Opinion
2d Civil No. B222391
01-18-2012
MARTHA JAIMES et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. AMERICAN INDIAN HEALTH & SERVICES et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Gordon & Rees LLP, Stephen E. Ronk, Michelle L. Steinhardt, Stephanie P. Alexander for Appellants. Law Office of Eric A. Woosley, Eric A. Woosley, Jordan T. Porter for Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. 1266707)
(Santa Barbara County)
This appeal involves construction of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 United States Code section 1600 et seq. (the Act), and related federal statutes concerning the status of Indians and tribal self-government. We conclude that the decision of the trial court is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; therefore, the judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to dismiss the proceeding.
Facts and Procedural History
Respondents Martha Jaimes, Michael Cordero, Frances Rose Uribe and Janet Darlene Garcia are former directors of appellant American Indian Health & Services (AIHS), a nonprofit corporation which provides free health care to "urban Indians," as defined by federal law, residing in the Santa Barbara area. Appellants are members of the Coastal Band of Chumash, as are most of the Indians served by AIHS. AIHS is funded by the federal government under the Act.
The Act and AIHS bylaws require that 51 percent of the board of directors be enrolled and verified members of a federally recognized tribe. The remaining 49 percent of the board would have to demonstrate that they are United States American Indians in one of four ways: (1) documentation from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), (2) documentation from a federally recognized tribe, (3) documentation from a state recognized tribe, or (4) sworn statements from five qualified individuals attesting to Indian identity.
The Coastal Band of Chumash is not a federally recognized tribe and has not been formally recognized by the State of California. At the time respondents were elected to the board of directors of AIHS in 2004 and 2005, the only documentation needed to qualify for the board was listing on the California Judgment Roll or a tribal affiliation card. Respondents met this criteria and were elected. Each director served a two-year term, and their respective terms ended in May 2006 and May 2007 under the bylaws in effect at the time they were elected. An amendment to the bylaws enacted subsequently lengthened the term to four years. Respondents assert that the amendment extended their terms of office to 2009.
In 2006, the executive director of AIHS, Alfred Granados, determined that federal law required greater documentation as to "urban Indian" status to receive health care services and to qualify for the board of directors. The new documentation required for board membership was: (1) certification as documented member of a federally recognized tribe, (2) possession of a certified degree of Indian blood from BIA, (3) listing on the California judgment roll with certification from BIA, or (4) be a descendant of any of the above within two generations. Granados requested that the sitting board members provide him with the newly-required documentation. Respondents did not provide such documentation. On September 25, 2006, Granados sent letters to each respondent immediately vacating his or her respective board seat.
In 2008, Granados was replaced by Scott Black as executive director of AIHS. Black did not agree with the eligibility criteria imposed by Granados, and AIHS again began providing free medical care to members of the Coastal Band.
Respondents filed a complaint for damages and a class action for declaratory relief in March 2008. All claims but the class claim for declaratory relief were dismissed. In February 2010, the trial court granted declaratory relief and a mandatory injunction, and issued a statement of decision finding that each of the ousted board members met the definition of "urban Indian" set forth in section 1603(c) and (f) because they met the definition of "Indians of California" under section 1679 and because they were members of the Coastal Band which the trial court determined was a tribe recognized by the State of California. The trial court ordered that the ousted directors be reappointed to fulfill the balance of their terms. The court also made several subsidiary findings and orders involving tribal self-government.
AIHS filed an appeal. We requested that the parties provide supplemental briefing as to whether the case should be dismissed as moot because the respondents' terms of office had expired. AIHS responded that the issues were moot, and that we should reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to dismiss the case. Respondents asserted the following issues are not moot: (1) whether the trial court erred in determining the State of California currently recognizes the Coastal Band, (2) whether the trial court erred in determining the respondents are urban Indians within the meaning of 25 United States Code section 1603, and (3) whether the trial court erred in determining certain amendments to the AIHS bylaws were unlawful.
Subsequently, we requested supplemental briefing on the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. AIHS responded that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Respondents assert that the court has subject matter jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
The Trial Court's Decision Is Void for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
If a court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, any decision it renders is void. (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 200.) Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver or estoppel. (People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, 340.) Failure of a defendant to raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court is not a waiver of the issue and it may be raised for the first time on appeal either by a party or by the court sua sponte. (See, e.g., Porter v. United Services Automobile Assn. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 837, 838 ["We have the duty to raise issues concerning our jurisdiction on our own motion"].)
