The TPR petitions were filed in Superior Court for Juvenile Matters (SCJM), 6th District (Waterbury) (SCJM) on 1/17/03. The petitions alleged the following:

Abandonment, as to all 3 fathers;

Failure to rehabilitate, as to all parents; and

No on-going parent/child relationship as to all fathers and as to Nannette in reference to LaToya and McKale.

The history of this case extends back to 2001, although the respondent mother's history with DCF apparently predates that year.

On 7/20/01 at approximately 11:00 pm, Inspector Don Brutnell of the Chief State's Attorneys Office contacted DCF Program Director, Ken Mysogland, and advised him that, based on confidential information received from informants, he believed that LaToya was in immediate physical danger from her surroundings. Inspector Brutnell advised that law enforcement received credible information that LaToya had been seriously sexually abused by an unnamed perpetrator. Based on that information, law enforcement received a search warrant to have LaToya examined and interviewed for sexual abuse.

It was learned that LaToya resided with maternal grandmother, Wanda J. (Wanda). DCF invoked a 96-hour hold on behalf of LaToya based on the belief that she was in imminent danger. At the time of LaToya's removal, her mother, Nanette, was incarcerated. On 7/26/01, DCF obtained an Order of Temporary Custody (OTC) from Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, 6th District, Waterbury (SCJM) (Reynolds, J.) on behalf of LaToya. On the same date, DCF filed a neglect petition on behalf of LaToya, alleging that she:

was being denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally or morally;

was being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to well-being, and;

that she had been abused and had a condition which is the result of maltreatment such as, but not limited to malnutrition, sexual molestation, deprivation of necessities, emotional maltreatment or cruel punishment.

On 7/31/01, the OTC was sustained (Reynolds, J.) Judge Reynolds denied the State's oral motion to change venue and to have a psychological examination of LaToya.

On 9/5/02, before this Court, John Doe was defaulted as to the neglect petition concerning LaToya.

On 8/10/01, DCF obtained an OTC from SCJM (Dewey, J.) on behalf of Vintia and McKale. Both children were also residing with MGM Wanda. On the same date, DCF filed a neglect petition on behalf of these children, alleging that they:

were being denied proper care and attention physically, educationally, emotionally or morally, and;

were being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to well-being.

On 8/17/01, the OTC as to Vintia and McKale was sustained (Dewey, J.).

On 9/26/01, Chester, Vintia's putative father, was defaulted for failing to appear as to the neglect petition (Pittman, J.).

On 10/24/01, the Court, (Reynolds, J.), granted the State's motion to amend the neglect petition as to McKale, to name Lemuel as his father.

On 11/13/01, Lemuel appeared at SCJM and entered a denial as to the neglect petition allegations. A paternity test as to McKale and Lemuel was also ordered. The court (Reynolds, J.) also held an evidentiary hearing on motions to intervene filed by Wanda, maternal aunt Vicki M. (Vicki) and maternal uncle Sharnar J. (Sharnar) and the State's motions to dismiss the motions to intervene. The court granted the motions to intervene as to Wanda and Vicki for dispositional purposes only, but granted the State's motion to dismiss Sharnar's motion to intervene.

On 2/27/02, the court (Reynolds, J.) granted the State's motion to amend the petition and the State's motion to bifurcate the neglect proceedings.

On 6/13/02 in SCJM, Nannette entered nolo contendere pleas as to the neglect petition concerning Vintia, LaToya, and McKale. Lemuel and Chester were defaulted for failing to appear. The children were adjudicated neglected and the matter set down for a hearing on disposition and the motions by the intervenors (Reynolds, J.).

On 9/5/02, before this court, John Doe was defaulted as to the neglect petition concerning LaToya.

On 9/24/02, before this court, the dispositional hearing commenced. Prior to the hearing, this court denied the interveners' motions for a continuance, for an evaluation and to hold DCF in contempt.

