Opinion
CIV 04-350-S-LMB.
June 27, 2004
MEMORANDUM ON REASONED JUDGMENTS
David Woodruff, pro se has moved the court to issue explanations citing facts, law, and just rationale why Woodruffs arguments fail or grant the requested relief. Woodruff moves to have this done in writing and for all the arguments he makes in this action and appeal.
"[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such. interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Governments' interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. See, e.g. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, US at 263-271, 25 Led2d 287." Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334.
PRIVATE INTEREST
What is the private interest that will be affected by the status quo of the official action?
The questions of law Woodruff has argued in this action concern the application and interpretation of the Federal Constitution.
Of particular notice is that the action involves ultimately the question of whether, (1) Woodruff is incarcerated by a void judgment, and, (2) Woodruff will be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.
The day after Woodruffs criminal trial the trial judge said, "The evidence, it seemed to me, was sufficiently equivocal that the jury could have found a reasonable doubt." on the record yet he failed to enter a judgment of not guilty, violating Woodruffs right to a jury trial, see Patton v. US (1929) 281 U.S. 276, 289 (judges opinion controls over contrary jury verdict if his opinion is not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt) and Woodruffs right to jury verdict of guilt only if it is beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt pursuant to a jury trial right, Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 278, and Woodruffs right to liberty and the presumption of innocence until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-365 (due process of law).
The jury was never instructed of the necessity that they find Woodruff not guilty if they have a reasonable doubt of guilt, violating due process, Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) but only that they "should" do so, which allows a choice of action. This also violates the jury trial right to have the jury properly instructed, Patton v. US, 281 U.S. 276, 288-289 (1929); the right to a jury verdict of quilt only if it is beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt pursuant to jury trial right, Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 278, and Woodruffs right to liberty and the presumption of innocense until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-365 (due process of law).
Since the errors resulted in the absence of a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, they are not subject to harmless error analysis, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280-281.
Woodruffs claims are not frivolous.
Woodruffs federal right to liberty is pursuant to the 14th Amendment, section 1, clause 2, US Constitution.
Liberty is "`an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty.'" In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526.
The issues in this case involve the right to access the court without being barred by the 28 U.S.C. § 1915 law (See the "Response to Order to Show Cause.") and whether the judgment confining Woodruff is void (See the "Memorandum On Rights Violation.").
The right to access the court preserves all constitutional rights. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 15 (1992). The right of access to the court is an aspect of liberty that the government must affirmatively protect. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 405 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); The ability to access the court is the first and often only line of defense against constitutional violations. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U 817, 828 (1977).
If Woodruff fails, he may decide to appeal to the US Supreme Court. ". . . records make possible appeals which, even if they do not occur, import by their possibility a healthy atmosphere of accountability." In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38, Ft. 65 (1967) (quoting Nat'l Crim Comm'n Report, pp 86-87). Increasing the possibility of valid appeals directly implicates the right to access the court.
"At least to the extent protected by the Due Process Clause, the interest of a person subject to government action is in the accurate determination of the matters before the court. . . ." Heller v. Doe (1993) 125 Led2d 257, 278. Woodruff contends more accurate results will be reached by the court giving in writing the facts, law, and just rationale explaining why and how Woodruffs arguments fail, but leaves a description and argument regarding how, to a later section of this argument showing and titled "Probable Value of New Procedural Safeguards."
Therefore, Woodruff has shown the private interest involved is the constitutional right to liberty, 14th Amendment, US Constitution, the right to access the court 1st Amendment, petition clause, 5th Amendment, due process, Article
4, section 2, clause 1, privileges and immunities clauses of the US Constitution, and the right to an accurate determination of matters before the court, due process, 5th Amendment, US Constitution.
RISK OF AN ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATION OF PRIVATE INTEREST(S) THROUGH THE PROCEDURES USED
When Woodruff makes arguments that fail but the court fails to explain why or how they fail citing a just reason; and fails to cite what laws were applied and what facts were relied on to be subjected to the applicable laws for a determination of a sound result, what rate of error exists?
