Opinion
Civil No. 3:94-CV-2477-H (SOUTHERN PACIFIC).
June 19, 2003.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs Southern Pacific Transportation Company and St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company's (collectively referred to herein as "the Railroads") Motion for Rehearing or, in the Alternative, for Reconsideration, filed December 9, 2002; Meridian Housing Co.'s ("Meridian") Response thereto, filed December 30, 2002; and the Railroads' Reply, filed January 14, 2003.
The Railroads' Motion is pursuant to the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of November 22, 2002 granting Meridian's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the Railroads' Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA") §§ 107 and 113 claims.
Upon review of the pleadings briefs, and relevant authorities, the Court is of the opinion for the reasons stated below that the Railroads' Motion to Reconsider should be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
The Railroads assert claims against Meridian for cost recovery and contribution for response costs which they allege were "in excess of Southern Pacific's and SSW's equitable shares" for releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances at the High-Yield site in Commerce, Texas. (First Am. Compl. at 12-15). The Railroads' First Amended Complaint was filed November 1, 2001 seeking cost recovery under CERCLA, § 107(a)(4)(B) and contribution under CERCLA § 113(f) as well as recovery under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act and various other claims which will be heard in a later trial.
These claims are asserted in the No. 3:94-CV-2477-H lawsuit by the Railroads against Meridian, Bonny, and Chickasha Cotton Oil Company, and as cross-claims and third-party claims in fifteen other cases associated with the VPG litigation. The Court's decision reached all of these cases.
Meridian and Bonny Corporation filed an Amended Motion for Summary Judgment Against the Railroads on August 21, 2002. On November 22, 2002 this Court denied Bonny Corporation's Summary Judgment claims as moot, pursuant to the Railroads' Agreed Order of Partial Dismissal against Bonny; Meridian's Amended Summary Judgment Motion was granted as to the CERCLA §§ 107 and 113 claims against Meridian.
The Railroads now ask for rehearing or reconsideration of the November 22, 2002 Order.
II. ANALYSIS-MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Although the Federal Rules do not recognize a Motion to Reconsider, this Circuit provides that such a motion can be considered either as a motion to "alter or amend" under FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). See Lavespere v. Niagara Machine Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds. The Court determines which rule to apply depending on the date the moving party files its motion. See Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 995 (5th Cir. 1996). Because the Railroads did not file their motion within the ten day period required by Rule 59(e), Rule 60(b) applies.
Rule 59(e) provides: "Any motion to alter or amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of judgment."
The Railroads do not specify under which aspect of Rule 60(b) they bring their motion. Because the Motion does not qualify for consideration under sections (1) through (5), the Court assumes that the Motion is brought under 60(b)(6). Section (b)(6) allows courts to relieve a party from a final judgment for "any other reason [than those set forward in (1)-(5)] justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).
Sections (1) — (5) allow courts to relieve parties from a judgment for: mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, a void judgment, or a satisfied judgment.
In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) the Supreme Court notes that Rule 60(b)(6) does not "particularize the factors that justify relief" but it "provides courts with authority `adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.'" Id. at 2204 (1988) quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1949). The Supreme Court cautions, however, that Rule 60(b)(6) should only be "applied in `extraordinary circumstances.'" Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 199 (1950).
In Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 157 (1990) the Fifth Circuit has warned that district Courts should be cautious in reopening judgments for the sake of "a judicial process that is predictable." Bailey, 894 F.2d at 160. The Circuit has set forth certain guidelines for when a judgment should be reopened under Rule 60(b)(6). Id. at 60. These include that the movant should "allege extraordinary circumstances warranting relief." Id. The moving party must also establish "manifest injustice" Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 173. Rule 60(b)(6) motions "are not substitutes for timely appeals" particularly where "a mistake of law is alleged to be the primary ground of the appeal." Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 216 (2002).
III. CONCLUSION
The Railroads have neither shown nor alleged extraordinary circumstances in connection with their Motion for Reconsideration, neither have they shown nor alleged manifest injustice if the judgment is not reopened. The Motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.