Opinion
No. FA 01-0727767 S
January 29, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO REOPEN JUDGMENT
On October 9, 2003, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Reopen and/or Vacate the financial orders of the court (Hon. John Caruso, J.) dated August 14, 2003 entered at the time the court rendered judgment. The motion is based on the plaintiff's contention that the stipulated value of a parcel of real property owned by the parties had dramatically increased either at the time that evidence concluded in February 2003 or prior to the time the court entered its orders in August. This court heard evidence on the motion and several other matters. For the reasons set forth in this decision, the motion is denied.
The plaintiff contends that Judge Caruso did not enter judgment because he did not use the words "the marriage of the parties is dissolved" in rendering his financial orders. The parties later stipulated that the marriage was dissolved and that judgment should enter accordingly, but the plaintiff then obtained new counsel and that stipulation was purportedly withdrawn. All of those issues are before the Appellate Court. This court must treat the court's decision as a final judgment.
On February 19, 2003, in a writing signed by both parties and their attorneys, the parties stipulated to the value of three properties. The stipulation states that the value of property in Watch Hill, Rhode Island (described as "the "Ninigret home" because of its street address) "is $3,450,000," and valued two other properties at a total of $1,425,000. The stipulation was approved by the court on February 19, 2003, and in rendering his decision on August 14, 2003, Judge Caruso noted that certain values had been stipulated, relieving the court of the responsibility of finding those values. The plaintiff's trial brief filed on March 11, 2003 reiterated the stipulation and argued that the plaintiff should be awarded the Ninigret property as part of the judgment.
The stipulation is attached to this decision.
The plaintiff has not questioned the valuation of the other two properties in the stipulation, only the Ninigret property.
The plaintiff contends that the stipulation as to value should be set aside because it was the product of a mutual mistake. The argument does not take into account the difference between a stipulated judgment and a stipulation of fact entered into by the parties before the rendition of judgment.
" A judgment rendered upon a stipulation of the parties is in the nature of a contract . . ." Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency of the City of Middletown v. Landmark Investment Group, Inc., 218 Conn. 703, 707 (1991) (emphasis added); also see Issler v. Issler, 250 Conn. 226, 235 (1999) (judgment entered in accordance with a stipulation is to be regarded and construed as a contract); Milhalyak v. Milhalyak, 30 Conn. App. 516, 523 (1993). Because a stipulated judgment is in the nature of a contract, the parties to it have available the same defenses available to the parties to any contract. Thus, a stipulated judgment may be reopened if it was obtained by fraud, duress, accident, or mistake. Connecticut Pharmaceutical Association, Inc. v. Milano, 191 Conn. 555, 558 (1983) (addressing a consent decree); Inland Wetlands and Watercourses, supra, 707.
A stipulation of fact, in contrast, is not a contract but rather a judicial admission. Pyne v. City of New Haven, 177 Conn. 456, 464 (1979). While the court may under certain circumstances disregard the stipulation, "under ordinary circumstances [it] should be adopted by the court as a mutual judicial admission." Id., 464-65.
[a] formal stipulation of facts by the parties constitutes a judicial admission and should usually be adopted by the court deciding the case . . . An admission concedes the truth of some fact so that no evidence need be offered to prove it.
Heise v. Rosow, 62 Conn. App. 275, 281 (2001), cert. denied, 256 Conn. 918 (2001), citing State v. Phidd, 42 Conn. App. 17, 31 (1996), cert. denied, 238 Conn. 907 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1108, 117 S.Ct. 1115, 137 L.Ed.2d 315 (1997). Indeed, a court does not have discretion to disregard the factual stipulations of parties without stating on the record its decision to do so and the reasons for that decision, and must then offer the parties the opportunity to present evidence on the factual issue. Cupe v. Commissioner of Correction, 62 Conn. App. 262, 269 (2002), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 908 (2002). When the intention of the parties is clear and unambiguous in the factual stipulation, "[t]he parties' manifestation of their intent [is] . . . binding on the court as a matter of law." Id., 269. Moreover, a stipulation to fact can act as a bar to a party's further contesting of that fact. Connecticut National Bank v. N.E. Owen II, Inc., 22 Conn. App. 468, 473 (1990). The plaintiff has not cited a case that stands for the proposition that a stipulation of fact can be set aside for mutual mistake, and the court has not discovered one.