No one can tell because there is nothing upon which to establish any error was made, nor that any error was not made. This is reason indicating that the risk of error is too high not to afford the new procedures.
North Carolina v. Pierce, 23 Led2d 673, FN3, "`. . . The risk of judicial arbitrariness rests where, in my view, the constitution puts it — on the government.' Gori v. United States, 6 Led2d 901 (Douglas J., dissenting)."
Using the new procedures, the risk of error will not be upon the litigants as much as on the government. By exposing the way a decision was made to deny a litigants arguments, we prevent the preservation of irrationality by the government and courts; we will institute logic and the guarantees of fairness will be capable of execution; and the litigants will be able to show how the government and court has erred and the government and court will bear the risk of such an error.
PROBABLE VALUE OF NEW PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
What good would come from procedures requiring courts to explain why a litigants arguments fail citing facts, law, and just rationale?
". . . `law' is not a static concept, but expands and develops as new problems arise . . ." Price v. Johnston (1948) 334 U.S. 266, 281.
Requiring judgments that state facts, law, and just rationale why a litigants arguments fail will allow the evolution, change, growth and creation of civil liberties.
Judges are not free in defining "due process" to rely on personal notions of fairness and disregard the limits that bind them. Dowling, 107 Led2d 708.
"The evil is so often spawned in the name of the law and the pursuit of the public order as expressed by officials who are engaged in doing what is, `good,' `right,' `fair,' `in the public interest,' or who are so often `just doing their duty.' However, when public officials adopt their own ideas about morality as standards for adjudicating the righteousness of others — the `good,' the `right,' and the `fair,' become the expedient. The standards for the successful society is then judged according to the end result with precious little attention being paid to the manner by which it is achieved and to how many heads may have fallen into the basket in the process. Government becomes ultra powerful and the citizen is relegated to the least rather that the most important unit of the social order. The fragile cobwebs of human rights become misty visions which tend to blend with the ghosts of some private opinion of what is `good,' `fair,' `right,' and `just' until they become inseparable and — at last — are no rights at all." Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173, 177 — 178 (Wyo. 1976).
These follies will be avoided by judgments that cite facts, law, and just rationale why a litigants arguments fail thereby "releasing the clutch of unconscious preference and irrelevant prejudice." Greater Boston T.V. Corp. v. FCC, 143 US App.D.C. 383, 394, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (1970) cert. Den. 403 U.S. 923, thereby serving due process of law, which "functions to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations." Fuentes v. Sherin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 97.
Judgments citing facts, law, and just rationale why a parties arguments fail will allow litigants to raise a focused objection to the reason(s), fact(s), or law(s) used. Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available defense. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932).
". . . records make possible appeals which, even if they do not occur, impart by their possibility a healthy atmosphere of accountability." In Re Gualt, 387 U.S. 1, 38, ft 65 (1967) (quoting Nat'l Crim Comm'n Report, pp. 86-87). A litigant cannot intelligently choose to appeal or object unless he is informed of why his arguments fail considering the courts explanation why they fail citing facts, law, and just rationale so that a litigant can estimate his likely success.
Also, a "healthy atmosphere of accountability," Id., goes to satisfy, as all other points argued in this section do, the rule the "The public conscience must be satisfied that fairness dominates the administration of justice." Adams v. United States (1942) 317 U.S. 269, 279.
Without a written opinion explaining why and how a litigants arguments fail citing facts, law, and just rationale, it is impossible to know how or whether he has been remiss in some way and future insufficiencies of that nature will not be avoided by the litigants and litigants in other cases. Parker v. Atlantic C.L.R. Co., 133 N.C. 335, 45 SE 658, 658 (1903). This becomes a matter of whether adequate opportunity to raise a defense has been granted if a litigant can next meaningfully allege his pleadings are not defective or if they are that the defects may be remedied as a matter of right, Hall v. Bellman, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110, ft. 3 (CA10, 1991) (pro se litigants are to be given reasonable opportunity to remedy pleading defects); Munz v. Darr, 758 F.2d 1254 (CA8 1985) (pro so litigants must be given a chance to amend their defective complaints).
