Opinion
34-2022 35-2022
08-14-2023
LATEEKQUA JACKSON v. STATE OF MARYLAND STATE OF MARYLAND v. GARRICK L. POWELL, JR.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND [*]
Argued June 1, 2023
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County Case Nos. C-02-CR-21-000392, Case No. C-02-CR-21-000394
Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ.
OPINION
Booth, J.
Under a Maryland statute and corresponding court rule, which are collectively known as the "Hicks rule," a criminal trial in a circuit court must commence within 180 days of the first appearance of the defendant or defense counsel in that court-a deadline known as the "Hicks date." A continuance of the trial beyond the Hicks date may be granted only for "good cause." Where a violation of the Hicks rule occurs, the defendant's charges must be dismissed with prejudice, unless the defendant or defense counsel sought or expressly consented to a trial date beyond the Hicks date.
In this case, it is undisputed that the criminal trial of three co-defendants whose cases had been consolidated was initially scheduled for a date beyond the Hicks date, and that the trial court made no finding of "good cause." We must determine whether the violation of the Hicks rule mandates the dismissal of the charges against co-defendants Garrick L. Powell, Jr. and Lateekqua Jackson, or whether the defendants or their counsel sought or expressly consented to a trial date beyond the Hicks date, thereby precluding the availability of the dismissal sanction.
After the defendants moved to dismiss their respective indictments because of the Hicks rule violations, the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County granted the defendants' motions and dismissed the charges against them. On appeal, the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court's judgment in Mr. Powell's case, concluding that Mr. Powell's attorney did not expressly consent to a trial date beyond the Hicks date. State v. Henry, 256 Md.App. 156, 179-82 (2022). The Appellate Court reversed the judgment in Ms. Jackson's case, concluding that Ms. Jackson expressly consented to a trial date beyond the Hicks date. Id. at 178-79.
The State petitioned for a writ of certiorari in Mr. Powell's case, and Ms. Jackson petitioned for a writ of certiorari in her case. We granted both petitions to review the following questions, which we have consolidated and rephrased:
1. Did Mr. Powell's attorney, through his conduct at a scheduling hearing, seek a first trial date beyond the Hicks date, thereby precluding dismissal for a Hicks violation?
2. Did Ms. Jackson expressly consent to a first trial date in violation of the Hicks date, precluding dismissal for a Hicks violation?
3. Did Ms. Jackson's attorney, through her conduct at a scheduling hearing, seek a first trial date beyond the Hicks date, thereby precluding dismissal for a Hicks violation?
For the reasons set forth below, we answer yes to the first question. We hold that Mr. Powell's counsel, through his conduct at a scheduling hearing, sought a trial date that exceeded the Hicks date, thereby precluding dismissal of Mr. Powell's indictment as a remedy for the Hicks violation. We reverse the Appellate Court's judgment in Mr. Powell's case. We answer no to the second question. We hold that Ms. Jackson did not expressly consent to a trial date in violation of the Hicks rule. We answer yes to the third question. We hold that Ms. Jackson's attorney, through her conduct at a scheduling hearing, sought a trial date that exceeded the Hicks date, thereby precluding dismissal of Ms. Jackson's indictment as a remedy for the Hicks violation. We affirm the Appellate Court's judgment in Ms. Jackson's case, but for different reasons.
I
Background
A. The "Hicks Rule" - The Text of the Statute and Rule
A criminal trial in a Maryland circuit court must begin within 180 days of certain triggering events. This deadline is set forth in statute and rule. In its current iteration, the statute provides:
(a) (1) The date for trial of a criminal matter in the circuit court shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of:
(i) the appearance of counsel; or
(ii) the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit court, as provided in the Maryland Rules.
(2) The trial date may not be later than 180 days after the earlier of those events.
(b) (1) For good cause shown, the county administrative judge or a designee of the judge may grant a change of the trial date in a circuit court:
(i) on motion of a party; or
(ii) on the initiative of the circuit court.
(2) If a circuit court trial date is changed under paragraph (1) of this subsection, any subsequent changes of the trial date may only be made by the county administrative judge or that judge's designee for good cause shown.
