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In the Interest of Amber F.

Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury Juvenile Matters at Waterbury
Jan 22, 2004
2004 Ct. Sup. 1756 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)

Opinion

January 22, 2004


MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS


This memorandum of decision addresses petitions brought to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of the respondent biological parents Donna F. (Donna), DOB: 4/8/70, and Joseph P., (also known as Jose and Joe) (Joseph), DOB: 6/1/66, of the child Amber F. (Amber), DOB: 2/2/01.

The TPR petition was filed in Superior Court for Juvenile Matters (SCJM), 6th District (Waterbury) on 2/24/03. The petition alleged as grounds abandonment, failure to rehabilitate and no on-going parent/child relationship as to each respondent parent.

For the reasons stated below, the court finds TPR issues against the above-listed respondent parents and in favor of the petitioner State of Connecticut and DCF.

The Department of Children and Families (DCF) originally obtained an Order of Temporary Custody (OTC) as to Amber on 2/14/02 (Reynolds, J.). On the same date, DCF filed a petition alleging that Amber was neglected, in that:

she had been denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally or morally.

DCF also alleged that Amber was uncared for, in that;

her home could not provide the specialized care which Amber's physical, emotional or mental condition required.

The history of the file reflects that on 2/22/02, Donna and Joseph appeared in SCJM (Reynolds, J.). Counsel was appointed for Donna, while Joseph appeared with private counsel. Both parents agreed to sustain the OTC. The Assistant Attorney General (AAG) motioned for a paternity test, which was granted by agreement. Specific steps were ordered as to both parents.

On 4/3/02, both parents appeared in SCJM and entered denials as to the neglect/uncared for petition (Reynolds, J.). The court record indicates that the paternity confirmed that Joseph was. Amber's father.

On 7/17/02, counsel for Donna requested that the neglect/uncared trial concerning Amber be continued. The court (Reynolds, J.) denied the request.

On 9/12/02, the trial date, Donna entered a nolo contendere plea to the uncared for allegation concerning Amber, while Joseph stood silent (Matasavage, J.). Judge Matasavage then committed Amber to the custody of DCF until further order of the court. He ordered final specific steps as to both respondent parents and found that DCF had made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification.

On 1/15/03, this court ordered a psychological evaluation pursuant to the request of the AAG. This court also granted the State's Motion to Maintain Commitment of Amber. The court deferred decision on the permanency plan until a future date to allow Donna's counsel to file pleadings. This court found that DCF had made reasonable efforts to achieve the plan and had made reasonable efforts for Amber to return to her home.

The permanency plan for Amber recommended TPR and adoption.

On 2/19/03, counsel for Joseph filed a Motion For Permission To Withdraw. On 2/24/03, DCF filed the TPR in SCJM.

On 3/19/03, the respondent parents appeared before this court and entered denials as to the TPR. Donna was appointed counsel; Joseph's application was denied. The Motion For Permission To Withdraw filed by Joseph's counsel was marked off. The Motion to Review Permanency Plan and the TPR were ordered consolidated. DCF was also ordered by the court to make up visits that they failed to provide if medically appropriate.

On 5/30/03, this court granted The Motion For Permission To Withdraw filed by Joseph's counsel. Joseph did not object to the granting of the motion, which represented that there had been a complete breakdown in the attorney/client relationship. Joseph was ordered to have new counsel in place and prepared to proceed with the 7/10/03 case status conference (CSC).

On 7/16/03, this court denied Donna's attorney's Motion To Continue Trial Date, with the caveat that, if he needed more time to review the results of the evaluation, he could renew his motion.

On 8/4/03, the TPR trial commenced. At the end of the day, the trial was continued until 8/5/03. On 8/5/03, the trial continued through that day and was continued to a future date. Eventually, the trial was concluded on 10/6/03.

The trial was concluded on 10/6/03 at the 11th Juvenile District courthouse in Rockville.

This court has jurisdiction over the pending case. Notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Practice Book. No action is pending in any other court affecting custody of these child.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

The court has reviewed the TPR petition and the TPR social study, which were submitted in evidence, as well as the other exhibits. The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering this evidence and the testimony of trial witnesses. Upon deliberation, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial.

"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn. App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Hector L., 53 Conn. App. 359, 366, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). "The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the trier to determine . . . In re Ashley E., 62 Conn. App. 307, 316, 771 A.2d 160, cert. denied 256 Conn. 910, 772 A.2d 601 (2001)." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn. App. 516, 528, 771 A.2d 695 (2001).

See § 17-112(j); see also In re Theresa S., 196 Conn. 18 (1985).

DONNA (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL, SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION)

Donna was born on 4/8/70 in Waterbury, the younger of 2 sisters born to her parents. She reported that, when she was age 7, her father moved out of the home and subsequently, her parents were divorced. She was raised by her mother. Donna continued to have contact with her father, and frequently visited him and her two half-siblings. She described her childhood as being "wonderful."

Donna attended local public schools, until the 11th grade, when she became pregnant with her son Michael F. (Michael) (dob 2/16/89) in 1989 at age 18. At this time, she quit high school and attended Waterbury Adult Education, having completed the 11th grade.

Donna worked as a cashier at Cumberland Farms for 2 years before the birth of Michael, and then worked at Sears photography studio in 1997.

Donna's first relationship was with Jose E., a truck driver, who fathered Michael and Courtney F. (Courtney) (DOB: 4/17/93). She reports that she had a 4-year relationship with him and then broke up with him for 2 years, but reconciled with him for 1 year. The end result of this reconciliation period was the birth of Courtney. During the period that Donna and Jose E. were estranged, she was involved with Eric M. (Eric), a carpenter. Eric was later arrested for arson and was, at the time of the writing of the TPR social study, incarcerated for this charge. Donna was also involved with Darrell H., and it was suspected that he was the biological father of Courtney. A paternity test proved that he was not the father of Courtney, but he was deemed the "psychological father."

Donna became involved with Joseph in 1993, who subsequently fathered Nicole F. (Nicole) (DOB: 3/7/95), Amelia F. (Amelia) (DOB: 5/21/98), Joseph F. (Joseph F.) (DOB: 12/26/99) and Amber. It was reported that Joseph once worked as an electrical engineer in Baltimore. Prior to this, he allegedly worked in Taiwan.

Donna's other 6 children are not a part of the TPR. Neglect Petitions were filed on behalf of the 6 children on 2/14/02. Eventually, the case was disposed of in SCJM with 6 months of Protective Supervision in the custody of Donna.

At the time of the last hearing of the TPR trial, evidence was adduced indicating that Donna was pregnant. She indicated that Joseph was the father, while Joseph denied it.

Donna refuses to engage in mental health treatment, and denies that she has any such problems.

Donna continues to live in an apartment in Naugatuck with her six children. DCF social worker (SW) Paul testified that the conditions presently in that residence are acceptable. Donna reported that she will soon be moving back into her previous living situation, Joseph's home, when the renovations are completed. Previously, the conditions in this residence were described by DCF as "deplorable" and were the subject of 3 different Naugatuck Police Department reports.

See State's exhibits ##P, R, T.

Donna does not work outside the home and is financially supported by Joseph.

JOSEPH (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL, SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION)

Joseph did not provide any information for this study, thus limiting DCF's information about him. He also refused to disclose his address in Baltimore to DCF when he was living there and has refused to have any direct contact with DCF.

Joseph has only attended one out of three Treatment Planning Conferences (TPC) regarding Amber that were held by DCF. He never contacted DCF or made himself available until 9/02, when he attended a court hearing regarding Amber and stated that he wanted to visit with Amber. He further stated that he intended to work towards reunification.

Once Joseph made DCF aware of his desire to visit with Amber, visitation was arranged for Fridays on a weekly basis. He attended three visits but reported that he could not visit on Fridays as it interfered with his job. He indicated that he wanted unsupervised weekend visitation.

Joseph has a history of alcohol abuse and domestic violence during his relationship with Donna. Over the course of each parent's involvement with child protection services, they have been vague and/or dishonest about their living situation. Although Donna has continued to live in the homes that Joseph owns, and Joseph pays child support; it appears that they have an inconsistent relationship in which they live together for short periods of time. Since 9/12/02, when Joseph appeared in court, he reported living in Maryland from Monday to Friday but refused to give the address. On the weekends, he would return to Connecticut to stay in one of his homes.

On 2/4/03, Joseph reported that his job was terminated in Maryland and he would be living in Connecticut full time in the near future. He gave as his address the same address that Donna provided as the address she intended to move to.

During the period of time from the spring of 1997 through the winter of 2002, there were 9 substantiated child protection referrals for reasons of physical neglect, physical abuse, emotional neglect, domestic violence, and inadequate supervision. During this period of time, Joseph had three children with Donna.

Since Amber's placement into foster care on 3/8/02, this family has had two substantiated CPS referrals. One of the referrals was a result of two-year-old Joseph F. having a third-degree burn on his hand and forearm and the other referral resulted in this same child having a fractured leg.

Joseph and Donna have had a violent relationship from 1993 to 2001. Donna has been arrested on three occasions for domestic violence incidents. On one of these occasions, on 3/12/00, Donna and Joseph were arrested for Breach of Peace involving an argument and physical violence with each other. On 4/23/01, Joseph was arrested on Threatening and Breach of Peace charges in a domestic violence situation involving Donna. Joseph was intoxicated at the time. As a result of this incident, the court issued a full no-contact order, barring Joseph from contact with Donna and children.

There is no evidence that either parent has been convicted of any criminal offenses, despite Joseph's representations that he is on probation.

Over the course of this time period, the police were called on several occasions to this home for verbal altercations.

AMBER (Includes Physical, mental and emotional status of the child as required by CGS 45a-717(e)(1).)

Amber was born on 2/2/01 at Bridgeport Hospital at 26 weeks gestation. On 3/27/01, Amber was transferred to the Newborn Special Care Unit at Yale-New Haven Hospital (YNH). She required nasal CPAP (Continuous Positive Airway Pressure) for 11 months after birth. Amber was discharged from hospital care on 3/8/02. Amber is a medically complex child, diagnosed with chronic lung disease, severe oral aversion and GERD (gastro esophageal reflux disorder). She continues the use of a gastrostomy tube (G-tube) implanted in her abdomen for feedings and medication administration. Amber has been participating in Birth to Three services since birth. She receives intensive speech and language therapy for her severe oral aversion through this program as well as services to address her multiple delays.