The court can more accurately determine the issues before it under a requirement that the judgment contain a citation to facts, law, and just rationale why the litigants arguments fail.
"`Having determined which facts are properly before him, and utilizing accepted principles of law, the chancellor must then exercise independent judgment to determine the proper result.' Domingues v. Johnson, 323 MD 486, 496, 593 A.2d 1133 (1991)." Kirchner v. Caughey, 606 A.2d 257, 260 (Md. 1992).
"The legal consequences flow from the facts and it is the province of the courts to ascertain and find facts in order to determine the legal consequences. That is every day practice." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth (1932) 300 U.S. 227, 243.
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. 137, 177.
The court "must decide the particular dispute according to a rule or principle which covers a whole class of like disputes." Trail Motors, Inc. v. First Nat Bank of Laramie, 301 P.2d 775, 780 (Wyo. 1956).
"Due process requires that court `make certain' that proper professional judgment was `in fact' exercised in the denial of a liberty interest. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982). Deference to professional judgment is not blind; it must be based on evidence that the responsible professional was guided in his judgment by evaluation of the relevant circumstances. . . . See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d at 1396." Large v. Superior Court, 714 P.2d 399, 408 (Ariz. 1986).
Appellate courts need lower court judgments to cite facts, law, and just rationale why a litigants arguments fail to effectively discharge justice.
A court's judgment that does not pass on federal constitutional questions or does not clearly do so may be remanded to accomplish that. Blackburn v. Alabama, 354 U.S. 393.
"We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of a statement of the grounds of decision, both as to facts and law, as an aid to litigants and to this court." Public Serv. Com. v. Wisconsin Telegraph Co., 289 U.S. 67, 69.
"Intelligent exercise of our appellate powers compels us to ask for the elimination of the obscurities from the opinion in such cases." Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) (quoted in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 US [advance, at page 6] (2000)).
Not only will Woodruff be in a position to intelligently choose to exercise his right to fix the error(s) and continue prosecution, and to object or appeal from a judgment if a court cites facts, law, and rationale why his arguments fail, but an appellate court may competently issue a judgment.
Also, prejudice against Woodruff because he is an indigent, pro se, not an attorney, and a prisoner is less likely to result in an illogical and arbitrary judgment if it cites facts, law, and just rationale why Woodruffs arguments fail.
Requiring judgments explaining why litigants arguments fail citing facts, law, and just rationale will;
(a) promote judges following the law instead of their personal notions that spawn the evil of the destruction of civil liberties.
(b) prevent arbitrary rulings governed by unconscious preference and irrelevant prejudice.
(c) allow objections focused on the grounds for denial of relief.
(d) allow defenses to be raised to the grounds for denial of relief.
(e) allow a litigant to intelligently choose to appeal or not according to the grounds for denial of relief and the litigants estimation of his chances for success.
(f) allow a litigant to modify his pleadings or conduct to conform to the law or court requirement.(s).
(g) allow a litigant and other litigants in future cases to meet the requirements of law and of the court.
(h) allow the court to reach a more accurate result.
(i) allow the court to satisfy its duty of citing facts, law, just reason, and to apply principles and rules of law applicable to whole classes of like disputes.
(j) allow an appellate court to effectively and intelligently discharge justice.
(k) impart a healthy atmosphere of accountability.
(l) avoid judgments affected by prejudice against indigent, pro se, non-attorney, prisoner litigants, such as Woodruff, and
(m) satisfy "The public conscience [which] must be satisfied that fairness dominates the administration of justice." Adams v. United States (1942) 317 U.S. 269, 279.
Therefore, Woodruff states the probable value of new procedural safeguards of requiring judgments that state facts, law, and just rationale why the litigants arguments fail.
