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In re Willis

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Oct 3, 2000
228 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2000)

Summary

holding in non-CAFA case that § 1446(b) time period begins to run upon a defendant's receipt of the initial complaint only if the complaint “explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount”

Summary of this case from Gibson v. Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc.

Opinion

No. 00-3134

Submitted: September 20, 2000

Filed: October 3, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Esastern District of Missouri, Charles A. Shaw, J.

Counsel who represented the petitioner was William A. Brasher of St. Louis, Missouri.

Counsel who represented the respondent was Christian L. Faiella of Moberly, Missouri.

Before BOWMAN, BEAM, and BYE, Circuit Judges.


Zachary Perry, a Missouri resident, filed this personal injury action in Missouri state court on October 7, 1999, against Virginia resident Curtis Bruce Willis. The complaint sought an unspecified amount of damages for pain and suffering, permanent disability, and wage loss. Following an initial round of discovery wherein Perry filed an Offer of Judgment in the amount of $75,001, Willis removed the action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), asserting the court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Perry then moved to remand the case to state court, arguing the notice of removal was filed beyond the thirty-day time limit of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The district court agreed, reasoning that the case was removable when filed and therefore the alternative time limit of section 1446(b) did not apply.

Section 1446(b) provides that if the case as stated in the initial pleadings is not removable, the notice of removal may be filed within thirty days of when the defendant first discovers the case is removable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

We disagree. We find the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount. See Chapman v. Powermatic, Inc., 969 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1992). This rule "promotes certainty and judicial efficiency by not requiring courts to inquire into what a particular defendant may or may not subjectively know." Id. Further, this rule prevents a plaintiff from disguising the amount of damages until after the thirty-day time limit has run to avoid removal to federal court. We therefore grant the petition for mandamus and direct the district court to reassume jurisdiction of the case and reinstate the case on its docket.


Summaries of

In re Willis

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Oct 3, 2000
228 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2000)

holding in non-CAFA case that § 1446(b) time period begins to run upon a defendant's receipt of the initial complaint only if the complaint “explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount”

Summary of this case from Gibson v. Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc.

holding that "the thirty-day time limit of section 1446(b) begins running upon receipt of the initial complaint only when the complaint explicitly discloses the plaintiff is seeking damages in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount"

Summary of this case from Zapata v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.

holding that 30-day period begins to run only when complaint explicitly discloses that the amount in controversy exceeds the federal jurisdictional amount

Summary of this case from Mendez v. Central Garden Pet Company

granting petition for mandamus and directing the district court to reassume jurisdiction

Summary of this case from Hurst v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.

noting that requirement for “explicit disclos[ure]” of federal jurisdictional damages amount “promotes certainty and judicial efficiency by not requiring courts to inquire into what a particular defendant may [have] subjectively know[n].... and prevents a plaintiff from disguising the amount of damages until after the thirty-day time limit has run to avoid removal”

Summary of this case from Gibson v. Clean Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc.

discussing amount in controversy requirement and citing Chapman v. Powermatic, Inc., 969 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1992)

Summary of this case from Christoffersen v. Yellow Book USA, Inc.

describing the complaint as "indeterminate"

Summary of this case from Bence v. Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc.

indicating that the plaintiff refused an offer of judgment for $75,001

Summary of this case from Bence v. Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc.
Case details for

In re Willis

Case Details

Full title:In re CURTIS BRUCE WILLIS, Petitioner

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

Date published: Oct 3, 2000

Citations

228 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2000)

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