Opinion
No. 3-634 / 02-2087
May 14, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, James Q. Blomgren, Judge.
A probate beneficiary appeals from the district court ruling that granted his former wife's request to attach certain assets of his mother's estate, in an effort to satisfy unpaid obligations stemming from the dissolution of the parties' marriage. AFFIRMED.
John Pabst of Pabst Law Firm, Albia, for appellant.
Robert Huffer of Huffer Law Office, Story City, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
In June 2003 Suzanne Ishmael filed a petition requesting the district court issue a writ of attachment to be levied on the assets of the estate of Flora Hiatt, to the extent of the bequest to her former husband, Donald Hiatt. Suzanne's request was based on unpaid obligations under a 1982 temporary support order and the 1984 decree dissolving the parties' marriage. This included Donald's obligation to pay Suzanne temporary and permanent child support for the parties' daughter, Joanna. Donald asserted the petition was barred by the doctrines of estoppel by acquiescence and laches, and that Joanna, not Suzanne, was the real party in interest. The district court rejected all three grounds, found the unpaid judgments and interest due to Suzanne totaled $131,723.34, and issued the writ. Donald appeals.
Although Donald asserts Joanna is not his child, that issue was conclusively adjudicated in the dissolution proceeding.
In addition to reasserting his claims based on estoppel by acquiescence, laches, and real party in interest, Donald at least nominally asserts that Suzanne's requested relief was barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. From our review of the record it does not appear this issue was presented to, or passed on, by the district court. As such, it is not before us on appeal. In re Marriage of Okonkwo, 525 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994).
This case was filed and proceeded in equity, and our review is thus de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. Upon our review we conclude that the district court's findings of facts are fully supported by a preponderance of the credible evidence, and we adopt them as our own. Most significant to this appeal are the court's findings that Donald was fired from a long-term position with Union Carbide while the dissolution of marriage case was pending; that he thereafter continued to farm with a limited profit margin and performed occasional for-cash work as a mechanic, but never again obtained wage-paying employment; that Suzanne contacted two area attorneys and the Child Support Recovery Unit in unsuccessful attempts to collect the unpaid obligations; that Suzanne did not attempt to execute on Donald's assets as she believed he would hide the assets, as he had endeavored to do during the dissolution; that Suzanne nevertheless kept abreast of Donald's known financial condition and employment situation through area relatives; that upon learning of Donald's bequest Suzanne took steps to collect on the overdue obligations; and that, contrary to Donald's contention, Suzanne did not agree to waive Donald's child support obligations.
We agree with the district court that Suzanne's right of recovery is not barred by the doctrine of laches or estoppel by acquiescence. Laches applies only if Suzanne unreasonably delayed in asserting her remedy, and the attachment would injure or prejudice Donald. See Thurn v. Thurn, 310 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981). Estoppel by acquiescence looks to Suzanne's actions, to determine if she waived her right to collect the unpaid obligations. Id. at 541. Here, despite the length of time that elapsed between the filing of the dissolution decree and Suzanne's petition for a writ of attachment, the record does not demonstrate an unreasonable delay, or that Suzanne abandoned her right to the funds.
Rather, the record reveals that Suzanne's periods of inaction were driven by a reasonable and good faith belief that any attempt to enforce her right would be unsuccessful, given Donald's continued lack of wage-paying employment and propensity and ability to hide assets. Suzanne took action as soon as she learned that Donald's financial situation had affirmatively changed. In addition, Donald has not established the prejudice necessary for the application of laches. Donald claims he is prejudiced by the imposition of interest on the unpaid judgments. However, the interest is merely consideration for his possession and use of the funds during the time they remained unpaid to Suzanne. Moreover, Donald had the power to entirely avoid the imposition of interest by simply meeting his obligations under the decree.
Finally, we reject Donald's claim that, to the extent the petition for a writ of attachment sought to recover for unpaid child support judgments, Suzanne is not the real party in interest. The real party in interest rule is intended "simply to protect the defendant against a subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover, and to insure generally that the judgment will have its proper effect as res judicata." In re Marriage of Stutsman, 311 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Iowa 1981) (citation and internal quotations omitted). While Donald's child support obligations ran to the benefit of Joanna, they were clearly due and payable to Suzanne, to compensate her for the funds she was required to expend in raising Joanna. See Anthony v. Anthony, 204 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 1973) (recognizing entitlement to past due child support, payable for the benefit of a now adult child, lay with custodial parent); see also Brown v. Brown, 269 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Iowa 1978) (recognizing, in light of joint and several obligation of parents to support their children, that "one obligor should reimburse the other for any sum paid by the other in excess of his or her proportionate share").
Anthony was superceded by statute on other grounds, as recognized in In re Marriage of Harvey, 523 N.W.2d 755, 756 (Iowa 1994).
Suzanne, as the real party in interest, had the right to seek satisfaction of Donald's past-due obligations. That right was not waived or abandoned. The district court did not err in issuing the writ of attachment.