The issues decided by the trial court involve the status of Indians and tribal self-government. Our state courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction of these issues. In a case raising similar issues, Lamere v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1059 (Lamere), the Enrollment Committee of the Temecula Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of the Pechanga Indian Reservation initiated disenrollment proceedings against certain enrolled members of the band on the ground that the ancestor from whom plaintiffs claimed descent was not one of the "original Pechanga people" and their descendants therefore did not qualify as band members. (Id. at p. 1061.) Plaintiffs objected to the procedures on the grounds that (1) the disenrollment proceedings had been improperly instituted by fewer than 51 percent of the committee members; (2) the tribal chairman had removed several members, leaving an insufficient number to take valid action; (3) members of the committee were improperly reinstated to create a false quorum; (4) the committee was imposing proof requirements on plaintiffs that were more strict than those set forth in Pechanga law; and 5) the committee acted inconsistently and arbitrarily in deciding whether a person was entitled to membership.
Defendants filed a demurrer asserting the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. The trial court overruled the demurrer. After a thorough exposition of a state court's subject matter jurisdiction over Indian affairs, the appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate its order overruling defendants' demurrer and to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend on the basis that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. (Lamere, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1068.)
The court held that Public Law 280 does not give California courts jurisdiction over tribal membership disputes. The court explained: "Public Law 280 cannot be viewed as a general grant of jurisdiction to state courts to determine intratribal disputes. [Citation.] Rather, '[t]he primary concern of Congress in enacting Pub[lic] L[aw] 280 . . . was with the problem of lawlessness on certain Indian reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal institutions for law enforcement.' . . . [¶] With respect to the grant of civil jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the legislative history reflects a 'virtual absence of expression of congressional policy or intent. . . .'" (Lamere, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1064.)
Public Law 280 provides in part: "Each of the States listed . . . shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country . . . to the same extent that such State has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action . . . ." (28 U.S.C. § 1360.)
The court further stated that its decision also turned on the fact that "membership issues . . . are basic to tribal self-governance. . . . Here, plaintiffs are effectively asking this court to interfere with the Band's determination of 'Who is a Pechanga?' and that decision would unavoidably have substantial and continuing effects on the Band's self-governance. Congress cannot have had such an intent in enacting Public Law 280. [¶] In short, we are persuaded that Congress did not intend that the courts of this state should have the power to intervene--or interfere--in purely tribal matters." (Lamere, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067.)
As in Lamere, the issues raised in the trial court and in this appeal primarily involve tribal self-government and are not within the jurisdiction of the California state courts. (See also Ackerman v. Edwards (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 946, 954 [Public Law 280 did not confer jurisdiction on California state courts over disputes regarding criteria for membership enrollment]; Great Western Casinos, Inc. v. Morongo Band of Mission Indians (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1427-1428 [Public Law 280 does not permit resolution of Indian gaming and gaming contract disputes in state court because Congress intended state court civil jurisdiction to cover only litigation involving strictly "private persons or private property" touching on "the laws of contract, tort, marriage, divorce, insanity, descent," and the like].) Respondents' argument that the state courts have jurisdiction because the board is a California nonprofit corporation formed under California law and that the parties are citizens of California misses the mark. While the California Corporations Code may be tangentially involved here, resolution of the substantive issues would require us to construe a federal law pertaining exclusively to Indians and resolve membership and election issues that are central to Indian self-determination and self-government. (See Timbisha Shoshone Tribe v. Kennedy (E.D. Cal. 2009) 687 F.Supp.2d 1171, 1185 ["Unless surrendered by the tribe, or abrogated by Congress, tribes possess an inherent and exclusive power over matters of internal tribal governance"].) We do not believe that Congress intended that state courts be involved in the determination of the issues involved here.
Conclusion
As the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to dismiss the proceeding. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701 [on appeal from a void judgment, the reviewing court's jurisdiction is limited to reversing the trial court's void acts].)
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
PERREN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P.J.
YEGAN, J.
James W. Brown, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
Gordon & Rees LLP, Stephen E. Ronk, Michelle L. Steinhardt, Stephanie P. Alexander for Appellants.
Law Office of Eric A. Woosley, Eric A. Woosley, Jordan T. Porter for Respondents.