The dispositional hearing took 4 days to complete. Lemuel arrived after the start of the 3rd day of the hearing, but was not allowed in court, due to his prior default and his failure to cooperate with paternity testing. The court took notice of the transcript of the 11/13/01 hearing before Judge Reynolds, as well as several stipulations by the parties concerning the potential testimony of several witnesses on behalf of the interveners.

On 10/28/02, in a written decision, this court committed Vintia, LaToya, and McKale to the care and custody of DCF.

On 11/12/02, this court approved of the permanency plan calling for TPR and adoption with a concurrent plan of long-term foster care. This court also found that DCF had made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency plan.

On 2/14/03, the respondent mother Nannette appeared and entered denials to the allegations in the TPR petitions. Chester, John Doe and Lemuel failed to appear and were defaulted by this court.

On 3/24/03, Lemuel appeared in court and applied for court-appointed counsel.

On 6/27/03, this court granted Nannette's attorney's motion for psychological evaluations as to Nannette and Vintia only.

On 5/9/03, this court granted the State's motion to disclose information to another court.

On 7/29/03, the TPR trial commenced. It was continued over to 8/1/03 and was completed on 8/29/03.

This court has jurisdiction over the pending case. Notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Practice Book. No action is pending in any other court affecting custody of these children.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

The court has reviewed the TPR petitions and the TPR social study as well as the other exhibits. The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering this evidence and the testimony of trial witnesses. The court has also taken judicial notice of the prior testimony of LaToya's therapist Dr. Rose Spielman, her former foster mother Evelyn Doe and DCF social worker Melissa Bostrom. The parties also stipulated that, had Wanda been called as a witness, she would have testified that;

"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn. App. 534, 540, CT Page 13971 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Hector L., 53 Conn. App. 359, 366, 730 A.2d 106 (1999). "The probative force of conflicting evidence is for the their to determine . . . In re Ashley E., 62 Conn. App. 307, 316, 771 A.2d 160, cert. denied 256 Conn. 910, 772 A.2d 601 (2001)." In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn. App. 516, 528, 777 A.2d 695 (2001).

This testimony was given during the neglect dispositional hearing before this court on 9/24/02 and 9/25/02.

Nannette was appropriate with the children;

Nannette met the children's needs;

Nannette had a good relationship with the children; and

The children had a good relationship with Nannette.

The court also took judicial notice of its decision in the neglect dispositional trial. Upon deliberation, the court finds that the following facts were proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial.

See § 17a-112(j); see also In re Theresa S., 196 Conn. 18 (1985).

NANNETTE (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL, SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION)

Nannette was born on 6/12/65 in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, the middle child of 5 children born to Wanda. Her father was Frank M. She reports she was well cared for growing up and that she and her siblings are all very bonded.

Nannette is the mother of five children. One child, Donte, is an adult who has had a history of substance abuse and incarcerations. Three of her children are currently in DCF foster homes. Her last child, Donquell, was born addicted to crack cocaine and was placed in a DCF foster home. He was adopted after Nannette signed a voluntary termination of parental rights.

Nannette attended Kennedy High School in Waterbury. She completed the 11th grade and then dropped out of school. She has never received her high school diploma or her GED.

Nannette has never been married. Her children have different fathers and Nannette did not have long-term relationships with any of the fathers.

Nannette has never been in the military.

Nannette began abusing substances at the age of 25 years. She reported that her maternal aunt and uncle introduced her to drugs and that drugs have severely impacted her life. Nannette's children were all born positive for drugs and resided with her mother, Wanda, due to Nannette's inability to care for them.

Nannette has also had numerous incarcerations due to substance abuse as well as prostitution. She is currently serving a 5-year sentence at York Correctional Facility for Robbery in the Third Degree, Larceny in the Second Degree, and Larceny in the Third Degree. Nannette reported that she has been in and out of jail most of her adult life.

Nannette is currently incarcerated at York Correctional Facility in Niantic. She is serving a five-year sentence. Her estimated release date is 10/27/05 and her maximum release date is 7/28/06; though she may be released to a halfway house in 12/04, at the earliest. She receives monthly visitation with the children.

