Summary
affirming bankruptcy court's decision to look at the IRS standard allowances for various living expenses to compute the debtor's likely expenses if she were to seek certain types of employment in the future
Summary of this case from In re MillerOpinion
Case No. 3:03CV7692
April 30, 2004
ORDER
This is a bankruptcy case in which plaintiff Marjorie Jackson filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio discharged plaintiff's student loan debt because repayment of the debt would impose on her an "undue hardship" pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B). Pending is defendant's appeal to have the discharge set aside.
Under 28 U.S.C § 157(b)(2)(I), a determination as to the dischargeability of a particular debt is a core proceeding; thus, it is an appealable decision. This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
For the following reasons, the order of the Bankruptcy Court shall be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Between February 1997 and February 2000, plaintiff executed twelve loan notes in favor of defendant to finance her education at Davis Junior College in Toledo, Ohio. The total amount dispersed to plaintiff was $20,337.53, and the total amount due on her loan as of February 24, 2003, the date of the Bankruptcy Court hearing, was $26,390.99. Plaintiff has made no payments on the loans but has applied for, and received, deferment or forbearance due to financial hardship.Plaintiff graduated from Davis in 2000 with an Associate of Arts degree in office administration and a minor in business. Her schooling prepared her to work in an office setting. Plaintiff is thirty-two years old and unemployed, despite having applied for between 300 to 400 positions in her chosen field over the past three and one-half years. She has received no offers of employment from the interviews she has been granted. Plaintiff says she is not likely to obtain employment in her field because potential employers have told her she lacks experience.
Plaintiff was employed before and while she attended Davis. In 1999, while a full-time student, she worked for Midwest National Mortgage. In 2000, also while attending Davis full-time, she worked for Family Health Plan and Market Place Mortgage. Her employment with each of those companies was in customer service or telemarketing positions. Her income in 1999 was $14,455 and in 2000 she earned $16,000.
Plaintiff is married and lives with her husband. They have no children. Plaintiff is in good health with no physical or mental problems to prevent her from working. Plaintiff has received no income since 2000. Her husband's total income is $883 per month, or $10,596 per year, comprised of $650 per month from a part-time job and $233 per month from Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). Plaintiff's mother normally lives with her, but is presently in respite care. Her mother contributes $275 per month for household expenses. Thus, plaintiff's total household net income is $1,158 per month or $13,896 per year.
Plaintiff's housing expenses are $314 per month. Her remaining monthly expenses are: $250 for utilities, $44 for telephone service, $150 for food, $60 for automobile insurance, and $40 for a washer and dryer. Her total expenses, therefore, are $948 per month. Plaintiff does not own a car, but carries insurance so she can borrow a car when necessary. Plaintiff testified that the $150 monthly food expense is less than adequate.
Plaintiff's housing expenses would increase to $632 per month if she did not receive Section 8 housing assistance.
Plaintiff's total debt is $35,563.63, of which $26,390, or 74.2 percent, represents student loan debt. The monthly payment on plaintiff's student loan debt is $189. Plaintiff sought discharge of this debt based on the "undue hardship" exception to the general rule of nondischargeability of such debt under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact shall be set aside only if clearly erroneous. A decision that student loans impose an undue hardship "`is a question of law subject to de novo review.'" Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Cheesman v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Cheesman), 25 F.3d 356, 359 (6th Cir. 1994)).