Amber is currently medically stable, but continues to present with a slight strider (raspy voice). Pulmonology and ENT groups at YNH are monitoring for scarring of her trachea or larynx. Birth to Three has expressed a concern in regards to her vocal development and possibility of vocal chord damage or paralysis from her intubation history.

Amber is currently taking food by mouth as tolerated, which is 2 baby teaspoons of cereal per day. It has been a slow and tedious process as Amber is so repulsed by food in her mouth, that she contorts as if having a seizure when fed orally. She continues to receive nourishment via G-tube 5 times per day, since her discharge from YNH on 3/8/02.

Amber is walking and vocalizing a few sounds. She refers to her foster mother (FM) as "mahna" and views her as her psychological parent. Amber and FM participate in peer playgroups with food sharing and trips to miniature animal farm to feed the animals. These activities are extremely important as Amber needs to be exposed to positive social situations around food as much as possible as her oral aversion is severe and there is a chance that she will never be able to take all of her nutrition by mouth.

Donna has visited with Amber on only 10 occasions during the past year out of a possible 37 offered visits. During visitations, there does not appear to be any change in Amber's mood or affect. Donna appears to be a passive participant in the visitation much of the time.

At the time of the writing of the TPR social study, Amber had visited with her father 5 times during the course of her life; twice while she was hospitalized for the first year of her life, and three times since she has been in foster care during the past year. DCF reports and an evaluation indicate that there are no indicators of bonding between Amber and her father. On the three occasions that Joseph visited with Amber under DCF supervision, he brought Amber's 3 siblings to the visit. When DCF asked him not to include the 3 siblings in the visitation as it gave him no opportunity for him and Amber to get to know each other, he refused to comply and brought the children anyway.

Amber has lived with FM since her discharge from the YNH on 3/8/02. She is in need of a permanent home that can meet her specialized needs as well as to nurture and care for her in a stable environment. Should Amber be freed for adoption, Amber's FM has expressed an interest in adopting her.

SIBLINGS

Amber has 6 siblings, 3 of whom are half-siblings. There was evidence that she has visited with them and recognizes them.

At the time of the writing of the TPR social study, Michael was in the 8th grade at City Hill Middle School and received special educational services while in school. He participated in the Transitional Program for children that are emotionally and socially disturbed. Juvenile Probation Officer Sarris, who followed and monitored Michael's progress, reported that he would remain on probation until 6/18/03. She indicated that he is doing fairly well, but he would continue to be a child at risk due to history and home structure. Michael and his family needed to continue to utilize services to ensure structure in the home. Michael utilized individual sessions and in-home support provided by Catholic Family Services.

At the time of the writing of the TPR social study, Star was in the 5th grade at Salem Elementary School. Mrs. Kruge, the school's principal, reported that Star attended school daily but she was tardy almost daily. She had an Individual Educational Plan which provided her with special educational services in the Resource Room.

At the time of the writing of the TPR social study, Courtney was in the 4th grade at Salem Elementary School. Mrs. Kruge reported that Courtney attended school daily but she was tardy almost daily and failed to return all of her homework. She had an Individual Educational Plan that provided her with educational services in the Resource Room. Mrs. Kruge also reported that Donna had a difficult time getting Courtney to attend school as she cries in the morning and sometimes she refuses to go to school. According to Mrs. Kruge, Donna will contact the school reporting that Courtney refuses to attend and that the children are going to be late for school because of her difficulty in getting Courtney to attend school. Mrs. Kruge and Mrs. Shea, School Social Worker reported that Courtney cried at times, was withdrawn, and had difficulty attending school. DCF concluded that Courtney appears to be depressed and she could benefit from a psychiatric evaluation.

At the time of the writing of the TPR social study, Nicole was in the 1st grade at Salem Elementary School. She attended school daily but was often late because of Courtney's difficulties concerning attendance. Mrs. Kruge indicated that Nicole had no problems in school.

At the time of the writing of the TPR social study, Amelia participated in the Head Start program at Central Elementary School and Joseph F. did not attend school.

RELATIVES

The maternal grandmother, Donna G. (MGM), initially expressed an interest in caring for Amber. DCF furnished her with a licensing packet, which was never returned. To date, no relatives have come forward as a resource for Amber.

ADJUDICATION

The court is now called upon to determine whether the petitioner has met its burden of proving the allegations presented by the pending TPR petitions. § 17a-112(j) "Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights . . . exists by clear and convincing evidence." (Citation omitted.) In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn. App. 96, 102, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 903 (2000).

In the adjudicatory phase of these proceedings, the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events prior to 2/24/03, the date upon which the TPR petitions against the respondent parents were filed, insofar as the allegations pertaining to abandonment against the respondent parents are concerned. With regard to the allegations of failure to achieve rehabilitation and no on-going parent-child relationship brought against the respondent parents, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial.

Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the four grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in [§ 17a-112(j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The commissioner . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds . . . In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999)." In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn. App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).

Practice Book Sec. 35a-7 generally provides that "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment."

"Despite Practice Book § 33-3(a) and case law regarding termination proceedings generally, we have determined that with regard to termination petitions brought under § 17a-112(c)(3)(B), the trial court may, in the adjudicatory phase, properly consider facts and events that occur after the filing date of the petition in determining whether a respondent has achieved a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of that statute. See In re Stanley D., 61 Conn. App. 224, 230, [ 763 A.2d 83] (2000)." In re Latifa K., 67 Conn. App. 742, 748, 763 A.2d 83 (2002). Events occurring after the date of the filing of the date of petition are particularly relevant to the issue of "whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Emphasis in the original; external citations omitted.) In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn. App. 230. As to no on-going parent/child relationship, see footnote #21.

Upon review, as discussed below, the court has determined by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exist as to both respondent parents.

LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

In order to terminate parental rights, the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCF "has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing that such efforts are not appropriate." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1). In this context, "reasonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Hector L., [ supra, 53 Conn. App. 372]." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn. App. 534, 547, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001).

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that all reasonable efforts were made to locate the respondent parents.

In reference to reunification efforts, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF did provide the following services to the respondent parents:

DCF — casework services, transportation, visitation, treatment plans, TPCs, administrative case reviews (ACR), Regional Resource Group for medical questions and answers Boys' Village In Home Services — parenting counseling and in-home services

Safe Haven — domestic violence classes child specific medical education

Easter Seals — parent intervention program

Waterbury Youth Services (WYS) — referrals for parenting classes, anger management and anger awareness class

Catholic Family Services — individual and family counseling

The Morris Foundation — substance abuse evaluation, drug screens

Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and First Aid training through the American Red Cross (ARC)

Interstate Compact Office — home assessment for father

Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite the respondent parents with their child. In re Antonio M., supra. 56 Conn. App. 547; see also In re Sheila J., 62 Conn. App. 470, 480-82, 771 A.2d 244 (2001).

"Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted, external citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn. App. 248, 255 (2000), cert. denied, CT Page 1811 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 105 (2001). Only "reasonable" efforts are required because "[i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." (Citation omitted.) In re Antony E., 54 Conn. App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).

The clear and convincing evidence presented in this case indicates that both Donna and Joseph were issued specific steps by the court on several occasions, yet both failed to comply with the directives contained therein.

The clear and convincing evidence further indicates that the respondent parents did not fully utilize these services, nor did they benefit from said services.

Furthermore, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that further efforts to reunify the child with either of the respondent parents are not appropriate.

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither respondent parent is either willing or able to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. § 17a-112(j)(1).

STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION — ABANDONMENT § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)

The petitioner first alleges that Donna abandoned Amber, within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in compliance with the mandate of § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.

CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) provides for the termination of parental rights where "[t]he child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child."

"Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct . . . General Statutes [§ 17a-112(j)(3)(A)] defines abandonment as the fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . . Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare . . . Section 17a-112(b)(1) does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . The commonly understood obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes; `(1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child; (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care: (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.'" (Citations omitted: internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Deana E., 61 Conn. App. 185, 193 (2000).

The clear and convincing evidence related to Donna's conduct reveals that, through the filing date of the TPR petitions, 2/24/03, the respondent mother Donna failed "to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the [child] . . ." In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193.

The clear and convincing evidence adduced at this trial shows the following:

Donna has failed to maintain a parental interest in the child as evidenced by Donna's sporadic visits with Amber and her lack of commitment to her. CT Page 1767

YNH reported that from 3/27/01 to 12/31/01, Donna only visited with Amber 23 times. Once Amber was discharged from the hospital and through the filing of the TPR, Donna only visited Amber 10 times out of a possible 37 times. On 3/18/02, Donna was asked if she wanted to visit with Amber; her response was, "This week is really hectic," When SW Nina April pushed the issue of visitation, Donna then said, "I don't know if I'm ready," After SW April strongly encouraged Donna to arrange a visitation schedule, Donna did attended visitation with Amber sporadically from 4/02 though 8/02.

On 8/16/02, when Donna arrived at the New Haven DCF office for a previously scheduled visit she reported to SW Paul that it would be her last visit as she is too tired to continue the visitation schedule. Donna was offered alternatives, including visits taking place later in the day; however, Donna refused and reported that she wanted to put Amber up for adoption.

On 8/22/02, during a visit to Donna's home, SW Paul again offered Donna visitation with Amber. Donna reported that she would be in school and didn't have the time to visit; however, upon SW Paul noting that Donna was home at a time when she claims to be in school, Donna reported that she was finished with school.

On 10/22/02, Donna contacted SW Paul and requested that visits with Amber resume. Visits were scheduled for Friday mornings beginning 11/1/02. Donna attended the 11/1/02 and 11/8/02 visits, but failed to attend the 11/22/02 and 11/29/02 visits. The 12/6/02 visit was canceled due to inclement weather. Donna called to cancel the 12/13/02 and 12/20/02 visits and again failed to appear for the 12/27/02 visit. Donna's next visit with Amber wasn't until 1/17/03.

When Donna has visited with Amber, the credible evidence shows that she is a passive participant in the visitation.

