exercised over it. As reflected in declarations submitted with the motion, T.H. Continental is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in the state of New York. It does not do business or own property in California. T.H. Continental is a franchisee of Days Inn Worldwide, Inc. (Days Inn Worldwide), and manages the Days Inn hotel located in Bloomington, Minnesota. It does not direct any advertising specifically at California residents on behalf of the Days Inn it operates in Bloomington, Minnesota. T.H. Continental acknowledges that James made her room reservation through the use of the internet. However, it did not set up, nor does it maintain, the website on which James made her reservation.
In opposition to T.H. Continental’s motion, James submitted a declaration stating she had lived in Alameda County since 2000. At some time before August 28, 2007, while she was in California, she searched the internet for a hotel in Minnesota near the Great Mall of America. She made a reservation online through the Days Inn website for a room at the Days Inn hotel operated by T.H. Continental in Bloomington, Minnesota. Upon checking into the hotel in Minnesota on August 28, 2007, she fell and injured herself. She received treatment for her injury at an emergency facility in Minnesota. The following day she returned home to California, where she received follow-up treatment for her injury.
The trial court granted the motion to quash, reasoning that T.H. Continental “lacks sufficient minimum contacts with California to subject itself to either general or specific jurisdiction here for the events alleged in the Complaint.” The court also denied a request by James for a statement of decision. Pursuant to the court’s order, T.H. Continental was dismissed from the action. James timely appealed the order of dismissal.
Discussion
I. Personal Jurisdiction
A. General Principles
“California courts may exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the Constitutions of California and the United States. [Citation.] The exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with these Constitutions ‘if the defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 268.) “[T]he minimum contacts test asks ‘whether the “quality and nature” of the defendant’s activity is such that it is “reasonable” and “fair” to require him to conduct his defense in that State.’ [Citation.] The test ‘is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite “affiliating circumstances” are present’ [Citation.]” (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1061 (Snowney).)
“Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. A nonresident defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if his or her contacts in the forum state are ‘substantial... continuous and systematic.’ [Citations.] In such a case, ‘it is not necessary that the specific cause of action alleged be connected with the defendant’s business relationship to the forum.’ [Citations.]” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 445-446 (Vons).) “If the nonresident defendant does not have substantial and systematic contacts in the forum sufficient to establish general jurisdiction, he or she may still be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum....” (Id. at p. 446.)
In this case, James does not assert that T.H. Continental is subject to the general jurisdiction of California courts. Instead, we consider only whether specific jurisdiction exists. “When determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts consider the ‘ “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” ’ [Citation.] A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) ‘the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits’ [citation]; (2) ‘the “controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ [the] defendant’s contact with the forum” ’ [citation]; and (3) ‘ “the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice’ ” ’ [citation].” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.)
“ ‘When a defendant moves to quash service of process’ for lack of specific jurisdiction, ‘the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.’ [Citation.] ‘If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, then the defendant has the burden of demonstrating “that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” ’ [Citation.]” (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1062.) Where, as here, “no conflict in the evidence exists... the question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent review of the record. [Citation.]” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 449.) The parties agree that our review is de novo.
James begins her argument with the contention that the lower court failed to properly apply the legal standard governing review of a motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction. In reviewing a decision of the trial court, “we review the result, not the reasoning.” (Florio v. Lau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 637, 653.) The trial court’s stated rationale for its decision is therefore irrelevant.
James advances three grounds to establish that T.H. Continental has sufficient minimum contacts with the state of California to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. First, she claims she entered into a contract with T.H. Continental in California by virtue of reserving a Minnesota hotel room over the internet. Second, she argues that the existence of a franchise relationship between franchisee T.H. Continental and the franchisor, Days Inn Worldwide—which purportedly has substantial and continuous contacts with California—is sufficient to establish that T.H. Continental purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in California. Third, she claims T.H. Continental purposefully availed itself of doing business in California by operating an interactive website on which James was able to reserve a room. Because James’s jurisdictional claims rest primarily upon the contention that she was able to reserve a room over the internet, we begin by focusing on that alleged basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over T.H. Continental.
