Opinion
No. 0-295 / 00-0137
Filed July 12, 2000
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, James Weaver, District Associate Judge.
Mother and father appeal from the termination of their parental rights. They contend the court erred in (1) finding the grounds for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence, (2) determining reasonable efforts were made to maintain the family unit, and (3) denying their motion to bifurcate the permanency and termination hearings.
AFFIRMED.
Esther J. Dean, Muscatine, for appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, and Teresa Stoeckel, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Thomas Reidel of Conway Reidel, Muscatine, for minor children.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Karen, the mother of Cassandra, born June 28, 1995, and of Shannon, born November 14, 1997, appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to the two children. Daniel the father of Cassandra also appeals. The father of Shannon is not a party to this appeal. We affirm.
At the time of Cassandra's birth Daniel and Karen were not married. Karen, then seventeen years old, was a child in need of assistance and was living in the state juvenile home. Based on her mother's status Cassandra was found to be a child in need of assistance shortly after birth and placed in foster care.
In January of 1997 Dan was given custody of the child. Dan was married and his wife assisted him in care giving. Near the time of Shannon's birth in November of 1997, Dan and his wife separated. He was to then take up residence with Karen. He was listed on the birth certificate as Shannon's father though he is not her biological father.
On November 19, 1997 a petition was filed seeking to have Cassandra found to be a child in need of assistance. A caretaker in Dan's home had hurt her. The State also was concerned that Karen now was Cassandra's caretaker. Services were offered. The State contends there was minimal compliance by the parents.
On August 1, 1998 Karen and Dan were married. On August 7, 1998, Cassandra was found wandering alone in Tipton, Iowa. At the time Karen's sister and her boyfriend were taking care of her. The children stayed in Karen and Dan's care. Dan worked long hours at a local Ready Mix. The State was concerned that Karen was not attentive to treatment for her mental problems although when she was, she was responsive to services.
In October of 1998 Shannon was found to be a child in need of assistance. On December 10th of that year Dan was arrested for the alleged abuse of Karen. He was concerned about Karen's ability to care for both children alone. The children were placed in foster care where they have remained.
Unfortunately all did not go well for the children after the removal. They were in their first foster home only until the end of January of 1999, when their foster mother demanded they be removed immediately because she was becoming too attached to them. They attended day care. They went to a second foster home in February. The second set of foster parents gave a notice after two weeks that they were to be removed in ten days. They had different day care at the second home than at the first. At the end of February they were moved to the third foster home where they had a third day care provider.
The parents were only allowed supervised visits with the children. Then on February 18, 1999, the department suspended the parent's visits. The parents were told to comply with a nit/lice check. It appeared Cassandra had lice.
On March 1, 1999 Karen was ordered committed to the University of Iowa Hospital in Iowa City. Visits between the parents and the children were resumed but again suspended on March 16th because the parents were to have missed too many visits.
A petition to terminate parental rights was filed June 24, 1999, and on November 5, 1999 the juvenile court considered the petition to terminate and the permanency hearing despite the parents' request to separate the two matters. By order dated January 5, 2000 the parental rights of all parents were terminated pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116 (1)(b), (d), (e) and (g) (1999).
We review de novo. In re A.Y.H., 508 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Iowa App. 1993). The State has the burden of proving the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. See In re T.A.L., 505 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 1993). A parent has the right to due process and a fair trial when the State seeks to terminate parental rights . In re R.B., 493 N.W.2d 897, 898 (Iowa App. 1992); see also Alsager v. Iowa District Court of Polk County, 406 F. Supp. 10, 22 (S.D.Iowa 1975). A parent's right to have custody of his or her child should be terminated only with the utilization of the required constitutional safeguards. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045 (1923); In re T.R., 460 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Iowa App. 1990). The parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected . Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, 519 (1978 ); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1542, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 35 (1972).
The issue of whether or not to legally sever the biological ties between parent and child is an issue of grave importance with serious repercussions to the child as well as the biological parents. See R.B., 493 N.W.2d at 899. The goal of a child-in-need-of-assistance proceeding is to improve parenting skills and maintain the parent-child relationship. When the State seeks termination, it is because the State has been unable to furnish the help necessary to correct the parent's deficiencies. An underlying issue in a termination action is whether the parent is beyond help. A parent does not have an unlimited amount of time in which to correct his or her deficiencies. See In re D.J.R., 454 N.W.2d 838, 845 (Iowa 1990).
If the juvenile court terminates a parent's right on more than one statutory ground, we need only find clear and convincing evidence to support the termination under one of the sections relied upon by the juvenile court. See In Re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa App. 1996); In re S.R. 600 N.W.2d 63,64 (Iowa App. 1999).