During visitation, the clear and convincing evidence shows that Amber separates easily from Donna.

Additionally, the clear and convincing evidence shows that Donna has failed to attempt complying with the minimal standards necessary to establishing a relationship with Amber. Donna has refused to participate in CPR training and G-tube training as indicated by DCF. SW Paul testified that, because of Amber's medical needs, it is necessary that anyone caring for her be able to handle the necessary processes for feeding her and addressing her medical needs. Paul also indicated that it was necessary, due to Amber's medical condition, to have her visits supervised by an individual certified in CPR. By Donna's refusal to complete the simple 6 hour CPR, she has, by her own machination, made it impossible to expand her own relationship with her daughter beyond supervised visitation.

The evidence in this matter clearly and convincingly establishes that Donna has failed the test of meeting "[t]he commonly understood obligations of parenthood" identified by In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193. Accordingly, based on clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has met its burden of proving that Donna has abandoned Amber within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).

The petitioner further alleges that Joseph abandoned Amber, within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in compliance with the mandate of § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.

The clear and convincing evidence related to Joseph's conduct reveals that, through the filing date of the granting of the amendment to the TPR petitions, 12/27/02, the respondent father Joseph failed "to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the [child] . . ." In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193.

The clear and convincing evidence adduced at this trial shows the following:

CT Page 1769 Joseph has failed to maintain an interest in his daughter Amber as evidenced by his lack of visitation with the child and his refusal to maintain contact with DCF.

YNH reported that, from 3/27/01 to 1/11/02, Joseph only visited Amber twice.

Joseph has failed to recognize Amber on special occasions through sending cards or gifts.

Joseph did not contact DCF in any manner to show concern for the child or to request visits with Amber until 9/16/02.

As of the time of the writing of the TPR social study, Joseph had only visited with Amber on 9/27/02, 10/4/02 and 11/15/02, and had not scheduled further visits.

The evidence in this matter clearly and convincingly establishes that Joseph has failed the test of meeting "[t]he commonly understood obligations of parenthood" identified by In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193. Accordingly, based on clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has met its burden of proving that Joseph has abandoned Amber within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).

PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)

The petitioner State of Connecticut and DCF alleges that Donna's parental rights should be terminated because she has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). As Amber has been adjudicated neglected, the critical issue for this court is whether this respondent has achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render her able to care for this child. Applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in compliance with the mandate of § 17a-112(p), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court as to the parent of a child who "(i) has been found by the . . . Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child."

The court file and the evidence clearly and convincing shows that specific steps were ordered for both Donna and Joseph on 2 occasions. On 1/4/02, Judge Reynolds ordered specific steps for Donna and on 9/12/02, Judge Matasavage ordered specific steps for both respondent parents.

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion Donna has yet to achieve a sufficient "level of rehabilitation . . . which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [her child's life]." In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn. App. 448. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 354, 776 A.2d 487 A.2d (2001); In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 665. First, the credible evidence in this case, presented through the exhibits and the credible testimony at the TPR trial, clearly and convincingly establishes that Donna has not achieved § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. The court credits the DCF reports and the testimony which showed that Donna has accomplished little or nothing towards achieving her rehabilitation and, based upon her refusal to cooperate with DCF and her other issues, is extremely unlikely to achieve rehabilitation.

The amended TPR social study indicates the following:

Despite specific steps having been ordered by the court, the clear and convincing evidence shows Donna to have been substantially non-compliant.

She has been non-compliant with the following steps:

Keep all appointments set by or with DCF.

Donna has failed to attend any ACRs or TPCs. She failed to attend CPR training at the ARC in Naugatuck in 2002.

Participate in counseling (parenting and individual) and make progress toward identified goals.

Donna failed to engage in any form of parenting classes.

Donna failed to engage in individual counseling until 4/21/03.

In her evaluation with Dr. Robert H. Neems, Ph.D, on 7/31/03, Donna indicated that she had not attended either parenting or individual counseling. She indicated that she had not attended parenting class because DCF had failed to refer her. She also indicated that she believe that she did not need individual counseling and could not identify any problems that she believed that she needed to work on.

Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF.

Donna did not comply with this step as she was discharged from the Boys Village program which provided in-home counseling and parenting skills counseling due to her missing several visits and failure to follow through on goals and recommendations, including the need to engage in therapy.

Submit to recommended service providers for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services and/or substance abuse assessment/treatment.

Donna failed to complete CPR training with ARC. As a result, she rendered herself unable to continue with further training to address Amber's medical and feeding (G-tube) training. Donna also failed to comply with Boys Village for home counseling and parenting skills counseling. Donna also failed to participate in the Parent Infant Program (PIP) satisfactorily. Kristin Hales testified that Donna stopped therapy with her from 5/03 through the end of 7/03 and indicated that this stoppage of therapy was not recommended. Hales also testified that Donna never told her that she needed to address parenting issues. She also indicated that Donna was not forthcoming in therapy and that this failure would slow down the progress of her therapy.

Consistently and timely meet and address the child's physical, educational, medical, or emotional needs, including, but not limited to, keeping the children's appointments with her medical, psychological, psychiatric, or educational providers. CT Page 1772

DCF has offered Donna educational opportunities for her to learn about/and prepare for Amber's medical needs. She has failed to follow through with services.

Cooperate with the children's therapy. (Birth to Three, physical therapy, occupational therapy and speech therapy)

Donna has failed to comply, as she has refused to visit Amber consistently.
Visit the child as often as DCF permits.

Donna has not complied with this step. The court incorporates its findings as to the ground of abandonment as outlined above.
Other

Donna failed to fully comply with the PIP program, as indicated by Hales' testimony. She also failed to attend Amber's medical appointments. Donna also failed to obtain the necessary CPR training from ARC. By failing to obtain the CPR training, she also made it impossible to obtain further medical training necessary for Amber's care, such as G-Tube training.

The court also notes that Donna has a history of failing to complete medical training. The clear and convincing evidence show that she was advised of the need for medical training by YNH while Amber was still hospitalized there, but failed to complete it. On 7/25/01, Regina M. Palazzo, M.D., spoke at length with Donna at YNH regarding Amber's discharge needs, more specifically, that she needed training in Amber's care and that a regular schedule of visits would be needed to accomplish that training. The credible evidence shows that Donna completed trachea tube training at YNH, but failed to continue with any other training either there or with DCF that would allow her to bring Amber into her home and safely care for her there.

This court concludes that Donna has not corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment of Amber as far as she is concerned. The clear and convincing evidence reveals that from 9/12/02 and continuing through the time of trial, Donna has not been available to take part in her daughter's life, and, based on her mental health issues, parenting deficits, her dogged refusal to cooperate with DCF, her failure to engage in and benefit from counseling and her abject failure and refusal to comprehend and understand this child's serious medical needs, she will never be consistently available for this child. When one considers the level of care, patience and discipline that young children require from their caregivers, it is patently clear that Donna is not in a better position to parent Amber now than she was at any other time in these proceedings and remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent her. Effectively, she was no better able "to resume the responsibilities of parenting at the time of filing the termination petition than [she] had been at the time of [the child's] commitment." In re Hector L., supra, 53 Conn. App. 367. Given the age, sensibilities, needs and special needs of the child involved, and given Donna's failure to correct her deviancies, it would be unreasonable to conclude that she will be able to achieve rehabilitation from her mental health issues, parenting deficits, her dogged refusal to cooperate with DCF, her failure to engage in and benefit from counseling and her abject failure and refusal to comprehend and understand this child's serious medical needs so as to be able to serve as a safe, responsible and nurturing parent within a reasonable time.

Amber is a medically complex child, diagnosed with chronic lung disease, severe oral aversion and GERD (gastro esophageal reflux disorder). She continues the use of a G-tube for feedings and medication administration. She is also a child with special needs, in that she has a chronic choking and gagging problem and speech problems. She has been susceptible to Respiratory Syncytial Viruses (RSVs) and uses a nebulizer. It is believed that she may have learning disabilities related to anoxia and prematurity. She has developmental delays.

The clear and convincing evidence offered at trial indicates that Amber requires substantial care to address her medical and special needs. This requires the commitment of at least 8 hours per day towards her medical and feeding care alone. Additionally, Amber requires cleanliness in her surroundings due to the G-tube and its attendant equipment. She must be maintained on a precise and consistent feeding schedule. Due to her chronic lung disease, Amber must avoid cigarette smoke.

Amber's medical needs require frequent visits to medical professions.

Despite the services that were offered to her, Donna has failed to demonstrate that within a reasonable time, considering Amber's age, needs and special needs, she could assume a responsible position in the child's life.

Amber is 34 months old and requires a permanent home. She is a small child who is totally dependent upon her caretaker. She must have a parent able to effectively care for her at all times and who is capable and trained to address her myriad of health concerns and special needs. Amber cannot wait for the remote possibility of Donna finally applying herself to CPR training, medical training, individual counseling, parenting counseling, overcoming her gross opposition and defiance of DCF and remedying her chronic parenting deficits and becoming a safe, responsible and nurturing parent for Amber.

Amber cannot wait for Donna to show that she has rehabilitated herself and is ready to assume her parental role. It is fundamental that "in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 384. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proved that Donna has failed to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).

The petitioner State of Connecticut and DCF alleges that Joseph's parental rights should be, terminated because he has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). As Amber has been adjudicated neglected, the critical issue for this court is whether this respondent has achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render him able to care for this child. Applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in compliance with the mandate of § 17a-112(p), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

The court file and the evidence clearly and convincing shows that specific steps were ordered for both Donna and Joseph on 2 occasions. On 1/4/02, Judge Reynolds ordered specific steps for Donna and on 9/12/02, Judge Matasavage ordered specific steps.

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion Joseph has yet to achieve a sufficient "level of rehabilitation . . . which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his child's life]." In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn. App. 448. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 354, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 665. The credible evidence in this case, presented through the exhibits and the credible testimony at the TPR trial, clearly and convincingly establishes that Joseph has not achieved § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. The court credits the DCF reports and the testimony which showed that Joseph has done little or nothing to achieve his rehabilitation and, based upon his refusal to cooperate with DCF and his other issues, is extremely unlikely to achieve rehabilitation.

