Opinion
Civil Action 2:21-cv-1734
03-16-2022
KAREEM JABBAR-EL, ex rel., KAREEM JABBAR ROCK, ESTATE, Petitioner, v. CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND, WARDEN OF NORTHEAST OHIO CORRECTIONAL CENTER, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, Respondents.
KAREEM JABBAR-EL Adam Fisher United States Attorney's Office (via ECF electronic notification)
KAREEM JABBAR-EL
Adam Fisher United States Attorney's Office (via ECF electronic notification)
ROBERT J. COLVILLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CYNTHIA REED EDDY CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by Petitioner, Kareem Jabbar-El, ex rel., Kareem Jabbar Rock, Estate, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It is further recommended the Petitioner's Motion to Strike (ECF No. 10) and Motion to Vacate Judgment (ECF No. 13) be denied.
II. REPORT
Pro se petitioner Kareem Jabber-El is currently awaiting trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on charges of conspiracy to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing detectable amounts of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), 841(b)(1)(B)(vi), 841(B)(1)(viii), and 846. See United States v. Zamudio, et al., Criminal No. 2:21-cr-358 (W.D. Pa.) (Weigand, J) (ECF No. 4). The criminal case against Petitioner is active and Petitioner is proceeding pro se. Petitioner has filed numerous motions in his criminal case. He is being held in the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center pending his trial.
Despite being detained in the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, in this case Petitioner's listed address of record and the return address on his envelopes is 434 Douglas Blvd., Richmond Heights, OH 44143. See ECF Nos. 1-3, 10-1, and 13-1.
On November 26, 2021, Petitioner submitted, without the filing fee or a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. On November 30, 2021, Petitioner paid the $5.00 filing fee and his Petition was formally filed that day. (ECF No. 2). He claims that this Court does not have jurisdiction “to try a Free Moor, ” and as such, “his criminal proceedings are a nullity” and that his arrest and continued detention violates his due process rights. Id. at ¶13. He requests that the criminal indictment filed against him be dismissed.
The undersigned notes that Petitioner also challenged the Court's jurisdiction in his criminal case and such challenged was denied by the District Court on February 17, 2022. (See 2:21-cr-00358, ECF No. 218).
On January 24, 2022, Respondents, the United States Attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania and the Attorney General of the United States, filed a response to the Petition. Respondents argue, inter alia, that the Petition should be dismissed with prejudice as Petitioner should be directed to seek his requested relief through pretrial motions in the ongoing, criminal matter. (ECF No. 7).
The law in this Circuit is clear that federal defendants who seek pretrial release should do so through the means authorized by the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150, not through a separate §2241 action. Reese v. Warden Philadelphia FDC, 904 F.3d 244, 247 (3d Cir. 2018). The presumptive means to challenge a federal conviction or sentence is the filing of a motion to vacate sentence under §2255 in the district which imposed the sentence in question. See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. §2255(a). Because Petitioner has not yet been sentenced, however, relief under §2255 is not yet available, and he could only acquire habeas relief prior to the issuance of his sentence and any appeal by pursuing his claims as part of a habeas petition instead filed pursuant to §2241. Although §2241 has the capability of providing a jurisdictional basis for a challenge to confinement in violation of the Constitution prior to trial or a sentence, it does not follow that the habeas statute may be used as an end-run around criminal motion practice or appeal. See Reese, 904 F.3d at 246. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained,
[E]ven in cases where the habeas court has the authority to grant relief, it must consider “whether this be a case in which that power ought to be exercised.” [Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008).] ...
Courts have consistently refused to exercise their habeas authority in cases where federal prisoners have sought relief before standing trial. Instead, courts have long stressed that defendants should pursue the remedies available within the criminal action. See, e.g., Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 391 (1918) (“It is well settled that in the absence of exceptional circumstances in criminal cases the regular judicial procedures should be followed and habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of a trial.”); Riggins v. United States, 199 U.S. 547, 551 (1905) (vacating order granting habeas relief to federal pretrial detainees because there was “nothing in this record to disclose that there were any special circumstances which justified a departure from the regular course of judicial procedure” of pretrial motions and, if necessary, appeal); see also Medina v. Choate, 875 F.3d 1025, 1029 (10th Cir. 2017) (adopting “the general rule that §2241 is not a proper avenue for relief for federal prisoners awaiting federal trial”).
Funneling requests for pretrial relief through the criminal action encourages an orderly, efficient resolution of the issues, maintains respect for the appellate process and prevents duplication of judicial work and judge-shopping See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n. 10 (1979) (explaining that “the writ of habeas corpus should not do service for an appeal, ” and that “[t]his rule must be
strictly observed if orderly appellate procedure is to be maintained”); see also Medina, 875 F.3d at 1029-29 (identifying similar interests.)
We relied on this rationale in Government of Virgin Islands v. Bolones, 427 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam), to affirm the District Court's denial of pretrial habeas petitions filed by federal defendants. We rejected the defendants' challenges to their arrest and interrogation on the ground that a pretrial motion in the criminal case, “rather than their petition for writs of habeas corpus, provides the appropriate avenue of relief before trial.” Id. at 1136. We similarly held that the defendants' claim that they had been denied a speedy trial should be resolved “on an appropriate pretrial motion.” Id. Accordingly, insofar as Reese sought to challenge the charges against him or the conduct of law-enforcement officers during arrest or interrogation, he was required to do so through pretrial motions in his criminal case, not via a pretrial §2241 petition. See id.
Section 2241 is likewise not the proper vehicle for Reese to challenge his detention pending trial. The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§3141 - 3150, provides a comprehensive scheme governing pretrial-release decisions. See generally, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742-43 (1987)....Reese, 904 F.3d at 246-47.
Thus, it is clear that under the controlling law of this Circuit, Petitioner has used the wrong vehicle to challenge the validity and nature of his arrest and pretrial detention. He should seek pretrial relief through the filing of pretrial motions in his criminal case. Reese, 904 F.3d at 245. As such, the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2241 should be dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
Because it is recommended that the petition be dismissed, it is recommended that Petitioner's Motion to Strike (ECF No. 10) and Motion to Vacate Judgment (ECF No. 13) likewise be denied.
The motion to strike seeks to strike “Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.” The Court notes that no such motion has been filed in this case. Further, the motion consists of difficult to decipher, legalistic language (i.e., “petitioner has ex-relationed with non de guerre KAREEM ROCK II. This means that the petitioner is no longer willingly accepting charges without a corpus delecti indicted by any court under the Corporal status KAREEM ROCK or KAREEM ROCK II.”). The motion to vacate appears to challenge his arraignment proceedings and the order of detention pending trial entered in his criminal case. No judgment order has been entered in his criminal proceedings.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, it is respectfully recommended that the Petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that Petitioner's Motion to Strike (ECF No. 10) and Motion to Vacate Judgment (ECF No. 13) be denied. To the extent one would be needed, a Certificate of Appealability should be denied because jurists of reason would not find the foregoing debatable.
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Petitioner, because his a non-electronically registered party, may file written objections to this Report and Recommendation by April 4, 2022, and Respondents, because they are electronically registered parties, may file written objections by March 31, 2022. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).