Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1944-K.
August 16, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant State Trooper David Miranda's ("Trooper Miranda") Motion for Summary Judgment. Having considered the merits of the motion, and because Trooper Miranda has established the applicability of qualified immunity to this case, Trooper Miranda's motion is GRANTED.
I. Background
This is a case brought by Plaintiff Bobby Wayne Ingram ("Ingram") against Trooper Miranda pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged deprivation of constitutional rights in connection with Trooper Miranda's allegedly unlawful treatment of Ingram during the course of a traffic stop.
On September 28, 1999, Trooper Miranda was on patrol in Ellis County, Texas, traveling northbound on Interstate 45. Trooper Miranda noticed an automobile traveling northbound in which the driver, Ingram, was not secured by a seatbelt. As the car passed Trooper Miranda, Ingram put on his seatbelt. Trooper Miranda subsequently stopped Ingram for failure to wear a seatbelt. Trooper Miranda asked Ingram to step out of his vehicle, onto the side of the highway, and informed Ingram that he would be receiving a citation for not wearing his seatbelt.
Trooper Miranda explained the citation to Ingram, and told him that by signing the citation, Ingram was not pleading guilty, but merely agreeing to contact the court. Ingram asked Trooper Miranda if he had to sign the citation, and Trooper Miranda informed him that his signature was not required. At this point, that the parties' recounting of the incident begins to differ.
Ingram states in his complaint that after Trooper Miranda informed him that he did not have to sign the citation, Trooper Miranda told him that he was under arrest for refusing to sign it. Ingram states that he then repeatedly offered to sign the citation, but Trooper Miranda denied his requests and instructed him to put his hands behind his back. Ingram alleges that Trooper Miranda then improperly placed handcuffs on him, clamping them on his wrist bone and grabbing him by the back of his neck while forcing him on the hood of the patrol car. Ingram also claims that Trooper Miranda then grabbed Ingram's right thumb while bending his wrist, which forced the handcuffs into Ingram's skin and back and tore the skin on both of his wrists. As Trooper Miranda had Ingram handcuffed, Ingram told Trooper Miranda that he now wished to sign the citation. Trooper Miranda took the handcuffs off of Ingram and allowed him to sign the citation. Ingram claims that after he signed the citation, and just before he left the scene, a police officer for the City of Palmer arrived, and upon seeing Ingram's torn wrists, the police officer showed disgust. Ingram then returned to his vehicle and was allowed to drive away.
Trooper Miranda's account of the incident differs slightly from that of Ingram. According to an affidavit signed by Trooper Miranda and presented to the Court in connection with Trooper Miranda's motion for summary judgment, once Ingram told Trooper Miranda that he was not going to sign the citation, Trooper Miranda told Ingram to place his hands behind his back, because he must be brought before a magistrate for refusing to sign the citation. Trooper Miranda alleges that as he began to grab Ingram's arm to place him at a disadvantage, Ingram resisted and attempted to pull away. Trooper Miranda states that he got hold of Ingram's arm and repeatedly instructed Ingram to turn around, but Ingram did not voluntarily comply, and he kept moving around. In order to restrain Ingram, Trooper Miranda escorted Ingram over to the patrol car and placed him on the hood, where Trooper Miranda handcuffed him with his hands behind his back. Trooper Miranda claims that after informing Ingram of the consequences of not signing the citation, Ingram immediately indicated that he would sign the citation. Trooper Miranda alleges that he then removed Ingram's handcuffs to allow him to sign the citation. While Ingram claims that it was a City of Palmer police officer who arrived on the scene, Trooper Miranda alleges that the officer which arrived worked for the City of Ennis.
Ingram brought this suit against Trooper Miranda pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest and excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Trooper Miranda contends that he is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits and other summary judgment evidence show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2551 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2551-54. Once a movant makes a properly supported motion, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment should not be granted; the nonmovant may not rest upon allegations in the pleadings, but must support the response to the motion with summary judgment evidence showing the existence of a genuine fact issue for trial. Id. at 321-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2551-54; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-57, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14 (1986). All evidence and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993 (1962).
While the Court is not permitted to enter a "default" summary judgment when a party fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, the party's failure to respond does permit the court to accept the movant's evidence as undisputed. Tutton v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 733 F. Supp. 1113, 1117 (N.D. Tex. 1990). If the movant fails to discharge his initial burden, the nonmovant need not respond at all. See John v. State of Louisiana (Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities), 757 F.2d 698, 708 (5th Cir. 1985). However, if the movant meets his burden under Rule 56, "the nonmovant cannot survive the motion by resting on the mere allegations of [his] pleadings." Isquith for and on behalf of Isquith v. Middle S. Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988). As this Court has stated, "[a] summary judgment nonmovant who does not respond to the motion is relegated to [his] unsworn pleadings, which do not constitute summary judgment evidence." Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996) ( citing Solo Serve Corp. v. Westowne Assocs., 929 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1991)). Because Mr. Ingram has not responded to Trooper Miranda's evidence presented in support of his motion for summary judgment, the Court will treat Trooper Miranda's evidence as undisputed.