The amended TPR social study indicates the following:

Despite specific steps having been ordered by the court, the clear and convincing evidence shows Joseph to have been substantially non-compliant.

He has been non-compliant with the following steps:

Keep all appointments set by or with DCF.

Joseph has not complied as he missed the ACR on 7/25/02.

Keep child's whereabouts and your own whereabouts known to DCF, your attorney and the attorney for the child.

Joseph refused to provide DCF with his address in Maryland, and he did not notify DCF when he returned to Connecticut.

Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF.

Joseph refused to provide DCF with his address in Maryland CT Page 1776

Participate in counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals: parenting and individual counseling.

Joseph has failed to provide DCF documentation of parenting, individual and domestic violence classes, although he stated that he has completed some services through the Family Court. He was asked to attend DCF recommended services, but refused to do so.

Submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment.

Joseph claimed that he has completed this assessment; however he has failed to provide DCF with documentation of a completed substance abuse assessment evaluation and recommendations.

The credible evidence indicates that there was a domestic incident between Donna and Joseph that involved the Naugatuck police department, who reported that Joseph had consumed alcohol. See State's exhibit's W.

Submit to random drug testing; time and method of testing shall be at the discretion of DCF.

Joseph has failed to submit to random drug testing as required by DCF.
Recommended service providers for parenting/individual/family counseling, in-home support services and or substance abuse assessment/treatment.

Joseph has completed CPR and First Aid training. Despite being offered, Joseph has failed to participate in any further training or counseling that would be a pre-requisite to G-tube or equipment training.
Secure and maintain adequate housing and income.

Joseph refused to provide DCF with his address in Maryland so that DCF could assess his housing there through the Interstate Compact.
No substance abuse.

Joseph has failed to provide DCF with proof of sobriety.
Consistently and timely meet and address the child's physical, educational, medical, or emotional needs, including, but not limited to, keeping the children's appointments with his/her medical, psychological, psychiatric, or educational providers.

DCF has offered Joseph educational opportunities for him to learn about and prepare for Amber's medical needs but he has failed to follow through with services.
Immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to ensure that the change does not compromise the health and safety of the children.

Joseph refused to provide DCF with his address in Maryland
Visit the children as often as DCF permits.

Prior to 9/27/02, Joseph had not visited with Amber since her release from Yale New Haven Hospital on 3/8/02. Since Joseph contacted DCF on 9/27/02, he only visited with Amber on three occasions through 8/3/03, with 11/15/02 being the last visit. Since the TPR trial commenced, SW Paul testified that Joseph has visited every other week.
Other: PIP, attend medical appointments and other necessary training sessions medically related.

Joseph has failed to comply with the PIP program and has also failed to attend Amber's medical appointments. He has also failed to obtain the necessary G-Tube training and medical training so as to be able to bring Amber into his home and safely care for her there. The evidence clearly shows that DCF required him to complete his parenting classes, domestic violence counseling and substance abuse assessment prior to G-Tube training. By his failure to complete those other counseling requirements, Joseph made it impossible to obtain the G-Tube and medical training necessary for Amber's care.

This court concludes that Joseph has not corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment of Amber as far as he is concerned. The clear and convincing evidence reveals that from 9/12/02 and continuing through the time of trial, Joseph has not been available to take part in his daughter's life, and, based on his mental health issues, parenting deficits, substance abuse issues, his dogged refusal to co-operate with DCF, his failure to engage in and benefit from counseling and his abject failure and refusal to comprehend and understand this child's serious medical needs, he will never be consistently available for this child. When one considers the level of care, patience and discipline that young children require from their caregivers, it is patently clear that Joseph is not in a better position to parent Amber now than he was at any other time in these proceedings and remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent her. Effectively, he was no better able "to resume the responsibilities of parenting at the time of filing the termination petition than [he] had been at the time of [the child's] commitment." In re Hector L., supra, 53 Conn. App. 367. Given the ages, sensibilities, needs and special needs of the child involved, and given Joseph's failure to correct his deviancies, it would be unreasonable to conclude that he will be able to achieve rehabilitation from his mental health issues, parenting deficits, his dogged refusal to co-operate with DCF, his failure to engage in and benefit from counseling and his abject failure and refusal to comprehend and understand this child's serious medical needs so as to be able to serve as a safe, responsible and nurturing parent within a reasonable time.

Amber is a medically complex child, diagnosed with chronic lung disease, severe oral aversion and GERD (gastro-esophageal reflux disorder). She continues the use of a G-tube for feedings and medication administration. She is also a child with special needs, in that she has a chronic choking and gagging problem and speech problems. She has been susceptible to RSVs and uses a nebulizer. She is developmentally delayed. It is believed that she may have learning disabilities related to anoxia and prematurity.

The clear and convincing evidence offered at trial indicates that Amber requires substantial care to address her medical and special needs. This requires the commitment of at least 8 hours per day towards her medical and feeding care alone. Additionally, Amber requires cleanliness in her surroundings due to the G-tube and its attendant equipment. She must be maintained on a precise and consistent feeding schedule. Due to her chronic lung disease, Amber must avoid cigarette smoke.

Amber's medical needs require frequent visits to medical professions.

Despite the services that were offered to him, Joseph has failed to demonstrate that within a reasonable time, considering Amber's age, needs and special needs, he could assume a responsible position in the child's life.

Amber is 34 months old and requires a permanent home. She is a small child who is totally dependent upon her caretaker. She must have a parent able to effectively care for her at all times and who is capable and trained to address her myriad of health concerns and special needs. Amber cannot wait for the remote possibility of Joseph finally applying himself to individual counseling, parenting counseling, a substance abuse assessment and treatment if deemed appropriate and medical training and remedying his chronic parenting deficits and becoming a safe, responsible and nurturing parent for Amber.

Amber cannot wait for Joseph to show that he has rehabilitated himself and is ready to assume his parental role. It is fundamental that "in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent improved [his] ability to manage [his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 384. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proved that Joseph has failed to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).

Amber is 34 months old and is in need of permanency. She spent the first year of her life in YNH and has spent the time since in foster care with FM. To allow Donna or Joseph further time to rehabilitate themselves, if that were possible, and assume a responsible position in the life of their child would not be in the best interest of Amber.

LACK OF ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP — § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)

The State has alleged that there is no on-going parent/child relationship between Donna and her child Amber. This means that, based on the evidence produced, that the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child has not been established and to allow further time for the establishment of such parent/child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(D). Applying the requisite legal standards, and complying with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.

General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(D) provides for the termination of parental rights "where there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child."

Section 17a-112(j)(3)(D) "`. . . requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only . . .' In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn. App. 595, 601-02, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999)." (Internal and external quotations omitted.) In re Jonathan G., supra, 63 Conn. App. 525.

In determining that no such relationship exists, the court makes reference to the abandonment findings set forth in previous parts of this decision.

The clear and convincing evidence presented indicates the following:

Donna's interest in Amber has been sporadic as outlined in the sections of the decision relating to abandonment, above.

For the first year of Amber's life, Yale New Haven Hospital encouraged Donna to establish a nurturing relationship with her infant daughter; however, Donna's failure to do so, ultimately led to a foster mother caring for Amber.

For the second year of Amber's life, the Department strongly encouraged Donna to visit with Amber in an effort to establish a parent/child relationship with the child; however, Donna refused to visit with Amber for months at a time.

Amber is 34 months old and has developed a strong bond with FM. To allow further time for the establishment/re-establishment of a parent/child relationship is detrimental to the best interests of the child.

Donna has never provided care for Amber, who spent the 1st year of her life in YNH and was then placed into DCF custody on 2/14/02 pursuant to an OTC. Since that time, she has been in foster care.

She has not provided for her child since birth.

She has been unable and/or unwilling to adjust her circumstances to allow for Amber to be returned to her care.

In his evaluation of 7/31/03, Dr. Neems described the relationship between the biological parents and Amber as follows:

Amber seems to have some connection with her mother. She related to her mother cautiously but seems to be familiar with her mother.

Amber did not seem to recognize her father at first and was unwilling to separate from her mother to go with him. [Joseph] is skilled in interacting with children and was able to help Amber be comfortable with him, suggesting that he could build a relationship with her.

It is unlikely that Amber looks to either parent, however, to meet her basic needs. She has been cared for by others for her whole life and she is more ready to turn to others than to her parents to have her needs met.

In his testimony, Dr. Neems indicated that there was a weak relationship between Donna and Amber, but not a parent/child relationship.

Donna has failed to consistently visit Amber. Since Amber was born, Donna has visited her only infrequently, despite having the opportunity for frequent visitation. YNH reported that, from 3/27/01 to 12/31/01, Donna only visited with Amber 23 times. Once Amber was discharged from the hospital and through the filing of the TPR, Donna only visited Amber 10 times out of a possible 37 times.

Amber has bonded to her FM and recognizes her as her parent. She seeks comfort from the FM and goes to her to have her needs met. Despite having been afforded the opportunity for frequent visitation, Donna has failed to utilize the visitation to develop a bond with her daughter. The court would also find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent mother Donna has been afforded an opportunity to establish a parent/child relationship with Amber and has been unable and/or unwilling to do so. See In re Alexander C., 67 Conn. App. 417, 421-27 (2001), aff'd, 262 Conn. 308, 311 (2003); In re Kezia M., 33 Conn. App. 12, 21-22, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915 (1993).

The court would note that Amber was taken into DCF custody at birth; hence In Re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492 (1992) is applicable here. The clear and convincing evidence shows that Donna has been afforded the opportunity to develop a relationship with Amber, but has failed to do so.

Obviously, Amber needs a family now, not later. To allow further time for Donna to establish a parent/child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of Amber. She is a young child who has flourished while in foster care. The FM has indicated her wish to adopt this child. To allow further time for the establishment of a parent/child relationship is clearly detrimental to Amber's best interests. On this issue, Dr. Neems wrote the following:

I think that the parents' failure to make needed changes indicates that it would not be useful to allow more time for them to build a relationship with Amber.

Dr. Neems also testified that, in his opinion, Donna was not likely to make changes within a reasonable time to justify reunification.

Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this matter and applying the appropriate legal standards, the court finds that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between Donna and Amber.