Moreover, it is clear that the plaintiff was aware before the court's decision of the possibility that the Ninigret property was more valuable than the stipulation provided. She could have contacted her appraiser in March, April, May, June or July. Between May and August of 2003, she was convinced that the stipulated value was wrong. One of the comparable sales relied upon by her appraiser was of a sale that took place in January 2003, while the trial was on-going, and a second took place in May, three months before the court rendered its decision. She knew of the latter transaction not later than June. She is knowledgeable about the real estate market in Watch Hill, and frequently talks about it to two realtor friends. She did not seek an updated appraisal until after the court's decision was rendered, and would not have done so if the court had awarded her title to the Ninigret house. It was not until September 9, 2003 that she contacted Judith Jones, the real estate appraiser who had performed the first appraisal in the fall of 2001, and Ms. Jones did the inspection of the house on September 15, 2003.
Ms. Jones' first appraisal valued the house at $3,500,000, a figure she believes was correct at the time of the appraisal.
A court has the authority to set aside a judgment which is the product of a mistake if a motion is filed within four months of the judgment. In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 283 (1992). However, the court is not empowered to open a judgment which is the product of a mistake if the party claiming the mistake caused or permitted it to occur by her own negligence.
There is no such time limit if the judgment was the product of fraud, but that is not the case here. Kenworthy v. Kenworthy, 180 Conn. 129, 131 (1980).
Fraud, accident, mistake and surprise are recognized grounds for equitable interference, when one, without his [or her] own negligence, has lost an opportunity to present a meritorious defense to an action . . . Equity will not, save in rare and extreme cases, relieve against a judgment rendered as the result of a mistake on the part of a party or his [or her] counsel, unless the mistake is unmixed with negligence, or . . . unconnected with any negligence or inattention . . .
O'Neil v. Honeywell, Inc., 66 Conn. App. 332, 338 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 914 (2002), citing, Cavallo v. Derby Savings Bank, 188 Conn. 281, 284-85 (1982). In the context of an action to reopen and set aside a judgment based on a claim of mistake, that negligence includes the failure of a party to produce evidence which, prior to judgment, was within her power to produce. "If a party, upon the filing of a decision unfavorable to him on an issue which has been litigated at the trial, has a right to have the judgment opened to enable him to offer further testimony upon that issue, which might equally well have been offered at trial, litigation would be prolonged beyond the requirements of a sound public policy." Pollio v. Conservation Commission of the Town of Somers, 32 Conn. App. 109, 117 (1993), citing, Damico v. Dalton, 1 Conn. App. 186, 187-88 (1984); see, also, Shelton Sewer Authority v. DeFillippo, 2 Conn. App. 355, 361-62 (1984). This conclusion is in accord with the Restatement of Judgments. In its commentary, the reporters note: "The requirement that reasonable effort to ascertain the matter in question have (sic) been used during the course of the action is, in modern procedure, an insupperable barrier to relief except in very unusual cases." Restatement 2d, Judgments, Section 71 and Comment d, pp. 187-90. At the time evidence was being taken, the plaintiff in this case had the opportunity to obtain another appraisal, and before the court entered its judgment, she had the knowledge that such an appraisal was required, based on her perception of the real estate values in the area. She gambled for a windfall, and now complains that her former husband received it instead.
The court, however, is not satisfied that a windfall has, in fact occurred. The court does not credit the opinion of the plaintiff's appraiser that the value of the property in question was $7,000,000.00. Accordingly, the plaintiff has not proved that a mistake occurred.
The court is aware of the parties' stipulation that a neighboring property, on the market for three years, was the subject of' an offer for $5,250,000.00. There is no evidence that the bid was accepted, that a contract was formed, or that a sale took place, but the fact of such a bid in December 2003, after the date of the judgment, is irrelevant.
BY THE COURT,
GRUENDEL, J.