B. Internet website as basis for jurisdiction
In determining whether a nonresident defendant’s operation of a website accessible in California is sufficient to establish the “purposeful availment” prong of the test for specific personal jurisdiction, California courts look to the sliding scale analysis described by the federal district court in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. (W.D.Pa. 1997) 952 F.Supp. 1119 (Zippo).) (See Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1063.) Under the Zippo court’s sliding scale analysis, “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. This sliding scale is consistent with well developed personal jurisdiction principles. At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. [Citation.] At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise personal jurisdiction. [Citation.] The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site. [Citation.]” (Zippo, supra, 952 F.Supp. at p. 1124.)
James contends the website on which she reserved her room was interactive and therefore falls on the side of the Zippo sliding scale justifying the exercise of personal jurisdiction. We disagree. Although the California Supreme Court has not definitively answered the question, it has indicated that a hotel website allowing visitors to make reservations likely falls in the middle ground of the Zippo test. (See Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1063-1064.) In Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, Inc. (E.D.Mo. 2001) 200 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1087-1088, the court explained why a hotel website allowing visitors to reserve rooms is different from those involving the sale of goods: “In internet cases involving the sale of goods, the entire transaction (order, payment, and confirmation) can be completed online. The resident can bring about the transmission of the goods into the forum state through the order alone. Hotels, on the other hand, are somewhat unique in the internet context. Neither party anticipates that goods, services, or information of intrinsic value will be transmitted or provided in the forum state as a result of the internet exchange of information. To the contrary, both parties recognize that the internet exchange is simply preliminary to the individual traveling outside the forum state to use the service. In this respect, the exchange of information over the internet is not unlike a toll-free reservations hotline. The purpose of the internet interaction is not achieved until the resident customer leaves the forum state and arrives at the hotel destination.”
T.H. Continental asserts that it does not operate or maintain the website on which James made her reservation. Regardless of whether T.H. Continental actually operates the website, it enjoys the benefit of its exposure on the internet just the same. For our purposes, it is immaterial whether the website is operated by T.H. Continental or by some other entity, such as the franchisor, Days Inn Worldwide.
James’s reliance on Snowney, supra, is unavailing. In Snowney, a California resident filed a class action against a group of Nevada hotels for failing to provide notice of an energy surcharge imposed on hotel guests. (35 Cal.4th at p. 1059.) In concluding that the defendants’ website established purposeful availment of the benefits of doing business in California, the court noted that the website specifically targeted California residents by touting the proximity of the hotels to California and providing driving directions from the state to the hotels. (Id. at p. 1064.) In addition, the defendants advertised extensively in California. (Id. at p. 1065.) Thus, they “purposefully and successfully solicited business from California residents. In doing so, defendants necessarily availed themselves of the benefits of doing business in California and could reasonably expect to be subject to the jurisdiction of courts in California.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
Here, unlike in Snowney, T.H. Continental did not target its business toward California residents. It did no more than provide a website that allowed a visitor to the website anywhere in the world to request a reservation at its Minnesota hotel. If it had operated a passive website that merely contained information about the hotel along with a toll-free number, there would appear to be no dispute the website does not establish sufficient minimum contacts under Zippo. The mere fact a website allows a visitor to transmit a reservation request electronically via the internet, instead of requiring the visitor to transmit the same request by telephone, does not necessarily transform the interaction into one in which the hotel management purposefully avails itself of the benefit of doing business in the state from which the request is made. Thus, the existence of website that allows California residents to make a hotel reservation does not, by itself, weigh in favor of an exercise of personal jurisdiction.
The more compelling reason why James fails to establish the necessary minimum contacts for specific jurisdiction is that she has failed to demonstrate the controversy arises out of T.H. Continental’s contacts with California. (See Pavlovich v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.) In applying this “relatedness” prong of the test for specific jurisdiction, the California Supreme Court has adopted a “substantial connection” test in which the relatedness requirement is satisfied if “there is a substantial nexus or connection between the defendant’s forum activities and the plaintiff’s claim.” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 456; accord Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068.) The court specifically declined to apply a “but for” test of relatedness, which simply “asks ‘whether the injury would have occurred “but for” the forum contacts.’ (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 467.)” (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068 & fn. 8.) The court also rejected a “proximate cause” test of relatedness, which “asks whether ‘the alleged injury was proximately caused by the contacts in the forum state.’ (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 462.)” (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068 & fn. 7.)