Nannette reported she has never received any counseling or been hospitalized for psychiatric issues. She did report, however, that as a child, she was sexually abused by a male baby-sitter.

CHESTER (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL, SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION)

Nannette was able to provide only limited information regarding Vintia's father, Chester. His current whereabouts are unknown and he has never played an active role in the life of his daughter. She reports that he may be approximately forty years old but she does not know his date of birth. She last heard he was residing in Raleigh, North Carolina. Nannette reports she met Chester through a friend but that she was also heavily abusing substances at the time. She further stated that Chester has never been in the military nor did he abuse substances. She had no further information to offer.

In her evaluation with Dr. Bruce Freedman, Ph.D, on 7/31/03, Vintia disclosed that she had met her father several times during trips to North Carolina and indicated that he had his own apartment there. She said that he always sent her money for her birthday or Christmas while she lived with MGM, but that she had not heard from him since. Vintia said that he had moved at about the time she went into foster care, and that she had never learned his new address or telephone number. She said that he used to call and talk to her at her grandmother's house.

Chester has failed to respond to any attempts to contact him concerning his daughter.

JOHN DOE

Nannette was unable to provide any information regarding LaToya's father. She was not aware of his last name and only had one sexual encounter with him.

LEMUEL

Lemuel was born on December 28, 1964 in Ashville, North Carolina, the oldest of seven children. He reported that he had a strong bond with his parents and that his siblings relied heavily upon him for emotional as well as financial support. His father was the minister of New Saint John's Baptist Church in Maryland at the time of the writing of the TPR study.

Lemuel graduated from Forest Hill High School in Ocala, Florida. He continued his education at Central Florida Community College and the Connecticut Business Institute. He reports that he successfully received his certification for nursing and has been working in the field for the past nine years.

Lemuel reports that he has a criminal record consisting of charges for possessing a firearm and for possession with the intent to sell narcotics. He also reported that is currently a recovering alcoholic and has been sober for the past five years.

Lemuel reported that he met Nannette at a nightclub called Mingles in Waterbury, stating that he met her while she was on a furlough from Niantic Correctional Facility. He claimed that after their encounter he never saw her again. He was not aware that McKale was his son until McKale was 1 year old.

In her evaluation with Dr. Freedmen, Nannette disputed much of what Lemuel told DCF:

[Nannette] said that [Lemuel], called "Heavy," was a drug dealer, but not a drug user. She said that he was selling drugs, while she was using. She said that she was not using drugs when she met him, then started using again, and so he supplied her with drugs. She said that although he looked down on drugs users and did not like to have relationships with them, he tried to "help" her by supplying her with drugs once he found out she was using. She said that it never occurred to her that having a romantic relationship with a drug dealer could cause her to relapse. She said that she had been going to meetings, but kept her relationship with [Lemuel] a secret . . .

[Nannette] said that after she had McKale, she stayed clean for a while, started hanging around with old friends, and started using again. She said that her mother took McKale as well. She said she went to another drug program called CT Renaissance. She said that each time she started using drugs, she would find a treatment program.

[Nannette] said that [Lemuel] knew she was pregnant, and that she had given birth to McKale while still in prison. She said that much of what [Lemuel] had told DCF staff was untrue, including his claim that he had been unaware that he had a son. She said that their relationship had lasted for a while, he went to jail around the same time she did, and she had told him about the pregnancy, then about the birth of his son. She said that he came to her mother's house, acknowledged that McKale was his son, and used to visit him with some regularity. She said that his family sent things for McKale's birthday and Christmas. She said that this had continued until the last two years, when McKale had been in foster care.

On 11/13/01, the court (Reynolds, J.) issued an order to determine paternity of McKale. Two appointments were scheduled for Lemuel in Maryland, but he failed to attend either one. Eventually, Lemuel participated in paternity testing while in Connecticut at a court hearing.

At the time of the TPR trial, Lemuel had moved to South Carolina. Prior to that, he lived in Baltimore.