A court judgment should be direct, free from ambiguity, consistent, fully responsive to the issues and contain nothing indicating that they are ill founded in law. Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 533 (discussing when remand required); Gillis v. FA Enters (Wyo.) 813 P.2d 1304 (same).
GOVERNMENTS INTEREST
It is the duty of the government to secure to the people the right of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, see the Declaration of Independence, paragraph?.
"One of the purposes of Article III was to vest in the federal courts the power to settle disputes that might threaten the peace and unity of the nation." Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon (1985) 473 U.S. 234, 269 (Brennan, dissent).
"`If a government refuses to do justice to individuals, war is the consequence. Is this the bloody alternative to which we are referred?. . . .' quoting Edmond Randolph, 3 Elliot's Debates, at 573." Atascadero, 473 US at 268 (Brennan, dissent).
"The public conscience must be satisfied that fairness dominates the administration of justice." Adams v. United States (1942) 317 U.S. 269, 279.
Woodruff claims that the above government interests will be served by requiring judgments citing facts, law, and just rationale why and how Woodruffs arguments fail, if they do.
GOVERNMENTS FUNCTION INVOLVED
". . . courts . . . are bound by . . . [the US Constitution]." Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. 137, 180.
"The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the duties of government is to afford that protection." Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. 137, 180.
The court "must decide the particular dispute according to a rule or principle which covers a whole class of like disputes." Trial Motors, Inc. v. First Nat Bank of Laramie, 301 P.2d 775, 780 (Wyo. 1956).
"The legal consequences flow from the facts and it is the province of the courts to ascertain and find facts in order to determine the legal consequences. That is every day practice." Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth (1936) 300 U.S. 227, 243.
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. 137, 177.
Article III of the US Constitution embraces a power in the federal courts to formulate the law to be applied. National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., (D.C. Mass, 1942) 47 F. Supp. 499, add'd 140 F.2d 618.
Courts sit to adjudicate controversies involving alleged denials of constitutional rights. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of State of Co. (1964) 377 U.S. 713.
The above stated laws indicate the government function involved.
FISCAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS ENTAILED BY NEW PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Woodruff presumes for the sake of argument but by no means accepts that judges are presumed to know the law and apply it in making their decisions. Lambrix v. Singletary, 117 SCt 1517, 137 Led2d 771 (US 1997); Glasser v. US, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (judge or court has duty to enforce laws and rights); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (same); Taylor v. Kentucky (1978) 436 U.S. 478, 489, ft. 17 (same); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (same); Article 6, section 3, US Constitution (Oath of Office); 28 U.S.C. § 453 (Oath of Office); Article 6, section 2, US Constitution (Supremacy Clause).
There is a presumption that judgments are correct. Martin v. Gray, 142 U.S. 236; Thompson v. Tolmie, 27 U.S. 157; Evers v. Watson, 156 U.S. 527; Landes v. Brant, 51 U.S. 348; Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U.S. 327.
These laws indicate that judges find facts, law, and just rationale and apply them when deciding whether or not and how a litigants arguments fail in reaching a decision. Therefore, Woodruff claims the only cost and administrative burden involved is transferring these facts, law, and just rationale from thought to print.
Woodruff claims this is too cheap and easy to avoid the implementation of new procedural safeguards.
To any further extent that the cost and burden is an issue, Woodruff claims the government or court has the burden to produce evidence thereof, since that is within their knowledge peculiarly and particularly. Hildebrand v. Chicago, B O.R.R., 17 P.2d 651 (Wyo. 1933); Browzen v. Catholic University of America, 527 F.2d 843 (C.A.D.C. 1975).
CONCLUSION
Therefore Woodruff argues that he is entitled to and the court must issue judgments in writing explaining how and why all of Woodruffs arguments fail citing facts, law, and just rationale pursuant to the right to be heard at a meaningful time and manner, the right to accurate judgments, and the right to meaningfully petition and access the court, 1st Amendment, petition, 5th Amendment, due process, and Article 4, section 2, clause 1, privileges and immunities clauses of the US Constitution, and requests declaratory relief also.
I, David Woodruff, certify under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.