The subject matter of James’s complaint is a slip and fall accident that occurred on hotel premises in Minnesota. That event is unrelated to a website that allows California residents to reserve a room at the hotel, except to the extent one might claim James would not have been injured “but for” the website that allowed her to reserve a room. However, California does not apply a “but for” test, choosing instead to analyze whether the claim has a “substantial nexus or connection” to the defendant’s forum contact. (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068.) An injury suffered at a hotel in Minnesota as a result of a dangerous condition or improper directions given by hotel employees lacks any substantial connection to the existence of a website or the fact that James was able to reserve a room on the website.
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Snowney is instructive. There, the court held that the plaintiff’s causes of action arising out of allegations that the defendant hotels had failed to provide notice of an energy surcharge were sufficiently related to the defendants’ contacts with California. (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1068-1069.) Specifically, the court observed that the “plaintiff’s causes of action are premised on alleged omissions during defendants’ consummation of transactions with California residents and in their California advertisements.” (Ibid.) Because the alleged harm related directly to the content of the hotels’ promotional activities in California, there was an “inherent relationship between plaintiff’s claims and defendants’ contacts with California....” (Id. at p. 1069.) However, the court was careful to distinguish claims for injuries suffered during a plaintiff’s stay at an out-of-state hotel. The court stated: “Unlike the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs in [cases involving personal injury], the injury allegedly suffered by plaintiff in this case relates directly to the content of the defendants’ advertising in California.” (Id. at p. 1070.)
The causes of action in this case arise out of the alleged negligence of the hotel operated by T.H. Continental in Minnesota. They are not premised on omissions or misrepresentations contained in the website on which James reserved her room. The advance reservation agreement would hardly be a relevant, much less a material, element in James’s slip and fall case. The controversy therefore lacks any substantial connection to T.H. Continental’s contacts with California.
James cites a number of federal cases and cases from other states that she claims support her jurisdictional argument. The cases are inapposite. For example, in Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc. (1994) 416 Mass. 763 [625 N.E.2d 549], the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a case in which a Massachusetts resident brought a personal injury action for injuries suffered at a hotel in California. The court found that the defendant hotel had actively solicited and obtained business from Massachusetts businesses, allowing the court to conclude the defendant transacted business in Massachusetts. (Id. at pp. 550, 552.) By contrast, here there is no evidence indicating that T.H. Continental actively solicited business from California residents. More importantly, in assessing the relatedness requirement, the court employed a “but for” test, stating that “[b]ut for the defendant’s solicitation of business in Massachusetts, and its agreement to provide the plaintiff with hotel accommodations in Anaheim, California, the plaintiff would not have been injured in a room of the hotel.” (Id. at p. 554.) The “but for” test has been specifically repudiated by the California Supreme Court. (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068 & fn. 8.) Thus, the case has little bearing on our analysis.
The same could be said of Nowak v. Tak How Investments, Ltd. (1st Cir. 1996) 94 F.3d 708, in which the court exercised jurisdiction over a wrongful death claim arising out of a drowning at a Hong Kong hotel. There, as in Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., facts justifying a finding of purposeful availment were present. Among other things, the Hong Kong hotel had specifically solicited the patronage of a Massachusetts business that employed the spouse of the decedent. (Nowak v. Tak How Investment, Ltd., supra, 94 F.3d at p. 717.) In addition, the court employed a “proximate cause” test of relatedness with what it described as an “overlay” of the “but for” test. (Id. at p. 716.) As discussed above, the California Supreme Court has rejected both the “proximate cause” test and the “but for” test in favor of the “substantial connection” test of relatedness. (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068.)
In neither Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc. nor Nowak v. Tak How Investment, Ltd. did the defendant’s contact with the forum state consist of a website.