(b) The [Supreme] Court of [Maryland] may adopt additional rules to carry out this section.Md. Code (2018 Repl. Vol., 2022 Supp.), Criminal Procedure Article ("CP") § 6-103. This Court has adopted a rule consistent with this statute-Maryland Rule 4-271. As we noted above, "[t]he requirements established by the statute and rule are often referred to colloquially as the 'Hicks rule' and the deadline for commencing trial under those provisions as the 'Hicks date.'" Tunnell v. State, 466 Md. 565, 571 (2020). As is evident from its text, the statute does not specify the consequences for failure to begin a trial by the statutory deadline.
B. The Hicks Case
In a 1979 decision, this Court considered a prior version of the statute, and held that compliance with the statutory deadline was mandatory and that any postponement beyond that deadline must be authorized by the administrative judge upon a determination of requisite cause. State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318 (1979). This Court held that a failure to commence a trial in accordance with the statutory timeline requires dismissal of the charges with prejudice. Id.
Prior to the Hicks decision, "it was widely understood that the deadline for trial set forth in the statute and rule was directory rather than mandatory." Tunnell, 466 Md. at 584. "That understanding was based in part on the absence of any sanction in the statute or rule for failure to meet the deadline-an understanding that was initially confirmed with respect to the statute by the appellate courts." Id. (citing Young v. State, 15 Md.App. 707, aff'd, 266 Md. 438 (1972)). The Court's decision in Hicks "upended that understanding." Id. Rather than describing the Hicks case anew, we restate some of this Court's recent discussion:
In Hicks, the trial was scheduled well within the rule's (then) 120-day deadline, but postponed when it turned out that the defendant was incarcerated in another state. At a motions hearing approximately 40 days past the deadline, the circuit court dismissed the charges for failure to comply with the deadline. The circuit court held that the 1977 adoption of the court rule set forth a mandatory deadline for commencement of a trial in a criminal case and that the failure to try the defendant in that case by the deadline required dismissal of the charges.
On appeal, this Court agreed that the rule established a mandatory deadline, although it also concluded that there was 'extraordinary cause'-the standard set forth in the rule at that time-for continuance of the trial past the deadline. The Court therefore reversed the dismissal of the charges.
The Court explained that its conclusion that the rule was mandatory was based on the underlying purpose of the statute and court rule 'to obtain prompt disposition of criminal charges.' Quoting a prior decision of the [Appellate Court of Maryland], the Court observed that postponement of criminal trials resulted in trial courts and court-supporting agencies 'spinning their wheels,' wasted time of attorneys and witnesses, and frustrated other persons involved in the system, all of which impaired public confidence in the courts. The Court was careful to distinguish this rationale from a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial, stating that the court rule 'stands on a different legal footing' from the constitutional speedy trial requirement.
Although the Court in Hicks found that the 'extraordinary cause' standard was met under the circumstances of that case and allowed the prosecution to go forward, its holding set a strict standard that presaged dismissal of cases scheduled under the prior understanding of the rule, with results that could be unfair and unforeseen in pending prosecutions.Tunnell, 466 Md. at 584-85 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
In response to the State's motion for reconsideration, the Court in Hicks issued a per curiam opinion that moderated the potential consequences of the sweeping nature of the mandatory dismissal sanction. 285 Md. 310, on motion for reconsideration, 285 Md. 334 38 (1979). Specifically, the Court stated that dismissal of criminal charges would be "inappropriate" in situations where the defendant, personally or through counsel, "seeks or expressly consents to a trial date" that does not comply with the Hicks rule:
[I]t is inappropriate to dismiss the criminal charges . . . where the defendant, either individually or by his attorney, seeks or expressly consents to a trial date in violation of [the rule]. It would, in our judgment, be entirely inappropriate for the defendant to gain advantage from a violation of the rule when he was a party to that violation.Id. at 335 (emphasis added). The above-quoted language has become commonly referred to as the "seeks or expressly consents exception." The Court analogized the exception to a defendant who seeks or expressly consents to a mistrial, then asserts the aborted trial as a bar to retrial. Id. at 335-36 (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1971); Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 508 (1975); Cornish v. State, 272 Md. 312, 318-19 (1974)). Put simply, in carving out an exception to dismissal where the defendant or defense counsel "seeks or expressly consents" to a trial beyond the Hicks date where a violation of the rule has occurred, the Court refused to allow a defendant to "take advantage of his own act[.]" Id. at 335.
