Opinion
May 6, 1996
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (LeVine, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the cross motion of the defendant Corona Car Service Corporation is granted, the complaint and all cross claims are dismissed insofar as they are asserted against it, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.
There are no material questions of fact with respect to the plaintiffs' claim that driver Julio Terrero was an employee of Corona Car Service Corporation (hereinafter Corona Car). Although drivers interested in receiving dispatches from Corona Car agreed to certain basic standards of conduct and rules of operation, these rules and standards related to largely incidental matters and constituted the exercise by Corona Car of only general supervisory powers ( cf., Lazo v. Mak's Trading Co., 199 A.D.2d 165, 166; Matter of Pavan [UTOG 2-Way Radio Assn.], 173 A.D.2d 1036). More particularly, the record reveals that the persons driving for Corona Car owned and maintained their own vehicles, received no salary, retained their own fares, obtained their own health, automobile, and disability insurance, and were at liberty to maintain their own schedule of working hours. Under these circumstances, Corona Car retained only "incidental control over the results produced without further indicia of control over the means employed to achieve the results" ( Matter of Ted Is Back Corp., 64 N.Y.2d 725, 726; see also, Matter of Rukh [Battery City Car Limousine Serv.], 208 A.D.2d 1105; Matter of Bishai [Tel-A-Car of N.Y.], 208 A.D.2d 1103; Matter of Pavan [UTOG 2-Way Radio Assn.], supra). Thompson, J.P., Joy, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.