James asserts that Minnesota courts have chosen to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants on the basis of a defendant’s operation of a website, citing State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc. (Minn.Ct.App. 1997) 568 N.W.2d 715, affd. (Minn. 1998) 576 N.W.2d 747. However, the case must be viewed in the context of the facts giving rise to the claim. There, the state of Minnesota filed a complaint against out-of-state entities that operated a website advertising online gambling, alleging that the defendants engaged in deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and consumer fraud on the internet. (Id. at pp. 716-717.) In upholding the exercise of jurisdiction, the Minnesota court concluded the advertising contacts on the internet justified the “exercise of personal jurisdiction where unlawful or misleading advertisements are the basis of the plaintiff’s claims. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 720.) In other words, it was the content of the defendants’ website that gave rise to the causes of action, much like the content of advertising gave rise to the claims in Snowney, supra. Here, by contrast, there is an insufficient connection between the website and the claims asserted in the lawsuit.
We conclude the existence of a website on which James reserved her room does not satisfy either the purposeful availment requirement or the relatedness requirement of the specific jurisdiction analysis. Accordingly, James has not met her initial burden to establish sufficient minimum contacts to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over T.H. Continental.
Because James has not met her initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction, we need not address whether it would be unreasonable to exercise jurisdiction under the circumstances presented here. (See Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1062 [defendant has burden of demonstrating the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable only after plaintiff has satisfied initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying exercise of jurisdiction].) Suffice it to say, however, that an analysis of fair play and substantial justice would not necessarily weigh in favor of a California court exercising jurisdiction over James’s tort claims arising out of an accident in Minnesota. (See Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, Inc., supra, 200 F.Supp.2d at p. 1089 [state has no particular interest in providing a forum for claim where tort and injury occurred in another state].)
C. Contract and/or franchise agreement as basis for jurisdiction
James argues that a contract was formed in California when she made an internet reservation for a room. She contends the contractual relationship is sufficient to support a conclusion that T.H. Continental has sufficient minimum contacts with California. She also claims the existence of a franchise relationship between T.H. Continental and Days Inn Worldwide justifies the assertion of personal jurisdiction. Under the facts of this case, we disagree with both the contract and franchise theory of jurisdiction espoused by James.
As support for her contract theory, James relies primarily on Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462. There, Burger King Corporation filed suit in federal district court in Florida against individuals who operated a Burger King franchise in Michigan. (471 U.S. at pp. 468-469.) Burger King claimed the defendants had breached their franchise obligations and were infringing upon Burger King’s trademarks through their continued, unauthorized operation of a Burger King restaurant. (Ibid.) The Michigan defendants claimed the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because they were Michigan residents and because Burger King’s claim did not arise within Florida. (Id. at p. 469.) The United States Supreme Court concluded there was a sufficient basis for the court to exercise jurisdiction over the Michigan defendants. (Id. at p. 478.) Among other things, the franchise dispute grew directly out of a contract that had a substantial connection with the state of Florida, where Burger King was headquartered. (Id. at pp. 479-480.) The Michigan franchisee deliberately reached out to a Florida corporation for the purchase of a long-term franchise agreement with the anticipation that it would involve continuing and far-reaching contacts with Burger King in Florida. The franchisee voluntary accepted the long-term and exacting regulation of the business from Burger King’s Miami headquarters. (Ibid.) Further, the franchise documents specifically provided that all disputes would be governed by Florida law. (Id. at p. 481.) When the choice-of-law provision was combined with “the 20-year interdependent relationship” between the Michigan franchisee and Burger King’s Miami headquarters, “it reinforced [the franchisee’s] deliberate affiliation with the forum State and the reasonable foreseeability of possible litigation there.” (Id. at p. 482.)