VINTIA (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL STATUS OF THE CHILD AS REQUIRED BY CGS 45a-717(e)(1))

Vintia was born on 6/4/88 in Waterbury, the daughter of Nannette and Chester and the second child born to Nannette. She was primarily raised by MGM Wanda. According to the family she met all of her developmental milestones on target. She is described as a sweet, quiet, and manageable child.

Vintia suffers from no medical illnesses. Prior to coming into DCF care, Vintia was behind on her routine medical care. Her immunizations were up to date but she had not had a physical in several years. She is currently up to date with all of her medical appointments as well as dental exams. Vintia is an average student who presents with no behavioral difficulties in her educational setting. She attended school in Waterbury prior to her removal and was a regular education student. She did not repeat any grades nor experience significant academic difficulty.

Vintia was raised with her siblings and cousins and is very bonded to all of them. She is currently placed in a foster home. She has monthly visitation with her other sister and cousins. She looks forward to the visits and has a good time with her family.

Vintia was initially placed by DCF on 8/10/01. Prior to this date she had never been in placement. She was then moved to her current foster home on 2/8/02. Vintia and her sister LaToya are presently residing in the same foster home. Vintia has adjusted well to her placement and is comfortable in her surroundings. She is currently enrolled in high school and is doing well academically. She gets along well with peers and her teachers. Vintia has had no formal psychological testing but attends weekly therapy sessions.

Linda Doe, Vintia and LaToya's foster mother, testified that Vintia made the honor roll at her school, where she is also on the track team and involved with Jr. ROTC. Vintia also works with a teen pregnancy program.

LATOYA (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL STATUS OF THE CHILD AS REQUIRED BY CGS 45a-717(e)(1))

LaToya was born on 9/21/90 in Waterbury. Initially, she was raised by a friend of the family, Liz Paradise, from the time she was 6 months old, until she was 7 years old. At that time, MGM took her into her home. LaToya was with her mother occasionally when Nannette was out of prison but Nannette was not her primary caretaker. According to the family, LaToya met all of her developmental milestones on target and does not suffer from any physical ailments or medical conditions.

LaToya attended school in Waterbury prior to her removal, where she had numerous academic difficulties and repeated a grade. She is presently attending school in the district of her placement. She is doing extremely well academically and is often at the top of her class. LaToya has adjusted extremely well to her placement and realizes that she is receiving the structure that she needs. She has expressed fear in returning to the care of her grandmother and does not believe that her mother will be able to maintain sobriety once she is released from prison.

LaToya was placed by DCF on 7/21/01. LaToya has adjusted well to her placement. Previously, she was placed with her cousin, Tatiana J (Tatiana), but is presently placed with her sister Vintia. LaToya seeks comfort from the foster mother, Linda Doe, and is able to speak to her about her feelings and the experiences she had prior to placement. LaToya receives weekly individual therapy and is making progress in expressing her feelings related to the sexual abuse she experienced. She has monthly visitation with her siblings and cousins and looks forward to the visits. She enjoys spending time with the other children.

Linda Doe testified that LaToya gets good grades, but had some difficulties "fitting in."

McKALE (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL STATUS OF THE CHILD AS REQUIRED BY CGS 45a-717(e)(1))

McKale was born on 4/14/92 in New London, the son of Lemuel and Nannette. He is the fourth of five children born to Nannette. He was born while his mother was incarcerated at York Correctional Facility. He was born positive for substances and was raised by MGM for most of his life. He was placed with a family named Copeland by informal family arrangement for the first 3 years of his life and was raised by MGM afterwards. According to the family, McKale met all of his developmental milestones on target. He suffers from no physical ailments or medical conditions.

McKale attended school in Waterbury prior to his removal. He was a special education student who received his education in a smaller classroom setting. He struggled academically and at times had behavioral difficulties. McKale has continued to receive special education services since coming into placement. He is doing better academically and his educational needs are being well provided for. He is still reading below grade level.

Prior to coming into DCF care, McKale was not up to date medically. It had been several years since he had a complete physical examination. McKale is now up to date with all of his immunizations, physical examinations, and dental work. He is in therapy.

