Opinion
No. 22116.
Decided February 6, 1967.
From a money judgment in favor of paint supplier and painter and also decreeing foreclosure of a mechanic's lien, farm owner brings error.
Affirmed.
1. CONTRACTS — Painter — Improvements — Stoppage — Supplier — Breach — Performance — Excuse. Where owner of farm entered into contract with painter to have improvements on her farm painted and before work was completed ordered painter to stop because she was dissatisfied with results and refused to permit either painter or paint supplier to complete work which trial court found they were willing to do, held, under such circumstances farm owner breached contract and thus excused further performance on part of painter.
2. Work — Promise — Hinder — Performance — Implication. Where parties enter into a contract for the performance of certain work, the law implies a promise on the one party not to prevent, hinder or delay the performance of the other party.
3. WORK and LABOR — Evidence — Findings — Paint Supplier — Painter — Recovery. Record reflects sufficient evidence to support trial court's findings that paint supplier was entitled to be paid for value of paint furnished and used upon farm owner's barns and improvements, and painter was entitled to recover for the reasonable value of work completed by him in accordance with contract.
Error to the District Court of Lincoln County, Honorable John F. Gallagher, Judge.
George J. Francis, Frances DeLost, for plaintiff in error.
Robert J. Safranek, for defendant in error Charles Jones, doing business as Chas. Jones Lumber Company.
Velma Jones, owner of an improved farm, entered into a contract with Earl Walker in which he agreed to paint the improvements on the farm. Walker purchased the paint from Charles Jones, doing business as Chas. Jones Lumber Company. Before the work was completed, Jacobs ordered Walker to stop because she was dissatisfied with the results. Offers were made by Jones and Walker to complete the job but Jacobs declined to permit Walker to fulfill his contract.
Jones instituted this lawsuit against Jacobs to foreclose his mechanic's lien and made Walker a party. Walker filed a cross-claim. Jacobs answered by way of general denial and alleged, as an affirmative defense, that Jones had sold the materials under an implied warranty of fitness. Jacobs also counterclaimed, alleging damages resulting from thinning the paint by use of linseed oil, rather than an evaporative solvent (as suggested in manufacturer's product literature).
[1,2] Jacobs, by her order to Walker to cease work and by refusing to permit either Walker or Jones to complete the work, which the trial court found they were willing to do, breached the contract, and excused further performance on the part of Walker. Under the circumstances the law implies a promise on the one party not to prevent, hinder or delay the performance of the other party. 3 Corbin, Contracts §§ 521, 770; 4 Corbin, Contracts § 947; Restatement, Contracts § 315.
Under the facts, as found by the trial court, Jones was entitled to be paid for the value of the paint furnished for use and used upon Jacobs' barns and improvements, and Walker was entitled to recover for the reasonable value of the work completed by him in accordance with the contract. Broadway, Inc. v. Covello, 144 Colo. 562, 357 P.2d 356. (See, Fagg v. Courtright, 98 Colo. 486, 56 P.2d 1321; Zion Baptist Church v. Hebert, 94 Colo. 59, 28 P.2d 799, and Elliott v. Wolfer, 78 Colo. 213, 240 Pac. 694.)
The court, with sufficient evidence to support each of its findings, entered a money judgment in favor of Jones and against Walker and decreed the foreclosure of the mechanic's lien. It also entered a money judgment in favor of Walker and against Jacobs.
We find no reversible error.
The judgment is affirmed.