Opinion
No. 3-854 / 03-0149.
Filed December 24, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, E. Richard Meadows, Jr., Judge.
Bernadine Cowan appeals following the denial of her claims against Gerald and Becky Chaplin for the recovery of balances allegedly due on three loans made to Bernard Chaplin. AFFIRMED.
John Pabst of Pabst Law Firm, Albia, for appellant.
J. Terrence Denefe of Kiple, Denefe, Beaver, Gardner Zingg, L.L.P., Ottumwa, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Bernadine Cowan appeals following the denial of her claims against Gerald and Becky Chaplin for the recovery of balances allegedly due on three loans made to Bernard Chaplin. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Bernadine Cowan, Charles Chaplin, and Gerald Chaplin are the three children of Bernard Chaplin, who died testate in February of 2001. Gerald was appointed as executor of the estate. In September of 2001, Bernadine filed a motion to appoint a special executor, claiming Gerald and his wife Becky were debtors of the estate. The district court appointed a special executor. Following the entry of the final report, the court ordered that the dispute between Gerald and Bernadine should continue as an ancillary matter to the estate.
Accordingly, on May 2, 2002, Bernadine filed a petition at law alleging Gerald and Becky were indebted to the decedent for unpaid loans. Gerald and Becky answered, asserting the statute of limitations as a defense against the alleged debts. Following a trial, the court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. In pertinent part, it concluded the loans were based on unwritten contracts, and thus barred by the five-year statute of limitations. See Iowa Code § 614.1(4) (2001). In particular, the court rejected Bernadine's contention a 1996 writing by Becky served as an "acknowledgement," effectively removing the bar of the statute of limitations. See id. § 614.11.
In a motion to amend and enlarge, Bernadine contended the 1996 writing served as a novation/modification of the original loans, thus extending the statute of limitations period for another five years. See In re Integrated Res. Life Ins. Co., 562 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Iowa 1997) (listing elements of novation). The district court concluded that because the novation/modification issue was first raised in the motion to amend and enlarge, it was untimely, and thus not preserved. However, "for the sake of thoroughness," the district court nonetheless addressed the post-trial contention on the merits and rejected it.
On appeal, Bernadine argues only that the court erred in rejecting her claim the March 4, 1996 writing served as a contract novation and modification such as would revive her claim. While we question whether this issue is preserved for our review in that Bernadine first raised the novation/modification issue in her motion to amend and enlarge, see Osborne v. Iowa Natural Res. Council, 336 N.W.2d 745, 747 (Iowa 1983), we conclude the purposes of the error preservation rule were satisfied by the district court's alternate ruling on the merits. We therefore proceed to address the issue.
II. Scope of Review.
This was an action for the establishment of a contested claim in probate, and thus triable at law. Iowa Code § 633.33. Our review, therefore, is for corrections of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.
III. Novation/Modification.
As the district court properly noted, the essential elements of a novation are: (1) a previous valid obligation, (2) agreement of all parties to the new contract, (3) extinguishment of the old contract, and (4) validity of the new contract." Integrated Res. Life Ins. Co., 562 N.W.2d at 182 (citing Klipp v. Iowa Grain Indem. Fund Bd., 502 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa 1993)). The effective result of finding a novation or modification is that the bar of the statute of limitations would effectively be lifted.
We conclude Becky's handwritten note dated March 4, 1996, which Bernadine alleges constituted a novation, fails to establish elements (2), (3), and (4). It is not at all apparent the writing constitutes an "agreement of the parties to a new contract." The note was only signed by Becky, and not by Gerald, Gertrude, or Bernard. The note appears to merely reflect a series of payments made in 1995. The handwritten note does not clearly "extinguish" the "original contract"; in fact, it makes no specific mention of the original contract. Moreover, the note makes no reference to any modification of a contract or agreement to enter into a new one. In conclusion, we concur in the district court's determination that we "cannot reasonably imply from this that the intention of the parties was to create a new contract." Accordingly, we affirm the court's ruling.