Opinion
2003-04164.
Decided February 2, 2004.
In related proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (Foskey, J.), dated March 24, 2003, which upon, in effect, denying her petitions alleging, inter alia, violation of a consent order of custody and visitation of the same court dated August 30, 2001, suspended all visitation between her and the children, and barred her from refiling any custody and visitation petitions without a prior showing that she is compliant with therapy and the use of antipsychotic medication.
Mark Diamond, New York, N.Y., for appellant.
Jacqueline Williams and George Williams, Cumberland, R.I., and John Ross and Mary Ross, Rockaway Park, N.Y., respondents pro se (one brief filed).
Carol Lewisohn, Cedarhurst, N.Y., Law Guadian for the children.
Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN, SANDRA L. TOWNES and BARRY A. COZIER, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof barring the mother from refiling any custody and visitation petitions without a prior showing that she is compliant with therapy and the use of antipsychotic medication; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Under the circumstances of this case, the Family Court properly suspended the mother's visitation rights without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Family Court possessed sufficient information, including the report of a neutral forensic psychiatrist, to render an informed visitation determination consistent with the best interests of the children ( see Matter of Smith v. Molody-Smith, 307 A.D.2d 364; Matter of Porter v. Burgey, 266 A.D.2d 552; Matter of Vangas v. Ladas, 259 A.D.2d 755; Matter of Hermann v. Chakurmanian, 243 A.D.2d 1003). Furthermore, in light of the evidence concerning the severity of the mother's mental illness, and the recommendation of the neutral psychiatrist who evaluated her, the Family Court's determination to suspend visitation is in the best interests of the children ( see Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89; Matter of Wright v. LaRose, 271 A.D.2d 615; Nacson v. Nacson, 166 A.D.2d 510; Matter of Jones v. Jones, 155 A.D.2d 542).
However, we agree with the mother's contention that it was improper for the Family Court to bar her from filing any future applications for custody and visitation "without a prior showing that she is compliant with therapy and the use of anti-psychotic medication." Although the court may, in appropriate circumstances, require a party to obtain counseling and treatment as a component of a custody or visitation order ( see Matter of Remillard v. Luck, A.D.3d [3d Dept, Dec. 24, 2003]; Matter of Mongiardo v. Mongiardo, 232 A.D.2d 741; Matter of Irwin v. Schmidt, 236 A.D.2d 401; Landau v. Landau, 214 A.D.2d 541), it has no authority to compel a parent to undergo therapy as a condition to any future application for custody or visitation ( see Pudalov v. Pudalov, 308 A.D.2d 524; Matter of DeJesus v. Tinoco, 267 A.D.2d 308; Matter of Tucker v. Tucker, 249 A.D.2d 643; Nacson v. Nacson, supra).
RITTER, J.P., KRAUSMAN, TOWNES and COZIER, JJ., concur.