Opinion
No. 2685 C.D. 2010
07-15-2011
Keith Isenberg, Lori Marshall, Sue Miller, Mona Juart, and the Marion Center Concerned Taxpayers, an association by Patricia Leach, Trustee Ad Litem, Appellants v. Marion Center Area School District
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE BARRY F. FEUDALE, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER
Keith Isenberg, Lori Marshall, Sue Miller, Mona Juart, and the Marion Center Concerned Taxpayers, an association by Patricia Leach, Trustee Ad Litem, (together, Appellants), appeal from the final order dated November 23, 2010, of the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County that sustained the Marion Center Area School District's (District) preliminary objections (POs) to Appellants' Complaint and dismissed Appellants' Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Appellants' Complaint challenged the District's decision to realign grades and close two elementary schools under the Public School Code of 1949. The trial court ultimately dismissed the matter because it concluded that Appellants' Complaint was not timely filed under Section 5571.1 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 5571.1. On appeal, we must first decide whether the challenge is procedural and, if so, secondly, whether Appellants filed their Complaint within thirty days of the effective date of the District's Resolution to close the schools.
Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 1-101 - 27-2702.
In the fall of 2007, the District began debating whether it should close one or more elementary schools. On November 27, 2009, the District published a notice of public hearing concerning possible school closings. The notice set the time and place of the hearing; identified all four elementary schools in the District as possible targets for closing; and was published in The Indiana Gazette, a newspaper of general circulation in the District. (Amended Complaint ¶ 18, R.R. at 367a-68a.) The public hearing was held on December 16, 2009, and no particular elementary school was identified for closing. On March 22, 2010, the District Board of Education (Board) voted to reconfigure the grades so that grades Pre-K through 6 were in one grouping and grades 7 through 12 were in a second grouping. (Amended Complaint ¶ 27, R.R. at 369a.) On April 26, 2010, the Board held a meeting at which it approved and adopted the motion "that the high school building be used to house grades 7 to 12 and W.A. McCreery and Rayne buildings be used to house grades Pre-K to 6 beginning in the 2010-2011 school year." (Amended Complaint ¶ 29, R.R. at 370a (emphasis added).) On May 24, 2010, the Board conducted a work session at which the following motion was made:
to close Creekside-Washington Elementary and Canoe-Grant Elementary Schools effective the close of the 2009-2010 school year. This action shall allow for a more thorough and efficient school system and at the same time permit the School District to continue to meet its obligations under the School Code and [the District's] implementing Regulations.(Resolution 2009-2010-06, May 24, 2010, R.R. at 113a (emphasis added); see also Work Session Meeting Minutes, May 24, 2010, Supplemental R.R. at 477b.) This motion passed by a vote of five to four, and the Board signed a Resolution stating that:
1) Closing. Creekside-Washington Elementary and Canoe-Grant Elementary Schools will be closed effective with the end of the 2009-2010 school year.(Resolution, May 24, 2010, R.R. at 113a (emphasis added).) On August 13, 2010, the Pennsylvania Department of Education approved the staff reductions that resulted in closing the two elementary schools.
2) Delegation. The Superintendent, the proper officers of the Board of School Directors, the Business Manager and the Solicitor are authorized and directed to take such actions as may be necessary, desired or required to carry out the intent of this Resolution.
On August 20, 2010, Appellants filed their Complaint challenging the Board's actions in changing the grade configuration for the District and closing the two elementary schools. The first count alleged that the advertisement for the public hearing and the public hearing, itself, violated Section 780 of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. § 7-780. The second count alleged that the Board arbitrarily and capriciously chose to close the two elementary schools in violation of Section 1311 of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. § 13-1311. In addition to the Complaint, Appellants filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief and Brief in Support thereof.
The District filed POs in the nature of a demurrer raising procedural irregularities, in part alleging that the Complaint was not timely filed. Appellants filed a Response to District's POs and also filed POs to District's POs. Appellants filed an Amended Complaint on October 25, 2010, following argument before the trial court on the POs. (Amended Complaint, R.R. at 362a-78a.) Appellants pled the following four counts in their Amended Complaint: (1) Count I alleged that the advertisement for the public hearing and the hearing itself violated Section 780 of the Public School Code; (2) Count II alleged that the Board arbitrarily and capriciously chose to close the two elementary schools in violation of Section 1311 of the Public School Code; (3) Count III sought to enjoin the District from realigning its grades; and (4) Count IV alleged that the Board arbitrarily and capriciously chose to realign the District's grades and sought restoration of its previous grade alignment until the District complied with the requirements of the Public School Code. The District filed an Answer and New Matter to the Amended Complaint in which it denied that it violated the Public School Code in realigning the District's grades and closing the two elementary schools. The District also alleged in its New Matter and Affirmative Defenses that the Complaint is time-barred by Section 5571.1 of the Judicial Code.
