Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Shep Zebberman, Referee, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. FJ44521.
Bruce G. Finebaum, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and David C. Cook, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FLIER, J.
Appellant W.R. appeals from an order finding him to be a ward of the court because he unlawfully drove an automobile. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s findings. We find ample evidence supports the order and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 11, 2010, appellant was driving a white Honda Civic. The car was registered to John Crawdy and had been reported stolen. In order to start the car, appellant used a key that was shaved to fit into the Honda Civic’s ignition but was not manufactured for that car (a shaved key).
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Dwayne Brown stopped appellant, and appellant stated that he had found the vehicle on the street, the doors to the vehicle were open, and the shaved key was in the car. Appellant later wrote the following statement: “I don’t know who owns the car I just saw it, with the key and I took it.”
In a petition under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the People alleged that appellant unlawfully drove or took a vehicle. The trial court found the allegation true beyond a reasonable doubt. The court ordered appellant placed in camp.
DISCUSSION
Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (section 10851(a)) provides: “Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, or any person who is a party or an accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or stealing, is guilty of a public offense and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment.” Appellant argues that the record lacks sufficient evidence to support the findings that the owner had not consented to his driving the vehicle and that he had the specific intent to deprive the owner of title to or possession of the vehicle.
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “‘we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] We resolve all conflicts in the evidence and questions of credibility in favor of the verdict, and we indulge every reasonable inference the jury could draw from the evidence.” (People v. Wong (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1444; see also In re C.R. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393 [applying same standard in juvenile proceeding].)
1. Consent
The record contains substantial evidence supporting the court’s finding that appellant did not have the owner’s consent to drive the car. Appellant admitted that he did not know the owner and simply took the car. In addition to appellant’s statements, there was evidence that the vehicle had been reported stolen, and appellant used a shaved key to drive the car. Appellant’s use of the shaved key instead of the key manufactured for the vehicle supported an inference that he lacked the owner’s consent because he did not have the owner’s key. That fact also distinguishes this case from People v. Rodgers (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 531, in which the defendant testified that he borrowed the vehicle from a friend; the defendant had the keys to the car; and the court found the record lacked substantial evidence showing the owner did not consent to the defendant’s use of the car. (Id. at pp. 533-534.) In contrast here, strong evidence including appellant’s own statements supported the finding that appellant did not have the consent of the owner to drive the white Honda Civic.
Finally, contrary to appellant’s argument the prosecution did not violate the corpus delicti rule. Under that rule, the prosecution may not satisfy its burden in proving the body of the crime by relying exclusively upon appellant’s extrajudicial statements. (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1168.) The purpose of the rule is “to ensure that one will not be falsely convicted, by his or her untested words alone, of a crime that never happened.” (Id. at p. 1169.) “The independent proof may be circumstantial and need not be beyond a reasonable doubt, but is sufficient if it permits an inference of criminal conduct, even if a noncriminal explanation is also plausible.” (Id. at p. 1171.) Here, Deputy Brown saw appellant driving the car, which had been reported stolen, and appellant used a shaved key. That evidence constituted independent proof of criminal conduct.
2. Specific Intent
Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he had the specific intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of possession also lacks merit. The specific intent to deprive the owner of possession of his vehicle “‘“may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1577.) A person violates section 10851(a) by driving a vehicle “‘with the intent only to temporarily deprive its owner of possession (i.e., joyriding).’ [Citations.]” (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 876.)
Appellant’s admission that he took the car supports the court’s finding that he intended to deprive the owner of at least temporary possession of the vehicle. Appellant’s use of the car until he was stopped by a deputy sheriff further supports the finding that he intended to deprive the owner of possession of the vehicle during the time appellant made use of the vehicle. From this evidence, a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant harbored the specific intent to deprive the owner of possession of the car.
DISPOSITION
The order sustaining the petition is affirmed.
We concur: BIGELOW, P. J. GRIMES, J.