The facts in this case bear little resemblance to those in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. As an initial matter, it is unclear on what legal basis James contends the reservation for a room in Minnesota constituted a California contract. She claims that while she was in California she accepted an offer to rent a room at a certain rate, thus purportedly forming a contract. However, according to T.H. Continental, there was no acceptance of the reservation until it received James’s credit card in Minnesota. Thus, the act giving rise to a contract occurred in Minnesota, not California. (See Stone v. State of Texas (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1043, 1048 [contract formed where last act in its execution performed].) In any event, the place of contracting is not critical for purposes of assessing purposeful availment. “ ‘[T]he place where a contract is executed is of far less importance than where the consequences of performing that contract come to be felt.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
James’s contract to rent a room had little or no connection to California. It anticipated performance of the contract in Minnesota. It did not give rise to a longstanding contractual relationship or require any ongoing involvement between T.H. Continental and a resident of the state of California. There is no indication the contract was governed by California law. The acceptance of the hotel reservation certainly did not amount to T.H. Continental reaching out to California with the reasonable expectation it could be haled into a California court over any possible litigation that might result from the reservation. In short, none of the factors relied upon by the court in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz are present here.
James’s franchise theory of jurisdiction is even more tenuous than her contract theory. She points out that Days Inn Worldwide has an agent of process in California and answered the complaint in this case. Her argument appears to be that T.H. Continental availed itself of the benefits of doing business in California by virtue of its franchising relationship with Days Inn Worldwide, which is undeniably subject to the jurisdiction of California courts. She relies on Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 456, in which the Supreme Court held that “a nonresident defendant may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of this state if the defendant purposefully has availed itself of forum benefits through an ongoing franchise agreement and there is a substantial nexus or connection between the defendant’s forum activities and the plaintiff’s claim.” (Ibid.)
The record contains no evidence concerning the nature of the franchise relationship between T.H. Continental and Days Inn Worldwide. There is nothing to suggest the franchise agreement is governed by California law or has any relationship whatsoever to California. At most, James contends the franchise relationship allows T.H. Continental to reap substantial advantage from the reputation of the franchisor, Days Inn Worldwide. However, the mere fact a franchisee’s reputation is enhanced by its relationship with the franchisor does not support a conclusion it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in all states in which the franchisor operates.
Thus, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that T.H. Continental has purposefully availed itself of forum benefits by virtue of a franchise relationship with an entity that is subject to the jurisdiction of California courts. Even if there were such evidence, there is no connection, much less a substantial connection, between James’s tort claims and the franchise relationship. Accordingly, we reject James’s argument that the franchise relationship gives California courts authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over T.H. Continental.
D. Waiver by participation in case management conference
James contends T.H. Continental waived its right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction by making a general appearance at a case management conference. We are not persuaded.
T.H. Continental filed its motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction on February 26, 2009. The court conducted a case management conference on April 9, 2009, before ruling on the motion to quash. As reflected in the court’s minutes, James appeared in propria persona at the conference and counsel for T.H. Continental appeared by telephone. James filed a case management conference statement but T.H. Continental apparently did not.
James’s waiver argument fails for a number of reasons. First, there is no indication she raised the issue in the trial court. “ ‘It is axiomatic that arguments not asserted below are waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (Martinez v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1249.) Thus, we would be justified in treating the issue as waived.
The record on appeal does not include a transcript of the hearing on the motion to quash, so we have no way of knowing whether she raised the issue at oral argument.
Moreover, the argument fails on the merits. Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (e)(1) provides that, in the case of a defendant who files a motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction, “no act by a party who makes a motion under this section, including filing an answer, demurrer, or motion to strike constitutes an appearance, unless the court denies the motion made under this section.” (Italics added.) Thus, as expressly set forth in the statute, an act that would otherwise constitute an appearance by a party is not treated as such until the court denies a pending motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction. “The Legislature added subdivision (e) [to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10] in order to ‘simplify procedures and reduce the risk of an inadvertent submission to jurisdiction.’ [Citations.] Subdivision (e) prevents the inadvertent waiver of objections to jurisdiction by delaying recognition of the party’s general participation in the litigation until after the jurisdictional issue is finally resolved. A party may answer, demur, move to strike and perform other actions related to the merits without fear of accidentally waiving a potentially meritorious attack on personal jurisdiction.” (State Farm General Ins. Co. v. JT’s Frames, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 429, 441.)