DISCUSSION
Section 523(a)(8)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that an educational loan is not dischargeable in bankruptcy unless "excepting such debt from discharge . . . will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's dependents." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B). The underlying purpose of this provision is to "prevent indebted college or graduate students from filing for bankruptcy immediately upon graduation, thereby absolving themselves of the obligation to repay their student loans." Hornsby, 144 F.3d at 436-37 (citing Cheesman, 25 F.3d at 359).The Bankruptcy Code does not define "undue hardship." Consequently, courts have developed various tests to determine whether "undue hardship" exists. Flores v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Flores), 282 B.R. 847, 853 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000). Although the Sixth Circuit has declined to adopt any one test, in at least two cases it has considered and applied the three factors set forth in Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2nd Cir. 1987) to determine the existence of "undue hardship." See Hornsby, 144 F.3d at 437-38 (noting that the Brunner test has been the most widely applied); Cheesman, 25 F.3d at 359. Bankruptcy courts within this District have consistently applied the Brunner test. See, e.g., Ciesicki v. Sallie Mae, 292 B.R. 299, 304 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003); Flores, 282 B.R. at 853; Mitcham v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Mitcham), 293 B.R. 138, 144 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003). Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court in the instant case applied the Brunner test and was correct to do so.
Under the Brunner test, a debtor must prove each of the following three elements to demonstrate undue hardship under § 523(a)(8):
(1) the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a `minimal' standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loan;
(2) additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period . . .; and
(3) the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.Cheesman, 25 F.3d at 359 (quoting Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396). A debtor seeking an undue hardship discharge bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Grine v. Tex. Guaranteed Student Loan Corp. (In re Grine), 254 B.R. 191, 197 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000).
A. Minimal Standard of Living
The issue under the first prong of Brunner is whether the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that plaintiff would be unable to maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to repay her student loans. The essence of the minimal standard of living requirement "is that a debtor, after providing for his or her basic needs, may not allocate any of his or her financial resources to the detriment of . . . student loan creditor(s)." Mitcham, 293 B.R. at 144 (citing Rice v. United States (In re Rice), 78 F.3d 1144, 1149 (6th Cir. 1996)). The analysis of the first prong centers around two considerations: a 1) "the debtor's income;" and 2) "those expenses which are necessary for the debtor to meet his or her basic needs." Id.; Flores, 282 B.R. at 854.
In the instant case, the Bankruptcy Court found, and the record supports, a family income of $833 per month, augmented by a monthly contribution of $275 from plaintiff's mother. The net household income is significantly below the 2003 Department of Health and Human Services Poverty Guidelines for a family size of three. 68 Fed. Reg. 6456, 6457 (Feb. 7, 2003). Family expenses, estimated very conservatively, are $948 per month. To describe plaintiff's standard of living as minimal is to make it appear more prosperous than it is. This is not a case in which serious doubts can be raised concerning the legitimacy of plaintiff's income and expenses; the Bankruptcy Court's findings in this regard will not be disturbed.
The Poverty Guideline for a family of three is $15,260.00. To the extent plaintiff's mother does not continue to live with her or contribute to expenses, plaintiff's total household net income is $ 10,596.00 per year, well below the Poverty Guidelines for a family of two. 68 Fed. Reg. at 6457.
Courts, however, are not required to accept the debtor's enumerated income and expenses at face value. Flores, 282 B.R. at 854; Miteham, 293 B.R. at 144. Rather, courts are:
under a duty to scrutinize, and in appropriate circumstances adjust, a debtor's income and expenses so as to ensure that such income and expenses reflect a true picture of the debtor's financial situation. In this regard, a debtor is expected to use their best efforts to maximize their income within their vocational profile.Flores, 282 B.R. at 854; Miteham, 293 B.R. at 144.
Defendant contends the Bankruptcy Court erred by not scrutinizing plaintiff's alleged failure to maximize her income. Defendant suggests plaintiff's decision not to seek employment outside of her chosen line of work evinces such a failure. In Mitcham, 293 B.R. at 145, the court examined whether the debtor made attempts to maximize her income in order to make payments on her student loan obligation. The debtor, who was employed, unsuccessfully sought other employment in hopes of increasing her income. Id. at 141. The court, making no mention of how serious of an effort the debtor made to obtain alternative employment, found that the debtor had "used her best efforts to maximize her income within her vocational profile." Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
Although the debtor in Mitcham, was employed, as opposed to plaintiff in the instant case, the record demonstrates that plaintiff has applied to between 300 to 400 positions within her vocational profile. Of the interviews plaintiff has received, no job offers have been extended. Plaintiff, while living close to, if not under the poverty line, has extensively sought employment, thereby reasonably using her best efforts to maximize her income within her vocational profile. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court did not err in determining that plaintiff has not failed to maximize her income.
