Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-0032-L.
May 17, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed February 8, 1999. After careful consideration of the motion, response, reply, and applicable law, the court, for the reasons that follow, grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. I. Background
Perhaps a more appropriate vehicle to address Defendant's motion is by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 because both parties have referenced and relied on the collective bargaining agreement, which is relevant to this action. Whether the motion is addressed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, however, is really irrelevant because Plaintiffs have failed either to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to any claim. The court would, therefore, conclude that this action should be dismissed under either Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or 56. Since the parties have not objected to the court's consideration of the collective bargaining agreement, the court will analyze this motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
In early 1987, Plaintiffs Courtney W. Ingram ("Ingram") and Glenn E. Richard ("Richard") (collectively "Plaintiffs") were employed by the Kroger Company ("Defendant" or "Kroger") as tow motor and fork lift operators at Defendant's distribution center in Dallas, Texas. On July 16, 1987, Defendant and Plaintiffs' union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local No. 745 (the "Union"), entered into a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") which provided a grievance and arbitration procedure for the resolution of disputes covered by the CBA. Pursuant to the wage schedule, which was attached to the CBA, tow motor and fork lift operators were to be paid $12,435 per hour if their effective date of employment was prior to April 5, 1987. After April 5, 1987, employees hired as tow motor and fork lift operators were to be paid $8.73 for the first year, $9.73 the second year and $10.73 thereafter. Plaintiffs allege that although they were hired prior to April 5, 1987, Defendant incorrectly classified them as employees hired after April 5, 1987. Plaintiffs, were, therefore paid according to the pay schedule for employees hired after such date.
In August 1995, Plaintiffs learned that during the collective bargaining agreement between Kroger and the Union, an agreement had been reached to raise Plaintiffs' hourly base pay. On August 18, 1995, Ingram filed a grievance with the Union claiming that he was owed back pay at the highest pay tier from April 5, 1987 to August 16, 1995. Similarly, on October 26, 1996, Richard filed a grievance with the Union claiming that he was owed back pay at the highest pay tier from April 5, 1987 to August 16, 1995. In separate hearings held before a Kroger/Union grievance committee, Plaintiffs' grievances were denied.
Ingram's grievance was denied on December 4, 1996, and Richard was informed sometime during March 1997 that his grievance had been denied.
On December 4, 1998, Plaintiffs filed this action in the 162nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, asserting state law claims against Defendant for breach of contract based upon the CBA. Defendant removed the action to this court on January 6, 1999 on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, contending that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant are completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Defendant now moves to dismiss all claims and causes of action asserted by Plaintiffs pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
Pursuant to § 301(a) of the LMRA, suits may be brought in district court, without respect to the amount in controversy, for violation of a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
II. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Lowrey v. Texas AM University System, 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997). A district court cannot dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). In ruling on such a motion, the court cannot look beyond the pleadings. Id. The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid cause of action when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 247. A plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992).
II. Analysis
Relying on DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983), Defendant moves to dismiss all claims and causes of action asserted by Plaintiffs, contending that Plaintiffs claims are time-barred because they failed to file the instant lawsuit within the six-month statute of limitations period applicable to a "hybrid" § 301 breach of contract and union breach of duty of fair representation suit. Relying on United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966), Plaintiffs respond that their cause of action against Defendant is not subject to the six-month statute of limitation period because they are not asserting a "hybrid" claim. Plaintiffs contend that their cause of action against Defendant is a straight breach of contract claim governed by the Texas statute of limitations of four years for contract actions. In reply, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' reliance on Hoosier is misplaced because the case does not support Plaintiffs' contention that their claims are not hybrid claims. Kroger further argues that Hoosier is distinguishable because it involved a suit by a union against an employer to enforce rights afforded to employees under the collective bargaining agreements. The court agrees. The court also observes that unlike the CBA in this case, the agreement in Hoosier did not provide for grievance procedures, including arbitration, for the resolution of disputes. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 167. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Defendant because 1) Plaintiffs have failed to assert a breach of fair representation claim against the Union, which is a prerequisite to asserting a § 301 breach of contract claim against their employer, and 2) Plaintiffs claims against Defendant are nevertheless barred by the applicable statute of limitations, if they had asserted a claim against the Union.
It is well settled that an individual employee may bring suit against his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163; Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 198-200 (1962). As a prerequisite to bringing such a suit, an employee is ordinarily required to exhaust any grievance or arbitration procedures provided in the collective bargaining agreement. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163; Gutierrez v. United Foods, Inc., 11 F.3d 556, 559 n. 8 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1142 (1994). An exception to this general rule, however, arises when the union representing the employee in the grievance/arbitration procedure breaches its duty of fair representation in handling the employee's grievance. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164; Vaca v. Sites, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967). In such a case, an employee may bring suit against both the employer and the union, regardless of the outcome or finality of the grievance or arbitration proceeding. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164. In DelCostello, the Court explained that a § 301 breach of contract and fair representation suit comprises two causes of action. 462 U.S. at 164. "The suit against the employer rests on § 301, since the employee is alleging a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The suit against the union is one for breach of the union's duty of fair representation, which is implied under the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act." Id. These two claims, however, are inextricably interdependent, and together have been coined as a hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation suit. Id.; Daigle v. Gulf State Utilities Co., Local Union Number 2286, 794 F.2d 974, 977 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008 (1986) ( citing United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981)). "The interdependency arises from the nature of the collective bargaining agreement. If the arbitration and grievance procedure is the exclusive and final remedy for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, the employee may not sue his employer under § 301 until he has exhausted the procedure." Daigle, 794 F.2d at 977 ( citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965)). Moreover, the employee will be bound by the procedure's result unless he demonstrates the union breached its duty of fair representation. Id. ( citing Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976)). Therefore, "[t]he `indispensable predicate' for a § 301 action against an employer, based on a violation of a collective-bargaining agreement, is the union's breach of its duty of fair representation." Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 621-22 (5th Cir. 1994). To prevail against either, an employee must prove that the employer breached the contract and demonstrate that the union breached its duty of fair representation. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165 ( citing Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 66-67 ( quoting Hines, 424 U.S. at 570-71 (1976)). The applicable statute of limitations for a hybrid § 301/fair representation suit is six months. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171. If, on the other hand, the "collective bargaining agreement does not provide that the grievance and arbitration procedure is the exclusive and final remedy for breach of contract claims, the employee may sue his employer in federal court under § 301, (citation omitted), and the state statute of limitations applicable to contract breaches applies." Daigle, 794 F.2d at 977 ( citing Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966); Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., 748 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1984)).