After a second argument before the trial court on November 16, 2010, the trial court issued an opinion and order, in favor of the District, dismissing the Complaint. The trial court held that the thirty-day appeal period set forth in Section 5571.1 of the Judicial Code applied in this case because Appellants' Complaint was a procedural challenge, as opposed to a substantive challenge to the District's authority to close the schools. (Trial Ct. Op. at 11-15, October 5, 2010.) The trial court further determined that the District's August 20, 2010 Complaint was not timely filed within thirty days of the effective date of the Resolution because the trial court interpreted the phrase "end of the 2009-2010 school year" to mean June 30, 2010, applying the definition of "school year" set forth in Section 102 of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. § 1-102, instead of August 2010, when the teachers and students return for the new school year to begin. (Trial Ct. Op. at 4-8, November 23, 2010.) Thus, the trial court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the matter because the August 20th Complaint was not filed within thirty days of June 30th. Appellants have appealed to this Court.
The definition of "school year" as found in the Public School Code, means "[t]he period of time elapsing . . . between the first day of July of one year and the 30th day of June of the following year." 24 P.S. § 1-102.
On appeal, Appellants first argue that the trial court erred in determining that their challenge was procedural, rather than substantive, which results in invoking the thirty-day appeal period set forth in Section 5571.1 of the Judicial Code. Section 5571.1 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Applicability; court of common pleas.--
(1) This section shall apply to any appeal raising questions relating to an alleged defect in the process of or procedure for enactment or adoption of any ordinance, resolution, map or similar action of a political subdivision.
(2) An appeal pursuant to this section shall be to the court of common pleas.
(b) Appeals of defects in statutory procedure.--42 Pa. C.S. § 5571.1 (emphasis added).
(1) Any appeal raising questions relating to an alleged defect in statutory procedure shall be brought within 30 days of the intended effective date of the ordinance.
. . .
(g) Definitions.--As used in this section, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:
"Intended effective date." Notwithstanding the validity of the challenged ordinance, the effective date specified in the challenged ordinance or, if no effective date is specified, the date 60 days after the date the ordinance would have been finally adopted but for the alleged defect in the process of enactment or adoption.
"Ordinance." An ordinance, resolution, map or similar action of a political subdivision.
"Statutory procedure." The preenactment and postenactment procedures prescribed by statute or ordinance in adopting an ordinance.
Appellants' Complaint specifically alleges that the District failed to comply with Sections 1311 and 780 of the Public School Code. Section 1311(a) of the Public School Code provides that:
The board of school directors of any school district may, on account of the small number of pupils in attendance, or the condition of the then existing school building, or for the purpose of better gradation and classification, or other reasons, close any one or more of the public schools in its district. Upon such school or schools being closed, the pupils who belong to the same shall be assigned to other schools, or upon cause shown, be permitted to attend schools in other districts.24 P.S. § 13-1311(a). The Board's authority to close a school under Section 1311(a) is subject to the District providing notice and a hearing as set forth in Section 780 of the Public School Code, which provides that:
In the event of a permanent closing of a public school or substantially all of a school's facilities, the board of school directors shall hold a public hearing on the question not less than three (3) months prior to the decision of the board relating to the closing of the school. Notice of the hearing shall be given in a newspaper of general circulation in the school district at least fifteen (15) days prior to the date of such hearings.24 P.S. § 7-780 (emphasis added). Appellants allege in the Amended Complaint that the District did not comply with Section 780 of the Public School Code because the notice issued by the District "failed to identify the particular school that the District intended to close." (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 19, 39, R.R. at 368a, 371a (emphasis in original).) Moreover, Appellants allege in their Amended Complaint that the public hearing "did not focus on . . . closing the particular school the District intended to shut down," (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 20, 40, R.R. at 368a, 371a), and that the hearing was held even though the feasibility study, containing educational evaluations and studies, was not yet presented to the Board. (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 22, 44, R.R. at 368a, 372a.) Appellants argue that their Amended Complaint directly challenges the District's substantive power to close the two elementary schools because the District failed to obtain the community input demanded by the legislature. In support of their argument, Appellants rely on the Supreme Court's decision in White Deer Township v. Napp, 603 Pa. 562, 985 A.2d 745 (2009).