Initially, McKale had difficulty adjusting to being in DCF's care. He was very bonded to his maternal grandmother and had trouble being separated from her. Since being moved to a foster home, McKale has done well and has made smooth transitions into his new surroundings. He visits with his siblings and cousins once a month and looks forward to spending time with them.

SIBLINGS

Donte M. (Donte), Nannette's eldest child, appeared in court on 7/29/03 and testified on behalf of his mother. This court's opinion in the neglect dispositional trial, dated 10/28/02, indicated that he has battled substance abuse problems and has been involved with the criminal justice system. Nannette also had another child, Donquell, who was born addicted to crack cocaine. Her parental rights were terminated as to that child in 4/00 and he was adopted.

Also spelled Dante in various paperwork.

No evidence was presented concerning any paternal siblings.

RELATIVES

As to relative resources, the court incorporates its remarks on this subject found in its 10/28/02 decision on the neglect dispositional trial.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there are no viable relative resources for these children.

The history of this family shows that the MGM, Wanda, raised approximately 9 of her grandchildren, due to her daughters' substance abuse issues. The court gives Wanda much credit for undertaking this burden; unfortunately, the clear and convincing evidence shows that she failed to safeguard at least 3 of these children from sexual abuse orchestrated by her daughter Guitana J. (Guitana), as well as from physical abuse and sexual inappropriateness perpetrated by others within her home.

Guitana is Vintia, LaToya and McKale's maternal aunt and is Tatiana's mother.

The credible evidence shows that Wanda knew that Guitana had attempted to involve an older cousin of these children in prostitution in 1993; yet Wanda refused to cooperate with the police in the investigation of the matter. Furthermore, she was advised by DCF that it was not appropriate to allow the children to go with Guitana due to her bad character and activities, but she failed to heed that recommendation.

The court also finds that Wanda does not have adequate sleeping arrangements for these children.

The court also finds that maternal aunt (MA) Vicki M. (Vicki) is not a viable resource for these children. At the dispositional hearing, this court found that Vicki knew that her niece Tatiana was being sexually abused through the auspices of Guitana, yet she did nothing to remedy the situation or to protect the children.

Finally, the court finds that the maternal uncle (MU) Shanar J. (Shanar) is not a viable resource for these children. The credible evidence, offered through the testimony of DCF social worker Boyd Covington, indicates that his housing resources are inadequate to care for these children. Additionally, SW Boyd-Covington testified that a placement with Shanar would again result in Wanda having care and custody of these children, with the resultant dangers that have already been demonstrated.

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that there are no viable relative resources for these children.

ADJUDICATION

The court is now called upon to determine whether the petitioner has met its burden of proving the allegations presented by the pending TPR petitions. § 17a-112(j) "Under § 17a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights . . . exists by clear and convincing evidence." (Citation omitted.) In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn. App. 96, 102, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 903 (2000).

Despite having had due notice, Chester, John Doe and Lemuel failed to appear at the TPR trial. Chester and John Doe failed to participate in any of the neglect or TPR proceedings. Lemuel appeared in SCJM several times, the last time being 4/17/03. The fathers were found in default as to the TPR petitions on 2/14/03. Pursuant to Practice Book § 32a-2, establishing that juvenile hearings are essentially civil proceedings, the default against Chester, John Doe and Lemuel establishes admission of the material facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action, conclusively determining that the petitioner has prevailed on the TPR petition as to them. Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, 57 Conn. App. 688, 693 (2000). In addition, as discussed below, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that the petitioner has met its burden of proving the alleged statutory grounds necessary for consideration of terminating Chester, John Doe and Lemuel's parental rights.

In the adjudicatory phase of these proceedings, the court has considered the evidence related to circumstances and events prior to 1/17/03, the date upon which the TPR petitions were filed, insofar as the allegations pertaining to abandonment were concerned. With regard to the allegations of failure to achieve rehabilitation and no on-going parent-child relationship brought against the applicable respondent parents, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial. Upon review, as discussed below, the court has determined by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exist as to all respondent parents.