Moreover, as to plaintiff's enumerated expenses, the Bankruptcy Court would have been justified, had it done so, in increasing the amount of plaintiff's expenses to reflect a true picture of her financial situation. Plaintiff testified that the $150 monthly food expense is less than adequate. Not only is $150 per month for food extremely low for a family of two, but plaintiff's total monthly expenses of $948 make no mention of medical expenses. Nor has plaintiff accounted for clothing and recreation expenses. Moreover, as the Bankruptcy Court noted, no transportation expenses were included because plaintiff does not own a car. But it is unlikely that plaintiff has not incurred expenses, such as bus fare and gasoline costs when borrowing a car.
$150 per month for food would be especially low when plaintiff's mother was actually living in plaintiff's household. The Internal Revenue Service's Collection Financial Standards, which are used to determine a taxpayer's ability to pay a delinquent tax liability, allow $324 per month for food expenses for a two-person household with a monthly income of between $833 to $1,249. See Dep't of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses, available at http://www.irs.gov./businesses/small/article/0,, id=104627,00.html.
Even if plaintiff's monthly expenses are not adjusted upward, plaintiff has only $210 per month in disposable income, $189 of which is needed to satisfy the monthly payment due on her student loan obligation. This would leave $21 per month for plaintiff's unstated and unanticipated expenses, such as costs for medical care, clothing, recreation, and transportation. In light of the evidence received, the Bankruptcy Court did not err in determining that any increase in plaintiff's expenses would render plaintiff with no disposable income to meet her monthly student loan obligation. Plaintiff cannot maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to repay the loan. Thus, plaintiff has satisfied her burden with respect to the first prong of the Brunner test.
B. Additional Circumstances
The second prong of the Brunner test requires a showing of additional circumstances that indicate plaintiff's distressed state of financial affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the student loan repayment period. Mitcham, 293 B.R. at 146. It is implicit that the debtor's distressed state of financial affairs is the result of circumstances beyond the debtor's control; in other words, plaintiff has to show that she has done everything in her power to improve her financial situation. Berry v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Berry), 266 B.R. 359, 365 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000).
The Bankruptcy Court found that, even if plaintiff obtained employment outside of her field of study, her income would not increase to a level that would enable her to repay her student loan obligation while maintaining a minimal standard of living. The record demonstrates that, in 1999 and 2000, plaintiff held jobs in customer service and telemarketing while attending school. Plaintiff earned an average salary of $15,000 per year in those positions. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court imputed an additional $15,000 per year in plaintiff's income in the event she obtains employment outside of her field of study. As the record demonstrated plaintiff's difficulty in finding employment and her limited maximum level of income earned at prior positions, the Bankruptcy Court did not err in finding that plaintiff's income would not likely exceed $15,000 in the foreseeable future.
An additional income of $15,000 per year would amount to approximately $12,000 net yearly income, or $1,000 net monthly income. This, together with the $1,158 current monthly household income, would result in a gross monthly income of $2,158. While certainly an improvement in her financial situation, realistic expenses and her ability to repay her student loans must still be considered.
The Court assumes, as the Bankruptcy Court did, that approximately twenty percent of plaintiff's gross income will be paid to federal, state, and local taxes.
The Bankruptcy Court found that plaintiff's Section 8 housing assistance will likely be reduced to zero if her income increases by $ 1,000 per month, thereby increasing her monthly expenses by $318. In addition, the Bankruptcy Court reasonably anticipated an increase in transportation costs if plaintiff were working outside of her home. The Bankruptcy Court also found that expenses for clothing, recreation, medical care, and dental care ought to be added to plaintiff's expenses, despite her failure currently to budget for such expenses. Moreover, as the court stressed, $150 per month for food is an unrealistically low figure for a family of either two or three.