In White Deer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the relevant portions of a repealed version of the statute, (42 Pa. C.S. § 5571(c)(5) (repealed)), which is substantially similar to the language in Section 5571.1 at issue in the case at bar. In White Deer, new supervisors challenged, in 2003, a 1997 township ordinance that provided supplemental medical insurance for all retired employees of the township that had been employed by the township for at least 20 years. When the ordinance was enacted, all of the supervisors who passed the ordinance had been employees of the township for 21 years. The new supervisors challenged the old supervisors' authority to enact the ordinance under Section 606 of the Second Class Township Code, Act of May 1, 1933, P.L. 103, as amended, 53 P.S. § 65606, which provides that only the township auditors had authority to fix compensation for supervisors. The appellants filed a preliminary objection. The Supreme Court set out the appropriate inquiry in determining whether the limitations of Section 5571.1 of the Judicial Code apply:
As the plain language of the statute states, the thirty-day appeal period applies only to attacks based upon procedural defects in the enactment of the ordinance and does not prevent subsequent attacks on its substantive validity. . . .Therefore, under this statute, any individual who wishes to challenge an ordinance's validity on procedural grounds must raise his claim within thirty days of the ordinance's effective date, but a substantive challenge to an ordinance that does not implicate an alleged defect in the process of enactment or adoption does not have to be filed within thirty days.Id. at 579, 985 A.2d at 755. In concluding that the new supervisors' challenge to the ordinance was not procedurally time-barred, the Supreme Court stated:
The Township argued that its challenge was substantive, based on the authority of the [old] supervisors to enact the Ordinance, and it therefore was not required to challenge the Ordinance within thirty days. Appellants framed the Township's challenge in terms of whether, under Section 606, the [old] supervisors obtained the required auditor approval of the post-retirement benefits, which they argued is a procedural challenge subject to the thirty-day statute of limitations. The Commonwealth Court agreed with the Township, reasoning that the Township's assertion that the supervisors needed auditor approval went directly to the substantive question of whether the supervisors had the
authority under Section 606 to enact the Ordinance, and thus its challenge was not time-barred.Id. at 576, 985 A.2d at 753-54. Thus, we must determine whether the challenge brought by Appellants is based on procedural defects, or the process of enactment, in which case the thirty-day time limit does apply.
Here, Appellants are challenging the Board's failure to comply with notice and hearing requirements, which are procedural defects in the process of enacting the Resolution. The issue is not whether the Board possessed the statutory authority to act in closing the two elementary schools as in White Deer. Thus, Section 5571.1 applies to this case and we must, therefore, determine whether the Complaint was filed "within 30 days of the intended effective date of the ordinance." 42 Pa. C.S. § 5571.1(b)(1) (emphasis added).
Appellants also seem to argue that our decision in Save our School v. Colonial School District, 628 A.2d 1210 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), stands for the proposition that the District's alleged non-compliance with Section 780 of the Public School Code is a substantive challenge to the District's power to close the two elementary schools because the District failed to obtain the community input demanded by the legislature. However, in that case, the appeal was filed within the thirty-day period and, because there was no dispute, there was no discussion about whether the challenges were procedural or substantive under Section 5571.1. Moreover, there is no indication in the opinion that challenges involving a school district's technical compliance with the notice and hearing requirements in Section 780 of the Public School Code are anything other than procedural.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the August 20, 2010 Complaint was untimely filed. They argue that the August 20th Complaint was filed "within 30 days of the intended effective date of the ordinance," 42 Pa. C.S. § 5571.1(b)(1) (emphasis added), which is August 2010, when the teachers and students return for the new school year to begin, because the "District and Board typically approve and use a 'school year' that begins in August." (Appellants' Br. at 9 (quoting Amended Complaint ¶ 30, R.R. at 370a).) Appellants contend that the trial court improperly interpreted the phrase "end of the 2009-2010 school year" in the Resolution, consistent with the definition of "school year" in Section 102 of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. § 1-102, to conclude that the end of the 2009-2010 school year meant June 30, 2010. Appellants contend that applying the "school year" definition in Section 102 of the Public School Code to the Resolution was improper because: (1) there is no evidence in the record that the Board even knew that the phrase "school year" was defined in the Public School Code; (2) there is no evidence in the record that the Board intended to apply the Public School Code definition of "school year" in the Resolution; and, (3) the statutory definition of "school year" applies only to the Public School Code. See 24 P.S. § 1-102 ("When used in this act the following words and phrases shall have the following meanings: . . . 'School year.' The period of time elapsing . . . between the first day of July of one year and the 30th day of June of the following year." (emphasis added)). Appellants point out that neither of the Public School Code provisions at issue in this case (Sections 780 and 1311) use nor refer to a "school year." Because Appellants contend that the Board "intended its motion and resolution to be effective in August 2010," (Appellants' Br. at 12), they contend that their Complaint filed on August 20, 2010, was timely filed within thirty days of the effective date of the Resolution.
