Summary
discussing Minnesota's employment discrimination statute which has a similar "aiding and abetting" provision
Summary of this case from Miller v. Edward Jones Co.Opinion
Civil File No. 03-5276 (PAM/RLE)
December 19, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Ruth Iyorbo was employed at a plant operated by Quest International Food Flavors Food Ingredients Company ("Quest") in Rochester, Minnesota. She began work in April 1999 and was terminated in December 2002. Defendant George Mathey was Iyorbo's supervisor. Defendant ICI Americas, Inc. ("ICI") is owned by the same corporation that owns Quest.
Iyorbo is from Trinidad and is female. Her Complaint contains a litany of employment discrimination allegations and she raises nine counts against Defendants. Iyorbo's Complaint does not specify whether her employer was Quest or ICI, however, alleging merely that she worked for "Defendants." (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 7.) She does not explain the relationship between Quest and ICI in her Complaint. According to Defendants, aside from being owned by the same parent corporation, ICI and Quest are unrelated.
Count One of the Complaint alleges that Defendants violated the Minnesota Whistleblower Statute, Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a)-(c), by discriminating against and terminating Iyorbo in retaliation for her complaints about violations of federal laws. Count Two claims that Defendants discriminated against Iyorbo on the basis of gender, sexually harassed Iyorbo, and aided and abetted gender discrimination, all in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat. § 363.01 et seq. Count Three raises a claim of race discrimination and aiding and abetting race discrimination, also in violation of the MHRA. Count Four contends that Defendants discriminated against and harassed Iyorbo on the basis of her (unnamed) disability, in violation of the MHRA. In Count Five, Iyorbo claims national origin discrimination in violation of the MHRA. Count Six alleges age discrimination and aiding and abetting age discrimination in violation of the MHRA. Count Seven contends that Defendants retaliated against Iyorbo for complaining about the discrimination and harassment, in violation of the MHRA. Count Eight contends that Defendants' actions amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count Nine alleges that Defendants breached their employment contract with Iyorbo. Iyorbo has agreed that Counts One and Nine must be dismissed as to Mathey.
ICI contends that it was not Iyorbo's employer and therefore cannot be liable for employment discrimination under the MHRA, for retaliation under the Whistleblower Statute, or for the alleged breach of an employment contract. Further, ICI argues that Iyorbo's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress are preempted by the Minnesota Workers Compensation Act. Alternatively, ICI asserts that Iyorbo has failed to plead facts sufficient to maintain a claim for intention infliction of emotional distress. Mathey challenges Iyorbo's assertion of aiding and abetting liability under the MHRA, contending that Iyorbo's allegations are that Mathey himself committed the alleged violations, not that he aided and abetted the commission of the alleged violations. According to Mathey, the MHRA precludes direct liability for supervisors and Iyorbo's MHRA claims against him must be dismissed. Mathey further contends that Iyorbo's MHRA reprisal claim fails as a matter of law, and both Mathey and Quest join Id's arguments as to Iyorbo's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
DISCUSSION
For the purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, the Court takes all facts alleged in the Complaint as true. Westcott v. Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). The Court must construe the allegations in the Complaint and reasonable inferences arising from the Complaint favorably to Plaintiff. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). A motion to dismiss will be granted only if "it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief."Id.; see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46(1957).
Shortly before the hearing on this matter, Iyorbo sent an Amended Complaint to Defendants. This Amended Complaint contains only one new paragraph, making a specific allegation that ICI was Iyorbo's employer. However, the Amended Complaint has not been filed with the Court, and indeed cannot be filed without first receiving the Court's permission to do so. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). There is no evidence in the docket that Iyorbo has sought leave of Court to file an Amended Complaint. Because no Amended Complaint has been filed, the Court will consider only the allegations in the Complaint when ruling on the Motion to Dismiss.
A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In order to prevail on her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Iyorbo must establish that: 1) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; 2) the conduct was intentional or reckless; and 3) it caused severe emotional distress. Hubbard v. United Press Int'l. Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983) "The operation of this tort is sharply limited to cases involving particularly egregious facts." Id. at 439. Iyorbo has failed to plead sufficient facts to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In order to be deemed "extreme and outrageous," conduct "must be `so atrocious that it passes the boundaries of decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized community.'" Id. (quoting Haagenson v. Nat'l Farmers Union Property Cas. Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652 n. 3 (Minn. 1979)). Even assuming that all of the facts in the Complaint are true, Defendants' actions fall far below this deliberately high standard. Moreover, Iyorbo has utterly failed to allege that she suffers from any distress, much less the severe distress necessary to maintain an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. She has failed to plead that she suffers from distress "so severe that [she cannot] be expected to endure it." Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439. Because Iyorbo has not pled the elements necessary to maintain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Count Eight fails as a matter of law.