III. Qualified Immunity to § 1983 Claims
Qualified immunity is a doctrine which serves to shield a government official from liability based on the performance of his discretionary functions. See Beltran v. City of El Paso, 367 F.3d 299, 302-03 (5th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has established that generally, government officials performing their discretionary duties are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 322 ( quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 475 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Courts apply a two-pronged inquiry to determine whether qualified immunity applies in a given case. First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established federal constitutional or statutory right. See Beltran, 367 F.3d at 303. Second, the court must determine whether the official's conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established legal rules at the time the alleged violation occurred. See id.
Once a defendant has properly invoked qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense. See McClendon, 305 F.3d at 323. At the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff cannot rest on his pleadings, and the court looks to the evidence before it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff in conducting its two-part inquiry. See id. In this case, Trooper Miranda raised the defense of qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, this Court must examine the summary judgment record and determine whether Ingram has adduced sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact suggesting that (1) Trooper Miranda's conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right; and (2) Trooper Miranda's conduct was so objectively unreasonable in light of law that was clearly established at the time of his actions.
A. Trooper Miranda's Alleged Violation of Ingram's Constitutional Rights
Ingram alleges that on the day in question, Trooper Miranda violated his constitutional rights by arresting him without probable cause and using unreasonable and excessive force in taking him into custody in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment ensures "[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures. . . ." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ." Id. amend. XIV, 1.
Ingram complains that Trooper Miranda wrongfully arrested him because there was no probable cause to support his arrest. The Fourth Amendment requires that an arrest be supported by either a properly issued arrest warrant or probable cause. Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2001). As such, wrongful arrest is a constitutional violation. See Dennis v. Warren, 779 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1985). Therefore, in order to satisfy the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis on summary judgment, Ingram must produce evidence identifying conduct by Trooper Miranda which amounts to wrongful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Castillo v. City of Weslaco, 369 F.3d 504, 504 (5th Cir. 2004).
In his affidavit, Trooper Miranda states that he arrested Ingram because Ingram refused to sign a citation for failure to wear a seat belt in the front-seat of his car. This evidence is not disputed. In Texas, if a car is equipped with safety belts, a front-seat passenger must wear one. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.413(a) (Vernon 2004). A violation of this provision is "a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not less than $25 or more than $50." Id. § 545.413(d). Texas law expressly authorizes "[a]ny peace officer [to] arrest without warrant a person found committing a violation" of this law, although it permits police officers to issue citations in lieu of arrest. Id. § 543.001; §§ 543.003-543.005.
In a case with similar factual circumstances, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this particular law in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). In Atwater, the Court held that a motorist's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure was not violated when she was arrested, handcuffed and detained in jail for one hour because she failed to wear her seat belt and fasten her children's seatbelts in violation of § 545.413, and the officer had observed the violation. Id. at 354 ("if an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender").
The evidence in this case shows that Ingram's arrest satisfies constitutional requirements. Because Trooper Miranda observed Ingram driving his car without being secured by his seat belt, Trooper Miranda had probable cause to believe that Ingram violated the seatbelt law. As Ingram has not disputed this evidence, there is no dispute that Trooper Miranda had probable cause to believe that Ingram had committed a crime in his presence by not wearing a seatbelt. Therefore, Trooper Miranda did not wrongfully arrest Ingram, and Ingram has not established a violation of his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.
Regarding Ingram's claim of excessive force, the court must determine if Ingram's injuries rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Where an excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest, the Court most properly characterizes the claim as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right "to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures" of the citizen. See Dobecka v. Mondy, 2004 WL 690888, *2 (N.D. Tex. March 29, 2004) (Solis, J.) ( quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)).
Although a physical confrontation results whenever a detainee is searched or arrested by an officer, the resulting injuries do not always rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 704 (5th Cir. 1999). For example, the Fifth Circuit has failed to find excessive force when the plaintiff alleged that the officer placed handcuffs on her too tightly, thereby causing her wrists to swell. See Glenn, 242 F.3d at 314 ("handcuffing too tightly, without more, does not amount to excessive force").
In his complaint, Ingram alleges that his wrists were torn from Trooper Miranda handcuffing him too tightly and abusing him with the handcuffs. At the summary judgment stage, Ingram must present evidence to support his allegations. See Castillo, 369 F.3d at 504. While Ingram presents no evidence to the Court regarding his claims, Trooper Miranda presents his own affidavit and an affidavit signed by the Ennis police officer which arrived on the scene just before Ingram left. According to both affidavits, while both of them noticed marks on Ingram's wrists which appeared to be left by handcuffs, they saw no sign of blood or excessive force. Furthermore, Trooper Miranda presents the report of a physician who, at the request of the Department of Public Safety and the Attorney General's office, examined Ingram shortly after the encounter. According to the report, the physician noticed only abrasions and mild sprains which did not require any medical attention. There is no evidence that Trooper Miranda tore Ingram's wrists or other evidence of excessive force, when Trooper Miranda handcuffed Ingram. Therefore, under Glenn, Ingram has failed to demonstrate that his injury rises to the level of a constitutional violation.