The District argues that the trial court correctly applied the well-established definition of the phrase "school year" as set forth in the Public School Code to mean that the Resolution became effective on July 1, 2010, with the end of the 2009-2010 school year being June 30, 2010. The District argues that, although Appellants contend that Board members Isenberg and Marshall can speak to the District's interpretation of the phrase "school year" so as to avoid their case being dismissed, this Court has previously opined that it is the Board as a whole, and not individual members, that has authority to bind the School District. See Bangor Area Education Association v. Bangor Area School District, 720 A.2d 198, 201 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (stating that the Public School Code "confers no authority upon individual school board members to act unilaterally.") (emphasis in original). Moreover, the District argues that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth ex rel. v. Sunbury School District, 335 Pa. 6, 6 A.2d 279 (1939), has ruled that meeting minutes are the best evidence of action taken by a school board. Therefore, the meeting minutes memorializing the Board's actions taken in May, April, and March 2010, are the best evidence, and are reflective of the school closing effective the end of the 2009-2010 school year, i.e., June 30, 2010.
In addressing this issue, we note that our review of a trial court's order sustaining POs and dismissing a complaint is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Petty v. Hospital Service Association of Northeastern Pennsylvania., 967 A.2d 439, 443 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), appeal granted in part, ___ Pa. ___, 995 A.2d 873 (2010). "In reviewing [POs], all well pleaded relevant and material facts are to be considered as true, and [POs] shall only be sustained when they are free and clear from doubt." Id. (citation omitted). "Such review raises a question of law as to which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Here, it is not clear which date the Board was referring to when it resolved to have Creekside-Washington Elementary and Canoe-Grant Elementary Schools closed "effective the close of the 2009-2010 school year." (Resolution at 1, R.R. at 113a.) Appellants pled in their Amended Complaint that the Board's decision to close the two elementary schools "effective the close of the 2009-2010 school year" meant August 2010, when the teachers return for the start of the 2010-2011 school year, and that "[t]he Board typically approves and utilizes a school year that begins in August." (Amended Complaint ¶ 30, R.R. at 370a.) The District now contends that the end of the 2009-2010 school year means June 30, 2010, consistent with the definition of "school year" as set forth in Section 102 of the Public School Code. However, in its Answer to the Amended Complaint, the District "denied that the closures were effective [in August 2010]. To the contrary, the closures were effective at the close of the 2009-2010 school year, June 7 , 2010." (Answer ¶ 36, R.R. at 392a (emphasis added).) Therefore, before the trial court used the June 30, 2010 date, the Board's own filings did not use that date and, thus, are not consistent with its current argument. We also note that the Resolution described a motion that had been passed at the April 2010 Board meeting to use WA-McCreery Elementary and Rayne Elementary buildings to house the students from the Creekside-Washington Elementary and Canoe-Grant Elementary Schools "beginning in the 2010-2011 school year." (Resolution at 1, R.R. at 113a (emphasis added).) Realistically, the students would not physically be housed at these schools until the teachers and students returned for the 2010-2011 school year in August 2010 and, thus, it is not entirely clear that the Board was referring to the definition of "school year" as set forth in the Public School Code in this part of the Resolution.
Based on the averments in the Complaint, which we must accept as true, and the District's inconsistent Answer of what the "close of the 2009-2010 school year" meant in the Resolution, we find that this language in the Resolution is ambiguous and, as such, we cannot conclude that the Complaint was untimely. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court dismissing the Amended Complaint and remand for further proceedings on the merits of the Amended Complaint.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge ORDER
NOW, July 15, 2011, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County in the above-captioned matter is hereby REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings on the merits of the Amended Complaint filed by Appellants.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
/s/ _________
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge