Opinion
W.C. No. 4-663-860.
October 24, 2006.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order dated April 25, 2006 of Administrative Law Judge Mattoon (ALJ) that denied her claim for compensation. We affirm.
The claimant is the widow of the deceased worker, Mr. James Wright, who sought benefits related to Mr. Wright's death. Several of the ALJ's findings are summarized as follows. The decedent suffered from longstanding heart problems. After becoming employed, the decedent obtained health insurance and resumed treatment by his regular doctor. He became a store manager and his duties included working long hours. His physician imposed work restrictions, which included working no more than 36 hours a week. However, the decedent did not advise his employer of the restrictions. Instead, he continued working in excess of 40 hours a week. Drug therapy and a defibrillator implant were recommended for the decedent, but were not implemented. After taking a family vacation, the decedent worked several additional shifts at work.
The decedent died at home on June 1, 2005, after completing his regular work shift for the day. His youngest daughter discovered his body and paramedics were called to the scene; however, the decedent expired in the emergency room. The decedent did not die of a heart attack, but due to ventricular arrhythmia stemming from longstanding heart complications.
The ALJ found there was testimony that the decedent received a telephone call from Jean at work immediately before his death, which had made him very angry. However, the ALJ found an interview by the fire rescue district on the date of the decedent's death did not support that testimony. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (Order) at 4, ¶ 15.
Dr. Battock, a cardiologist, opined that the decedent's long hours and stress at work, combined with his anger at being called just prior to his collapse, led to his death. Another cardiologist, Dr. Hutcherson, opined that it could not be stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that such events were related to his death.
The ALJ found that the reputed telephone call to the decedent from his workplace just prior to his death did not occur. She found the claimant failed to show that anything occurring on the date of his death contributed to the decedent's demise. She also found Dr. Battock's opinion to be less persuasive since it assumed the decedent sustained work-related stress and anger just prior to his death. The ALJ determined that the statutory provision governing compensation for heart attacks was inapplicable. See § 8-41-302(2), C.R.S. 2006. She concluded that the claimant failed to sustain her burden of establishing that her spouse's death was work-related and dismissed her claim for benefits.
On appeal, the claimant asserts that the ALJ misconstrued certain evidence in the record underlying her finding that no phone call from work was made to the decedent just before he died. She therefore argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the ALJ's order. Specifically, the claimant argues that the ALJ erroneously interpreted part of her exhibit consisting of records from the fire rescue district that responded to the emergency call from the decedent's home after he collapsed. See Exhibit 14. The exhibit includes a recitation of a conversation with the claimant's daughter who had called for help. The record indicates that daughter stated the decedent instructed her to answer the telephone if it rang because he was loading the dishwasher. Exhibit 14 at 5.
The claimant argues that the ALJ drew an implausible inference from this evidence that the telephone call from the decedent's work did not occur. The claimant further contends that the ALJ went on to discredit Dr. Battock's opinion due to this impermissible inference from the emergency records. Instead, the claimant asserts that the rescue record may not be read to indicate a call from work was not received. The claimant also asserts that the ALJ did not make any credibility determinations concerning the daughter's testimony. The claimant argues the ALJ "implausibly interpreted the evidence before her in an unreasonable fashion and has created a conflict in the evidence that is non-existent." Claimant's Brief at 6. However, we are not at liberty to construe the evidence so narrowly and must uphold the ALJ's decision.
This matter concerns the question of whether the claimant established that the decedent's death was causally connected to his employment. Section 8-41-301(1)(c), C.R.S. 2006, creates the right to compensation where the worker's death is "proximately caused by an injury or occupational disease." In this regard, the industrial injury need not be the immediate cause of the death, but only a proximate cause to support an award of death benefits. Johnson v. Industrial Commission, 148 Colo. 561, 366 P.2d 864, 865 (Colo. 1961).
Because the issue of causation is factual in nature, we must uphold the ALJ's order if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2006; Trujillo v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 957 P.2d 1052 (Colo.App. 1998).
This standard of review requires us to consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, and to defer to the ALJ's resolution of conflicts of the evidence, credibility determinations, and plausible inferences drawn from the record. Metro Moving and Storage Co. v. Gussert, 914 P.2d 411 (Colo.App. 1995). Further, this standard is one of appellate review, and does not afford us any independent fact-finding authority. Metro Moving and Storage Co. v. Gussert, supra.
Finally, we note the ALJ is not held to a crystalline standard in expressing findings of fact and conclusions of law. The ALJ need not make findings concerning every piece of evidence, nor resolve every conflict in the evidence, so long as the findings are sufficient to demonstrate the basis of the order. Magnetic Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 5 P.3d 385 (Colo.App. 2000).
Contrary to the claimant's contention, we perceive no basis for interfering with the ALJ's determination that the rescue district's report does not support the daughter's testimony about a call from work. The fire rescue district's record indicates that the paramedic spoke with Mr. Wright's daughter and states that daughter said "her father told her to answer the telephone if it rang because he was loading the dishwasher. Exhibit 14 at 2, 4-5. The deposition testimony of one of Mr. Wright's co-workers indicates that someone named Jean worked at the store, but he did not recall her having any problems during the shift in question. Valle Deposition at 6. The deponent also said he made no call to the decedent, but was not sure whether or not Jean called him. Valle Deposition at 7-8. The evidence was susceptible of conflicting inferences, but it is the province of the ALJ to assess credibility and resolve the conflicts. We have no basis for interfering with her assessment of the evidence. See Metro Moving Storage Co. v. Gussert, supra; Rockwell International v. Turnbull, 802 P.2d 1182 (Colo.App. 1990). Moreover, we do not find that the ALJ's credibility determinations are erroneous. See Halliburton Services v. Miller, 720 P.2d 571 (Colo. 1986) (ALJ's credibility determinations are binding unless the testimony is so rebutted by hard, certain evidence that as a matter of law the ALJ would err in crediting the testimony). The ALJ is not required to credit the testimony of a witness, even if it is uncontradicted and unrebutted. Levy v. Everson Plumbing, Co., Inc., 171 Colo. 468, 468 P.2d 24 (1970); Cary v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 867 P.2d 117 (Colo.App. 1993).
The claimant, citing Matter of Death of Talbert, 694 P.2d 864 (Colo.App. 1984) contends the ALJ misapplied the law by requiring medical proof as to causation. We disagree. The ALJ in her conclusions of law specifically determined that it was not necessary for a claimant to present a medical opinion to establish causation. The ALJ considered the expert as well as other evidence offered, but found the claimant did not carry the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Therefore, we may not reweigh the evidence on review and decline the respondents' request to do so. See General Cable Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 878 P.2d 118 (Colo.App. 1994). While the ALJ might have interpreted the testimony differently and drawn other inferences, the mere possibility of a different result affords no basis for relief on appeal. Wilson v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 81 P.3d 1117 (Colo.App. 2003). Hence, we may not disturb the ALJ's finding that the claimant failed to establish a compensable claim. See Snow v. Industrial Commission, 172 Colo. 133, 470 P.2d 852 (1970).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ=s order dated April 25, 2006, is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
____________________________________ John D. Baird
____________________________________ Thomas Schrant
White Steele, P.C., Matthew W. Tills. Esq., Denver, CO, (For Respondents).
Robert Turner, LLC, Robert W. Turner, Esq., Denver, CO, (For Claimant).
James Wright c/o Glenda Wright, Northglenn, CO, 7-11 Stores, Southland Corporation, Westminster, CO, Ace American Insurance, Portland, OR, Sedgewick of Colorado, Greenwood Village, CO,