In the cases on which James relies, the trial court denied the motions to quash as to the defendants who claimed their actions did not amount to a general appearance. (See Mansour v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1754; Creed v. Schultz (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 733, 738.) In Mansour v. Superior Court, for example, the court held that the mere fact the defendants had petitioned the appellate court to overturn the trial court’s order denying their motions to quash did not “grant them immunity from making a general appearance by their subsequent participation in the litigation.” (38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1757.) Defendants whose motions to quash are denied, like those in the cases cited by James, do not enjoy the protection from inadvertent waiver afforded by section 418.10, subdivision (e)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Here, of course, the court did not deny the motion to quash. T.H. Continental was allowed to participate in the case management conference without concern that its participation would waive its pending attack on the court’s jurisdiction.
As an alternative argument relating to the case management conference, James contends this court should exercise personal jurisdiction over T.H. Continental as a result of its purported unclean hands. James argues that T.H. Continental violated a rule of court by failing to submit a case management conference statement, thereby gaining an unfair advantage by obtaining information about James’s case but providing nothing in return. The argument is meritless. In addition to the fact she forfeited the argument by not raising it below, she cites no authority whatsoever to support the contention a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based solely on the fact the defendant acted with unclean hands.
Nothing in our opinion should be construed to suggest T.H. Continental acted with unclean hands by not filing a case management conference statement at a time when it was challenging the court’s jurisdiction.
II. Statement of Decision
Code of Civil Procedure section 632 provides in relevant part that, “upon the trial of a question of fact,” the court must issue a “statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial upon the request of any party....” (Italics added.) “The requirement of a written statement of decision generally does not apply to an order on a motion, even if the motion involves an evidentiary hearing and even if the order is appealable. [Citation.]” (Lien v. Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 620, 623-624.)
Notwithstanding the general rule that an order on a motion need not be supported by a statement of decision, James contends reversal is required because the trial court refused her request for a statement of decision on T.H. Continental’s motion. We disagree.
Although courts have created exceptions to the general rule limiting statements of decisions to trials, those exceptions are limited. (See Lien v. Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 624-625; In re Marriage of Askmo (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1040.) “In determining whether an exception should be created, the courts balance ‘ “(1) the importance of the issues at stake in the proceeding, including the significance of the rights affected and the magnitude of the potential adverse effect on those rights; and (2) whether appellate review can be effectively accomplished even in the absence of express findings.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Askmo, supra, at p. 1040.)
James has cited no authority supporting her contention that a statement of decision is required for an order ruling on a motion to quash service for lack of jurisdiction. While it may be true that significant rights are at stake in such a motion, the same could be said of a demurrer or many other types of motions that dispose of individual claims or entire lawsuits. The more relevant consideration, in our view, is whether the lack of statement of decision impedes appellate review. (See Gruendl v. Oewel Partnership, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 654, 661 [“One of the primary purposes of a statement of decision is to facilitate appellate review”].)
The absence of a statement of decision does not preclude meaningful appellate review in this case. As James concedes, de novo review is appropriate because there are no disputed issues of fact. Consequently, a statement of decision is entirely unnecessary and, in light of the independent standard of review, would have been given no weight by this court even if it the trial court had complied with James’s request and prepared one. Accordingly, we decline to depart from the general rule that a statement of decision is not required for an order on a motion.
James also complains she was prejudiced by the trial court’s description of T.H. Continental as being “erroneously served and sued herein as DAYS INN AIRPORT IN BLOOMINGTON MINNESOTA.” The nature of her complaint is not entirely clear, but it appears she takes issue with the court’s conclusion that she was mistaken in identifying the defendant that operates the Days Inn hotel where she was injured. While she concedes “this may seem like a harmless error,” she asserts it is “prejudicial to [her] in the eyes of anyone who reads the lower court’s order.” As James aptly points out, “a judgment regarding Respondent’s name seems to be immaterial.” We agree. The issue is immaterial and provides no basis for an attack on the trial court’s order.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.
We concur: Siggins, J.Jenkins, J.