Summary
holding that an assignee of a claim "stands in the shoes of the assignor . . . and succeeds to all the rights and remedies of the latter."
Summary of this case from Adcor Indus., Inc. v. Bevcorp, LLCOpinion
No. 30100
Decided February 7, 1945.
Motor vehicles — Action against owner or operator in county where injury occurred — Section 6808, General Code — Remedial statute relating to venue and liberally construed — Assignee or subrogee may bring action in county where injury occurred.
1. Section 6308, General Code, providing that an action for injury to person or property, caused by the negligence of the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, may be brought by the person injured against such owner or operator, in the county where such injury occurred, is a remedial statute relating solely to venue and should be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of its enactment. ( Snavely v. Wilkinson, Exr., 138 Ohio St. 125, approved and followed.)
2. The assignee or subrogee of a claim for property damage from one whose motor vehicle is claimed to have been negligently injured in a collision with another motor vehicle, may bring an action against the operator of such latter vehicle in the county where the injury occurred, and summons may be issued and served as provided by Section 6308, General Code.
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals of Allen county.
The Inter Insurance Exchange of the Chicago Motor Club, as plaintiff, filed its petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Allen county, Ohio, against J. Clyde Wagstaff, as defendant, praying judgment in the sum of $390.45.
The petition alleged in substance that on September 26, 1941, a collision occurred on a public highway in Allen County, between an automobile owned and driven by plaintiff's insured, Russell Ramsey, and an automobile driven by the defendant, Wagstaff, proximately caused by the latter's negligence; that as a result of the collision Ramsey's car was damaged in the amount of $415.45; that in accordance with plaintiff's contract of insurance with Ramsey, plaintiff paid him the sum of $415.45, less a deduction of $25; that thereupon Ramsey assigned and transferred to plaintiff all his claims and demands against any other person arising from or connected with the loss, and plaintiff thereby became subrogated to the rights of its insured to the extent of $390.45; and that the insured authorized plaintiff to bring and prosecute an action in its own name and to the limit of the payment made by it.
A summons on the petition was issued to the sheriff of Van Wert county, Ohio, for service. The return showed personal service on the defendant.
Thereupon the defendant filed a motion disclaiming any intention to enter his appearance, challenging the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and asking that the summons be quashed and the service set aside for the reasons that he was not a resident of Allen county; that the cause of action set forth in the petition was upon a subrogation claim and should not be brought in Allen county; and that in the circumstances there was no authority in law for the issuance of summons to the sheriff of Van Wert county and for service thereof on the defendant in that county.
Upon hearing, the Court of Common Pleas sustained the motion and dismissed the petition.
An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, where the judgment below was reversed and the cause remanded. Finding the judgment rendered in conflict with the judgments pronounced on the same question by another Court of Appeals in the cases of Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Johnson (10 Ohio Law Abs., 625) and Travelers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Miller (27 Ohio Law Abs., 406), the judges of the Court of Appeals certified the record of the case to this court for review and final determination.
Messrs. Cable Cable, for appellee.
Messrs. Garling, Kuhn, Marsh Garling, for appellant.
We are presently concerned only with the legality of the service on the defendant in Van Wert county, under a summons issued in Allen county upon a petition filed against him in the Court of Common Pleas of Allen county. For the purposes of this decision, the averments of the petition must be taken as true.
As a general proposition, the venue of civil actions is a matter wholly within the legislative discretion.
Section 6308, General Code, provides:
"Actions for injury to a person or property, caused by the negligence of the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, may be brought, by the person injured, against such owner or operator in the county wherein such injury occurs. A summons in such action against any defendant or defendants shall be issued to the sheriff of any county within this state wherein such defendant or defendants reside and may be served as in other civil actions, notwithstanding any contrary provision of law for the service of summons in civil actions."
This court recently held in the case of Snavely v. Wilkinson, Exr., 138 Ohio St. 125, 33 N.E.2d 999, that the quoted section does not confer a right of action or create a liability, but is a remedial statute relating solely to the venue and should be construed and applied with liberality to accomplish the clear and obvious purpose of its enactment. Hence, an action for injury caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by its owner or operator, thereafter deceased, may be brought against the personal representative of such owner or operator in the county wherein such injury occurred, and summons may be issued and served as provided by the statute.
See Carrier v. Neal, Admx. (Ohio App.), 35 N.E.2d 870, affirmed on authority of the Snavely case by a per curiam opinion in 138 Ohio St. 131, 33 N.E.2d 1002; Pappas v. Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 139 Ohio St. 637, 41 N.E.2d 864. Compare, Harris v. Owens, Admr., 142 Ohio St. 379, 52 N.E.2d 522.
As was said in the Snavely case, the obvious purpose of Section 6308 is to authorize actions of the kind described therein to be tried in the county where the injury occurred, in order that the issues may be determined with greater fairness, convenience and economy for all concerned.
The situation involved in the Snavely case and in the present one is somewhat similar. In the former the defendant was the executor of the estate of the alleged tort-feasor, while here the plaintiff is the assignee or subrogee of one whose motor vehicle is alleged to have been negligently injured.
According to the general rule, an assignee or subrogee of a claim stands in the shoes of the assignor or subrogor, and succeeds to all the rights and remedies of the latter. 3 Ohio Jurisprudence, 275, Section 32; 38 Ohio Jurisprudence, 300, Section 51; 4 American Jurisprudence, 321, Section 115; 50 American Jurisprudence, 752, Section 110; 6 Corpus Juris Secundum, 1142, Section 85.
Applying to this case the rules enunciated in the Snavely case and the other cases decided by this court in which Section 6308, General Code, was liberally interpreted, we conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., WILLIAMS, TURNER, MATTHIAS and HART, JJ., concur.