Opinion
NUMBER 13-17-00644-CR
11-21-2017
IN RE DAVID N. WINSTEAD
On Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) ("When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so."); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
Relator David N. Winstead, proceeding pro se, filed a document in this Court on November 20, 2017 through which he appears to be complaining of allegedly illegal confinement. We construe this pleading as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus as stated herein.
Relator references both civil and criminal matters in his application. We note that we affirmed his felony convictions for tampering with physical evidence and possession of a controlled substance in 2014. See Winstead v. State, No. 13-12-00589-CR, 2014 WL 3888238, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 7, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
A relator is not entitled to habeas corpus relief unless he was deprived of his liberty without due process of law or if the judgment ordering him confined is void. See In re Alexander, 243 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding). The purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is not to determine the ultimate guilt or innocence of the relator, but to ascertain if the relator has been unlawfully confined. Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. 1979); Alexander, 243 S.W.3d at 827.
This Court's original jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus relief derives from section 22.221(d) of the Texas Government Code, which provides, in relevant part:
Concurrently with the supreme court, the court of appeals of a court of appeals district in which a person is restrained in his liberty, or a justice of the court of appeals, may issue a writ of habeas corpus when it appears that the restraint of liberty is by virtue of an order, process, or commitment issued by a court or judge because of the violation of an order, judgment, or decree previously made, rendered, or entered by the court or judge in a civil case.TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.221(d) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Thus, this Court has no original habeas corpus jurisdiction in criminal law matters. See id.; Ex parte Price, 228 S.W.3d 885, 886 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, orig. proceeding); Chavez v. State, 132 S.W.3d 509, 510 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Watson v. State, 96 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, pet. ref'd); Dodson v. State, 988 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.); Ex parte Hawkins, 885 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, no pet.). In such cases, our jurisdiction is appellate only. See Dodson, 988 S.W.2d at 835.
Further, this proceeding is a collateral attack on a final conviction and, therefore, falls within the scope of a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus under article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Only the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction in final, post-conviction felony proceedings. Id.; Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals, 802 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (orig. proceeding); In re McAfee, 53 S.W.3d 715, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding).
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of habeas corpus and the applicable law, is of the opinion that we are without jurisdiction to consider this application. Therefore, we dismiss this petition for writ of habeas for lack of jurisdiction without reference to the merits.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 21st day of November, 2017.