Under the Section 8 program, eligible families pay thirty percent of their adjusted income toward their rental payment, while HUD pays the balance of the rent to the landlord, usually through public housing agencies. Neighborhood Research Inst. v. Campus Partners for Cmty. Urban Dev., 212 F.R.D. 364, 366 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(3) and 1437a(a)(1)). Thus, additional adjusted income of $12,000 per year, or $1,000 per month, would require plaintiff to pay an additional $300.00 per month before any assistance is available. The record shows that plaintiff's rent before any housing assistance is $632. With Section 8 assistance at her current level of income, however, she now pays $314.
To quantify the increase in plaintiff's expenses, the Bankruptcy Court looked to national standards for allowable living expenses developed by the Internal Revenue Service to held determine a taxpayer's ability to pay delinquent taxes. Applying the IRS standards, the Bankruptcy Court found that monthly housing and utility expenses in Lucas County, Ohio, other living expenses, and expenses for the ownership of one automobile would total $2,029 for a family of two, which would leave a balance of only $129 each month for medical or other emergency expenses. See Ivory v. United States (In re Ivory), 269 B.R. 890, 900 n. 17 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2001) (inclusion in budget of amount for unanticipated and emergency expenses contemplated within standard of maintaining minimal standard of living); Meyers v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Meyers), 280 B.R. 416, 424 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2002) ($100 per month in potential income over expenses is minimal and does not demonstrate future ability to pay loans).
Living expenses other than housing and transportation are included in the "National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses" and include food, housekeeping supplies, apparel, and services, personal care products and services, and miscellaneous. See United States Dep't of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Collection Fin. Standards, available at http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,, id=96543,00.html.
Defendant claims that the Bankruptcy Court erred when it referred to the IRS national standards for allowable living expenses to compute plaintiff's monthly expenses if she were to obtain employment similar to her jobs while in school. I disagree. The Bankruptcy Court appropriately applied the IRS standards, which describe the amount of money a debtor needs to sustain a minimal standard of living before being required to pay overdue taxes. See United States Dep't of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Collection Fin. Standards, available at http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0, id=96543,00.html. Although the instant case involves student loan debt, as opposed to tax delinquency, it should be noted that there are no specific standards for courts to consider in bankruptcy situations.
Moreover, referencing the IRS standards to determine anticipated increases in expenditures may alleviate the primary criticism of the Brunner test: that courts ought to refrain from predicting future events. See Goranson v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assist. Agency (In re Goranson), 183 B.R. 52, 55-56 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995). Referencing the IRS standards will enable courts to diminish some of the speculation involved with the second prong of the Brunner test.
It was also appropriate for the Bankruptcy Court to find that plaintiff's potential cushion of $129 for emergency expenses would vanish without her mother's monthly contribution of $275. In Flores, 282 B.R. at 855, the court declined to include child support payments in the debtor's income, finding that doing so would be inappropriate "given that this source of revenue will not likely exist for any significant length of time," despite the fact that the debtor was due to receive $172.86 per month for the next two years. Here, plaintiff's mother does not currently live with her and is in respite care. The Bankruptcy Court, in determining whether plaintiff's financial situation is likely to improve, could consider that the income contributed by plaintiff's mother is not reliable, especially when the cessation of such income would result in plaintiff's expenses exceeding her income.
Thus, the Bankruptcy Court did not err in determining that plaintiff's limited future earning potential, whether inside or outside her field of study, and her current monthly resources, which include her mother's contribution, which may not be available in the future, are additional circumstances showing that her future financial situation will not likely permit payment of her student loan debt while maintaining a minimal standard of living. Thus, plaintiff has met her burden under the second prong of the Brunner test.