Karen and Dan contend that they were not afforded the reasonable efforts dictated by statutory and case law to allow them to be reunified with their children. They contend their visits were cut off without a court order, and then a court order terminating visitation was entered without notice to them.
There is a requirement that reasonable services be offered to preserve the family unit. See In re A.L., 492 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa App. 1992 ); In re B.L., 491 N.W.2d 789, 791-93 (Iowa App. 1992); In re A.W., 464 N.W.2d 475, 478 (Iowa App. 1990); In re M.H., 444 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Iowa App. 1989). A court is required to find reasonable efforts have been made to eliminate the need for removal before a removal is ordered. See Iowa Code § 232.102(4) (1999); see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1998).
The State had the obligation to make reasonable efforts, but it is the parent's responsibility to demand services if they are not offered prior to the termination hearing . In re C.D., 508 N.W.2d 97, 101 (Iowa App. 1993). The core of the reasonable efforts mandate is that the child welfare agency must make reasonable efforts to prevent placement or to reunify families in each case. This is both a required element of each state's Title IV-E state plan and a condition of federal funding for individual foster care placements. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15), 672(a)(2); In re L.M.W., 518 N.W.2d 804, 806-07 (Iowa App. 1994). Because federal law contains no elaborate definition of "reasonable efforts," the states have considerable discretion in meeting the requirement in individual cases . Id. Federal law does make it clear, however, the case plan for each child is an integral element of the reasonable efforts implementation process . Id. The federal regulations implementing the reasonable efforts requirement mandate each child's case plan must contain a description of what services were offered and provided to prevent removal of the child from the home and to reunify the family. 45 C.F.R. § 1 356.21(d)(4) (1990). In addition, federal law clearly requires that states provide a system of fair hearings to enable families whose request for services has been denied or not acted upon to seek review of the denial. S ee 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(12) (1998).
The State has expended considerable financial resources on this case. Have the services been sufficient to meet the reasonable efforts test? Before the final hearing the parents made no request for additional or different services. It is easy to blame the failure on the parents. These are two people who come from fractured families. Karen spent part of her childhood in State care and has mental problems.
We agree with Daniel and Karen that termination of parents' visitation with their children makes reunification very difficult. We also do not necessarily approve of visitation being terminated without affording the parents an opportunity for a hearing on the issue. However, Daniel and Karen had ample opportunity to seek a hearing on the issue in the juvenile court once they were made aware their visitation was terminated and failed to do so.
Maybe additional or different services would have helped. But at this juncture the only issue before us is whether reasonable services were offered. The record supports a finding there were.
Karen and Daniel contend that the court should not have held a permanency hearing and a termination hearing at the same time. On June 21, 1999, the State moved to consolidate the permanency and termination hearing. At that time a permanency hearing was scheduled for June 24, 1999. In filing the motion the State alleged it was its intent to file a termination petition by June 24, 1999, and it did. On the same day the court granted the motion and consolidated the two hearings and found and said in the order, "this notice shall be mailed to all parties entitled thereto at least five days prior to the hearing."
A hearing was held on both matters on November 5, 1999. At that time the parents asked to bifurcate the hearing and proceed only with a permanency hearing. Their motion was denied. They now argue in denying their motion that they were denied the opportunity that Iowa Code section 232.99(3) provides for at the permanency hearing. That is the opportunity to have the court inquire as to the sufficiency of services being provided and whether additional services are needed to facilitate the safe return of their children home and to advise that their failure to identify a deficiency in services or to request additional services may preclude them from doing so at a termination hearing.
The State contends that before a permanency order is issued the court must determine if the evidence supports termination of parental rights and if it does then the court should terminate parental rights rather than enter a permanency order. We agree. See In re L.M.F., 490 N.W.2d 66, 67-68 (Iowa App. 1992). The question then next becomes did the state prove grounds for termination of parental rights. Daniel and Karen contend the grounds were not proven by clear and convincing evidence.
There is clear and convincing evidence to support termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b) and we affirm on this ground. Having done so we need not address the challenges to the other ground relied on by the juvenile court. See S.R. 600 N.W.2d at 64. Having affirmed the termination, the parents' contention the permanency hearing should have been bifurcated has no merit.
We recognize that in affirming the termination we are not guaranteeing these children a safe and secure home. Cassandra particularly suffers as a result of the numerous caregivers she has had in her short life and her inability to look to any adult as a constant presence. We can only trust that the state in aggressively seeking termination of these parents' rights will be equally as aggressive in finding a permanent home for these two young girls. We trust too that the CASA worker who spent considerable time on this case and exhibits genuine concern for the child and supported termination will continue to monitor the children to assure that this happens.
AFFIRMED.