With regard to the allegations of no on-going parent/child relationship, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial for adjudicatory purposes. See Practice Book § 35a-7 (commentary).

The State has further alleged that there is no on-going parent/child relationship between Joseph and his child Amber. This means that, based on the evidence produced, that the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child, has not been established and to allow further time for the establishment of such parent/child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(D). Applying the requisite legal standards, and complying with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.

In determining that no such relationship exists, the court makes reference to abandonment findings set forth in previous parts of this decision.

The clear and convincing evidence presented indicates the following:

As of the date of the writing of the TPR social study, Amber has only seen Joseph 5 times in her life.

While Amber seemed to enjoy playing during recent visits with Joseph and managed to engage with him during the 7/31/03 evaluation by Dr. Neems, the clear and convincing evidence shows that she does not view Joseph as a parental figure.

Prior to the filing of the TPR petition in SCJM on 2/24/03, Joseph had 2 years in which to develop a relationship with Amber, but did not choose to do so. He failed to contact DCF to request visitation with Amber until 9/12/02, after she had been in foster care for approximately 6 months.

Prior to 9/27/02, Joseph had not visited with Amber since her release from Yale New Haven Hospital on 3/8/02. Since Joseph contacted DCF on 9/12/02, he only visited with Amber on 2 occasions through 8/3/03, with 11/15/02 being the last visit. Since the TPR trial commenced, SW Paul testified that Joseph has visited every other week.

During the year that Amber was in YNH, Joseph visited her but 3 times.

Joseph has never provided care for Amber nor support, either financial or emotional.

He has been unable and/or unwilling to adjust his circumstances to allow for Amber to be returned to his care.

The credible evidence indicates that, during visits with Joseph, Amber exhibits no bond or affection toward her father and does not recognize him as her father. Amber does not appear to have a bond with Joseph. Dr. Neems testified that, unlike Donna and Amber, there is no relationship between Joseph and Amber. The child has no present and positive memories of her father. To allow further time for the establishment of a parent/child relationship is detrimental to the best interests of the child. On this issue, Dr. Neems wrote the following:

I think that the parents' failure to make needed changes indicates that it would not be useful to allow more time for them to build a relationship with Amber.

Dr. Neems also testified that, in his opinion, Joseph had characteristics not suited to parenting Amber, such as being overly controlling and having temper issues.

Amber has bonded to FM and recognizes her as her parent. She seeks comfort from FM and goes to her to have her needs met. Despite having been afforded the opportunity for visitation, Joseph has failed to utilize the visitation to develop a bond with his daughter. The court would also find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent father Joseph has been afforded an opportunity to establish a parent/child relationship with Amber and has been unable and/or unwilling to do so. See In re Alexander C., 67 Conn. App. 417, 421-27 (2001), aff'd, 262 Conn. 308, 311 (2003); In re Kezia M., 33 Conn. App. 12, 21-22, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915 (1993).

Obviously, Amber needs a family now, not later. To allow further time for Joseph to establish a parent/child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of Amber. She is a young child who has flourished while in foster care. The FM has indicated her wish to adopt this child. To allow further time for the establishment of a parent/child relationship is clearly detrimental to Amber's best interests. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this matter and applying the appropriate legal standards, the court finds that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between Joseph and Amber.

With regard to the allegations of no on-going parent/child relationship, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial for adjudicatory purposes. See Practice Book § 35a-7 (commentary).

DISPOSITION

As the court has concluded that statutory grounds for termination exist, it next "must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the [child]." (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn. App. 103; see also In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511 and n. 15, 613 A.2d 478 (1992). In this dispositional phase the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events through the close of evidence. Practice Book 35a-9.

SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS

The court has made each of the seven written factual findings required by General Statutes § 17a-112(k) based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented at trial, and has considered the evidence relevant to each of these findings in deciding whether to terminate parental rights. See In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn. App. 528.

TIMELINESS, NATURE AND EXTENT OF SERVICES — § 17a-112(k)(1)

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF offered the following services to the respondent parents in order to facilitate reunification:

DCF — casework services, transportation, visitation, treatment plans, TPCs, administrative case reviews (ACR), Regional Resource Group for medical questions and answers

Boys' Village In-Home Services — parenting counseling and in-home services

Safe Haven — domestic violence classes

child specific medical education

Easter Seals — parent intervention program

Waterbury Youth Services (WYS) — referrals for parenting classes, anger management and anger awareness class

Catholic Family Services — individual and family counseling

The Morris Foundation — substance abuse evaluation, drug screens

CPR and First Aid training through ARC

Interstate Compact Office — home assessment for father

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has provided reasonable efforts in the past to reunify the child with the respondent parents. Those services were ordered in a timely manner and were appropriate for the circumstances at hand The parents were given ample opportunity to cooperate with those services in order to achieve a sufficient level of personal rehabilitation, but either failed to take advantage of those services or were unable to take advantage of them.

The clear and convincing evidence presented in this case indicates that both Donna and Joseph were issued specific steps by the court on several occasions, yet both failed to comply with the directives contained therein.

The clear and convincing evidence further indicates that the respondent parents neither fully utilized these services, nor did either respondent parent benefit from said services.

Furthermore, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that further efforts to reunify the child with either of the respondent parents are not appropriate.

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither respondent parent is either willing or able to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. § 17a-112(j)(1).

REUNIFICATION EFFORTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LAW — § 17a-112(k)(2)

This court finds that the clear and convincing evidence in this matter proves that neither of the respondent parents are presently able or willing to benefit from such reunification services as are contemplated by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

On 2/14/02, the court (Reynolds, J.) made a finding that reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of Amber were not possible.

On 9/12/02, the court (Matasavage, J.) made a finding that DCF had made reasonable efforts to reunite Amber with Donna.

On 1/15/03, this court made a finding that reasonable efforts had been made to make it possible for the child to return home.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification between the child and the respondent parents, but were unable to do so. The respondent parents were either unable or willing to benefit from said reunification services.

COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS — § 17a-112(k)(3)

With regard to the specific steps, Donna has:

Signed releases to allow DCF to communicate with service providers Advised DCF of changes in the composition of the household

With regard to the specific steps, Donna has not:

Kept all appointments set by or with DCF

Visited the child as often as DCF permits

Cooperated with in-home support services referred by DCF

Participated in individual therapy

Participated in domestic violence classes

Cooperated with the child's therapy

Participated in parenting class

Completed CPR and First Aid Training

Attended Amber's doctors' appointments

Obtained the medical training necessary to care for Amber

With regard to the specific steps, Joseph has:

Completed CPR and First Aid Training

With regard to the specific steps, Joseph has not:

Kept all appointments set by or with DCF

Signed releases

Kept his whereabouts known

Visited the child as often as DCF permits

Accepted and cooperated with in-home support services referred by DCF

Submitted to a substance abuse evaluation

Submitted to substance abuse testing

Participated in parenting classes

Participated in individual therapy

Secured and maintained adequate housing and legal income

Participated in domestic violence classes

Cooperated with the children's therapy

Attended Amber's doctors' appointments

Obtained the medical training necessary to care for Amber

Joseph has claimed to DCF to have participated in some services, but has failed to show verification of participation in these services.

THE CHILD'S FEELINGS AND EMOTIONAL TIES — § 17a-112(k)(4)

The court finds that the following were proven by clear and convincing evidence:

The credible evidence indicates Amber, who is 34 months old, does not recognize either Donna or Joseph as her parents. Neither Donna nor Joseph has ever parented this child or cared for her.

Due to inconsistent visitation, Amber has only seen her mother sporadically throughout her life. Although she recognizes her mother, she does not have a strong relationship with her and separates easily after visits with her.

Due to little visitation, Amber has only seen her father a few times throughout her life. She does not have a relationship with him.

In his evaluation of 7/31/03, Dr. Neems described the relationship between the biological parents and Amber as follows:

Amber seems to have some connection with her mother. She related to her mother cautiously but seems to be familiar with her mother.

Amber did not seem to recognize her father at first and was unwilling to separate from her mother to go with him. [Joseph] is skilled in interacting with children and was able to help Amber be comfortable with him, suggesting that he could build a relationship with her.

It is unlikely that Amber looks to either parent, however, to meet her basic needs. She has been cared for by others for her whole life and she is more ready to turn to others than to her parents to have her needs met.

In his testimony, Dr. Neems indicated that there was a weak relationship between Donna and Amber, but not a parent/child relationship.

Amber has been living with her FM for most of her life and looks to her to provide the loving and secure home in which she resides. Amber is very bonded to her FM and there is much affection and love between them.

In his testimony, Dr. Neems indicated that FM was Amber's psychological parent and that Amber looked to her to have her needs met. He testified that Amber was comfortable with her and was more lively with her than with her biological parents. He stated that FM met Amber's needs, including her psychological ones and was the most likely candidate to care for Amber.

The credible evidence also shows that FM and Amber have a typical mother-daughter bond for a child of that age. Amber is affectionate with FM, hugs her and seeks her for comfort.

The FM, who met Amber through her volunteer work as a "baby cuddler" at YNH while Amber was hospitalized there, has expressed a strong desire to adopt Amber.

AGE OF THE CHILD — § 17a-112(k)(5)

Amber was born on 2/2/01 and is 34 months old. She was placed with FM on 4/8/02, at 14 months of age. Amber is a medically complex child, diagnosed with chronic lung disease, severe oral aversion and GERD (gastro esophageal reflux disorder). She continues the use of a G-tube for feedings and medication administration. She is also a child with special needs, in that she has a chronic choking and gagging problem and speech problems. She has been susceptible to RSVs and uses a nebulizer. She is developmentally delayed. It is believed that she may have learning disabilities related to anoxia and prematurity.

The clear and convincing evidence offered at trial indicates that Amber requires substantial care to address her medical and special needs. This requires the commitment of at least 8 hours per day towards her medical and feeding care alone. Additionally, Amber requires cleanliness in her surroundings due to the G-tube and its attendant equipment. She must be maintained on a precise and consistent feeding schedule. Due to her chronic lung disease, Amber must avoid cigarette smoke.