B. Claims Against ICI
ICI contends that it must be dismissed as a Defendant because Iyorbo was employed by Quest, not by ICI, and therefore ICI cannot be liable as Iyorbo's employer under either the MHRA or Iyorbo's breach of contract claim. In response, Iyorbo contends that ICI was the company that responded to her charge of discrimination, evidencing the close relationship between ICI and Quest. As noted above, it appears that ICI and Quest are owned by the same company but are in other respects unrelated.
On a Motion to Dismiss, the Court must examine the Complaint to determine whether the allegations in the Complaint state a claim as a matter of law. The only allegations with regard to ICI are that ICI has a corporate address that is different from Quest's address (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 2), and that Iyorbo worked for "Defendants" (id. ¶ 7). Further, Iyorbo alleges that Mathey was her direct supervisor and states that Mathey was employed by Quest. (Id. ¶ 4.) Iyorbo has failed to sufficiently plead that ICI was her employer for purposes of liability under the MHRA or her employment contract.
The Court will dismiss ICI from this action without prejudice. Iyorbo may uncover evidence to establish that ICI and Quest are, for the purposes of her claims, interchangeable. At that time, should she receive permission from the Court to do so, Iyorbo may amend her Complaint to assert claims against ICI.
C. Claims Against Mathey
As noted above, Iyorbo has agreed to dismiss Counts One and Nine against Mathey. She contends, however, that he is liable on the remaining counts of the Complaint.
Mathey asserts that there is no liability for supervisors under the MHRA. Further, because Iyorbo alleges that Mathey was personally responsible for much of the allegedly discriminatory and harassing conduct, he cannot be liable under Iyorbo's aiding and abetting theory. As Mathey points out, one cannot aid and abet oneself.
A supervisor cannot be directly liable for violations of the MHRA. Waag v. Thomas Pontiac. Buick. GMC. Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393, 407-08 (D. Minn. 1996) (Lebedoff, M.J.); See also D.W. v. Radisson Plaza Hotel Rochester, 958 F. Supp. 1368, 1375 (D. Minn. 1997) (Magnuson, J.) (holding that supervisors cannot be individually liable under Title VII). Iyorbo argues that Mathey is liable for aiding and abetting Quest's illegal discrimination. This allegation is a mere re-cast of personal liability, however. The allegations of the Complaint show that Mathey was the actor in nearly every incident of alleged discrimination about which Iyorbo complains. Iyorbo cannot hold Mathey liable for aiding and abetting himself. Because supervisors are not individually liable under the MHRA, Counts Four, Five, and Seven, which do not allege any sort of aiding and abetting liability on the part of Mathey, are dismissed as to Mathey.
There are, however, some incidents of alleged discrimination that were perpetrated by people other than Mathey. For example, Iyorbo alleges that a co-worker who was also supervised by Mathey called her "brainless." (Compl. ¶ 28.) As to claims regarding discrimination and harassment by co-workers, taking her allegations as true, Iyorbo has sufficiently pled that Mathey is liable as an aider and abettor of this discrimination and harassment. None of the statements about which she complains, however, can fairly be read to constitute any sort of age discrimination, and thus Count Six is dismissed as to Mathey.
The Complaint does not explain what sort of discrimination being called "brainless" would entail.
CONCLUSION
Iyorbo has not pled that ICI was her employer, and all of her claims against ICI are dismissed without prejudice. Count Eight, which alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress, is dismissed with prejudice. Counts Four, Five, Six, and Seven are dismissed as to Defendant Mathey. The only counts remaining for resolution are Counts One through Seven and Count Nine against Quest, and Counts Two and Three against Mathey.
Accordingly, based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Clerk Doc. No. 10) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;
2. Plaintiffs claims against Defendant ICI Americas, Inc. are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
3. Count Eight of the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
4. Counts One, Four, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine against Defendant George Mathey are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.