The Hicks rule and the seeks or expressly consents exception are intended to balance competing societal interests. Concerning the rule itself, the Court in Hicks noted a "legislative policy designed to obtain prompt disposition of criminal charges[,]" and that the rule was intended to "put teeth" into the deadline. Id. at 316, 318. For these reasons, the rule is "of mandatory application, binding upon the prosecution and defense alike[.]" Id. at 318. In other words, the dismissal sanction "was intended primarily to carry out the public policy favoring the prompt disposition of criminal cases, independent of a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights." Tunnell, 466 Md. at 571-72; see also Dorsey v. State, 349 Md. 688, 702 (1998) (observing that dismissal under the Hicks rule "'is not for the purpose of protecting a criminal defendant's right to a speedy trial; instead, it is a prophylactic measure to further society's interest in trying cases within 180 days'" (quoting State v. Brown, 307 Md. 651, 658 (1986)) (additional citations omitted)). Any benefits to defendants "are purely incidental." Dorsey, 349 Md. at 701 (citing Calhoun v. State, 299 Md. 1, 11-12 (1984); Curley v. State, 299 Md. 449, 460 (1984); State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 456 (1984); Marks v. State, 84 Md.App. 269, 277 (1990)).
On the other hand, the seeks or expressly consents exception reflects that judicial efficiency is not the only policy interest at play. As we recently observed, the exception furthers a "public interest in the disposition of criminal cases on the merits-whether acquittal or conviction." Tunnell, 466 Md. at 588. We have explained that:
'[D]ismissal of a serious criminal case, on grounds unrelated to the defendant's guilt or innocence, is a drastic sanction' to be used 'only . . . when . . . needed' to further the goal of judicial efficiency. A criminal justice system can only call itself a justice system if cases are generally decided on their merits. The Hicks rule is not simply a mechanism for efficiently clearing dockets in a statistical sense.Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32, 41 (1984)). A justice system in which the calendar is the predominant factor in resolving cases-or in which a litigant can secure a dismissal of a case by pursuing delay-would merit little public confidence. Given the societal interest in the resolution of cases on their merits, "it makes sense that a defendant may consent to a trial beyond the Hicks date, as the defendant is the individual with the most at stake in the disposition of the charges on the merits." Id. The seeks or expressly consents exception ensures that a criminal defendant does not, by his express words or conduct, utilize the Hicks rule to seek an unfair advantage or game the system. In Hicks, this Court explained that "[i]t would[] . . . be entirely inappropriate for the defendant to gain advantage from a violation of the rule when he was a party to that violation." 285 Md. at 335. Accordingly, "[w]hile neither the statute nor the rule provided for such an exception, this gloss on the statute and rule eliminate[s] the potential for manipulation of the . . . mandatory rule by a defendant agreeing to a postponement and then seeking dismissal based upon that postponement." Tunnell, 466 Md. at 586.
Under the Hicks rule, the severe sanction of dismissal ensures the State complies with the 180-day deadline. The seeks or expressly consents exception imposes limitations on the availability of the dismissal sanction where the defendant or defense counsel expressly consented to a trial date beyond the Hicks date, or actively participated in conduct that resulted in a violation of the Hicks rule. Put another way, when the defense seeks or expressly consents to a delay beyond the Hicks date, it forfeits any remedy for a Hicks violation. As we will discuss in more detail, in the four decades since Hicks, Maryland appellate courts have developed a body of case law describing circumstances in which a criminal defendant or defense counsel expressly consents to or seeks a trial date in violation of the Hicks rule. As these cases reflect, courts confronted with this exception must analyze the particular facts and circumstances of the case through a common sense lens. With this background in mind, we turn to the facts and circumstances of this case.
II
Procedural History
A. Proceedings in the Circuit Court
On February 3, 2021, police searched a car occupied by Niran Marquise Henry, Lateekqua Jackson, and Garrick L. Powell Jr. The search allegedly uncovered drugs, cash, and firearms. The State indicted all three for related offenses on March 12, 2021. Six days later, the State moved to consolidate all three cases. That motion was granted in August 2021.