"Under § 117a-112, a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine whether one or more of the four grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in [§ 17a-112(j)] exists by clear and convincing evidence. The commissioner in petitioning to terminate those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the statutory grounds . . . In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89, 741 A.2d 873 (1999)." In re Quanitra M, 60 Conn. App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).

Practice Book Sec. 35a-7 generally provides that "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the judicial authority is limited to events preceding the filing of the petition, or the latest amendment."

"Despite Practice Book § 33-3(a) and case law regarding termination proceedings generally, we have determined that with regard to termination petitions brought under § 17a-112(c)(3)(B), the trial court may, in the adjudicatory phase, properly consider facts and events that occur after the filing date of the petition in determining whether a respondent has achieved a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation within the meaning of that statute. See In re Stanley D., 61 Conn. App. 224, 230, [ 763 A.2d 83] (2000)." In re Latifa K., 67 Conn. App. 742, 748, 763 A.2d 83 (2002). Events occurring after the date of the filing of the TPR petition are particularly relevant to the issue of "whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." (Emphasis in the original; external citations omitted.) In re Stanley D., supra, 61 Conn. App. 230. As to no on-going parent' child relationship; see footnote #21.

LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

In order to terminate parental rights, the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCF "has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing that such efforts are not appropriate." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1). In this context, "reasonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Hector L., [ supra, 53 Conn. App. 372]." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn. App. 534, 547, 744 A.2d 915 (2000); see also In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 362, 776 A.2d 487 (2001).

The record in this case indicates by clear and convincing evidence that DCF did make all reasonable efforts to locate the respondent parents in this matter. DCF was successful in locating Nannette due to her incarceration. They were also able to locate Lemuel in Baltimore. However, despite their best efforts, they were unable to locate Chester or John Doe.

In reference to reunification efforts, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF did provide the following services to Nannette:

case management

visitation

Additionally, Nannette, who has been incarcerated throughout these proceedings, was offered services through Department of Corrections (DOC). These services included theraputic support, parenting classes and substance abuse treatment. At the TPR trial, her attorney submitted into evidence certificates showing that she had completed the following programs while incarcerated:

The court notes that the certificates were issued under the name of Michelle [J.], which Nannette has indicated is the alias which DOC holds her under.

Parenting At A Distance

Parenting Program (10 weeks)

Anger Management

Tier I

"Beat The Streets"

"Sisters Helping Sisters"

Unified School District #1 Outstanding Achievement Award

The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF did attempt to provide reunification services to Lemuel. DCF did attempt to provide paternity testing to him; however, the evidence shows that he failed to cooperate with DCF and did not submit to said testing until 2003, while at a court appearance at SCJM. The court finds that DCF was unable to provide any further reunification services to him due to his failure to establish paternity in a timely manner and to cooperate with DCF.

Finally, the court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF was unable to provide reunification services to Chester and John Doe due to their failure to make themselves available to DCF and their failure to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of SCJM.

Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite Nannette with her children. In re Antonio M., supra, 56 Conn. App. 547; see also In re Sheila J., 62 Conn. App. 470, 480-82, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). The clear and convincing evidence also shows that DCF was unable to make reasonable efforts to reunite Lemuel, Chester or John Doe with their children.

"Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted, external citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn. App. 248, 255 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 105 (2001). Only "reasonable" efforts are required because "[i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." (Citation omitted.) In re Antony B., 54 Conn. App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).

On 11/12/02, this court found that:

DCF had made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency plan; and

That further efforts to reunify the children with any of the respondent parents were not appropriate.

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent parents are either unwilling or unable to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts. § 17a-112(j)(1).

STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION — ABANDONMENT § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)

The petitioner alleges that Chester abandoned Vintia within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in compliance with the mandate of § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.

CGS § 17a-112(j)(3)(A) provides for the termination of parental rights where "[t]he child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child."

"Abandonment focuses on the parent's conduct . . . General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)] defines abandonment as the fail[ure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child . . . Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare . . . Section 17a-112(b)(1) does not contemplate a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child . . . The commonly understood obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes; (1) express love and affection for the child; (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child, (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care: (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile; and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance." (Citations omitted: internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Deana E., 61 Conn. App. 185, 193 (2000).

