Opinion
No. 3-171 / 03-0089
Filed April 4, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A. Price, District Associate Judge.
A mother and father appeal separately from the juvenile court order terminating their parental rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
David Pargulski, Des Moines, for appellant father.
Michael Burdette of McEnroe, McCarthy Gotsdiner, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Martha Johnson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Nicole Garbis Nolan, Des Moines, for minor child.
A mother and father appeal separately from the juvenile court order terminating their parental rights. The mother claims termination was not in the child's best interests and the juvenile court abused its discretion under Iowa Code section 232.116(3) (2001) by refusing to withhold termination of her parental rights based on clear and convincing evidence termination would be detrimental to the child due to the closeness of their relationship. The father argues the juvenile court erred by not granting him additional time for reunification and the State did not present sufficient evidence to warrant termination of his parental rights. We affirm on both appeals.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Denise and Alfredo are the biological parents of Nicole, born April 5, 2000.
Nicole resided with Denise after her birth and had very little contact with Alfredo. Denise has a long history of substance abuse. In February 2002 Denise was arrested on drug related charges and was sentenced to one hundred years in prison. As a result, the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) removed Nicole from the home and placed her in foster care. Nicole was adjudicated to be a child in need of assistance (CINA) pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(c)(2) and (n) in April 2002.
DHS offered both parents substance abuse services, visitation, and family centered services. Alfredo was also ordered to comply with individual therapy and complete a psychosocial evaluation. Denise participated in services until she was incarcerated, but Alfredo failed to participate in services. In fact, Alfredo has not seen Nicole since June 2002. In November 2002 the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Denise and Alfredo to Nicole. After a hearing in February 2003, the juvenile court terminated Denise's parental rights under sections 232.116(1)(e) and (h) (2003) and Alfredo's parental rights under sections 232.116(1)(b), (e), and (h) (2003). Both parties appeal.
II. Standard of Review.
We review termination proceedings de novo. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). The grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re E.K., 568 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Although we are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court's findings of fact, especially when considering credibility of witnesses. Iowa R. App. 6.14(6)( g); In re M.M.S., 502 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Iowa 1993). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 2000).
III. Denise.
Best Interests. Denise does not contest the fact that the statutory requirements for termination were met. Denise, however, contends termination of her parental rights is not in Nicole's best interests since her absence is due to the fact she is incarcerated. She also argues the juvenile court should have withheld termination based on clear and convincing evidence termination would be detrimental to Nicole due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship. SeeIowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). We disagree. Denise's absence from Nicole was created by her own drug problems. Ultimately, those problems led to her arrest for which she is now serving a one-hundred-year sentence. Denise testified at the termination hearing that she would be required to serve a minimum of ten years. Denise even admitted if she were released early she would not be an appropriate caretaker for Nicole in the foreseeable future.
Even if the statutory requirements for termination are met, the decision to terminate still must be in the best interests of the child. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994). In assessing the best interests of the child, we evaluate the child's long-range as well as immediate interests. Id. We must consider what the future likely holds for the child if returned to his or her parents. Id. We gain insight into the child's future prospects by reviewing evidence of the parent's past performance for it may be indicative of the parent's future capabilities. Id. "At some point, the rights and needs of the child rise above the rights and needs of the parent." J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d at 781. We believe Nicole's long-range and immediate interests are best served through the termination of Denise's parental rights, thereby giving Nicole an opportunity for permanency.
We affirm the decision of the juvenile court terminating Denise's parental rights to Nicole.
IV. Alfredo.
Additional Time. While we recognize the law requires a "full measure of patience with troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills," Iowa has built this patience into the statutory scheme of Iowa Code chapter 232. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000). The time period and patience are "limited because patience on behalf of the parent can quickly translate into intolerable hardship for the children." In re R.J., 436 N.W.2d 630, 636 (Iowa 1989). "The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems." In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987); see also In re D.W., 385 N.W.2d 570, 578 (Iowa 1986) (stating "we cannot gamble with the children's future, [t]hey must not be made to await their mother's maturity"). As previously mentioned, Alfredo failed to participate in the services offered by DHS and has had very little contact with Nicole since she was born. Nicole has waited for almost a year for her father to provide the safe and stable home she needs and deserves. Given her age and need for permanency and the father's failure to utilize the services that would have fostered reunification, we find it would not be in Nichole's best interests to force her to wait any longer.
Sufficiency of the Evidence. Alfredo claims there is insufficient evidence in the record to support termination of his parental rights under sections 232.116(1)(b), (e), and (h). There is clear and convincing evidence in the record to show Nicole could not be safely returned to Alfredo's care at the present time, which is an element of subsection 232.116(1)(h). In making its decision, the district court concluded:
The father wouldn't be an appropriate caretaker in that he has had little involvement in this child's life prior to June 2002 and no involvement with this child since June 2002.
. . . .
It is clear that the decision not to remain in the child's life is his own and he effectively abdicated his role as a father and did little and, in fact, did nothing to serve his role as a father other than on one occasion to go to the Department of Human Services and leave a note that he had been there.
Based on these factors, we determine there is sufficient evidence to terminate Alfredo's parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h).
When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the sections cited by the juvenile court to affirm. In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). Because we have determined Alfredo's parental rights were properly terminated under section 232.116(1)(h), we need not address his claims regarding sections 232.116(1)(b) and (e).
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court terminating Denise's and Alfredo's parental rights to Nicole.