A hybrid § 301 breach of contract and breach of duty suit is typically "brought by an employee against both his employer and his union in order to set aside a final and binding determination of a grievance, arrived at through the collectively bargained method of resolving the grievance. It is, therefore, a direct challenge to the private settlement disputes under the collective bargaining agreement." hell,U.S. at 66 (internal quotations omitted).
While Plaintiffs assert that their cause of action against Defendant is purely for breach of contract, this characterization ignores the significance of Plaintiffs pursuing this claim under § 301 of the LMRA. See Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 62. An indispensable predicate for such an action is not a showing under traditional contract law that Defendant's failure to pay their respective claims for backpay is a breach of the CBA, but instead a demonstration that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. Id. As the decisions of the Kroger/Union grievance committee were final, Plaintiffs must show that the Union breached its duty to represent them fairly before Plaintiffs can reach the merits of their contract claim. Id. (Because conclusion of grievance panel was binding on all parties, respondent was required to show that Union breached its duty of fair representation before respondent was entitled to reach the merits of his contract claim). Plaintiffs assert no cause of action against the Union. Indeed, Ingram contends that he was pleased with the job that the Union representative had done for him with respect to the grievance. See Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at p. 7. As Plaintiffs have neither asserted nor contended that the Union breached its duty of fair representation in representing them in the grievance proceedings, they cannot state a claim under § 301 of the LMRA. As such, Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant must be dismissed.
Moreover, even if Plaintiffs had asserted a claim against the Union for breach of fair representation, their claims against Defendant must nevertheless be dismissed. As previously stated, "hybrid" § 301/fair representation suits are governed by a six-month statute of limitations. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b); DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171. As this lawsuit was filed two years after the termination of Ingram's grievance proceeding and at least 21 months after the termination of Richard's grievance proceeding, and Plaintiffs assert no particularized circumstances for tolling the statute, the court concludes that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant would be barred by the six-month statute of limitations.
Although the court has determined that dismissal of this action is warranted based on the reasons previously stated, the court finds it necessary to address Plaintiffs' other arguments. Plaintiffs contend that they should have access to a judicial forum because they have exhausted the grievance procedures available to them pursuant to the CBA, and the CBA reserved the parties rights to resort to economic weapons when the procedures failed to resolve the dispute. In support of their proposition, Plaintiffs cite Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 168 (1990). The Groves case, however, is distinguishable in two respects. First, the action in Groves was brought by former employees and their union for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Second, the action was brought after the grievance procedures failed to resolve a dispute between the former employees, their union, and former employer. The question before the Court was whether, upon failure of the grievance procedures, a collective bargaining agreement that reserved the parties' rights to resort to economic weapons, such as strikes, lockouts and other job actions, could be construed to bar recourse to actions under § 301 of the LMRA. The Court held that a contract provision reserving the union's right to resort to economic weapons cannot be construed as an agreement to divest the court of jurisdiction to resolve disputes. This is because Congress, in passing the LMRA, envisioned peaceful resolutions of disputes. Groves, 498 U.S. at 174. In this case, while Plaintiffs may not agree with the decisions of the Kroger/Union grievance committee, the grievance procedure did not fail to resolve their disputes. Plaintiffs submitted their grievances to a grievance committee, and those grievances were denied. As the grievance proceedings were final under the CBA, Plaintiffs are bound by the decisions unless they can demonstrate that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. See Mitchell, 451 U.S. at 61; see also Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 622 (5th Cir. 1994) (under rule of DelCostello, former employee was bound by the results of the grievance proceeding unless he could prove that his employer violated the contract and his union failed to represent him fairly).
Equally unavailing is Plaintiffs' argument that it would be unjust to deprive them of judicial review of the decision of the grievance committee because they are not asserting an unfair representation claim against their union. While there is a strong presumption under § 301 that favors access to a neutral forum for the peaceful resolution of disputes, that presumption is overcome whenever the parties have agreed upon a different method for the adjustment of disputes. Groves, 498 U.S. at 173-174. Here, the CBA provides for such a method for resolving disputes. Moreover, because Plaintiffs assert their claim against Defendant under § 301 of the LMRA, the only claim that they can assert against Defendant is a hybrid § 301/fair representation claim, whether they join the Union as a party or not. See Thomas, 39 F.2d at 622. As Plaintiffs have failed to do so, their claims against Defendant must fail.
For the reasons previously stated, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief against the Union for breach of fair representation, or any set of facts that would defeat the statute of limitations defense, their claims against Defendant must be dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons previously stated, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant The Kroger Company are hereby dismissed with prejudice. The court will enter judgment by separate document.
It is so ordered this 17th day of May, 2000.