The clear and convincing evidence related to Chester's conduct reveals that, through the filing date of the TPR petitions, 1/17/03, the respondent father Chester failed "to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the [child] . . ." In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193.

The clear and convincing evidence adduced at this trial shows the following:

Chester has visited with Vintia at best only a few times since her birth on 6/4/88. He has had only infrequent contact with her.

Despite making reasonable efforts, DCF has been unable to find Chester. Since Vintia was taken into DCF custody on 8/10/01 to the present, Chester has remained whereabouts unknown.

Since Vintia's placement in DCF foster care on 8/10/01, Chester has failed to send cards, gifts or to make phone calls to his daughter. During this time, he has failed to contact DCF to inquire about Vintia's condition or to find out how he could contact her. He has expressed no concern with Vintia's personal situation, her schooling or her health.

Since Vintia's placement in DCF foster care on 8/10/01, Chester has failed to pay child support or any other maintenance on behalf of Vintia.

The evidence in this matter clearly and convincingly establishes that Chester has failed the test of meeting "[t]he commonly understood obligations of parenthood" identified by In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193. The credible evidence shows that Chester has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of his daughter. Accordingly, based on clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has met its burden of proving that Chester has abandoned his daughter Vintia within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).

The petitioner next alleges that John Doe abandoned LaToya within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in compliance with the mandate of § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.

The clear and convincing evidence related to John Doe's conduct reveals that, through the filing date of the TPR petitions, 1/8/03, the respondent father John Doe failed "to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the [child] . . ." In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193.

The clear and convincing evidence adduced at this trial shows the following:

The identity of LaToya's father is unknown.

Since LaToya was placed in DCF's care on 7/21/01, John Doe has had no contact with her. He has never seen or visited his daughter. He has failed to send cards, gifts or to make phone calls to his daughter. During this time, he has failed to contact DCF to inquire about LaToya's condition or to find out how he could contact her. He has expressed no concern with LaToya's personal situation, her schooling or her health. He has failed to make inquiry with DCF in view of the revelation that she was sexually abused with the contrivance of her maternal aunt.

Since LaToya's placement in DCF foster care on 7/21/01, John Doe has failed to pay child support or any other maintenance on behalf of LaToya. He has never provided physical care nor financial support for the child

The evidence in this matter clearly and convincingly establishes that John Doe has failed the test of meeting "[t]he commonly understood obligations of parenthood" identified by In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193. The credible evidence shows that John Doe has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of his daughter. Accordingly, based on clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has met its burden of proving that John Doe has abandoned his daughter LaToya within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).

Finally, the petitioner alleges that Lemuel abandoned McKale within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A). In the absence of evidence to the contrary, applying the requisite legal standards and construing the statute in compliance with the mandate of § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.

The clear and convincing evidence related to Lemuel's conduct reveals that, through the filing date of the TPR petitions, 1/17/03, the respondent father Lemuel failed "to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the [child] . . ." In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193.

The clear and convincing evidence adduced at this trial shows the following:

Since McKale was placed in DCF's care on 8/10/01, Lemuel has had no contact with his son McKale. He admitted to DCF SW Boyd Covington that he has only seen McKale twice in his life.

In view of the fact that McKale has no memories of his father, the court concludes that those visits have not been within the recent past.

Lemuel has not visited his son since he was committed to DCF's care on 8/10/01. Prior to that, he had only seen his child infrequently.

Lemuel has not sent cards, gifts, or letters to his child since 8/10/01.

Since McKale's placement in DOF foster care on 8/10/01, Lemuel has failed to pay child support or any other maintenance on behalf of McKale. Lemuel has never provided physical care or financial support for the child.

Prior to the filing of the TPR petition, Lemuel had twice failed to submit to paternity testing that DCF had arranged for in his then hometown of Baltimore.