PARENTS' EFFORTS TO ADJUST THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES — § 17a-112(k)(6)

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Donna has not made realistic and sustained efforts to conform her conduct to minimally acceptable parental standards as far as Amber is concerned. During the 22 months that her daughter has been in DCF care and the preceding 14 months that she was in YNH, Donna has failed to alter her lifestyle and make the changes necessary to regain custody of her child. She has made no efforts to work with DCF toward reunification with her child. She has failed to visit Amber consistently. She did not attempt parenting counseling or individual counseling in a timely manner, nor has she ever completed any counseling program. She has not maintained a residence that would be safe and appropriate for a child with Amber's special needs and medical concerns. She has refused to receive CPR training, so as to be able to obtain G-Tube and other medical training specific to Amber's care. She has not complied with the court-ordered specific steps necessary to work toward reunification and has not made changes that would lead a reasonable person to believe that she would be able to provide a safe, responsible and nurturing environment for her child.

Given Donna's mental health issues, parenting deficits, her dogged refusal to co-operate with DCF, her failure to engage in and benefit from counseling and her abject failure and refusal to comprehend and understand this child's serious medical needs and her inability to provide Amber with safe, responsible and nurturing care, tendering her additional time would not likely bring her performance, as a parent, within acceptable standards sufficient to make it in the best interests of the child to be reunited with her. She has demonstrated clearly and convincingly that she is unable to care for her child and provide her with the care and stability she needs and deserves.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Joseph has not made realistic and sustained efforts to conform his conduct to minimally acceptable parental standards. During the 22 months that his daughter has been in DCF care and the preceding 14 months that she was in YNH, Joseph has failed to alter his lifestyle and make the changes necessary to regain custody of his child. He has made no efforts to work with DCF toward reunification with her child. He has visited Amber minimally, until recently. He has provided no proof that he has ever completed any parenting, individual or domestic violence counseling. He has not completed a substance abuse evaluation. He has not maintained a residence that would be safe and appropriate for a child with Amber's special needs and medical concerns. Due to his failure to complete the other counseling and evaluations, he has been unable to receive G-Tube and other medical training specific to Amber's care. He has not complied with the court-ordered specific steps necessary to work toward reunification and has not made changes that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he would be able to provide a safe, responsible and nurturing environment for his child.

Given Joseph's mental health issues, parenting deficits, his dogged refusal to co-operate with DCF, his failure to engage in and benefit from counseling and his abject failure and refusal to comprehend and understand this child's serious medical needs, tendering him additional time would not bring his performance as a parent within acceptable standards sufficient to make it in the best interests of the child to be reunited with him. He has demonstrated clearly and convincingly that he is unable to care for his child and provide her with the care and stability she needs and deserves.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that neither Donna nor Joseph is either able and/or willing to care for their child and provide her with the care and stability she needs and deserves.

EXTENT TO WHICH THE PARENTS WERE PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHILD — § 17a-112(k)(7)

`This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no unreasonable conduct by DCF, foster parents or third parties, including YNH, prevented Donna or Joseph from maintaining a relationship with Amber, nor did the economic circumstances of any parent prevent such relationship, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system remained in effect.

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD — § 17a-112(j)(2)

The court is next called upon to determine whether termination of the parental rights of Donna or Joseph would be in Amber's best interests. Applying the appropriate legal standards to the clear and convincing facts of this case, the court finds this issue in favor of the State of Connecticut and DCF.

The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, "by clear and convincing evidence . . . (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child."

"Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents . . . Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action. In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990)." (Quotation marks and internal citation omitted.) In re Steven N., 57 Conn. App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000). "[T]he question . . . to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship. That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child. See Practice Book § 33-5." In re Carissa K., 55 Conn. App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). "In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition." (Citation omitted.) In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn. App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441 (2000).

In determining whether termination of Donna or Joseph's parental rights would be in Amber's best interests, the court has examined multiple relevant factors, including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of her environment; her length of stay in foster care; the nature of her relationship with her foster parent and biological parents; and the degree of contact maintained with her biological parents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn. App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn. App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., supra, 55 Conn. App. 816. In a matter such as this, the court is further called upon to balance Amber's intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with her biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

"[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his other child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider." (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) In re Savanna M., 55 Conn. App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).

Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that it is not in Amber's best interests to continue to maintain any legal relationship with either Donna or Joseph.

Despite being given ample time in which to rehabilitate herself and to become a safe, responsible and nurturing parent to her child, Donna has failed to show any improvement in her child rearing abilities. During the 22 months that her daughter has been in DCF care and the preceding 14 months that she was in YNH, Donna has failed to alter her lifestyle and make the changes necessary to regain custody of her child. She has made no efforts to work with DCF toward reunification with her child. She has failed to visit Amber consistently. She did not attempt parenting counseling or individual counseling in a timely manner, nor has she ever completed any counseling program. She has not maintained a residence that would be safe and appropriate for a child with Amber's special needs and medical concerns. She has refused to receive CPR training, so as to be able to obtain G-Tube and other medical training specific to Amber's care. She has not complied with the court-ordered specific steps necessary to work toward reunification and has not made changes that would lead a reasonable person to believe that she would be able to provide a safe, responsible and nurturing environment for her child.

Donna's mental health issues, parenting deficits, her dogged refusal to co-operate with DCF, her failure to engage in and benefit from counseling and her abject failure and refusal to comprehend and understand this child's serious medical needs and her inability to provide Amber with safe, responsible and nurturing care clearly and convincingly raise a barrier to her ever being able to safely and responsively parent Amber.

In the report of his 7/31/03 evaluation of Donna, Dr. Neems wrote the following:

[Donna] is oppositional and defiant. She is too ready to argue with and to defy authority. She blames others for her failure to meet court expectations. She basically dismisses the concern that she hadn't seen Amber enough in the hospital and alleges that the hospital had never offered her the training that was necessary to take care of Amber's medical needs. She blames DCF for her failure to comply with recommended services, saying that DCF had not made referrals for services. She had belatedly gotten involved in individual counseling to try to meet the court expectations but she does not see the need to make any personal changes.

[Donna]'s oppositional behavior contributes to the conflict with [Joseph] in that she has not learned to assert her views effectively. Instead, she refuses to listen to him and does things that help to escalate the tension between them.

[Donna] has weak limit setting skills. She tends to talk to her children instead of setting effective limits. It is likely that her poor limit setting skills contribute to chaos in the home.

Despite being given ample time in which to rehabilitate himself and to become a safe, responsible and nurturing parent to his child, Joseph has failed to show any improvement in his child rearing abilities. During the 22 months that his daughter has been in DCF care and the preceding 14 months that she was in YNH, Joseph has failed to alter his lifestyle and make the changes necessary to regain custody of his child. He has made no efforts to work with DCF toward reunification with his child. He has visited Amber minimally. He has provided no proof that he has ever completed any parenting, individual or domestic violence counseling. He has not completed a substance abuse evaluation. He has not maintained a residence that would be safe and appropriate for a child with Amber's special needs and medical concerns. Due to his failure to complete the other counseling and evaluations, he has been unable to receive G-Tube and other medical training specific to Amber's care. He has not complied with the court-ordered specific steps necessary to work toward reunification and has not made changes that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he would be able to provide a safe, responsible and nurturing environment for his child.

Given Joseph's mental health issues, parenting deficits, his dogged refusal to co-operate with DCF, his failure to engage in and benefit from counseling and his abject failure and refusal to comprehend and understand this child's serious medical needs, tendering him additional time would not bring his performance as a parent within acceptable standards sufficient to make it in the best interests of the child to be reunited with him. He has demonstrated clearly and convincingly that he is unable to care for his child and provide her with the care and stability she needs and deserves.

In the report of his 7/31/03 evaluation of Joseph, Dr. Neems wrote the following:

[Joseph] feels that he has responded to the challenges presented by his daughter's problems in a blameless manner. He does not feel that he has any personal problems that have could (sic) reasonably cause concern about how he would parent his daughter. He dismisses all concerns expressed by DCF about his failure to build a relationship with Amber or to learn how to meet her medical needs. Similarly, he does not think that he has any problems with his anger and with how he deals with [Donna] that would justify concern about the environment in which Amber would live were she to be placed with either he or [Donna]. Not believing that he has any issues to work on, he has not sought counseling that would give him the opportunity to reappraise his views.

[Joseph] blames others for his failure to meet the expectations of DCF and the court. While he reported that he had completed an anger management course as a condition of his probation, he has failed to insure that the documentation of his participation was provided to DCF or the juvenile court. He blames DCF for his failure to participate in individual counseling, saying that he and his attorney expected DCF to provide him with a letter indicating when he had an appointment with a counselor. His lack of motivation to participate in counseling suggests that his progress would be very slow even if he did engage in counseling.

He has problems in regulating his anger. This problem has contributed to his ongoing serious conflict with Donna and has caused him to be arrested for a conflict with a police officer. He has problems with being too controlling, also contributing to his conflict with Donna. He is defiant of authority, as evident in his defiance of the court's expectations and in his two arrests for violating the order prohibiting him from having contact with [Donna]. While he is bright and capable, he is very defensive and is very weak in looking at issues from the point of view of others with whom he disagrees.

[Joseph] has some relevant strengths as a parent. He is bright and generally capable. He is energetic and outgoing and has a strong ability to engage Amber in interactions. He has a strong belief that structure can help to organize the lives of his children and to promote improved self control. This orientation toward providing structure for his children could help to counteract [Donna]'s laissez faire attitude if he were able to be less controlling with [Donna]. He has apparently been very responsible in providing for his children and for [Donna]'s other children. It is unfortunate that his belief in his own virtue and correctness has led him to neglect issues that he needed to deal with.

It is obvious to the court that most, if not all, of the respondent parents' present difficulties lie in their refusal to see that they have shortcomings and issues that need to be addressed. Their recalcitrance and stubbornness have frustrated any attempt by DCF at reunification. Though the court, based upon the evidence presented, has little doubt that the respondent parents will place the blame for this TPR on others, it is clear and convincingly obvious that the sole cause lies within the respondent parents. Their failure to even to attempt to establish a relationship with this child, especially at the time that she needed them most, while lying helpless at YNH for over 1 year, is a most accurate barometer of the depth of the respondent parents' true commitment towards Amber.