C. Good Faith Efforts to Repay
In determining whether a debtor has made a good faith effort to repay her debt, a primary consideration is whether the debtor actually made any payments on the obligation, and if so, the amount of those payments. Green v. Sallie Mae Serv. Corp. (In re Green), 238 B.R. 727, 736 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999). Here, plaintiff has not made a payment toward her student loan obligation. A debtor, however, who has failed to make payments is not necessarily foreclosed from a finding of good faith; rather, good faith encompasses all relevant considerations. See id. Although not necessarily complete, courts look to the following considerations in determining whether a debtor has made a good faith effort to repay her student loan debt:
(1) whether a debtor's failure to repay a student loan obligation is truly from factors beyond the debtor's reasonable control;
(2) whether the debtor has realistically used all their available financial resources to pay the debt;
(3) whether the debtor is using their best efforts to maximize their financial potential;
(4) the length of time after the student loan first becomes due that the debtor seeks to discharge the debt;
(5) the percentage of the student loan debt in relation to the debtor's total indebtedness; and
(6) whether the debtor obtained any tangible benefits) from their student loan obligation.Flores, 282 B.R. at 856; Hall v. United States Dep't of Educ. (In re Hall), 293 B.R. 731, 737 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002); Mitcham, 293 B.R. at 148.
The first three considerations favor the plaintiff. Plaintiff's failure to repay her student loan obligation is based on factors beyond her reasonable control. In this respect, plaintiff has been unable to obtain employment despite applying to between 300 to 400 positions. See Ciesicki, 292 B.R. 299, 307 (finding the first consideration satisfied because one of the debtors had aggressively, although unsuccessfully, pursued employment). Moreover, the court has determined that, given plaintiff's financial situation, she cannot realistically afford to make the requisite payments on her student loan debt because of the marginal disparity between her income and expenses, as is supported by the Bankruptcy Court's finding that plaintiff's enumerated expenses were lower than they ought to be, specifically with respect to her food and medical expenses.
As to the third consideration, it is clear plaintiff has made her best efforts to maximize her financial potential by: 1) actively seeking employment; and 2) minimizing her expenses, as is also supported by the Bankruptcy Court's finding that she submitted a low estimation of her monthly expenses, particularly with regard to her food, medical, and transportation costs.
In addition to the first three considerations, the sixth consideration also indicates plaintiff's good faith. She has obtained no tangible benefit from her student loan obligation because she has been unable to find employment related to her chosen field. See Ciesicki, 292 B.R. at 306 (finding the debtors "clearly obtained a tangible benefit from their student loan obligation as they both have enjoyed employment related to their field of study."); Flores, 282 B.R. at 856 (finding the debtor's student loan obligation conferred a real and tangible benefit because her education helped her obtain her present job); Mitcham, 293 B.R. at 148 (finding that the "debtor, by obtaining a job in her chosen field of study, obtained a very real and tangible benefit from her educational debt"). Although a tangible benefit has been found solely when the debtor obtains a degree via her student loans, see, e.g., Hall, 293 B.R. at 737, tangible benefits are more commonly found when the debtor obtains employment in her chosen field. See Ciesicki, 292 B.R. at 306; Flores, 282 B.R. at 856; Mitcham 293 B.R. at 148. The sixth consideration, therefore, supports a finding of good faith.
Some of the good faith considerations, however, cut against a finding of good faith. The fourth consideration suggests plaintiff lacks good faith because very little time has passed since she obtained her degree in 2000. See Mitcham, 293 B.R. at 148 (finding the fourth consideration cut in favor of a good faith finding because the debtor waited nearly ten years after obtaining her Bachelor's degree before seeking a discharge of her student loan debt); Hornsby, 144 F.3d at 436-37 (stating that § 523(a)(8) was enacted to prevent indebted students from filing for bankruptcy shortly after graduation, thus absolving themselves of the obligation to pay their student loan debts) (citing Cheesman, 25 F.3d at 359).
The fifth consideration also militates against a finding of good faith because plaintiff's total debt is $35,563.63, of which $26,390, or 74.2 percent, is her student loan debt. See Mitcham, 293 B.R. at 148 (finding the fifth consideration to militate against a finding of good faith because the large majority of the debtor's outstanding unsecured debt consisted of her student loan obligation); Stupka v. Great Lakes Educ. (In re Stupka), 302 B.R. 236, 244 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003) (finding that the fifth consideration weighed in favor of good faith because there was "no evidence that the Debtor filed bankruptcy to solely discharge her student-loan obligations as this debt comprised just 16% of her total unsecured debt.").