Based on the evidence before the Court, probable cause existed for Trooper Miranda to arrest Ingram, and Trooper Miranda did not use excessive force during the course of the arrest. Therefore, Ingram has not established that Trooper Miranda violated his clearly established constitutional rights. Ingram thus fails to satisfy the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis on summary judgment.
B. Whether Trooper Miranda's Actions Were Objectively Reasonable
Even if Trooper Miranda was mistaken in his belief regarding the existence of probable cause and the amount of force necessary to use against Ingram, he is still immune from suit if his beliefs were reasonable. See, e.g., Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995). Objective reasonableness is a matter of law for the court to decide. See Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000). The touchstone of this inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have believed that his conduct conformed to the constitutional standard in light of the information available to him and the clearly established law. See id. Therefore, law enforcement officers who mistakenly commit a constitutional violation are nevertheless entitled to immunity if the mistake is a reasonable one. See id. The relevant question is whether reasonably competent police officers could disagree about the lawfulness of the Trooper Miranda's actions. See Harper v. Harris County, Texas, 21 F.3d 597, 600 (5th Cir. 1994).
Here, there are no underlying historical facts in dispute that are material to the resolution of the question of whether Trooper Miranda acted in an objectively reasonable manner at the time of Ingram's arrest. Trooper Miranda's affidavit indicates that he observed Ingram driving while not secured by his seatbelt, and, as Ingram's car passed his patrol car on the interstate, Ingram reached for the buckle of his seat belt to fasten the belt in. Trooper Miranda subsequently stopped the car and made contact with Ingram, informing him that the reason for the traffic stop was Ingram's failure to wear his seat belt in the driver's seat of the car. When Ingram refused to sign the citation, Trooper Miranda arrested him, because § 543.002(a) of the Transportation Code requires a violator who refuses to sign a citation to immediately be brought before a magistrate.
Ingram does not dispute the evidence showing that Trooper Miranda had probable cause to believe that Ingram had committed a crime in his presence by not wearing his seat belt. A reasonable officer in Trooper Miranda's position could have found that Ingram's failure to wear a seat belt warranted Trooper Miranda's belief that Ingram committed an offense. Accordingly, Trooper Miranda is entitled to qualified immunity on Ingram's unlawful arrest claim. See Gasser v. City of Garland, Tex., 864 F.2d 394, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that an officer had probable cause to arrest a motorist when the officer observed the motorist commit the crime for which the motorist was charged).
In considering Ingram's claim of excessive force, the court must determine whether it was clearly established on the date of the incident that Trooper Miranda's use of force against Ingram was objectively unreasonable and thus violative of his constitutional rights. The elements of an excessive force claim under the reasonableness standard are (1) a more than de minimis injury, which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which was (3) objectively unreasonable. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
Ingram alleges that Trooper Miranda used excessive force on him when Trooper Miranda improperly placed handcuffs on him by clamping them on his wrist bone, and that Trooper Miranda grabbed him by the back of the neck and forced him on the hood of the patrol car to assault him. According to Ingram, Trooper Miranda then grabbed Ingram's right thumb while bending his wrist, forcing the handcuffs into Ingram's skin and back, which tore the skin of both of his wrists. Trooper Miranda denies these allegations, and, in his affidavit, states that he merely handcuffed Ingram and only used force that was reasonably necessary in order to restrain Ingram, who was not voluntarily complying with Trooper Miranda's instructions. Moreover, the evidence shows that Trooper Miranda and the Ennis police officer only noticed marks on Ingram's wrists, but no sign of blood or excessive force.
Ingram does not counter Trooper Miranda's evidence with evidence of his own. Based on the record, there is no genuine issue of material fact that exists regarding whether a reasonable officer, facing the same situation, would consider that Trooper Miranda violated Ingram's constitutionally protected rights by holding and handcuffing Ingram in order to restrain him. Therefore, Trooper Miranda is entitled to qualified immunity on the basis of the objective reasonableness of his actions as a matter of law.
The only evidence before the Court shows that Trooper Miranda's decision to arrest Ingram was reasonable, as was the force used by Trooper Miranda during the arrest. Accordingly, Trooper Miranda is entitled to qualified immunity based on the objective reasonableness of his actions as a matter of law.
IV. Conclusion
Because Trooper Miranda has properly invoked qualified immunity, and Ingram has not met his burden of showing its inapplicability, Trooper Miranda has established his qualified immunity defense, and he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Judgment will enter that Ingram take nothing by this suit against Trooper Miranda.
SO ORDERED.