In the context of the child's best interests, the court must also address her special and medical needs. The State presented evidence that placement in the parents' care would have extremely dire consequences due to the parents' history of failing to address basic sanitary needs and Amber's need to avoid infection. State's exhibit #P, a sworn report of Off. Carmine Fidanza of the Naugatuck Police Department dated 6/6/01, stated the following:

On 06/06/01 at 11:45 a.m., I was dispatched to 163 High Ridge Rd. to meet a male party so could remove some personal belongings from said residence.

The male party I met at 163 High Ridge Rd. is identified as [Joseph]. Joseph said that due to a restraining order he is not allowed to enter his home or have any contact with his girlfriend [Donna]. While standing outside the home a green van pulled up the Street and operating this van was [Donna]. I went and explained to Donna that Joseph needed to get belongings from the house. Donna said that Joseph can go in and get belongings.

I went into the home with Joseph and accompanied him as he removed a small amount of his clothing and retrieved his mail. As we went around the home I was overwhelmed with the way the house was kept. I noted that from the basement to the first and second floor there was dirty laundry strewn about, with an odor of garbage in the basement entry .The worst of the areas was the large second story play room where 5 children who live in this house play. This room was covered completely with toys large and small, that were toppled over and piled on top of each other. This setting is a very dangerous one to be raising five children in. I asked Joseph if this was a normal living condition and he said it has gotten much worst since he has been out of the house. Joseph said that he cleaned the house when he was there, but Donna does not clean at all. Joseph said that Donna makes the oldest boy Michael, who is 12, clean the house.

When I went back out side I spoke with Donna and instructed her to clean up her house and make it a safer environment for her children. Donna said that she was going to get a dumpster and throw everything that was junk and throw away . . .

Additionally. State's exhibit #R, a sworn report of Off. Ronald Pugliese of the Naugatuck Police Department dated 12/21/01, stated the following:

On 12/21/2001 at approximately 2114 hrs, Officer Deeley and Myself were dispatched to 163 High Ridge Rd on a report of a panic alarm.

Upon arrival I made contact with a [Michael]. Michael stated that he pushed the panic button on the alarm system after his mother, [Donna], punched him in the head. Michael stated that he got into an argument over cleaning up the house, with his mother. Michael stated that his mother got mad at him and punched him in the head with a closed fist. Michael stated that he had some pain to his fore head, over his left eye.

I spoke to Donna who stated that she did get into an argument with Michael. Donna stated that the argument was over the fact that Michael will not clean the house. Donna stated that she got so frustrated with Michael that she hit him in the head with the back of her hand Donna stated that she cannot take it anymore and she needed to get away from the kids. Donna stated, several times that she was going to give the kids to her "EX," Donna did not specify what" EX" she was talking about.

I did see a bruise with some swelling over Michael's left eye. The bruise did not appear to need medical attention. At this point Officer Deeley and Myself noticed that the residence was in a condition that was neither safe nor healthy for the children. Donna has five children living in the residence besides Michael. The other children in the house are [Star, age 10], [Courtney, age 8], [Nicole, age 5], [Amelia, age 3], and [Joseph, age 2]. Donna also has a 10 mo. old, [Amber], who is in Yale New Haven Hospital due to complications after birth. As I walked around the house I noticed that there was old food and garbage on the kitchen counters and dirty dishes in and around the sink. There was food in the refrigerator but there was a foul smell coming out when you opened the door. The kitchen floor was sticky to the touch and the door to the oven was missing. There was broken glass in the foyer area near the front door. Donna stated that Michael broke the window several weeks ago but the glass has not been cleaned up. There was also broken glass on the floor to the down stairs bathroom. Upstairs, where the children's bedrooms are was covered with toys, clothing and garbage. There was also numerous piles of animal droppings in and around the children's bedrooms. The toilet in the upstairs bathroom was not flushed and there was a bottle of cleaner on the floor, among other pieces of garbage including a plastic bag. Donna's bedroom had clothing all over the floor and the bed.

All the dresser drawers were open with clothing hanging out. There was a filled litter box in the living room, near the fireplace. It also appeared that two of the children slept on the couch in the living room. There was a small refrigerator that was unplugged in the dining room. There was several cans of spoiled baby formula in the refrigerator along with a swarm of small flies. Down stairs was a large open room, with no lights. I was not able to enter the room due to the amount of trash and animal dropping on the floor. There was also a bathroom down stairs that had a large amount of animal droppings in the bath tub and on the floor. Several photos were taken of the bruise on Michael's head and of the residence. DCF was notified of the domestic situation and the condition of the house. Donna was advised that she was under arrest . . .

DCF investigator, Sandy Liguindoli, arrived on scene to start her investigation. Sandy interviewed Donna and all of the Children. Sandy looked over the condition of the residence. Sandy did not remove the children from the residence and allowed Donna to return to the house after making an arrangement with her to clean up the house and get some family counseling. Sandy stated that the benefits of keeping the children home out weighted the risk of them being in that environment at this time. Sandy stated that DCF will keep and open case on [this family] and will do frequent follow up visits. A DCF-136 form was also filed.

No further action at this time.

Additionally, State's exhibit #T, a sworn report of Off. Ronald Pugliese of the Naugatuck Police Department dated 1/15/02, stated the following:

On this date and time I received a call from Edwin Velez, a case worker with NAFI. Mr. Velez stated that he was at 163 High Ridge Road. Velez stated that he had come to that residence to check on a child who was presently assigned to him. Velez stated that this child identified as, [Michael] was suspended from school and was on probation. Velez was concerned due to the fact that there were no adults in the residence, and he stated that he had been there for awhile and Michael was apparently babysitting his 3 year old brother, Joseph and his 4 year old sister, Amelia. That, also Velez stated that there was a female child there who he stated was sick and had a 103 degree [temperature]. Velez stated further that the living conditions in the house were of a concern to him, as there were clothes all over the place, soiled diapers on the floor and that the housekeeping of the house was less than acceptable. I informed Velez that I would respond to his location. Velez stated that he had called DCF and was advised to call the Naugatuck Police. That I along with Sgt. Desrosiers responded to the residence.

Upon arrival we observed that there were dirty dishes, that the gas stove had no door on the oven, that there were no gates at the stairs of the house which created a hazard to the smaller children. That, further we observed that there were light switches, and receptacles in the room where the children were that had no covers on them, leaving them exposed causing the wires to be accessible. That, while looking around for more hazards, Sgt. Desrosiers found a steak knife lying on the floor next to where the small children were playing and laying. That, also a large butane lighter, (grill type), was found lying on a computer desk. That, in the kitchen it was observed that there was a gas range and that there was no door on the stove. There were 4 flights of stairs that were hazardous, as there were no gates to prevent the smaller children from climbing these stairs, and that these stairs had open back treads with an approximate 4-5 inch space. That, the smaller children could easily fall through these spaces.

I asked Michael where his mother was and he stated that she had left to pick his sister up from school. Michael stated that his sister got out of school at 11:00 a.m. Sgt. Desrosiers had the dispatcher call the Fire Marshals office and Deputy Chief Mark Seeger responded. Upon seeing the condition of the house, DIC Seeger shut the gas off from the stove and place red tags on the stove stating it was unsafe for use. That, he also taped over the electrical switches and receptacles and placed red tags on them also. Michael stated further that his mother was going to wash her vehicle also. We were at the residence for approximately 1 and 1/2 hours, (14:00 hours), before the mother called, I spoke with her and advised her we were there. Upon arriving home [Donna] became very offensive. She stated that she figured it was alright to leave the children with Michael. I informed her that due to Michael's present status that he was not fit to be responsible for the other children, reminded her that she had called approximately 2 weeks prior and had myself and Sgt. Griffin come to her house due to Michael physically assaulting Star, his 10 year old sister. That, [Donna] was also advised of the unsafe and hazardous conditions in the house which posed a threat to the safety of her children. [Donna] stated that her oven door was broken and that she had taken it to be repaired. She became very upset and belligerent when advised by Fire Marshall Seeger that she could not use the stove in it's present condition. [Donna] was advised that she would have to get an adult or older person to stay with the children or that she would have to take them with her when she went out.

That, further while waiting for the mother to come home this writer contacted DCF via Care Line. I spoke with a Gayle Murphy and advised her of our findings at the residence. She stated that there were records on file regarding this family, I was advised that Officer Pugliese had referred the family to DCF just prior to Christmas 2001. Murphy stated that she would see to it that someone from DCF made it to the residence on 01/15/2002.

Fire Marshall Seeger stated that he would write out a sworn written statement for me and Velez stated that he would be willing to make out a sworn statement. Upon receiving these statements I will be applying for an arrest warrant, for [Donna] for the charges of Risk of Injury to Minor (2 counts) in violation of Ct Statute 53a-21.

Erin Hynes of Boys Village indicated that her organization accepted a referral for in-home services. and family preservation from DCF on this family and opened up the case on 4/10/02. She was in the home twice per week for 5 months. She testified that home cleaning was an issue and that she attempted to set up some type of cleaning structure within the home. However, she further reported that she felt that Donna didn't follow through on maintaining this cleaning structure. Consequently, she noted that, in reference to cleaning issues in the home, there had been some improvement but also that there had been some return to the previous state of uncleanliness existent when the referral had been made. Haynes testified that Boys Village did not recommend placement of Amber with Donna due to her inability to care for her daughter.

SW April testified that the family had a DCF history that dated back to 1990 for domestic violence, physical abuse, lack of supervision and deplorable conditions. April, the social worker for the family prior to DCF SWs Cecilia McCrary and Paul, indicated that Donna's other 6 children were adjudicated neglected in 9/02 and were placed with Donna under 6 months protective supervision. She testified that the home prior to Amber's birth was cluttered and dirty. She opined that the home was not appropriate for Amber to reside in due to health considerations and that placement there would be detrimental to Amber.

In her testimony, SW Paul pointed out that, during her visit to the home in 5/02, she found that the carpet and walls were filthy and that the premises smelled of urine. She also testified that Donna smokes in the car with the children in it.