Defendant contends that any indicia of good faith is further negated by plaintiff's failure to apply for the Income Contingent Repayment Plan (ICRP) offered by the Department of Education. Generally, a debtor's failure to work with the ICRP is a consideration that cuts against a finding of good faith. See Douglass v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Serv. (In re Douglass), 237 B.R. 652, 657 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999); Swinney v. Academic Fin. Servs. (In re Swinney), 266 B.R. 800, 807 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001); Birrane v. Penn. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Birrane), 287 B.R. 490, 500 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002). Courts, however, are not constrained by a limited number of considerations when determining whether a debtor has demonstrated good faith. See Flores, 282 B.R. at 856; Hall, 293 B.R. at 737; Mitcham, 293 B.R. at 148.
This repayment option program bases a monthly payment on household size and discretionary income and compares the discretionary income in the household to poverty levels for the same size household. The amount of the monthly payment under the ICRP is calculated based on the borrower's annual income, the total amount borrowed, and family size. The monthly amount is calculated as (a) the amount that would be paid of the borrower repaid the loans in twelve years, multiplied by an annual income percentage factor that varies based on the borrower's annual income; or (b) twenty percent of the borrower's discretionary income, which is defined as the borrower's adjusted gross income minus the poverty level for the borrower's family size.
If that calculation yields a monthly payment between zero and $5, the monthly payment is $5, unless the borrower's income is less than or equal to the poverty level, in which case the monthly payment is zero. If the monthly payment is less than the amount of the interest that accrues on the loans, the interest is capitalized, i.e., added to the principal, once a year until the principal balance reaches ten percent more than the original principal balance. At that point, interest continues to accrue but is not added to the principal balance. See United States Dep't of Education, ICR, Standard, Extended and Graduated Repayment Plans, available at http://www.ed.gov/DirectLoan/RepayCalc/dlentry2.html.
A debtor who is able to pay little or nothing on student loans will carry the ever increasing debt for twenty-five years or more, after which the loan balance is cancelled. See Korhonen v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Korhonen), 296 B.R. 492, 496-497 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2003). The unpaid amount, including interest, however, is then treated a taxable income to the debtor, which may result in a large nondischargeable tax debt. Id.
The Bankruptcy Court, while recognizing that the availability of the ICRP does not automatically preclude relief under the Bankruptcy Code, found that "there is no evidence that [plaintiff] was even informed regarding such a plan." That finding was clearly erroneous because plaintiff testified that she was familiar with the ICRP, yet chose not to apply for it. Even if plaintiff was informed of the ICRP, however, and chose not to participate, this consideration alone will not preclude a finding of good faith. After all, this is not a case in which the debtor has ignored her obligations. Rather, the record demonstrates that plaintiff filed for deferment or forbearance, which she received due to hardship. See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 397 (finding among other factors that the debtor lacked good faith because she made no attempt to request a deferred payment on her loan) (emphasis added). The record, furthermore, demonstrates that plaintiff has applied for between 300 to 400 positions in order to improve the likelihood of being able to meet her student loan obligation. Plaintiff's failure to apply for ICRP, therefore, should not preclude relief under the Bankruptcy Code, especially when the majority of the other considerations weigh in favor of good faith.
Thus, I find that the greater weight of the evidence falls in favor of the plaintiff, and the Bankruptcy Court did not err in concluding that, on the whole, plaintiff had demonstrated good faith, fulfilling the third Brunner factor.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has sustained her burden under all three prongs of the Brunner test. The Bankruptcy Court did not err in determining that exempting plaintiff's student loan debts from discharge would impose on her an "undue hardship."
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED THAT the Bankruptcy Court's decision be, and hereby is, affirmed.
So ordered.