Gerri Dudick, R.N., nurse consultant for DCF, testified that, in her opinion, it was not in Amber's best interests to be placed in:

a home with other children, much less 6 other children under 15 years of age due to Amber's needs being a "fulltime job";

a home with a pregnant caregiver, due to Amber's needs;

a home with a caregiver who was a smoker, due to Amber's propensity for respiratory infections;

a home with a caregiver who had a 10 year history with DCF for deplorable home conditions, due to the increased risk for infection and contamination of her food; CT Page 1803

a home with a caregiver who had a 10 year history with DCF for physical abuse, emotional abuse, educational neglect, inadequate supervision and domestic violence, due to the increased risk for physical abuse of special needs children; or,

a caregiver with substance abuse or domestic violence issues.

Dr. Margaret Sanyol, M.D., Amber's pediatrician, testified that she would be concerned at the concept of placing Amber in a dirty home. She indicated that it would increase the risk of exposing Amber to infection. She also opined that the sanitation issues suggested disorganization and a lack of structure in the home.

While on redirect by the AAG, SW Paul minced no words on this issue. With Trumanesque bluntness, she testified that placing Amber in Donna's home would result in her death, due to medical issues.

Harry S. Truman (1884-1972). 33rd President of the United States (1945-53) and former U.S. Army artillery officer during World War I, noted for strong and forthright language.

This court agrees with her.

Although counsel for Donna pointed out that these conditions existed as Donna's former residence and that the present residence is sanitary, the court is disinclined to risk Amber's life on such a chancy proposition. The clear and convincing evidence shows that Donna and Joseph have consistently been unable or unwilling to adhere to minimum sanitary requirements and safety considerations in their home over a substantial period of time. The credible evidence indicates that between 6/6/01 through 5/02, on 4 different occasions, there were unsanitary and unsafe conditions in the residence. Theses conditions included, but were not limited to:

exposed wiring

animal feces throughout the house

soiled diapers

flies

broken and unsafe gas stove

inappropriate supervision

no safety gates for small children

garbage and trash throughout the house

spoiled baby formula in the refrigerator

smell of urine

Despite the notice given to the parents by the actions of the Naugatuck Police and Fire Departments and DCF, SW Paul testified that, when she entered the residence of 5/02, there was a smell of urine and the carpet and walls were filthy. The testimony of Ms. Haynes from Boys Village concerning the lack of success in ameliorating the sanitary problems clearly and convincingly show the parents' failure and/or unwillingness to provide a clean and sanitary home for their children.

The court must also address the respondent parents' claims in reference to DCF's requirement that the parents complete CPR and other training and counseling prior to under taking the G-tube training. Counsel for Donna argued that CPR training was not a prerequisite to G-tube training and cross-examined the State's witnesses extensively on this issue.

Based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented, the court finds that DCF's position of requiring the respondent parents to complete CPR and other training and counseling prior to under taking the G-tube training to be completely reasonable and logical, given the circumstances in this case. The credible evidence shows that both parents have a number of unresolved issues which would clearly prevent them from being safe, responsible and nurturing parents for Amber. DCF was well within their right to require that the parents deal with their other issues successfully before embarking on G-tube training. In Donna's case, her failure to complete CPR training prevented her from even having unsupervised visitation, should DCF have thought it appropriate. Additionally, as SW Paul pointed out during her testimony, having the parents undertake the G-tube training first and then addressing their other problems, such as individual counseling, domestic violence counseling, in-home services, cleanliness of their home, etc., would have required that they would have to retake the G-tube course in order to refresh themselves with the procedure.

In the end, the issue of whether DCF should have allowed the respondent parents to undertake the G-tube training first is a nullity; the parents' refusal to comply with the rest of the services specified in the specific steps, their failure to maintain a safe, sanitary and clean home and their failure to simply visit and establish a relationship with Amber has spoke volumes as to where the best interest of this child lie.

Based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented concerning the respondent parents' behavior and performance so far, this court cannot foresee either Donna or Joseph ever having the capacity, ability or the patience to be able to follow the regimen necessary for this child to maximize her abilities and achievements.

The clear and convincing evidence also shows that there are no viable relative resources for these child.

DCF believes that TPR and adoption by the present FM would be in the child's best interests, an opinion shared by the child's attorney and the child's pediatrician.

Counsel for Donna argued that long-term foster care (LTFC) would be appropriate in Amber's case, so as to allow Donna time to rehabilitate so she could avail herself of services. He claimed that DCF itself was responsible for the fact that there was no ongoing relationship between Donna and Amber due to their refusal to provide G-tube training. Finally, he argued that Donna was making slow but steady rehabilitative efforts.

Unfortunately, even a cursory view of the clear and convincing evidence proffered show that these claims lack merit. There was no credible evidence brought forth to show the benefit of LTFC for Amber. In fact, Dr. Neems recommenced against LTFC in both his report of his 7/31/03 evaluation and in his testimony. In his report, he wrote:

I am not recommending [LTFC] since this would subject Amber to the increased risks of disruption to the parenting relationship in this type of arrangement.

Under cross-examination by the child's attorney, Dr. Neems testified that Donna had already been given a reasonable amount of time in which to make the necessary changes to allow Amber to reside with her. He opined that she was not likely to make those changes within a reasonable period of time in the future.

As to Donna's present rehabilitative efforts, her therapist, Ms. Hales, testified that Donna only started seeing her on 4/21/03. She indicated that Donna's prognosis was very good. However, on cross-examination by the AAG, Ms. Hales was forced to admit that Donna had stopped therapy on her own at the end of 5/03, resuming only at the end of 7/03. It was also brought forth during cross-examination that Donna had not informed Ms. Hales of the various issues that are germane in this litigation or had minimized them, such as sanitary condition of the home, poor parenting skills, domestic violence, physical, emotional and educational neglect of the children, physical abuse of the children, inadequate supervision of the children, mental health and the true extent of Amber's health and development situation. By the conclusion of the cross-examination by the AAG, Ms. Hales had conceded that a patient who was not honest was difficult to help, that Donna had not shared much with her and that may slow down therapy and that her diagnosis was not accurate in view of the new information that she had received.

As to the claim that DCF itself was responsible for the fact that there was no ongoing relationship between Donna and Amber due to their refusal to provide G-tube training, it must be noted that Donna and Joseph failed to even attempt to establish a relationship with Amber due to their refusal to visit the child. This was evident when Amber was a patient at YNH for over a year and prior to DCF becoming involved with Amber. Neither patient visited much at that time, a situation which has existed through much of this child's life.

The respondent father Joseph argued that he proffered numerous plans for reuniting Amber with him. The credible evidence indicates that the only plan that he offered, aside from Amber returning to his and Donna's care, was to have a nanny care for her during the week. The credible evidence also showed the unrealistic nature of this plan, based on Amber's significant special and medical needs.

Joseph also argued that he did not receive enough opportunity to visit Amber and therefore was unable to develop a bond with her. He indicated that because he was now in the area, he could take the necessary classes and training and that the State stalled on offering him the training. He asked that the case be continued so he can take the necessary classes and training and be reunited with his daughter.

Although the court is aware that Joseph may have had employment concerns throughout this period, those employment concerns did not relieve him of his responsibilities towards his child. He had a duty to visit his child and to try to establish as normal a parent-child relationship as he could. This was something that he should have started in YNH, not when the child was released to foster care. Joseph's woeful record of visitation can only be ascribed to him, not to DCF. DCF did what they could to assist him.

Finally, as to both parents' requests that they be given further time for classes, counseling and reunification, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that this would not be in the best interest of Amber. The credible evidence shows that both respondent parents were given more than enough time to rehabilitate and establish a relation with their daughter. Both respondent parents wilfully chose not to do so.

Amber has established a parent-child relationship with FM, who has known her since she was 5 months old. Unlike the respondent parents, FM obtained all of the medical and G-tube training needed so as to safely care for Amber in a relatively short period of time. FM has mastered her challenging special and medical needs, including CPR, dealing with her choking and gagging episodes, utilizing her nebulizer and her numerous, time consuming feeds. FM makes sure that Amber is brought to her medical appointments, maintains cleanliness within her home and makes sure that Amber is not exposed to detrimental and unhealthy influences, such as cigarette smoke. FM has obtained necessary services for Amber such as Birth to Three and takes her to play groups and on appropriate trips such as the zoo for socialization. FM has even learned how to reinsert the G-tube into Amber when it has become dislodged.

Dr. Neems testified that FM is Amber's psychological parent. The court finds this to be true, based on the clear and convincing evidence brought forth during the trial. Dr. Neems also recommended that Amber remain in FM's care.

Our courts have recognized that "long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development." In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 709. Furthermore, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children. In re Alexander V., 25 Conn. App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The court is obliged to agree with the child's attorney and with the State and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that Amber is entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the period of uncertainty as to the availability of her biological parents as caretakers.

The State and DCF have recommended the TPR and adoption. There was absolutely no evidence to establish the unreasonableness of this request.

Having balanced Amber's intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with Donna or Joseph, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that this child's best interests cannot be served by continuing to maintain any legal relationship to the respondent parents. Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-14. In fact, the clear and convincing evidence in the case establishes that this child's life and survival would be substantially jeopardized if she were to be delivered into the callous hands of her parents. Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the child contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Donna and Joseph is in the best interest of the child Amber.

ORDER OF TERMINATION

WHEREFORE, after due consideration of Amber's sense of time, her need for a secure and permanent environment, the relationship she has with her foster parent, and the totality of circumstances; and having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights; and having concluded that the termination of the parental rights at issue will be in the child's best interests, the court issues the following ORDERS:

That the parental rights of Donna F. are hereby terminated as to the child Amber F.;

That the parental rights of Joseph P. are hereby terminated as to the child Amber F.;

That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for Amber for the purpose of securing an adoptive family or other permanent placement for her.

That a permanency plan shall be submitted within 30 days of this judgment, and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court, as required by law. That primary consideration for adoption of Amber shall be offered to her current foster parent.

BY THE COURT,

Taylor, J.


Summaries of

In the Interest of Amber F.

Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury Juvenile Matters at Waterbury
Jan 22, 2004
2004 Ct. Sup. 1756 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)
Case details for

In the Interest of Amber F.

Case Details

Full title:IN THE INTEREST OF AMBER F., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN YEARS

Court:Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury Juvenile Matters at Waterbury

Date published: Jan 22, 2004

Citations

2004 Ct. Sup. 1756 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004)