The evidence in this matter clearly and convincingly establishes that Lemuel has failed the test of meeting "[t]he commonly understood obligations of parenthood" identified by In re Deana E., supra, 61 Conn. App. 193. The credible evidence shows that Lemuel has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of his son. Accordingly, based on clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has met its burden of proving that Lemuel has abandoned his son McKale within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(A).

PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)

The petitioner has alleged that Nannette's parental rights should be terminated because she has failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). Applying the requisite legal standards, and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

As amended, General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) provides that parental rights may be terminated by the Superior Court for a child who

(i) has been found by the Superior Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child . . .

"`Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a-112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . [The statute] requires the trial court . . . to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his] child's life.' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Eden F., [ supra, 250 Conn. 706.] . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue. (Internal quotation marks omitted). In re Shyliesh H., [ 56 Conn. App. 167, 180, 743 A.2d 165 (1999)]." In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn. App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn. App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 250, 759 A.2d 63 (2001); In re Amneris P., 66 Conn. App. 377, 384-85, 754 A.2d 457 (2000).

Section 17a-112(p) establishes that the provisions of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) "shall be liberally construed in the best interests of any child for whom a petition under this section has been filed."

As Vintia, LaToya and McKale have been adjudicated neglected, the critical issue for this court is whether this respondent mother has achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render her able to care for these children.

The court record clearly and convincing shows that specific steps were ordered for Nannette on 7/31/01 (Reynolds, J.).

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion Nannette has yet to achieve a sufficient "level of rehabilitation . . . which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [her child's life]." In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn. App. 448. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 354, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 665. First, the credible evidence in this case, presented through the TPR social study, the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits at the TPR trial, clearly and convincingly establishes that Nannette has not achieved § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. The court credits the DCF reports and the testimony which showed that Nannette has accomplished little towards achieving her rehabilitation.

The clear and convincing evidence presented at trial indicates the following:

Nannette has an extensive and long-standing history of substance abuse and criminal recidivism. She has undertaken substance abuse treatment on several occasions, but has always relapsed back to drug use and abuse. By her own admission, Nannette began substance abuse at age 25, after having been introduced to it by her maternal aunt and uncle. In her testimony at the TPR trial, Nannette admitted to the following history of substance abuse treatment:

substance abuse treatment at Gaylord Hospital in the early 1990s;

substance abuse treatment at Connecticut Renaissance in 1994-95 (6 months inpatient); and

Stonehaven in 1999.

She also admitted that, after each of the above treatments, she eventually relapsed into substance abuse again.

The State also proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Nannette has an extensive criminal record. From 1986 through 2001, she has been convicted of the following:

Welfare Fraud

Violation of Probation (4 counts)

Prostitution

Breach of Peace (2 counts)

Larceny in the 2nd Degree

Larceny in the 5th Degree (2 counts)

Larceny in the 6th Degree (9 counts)

Failure to Appear in the 2nd Degree (5 counts)

Criminal Impersonation

Robbery in the 3rd Degree

Criminal Mischief in the 3rd Degree

She is presently completing a 5-year sentence for Larceny in the 2nd Degree, running concurrently with a 3-year jail term for Violation of Probation. Initially, Nannette testified that she would be eligible for parole in 1/04 and would be released in 12/04. Subsequently, she testified that her maximum release date was 7/28/06, her estimated release date was 10/27/05 and that, if she was released in 12/04, it would be to a halfway house.

The court did receive evidence during the TPR trial as to Nannette's present rehabilitative steps while incarcerated. Her attorney offered into evidence certificates showing completion of the following programs:

Parenting At A Distance

"Parenting Program" (10 weeks)

Anger Management (6 weeks)

Tier I Program (6 hours)

"Beat The Streets" (5 sessions)

"Sisters Helping Sisters" therapy group

Unified School District #1 Outstanding Achievement Award

In deciding the failure to rehabilitate issues, the court has remained aware that the evidence in this case tends to show that Nannette has made good faith attempts to engage in rehabilitative classes and programs while incarcerated. Where, as here, one of the grounds for the TPR petition is based upon § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), however, our courts have determined that the use of specific steps is not requisite to assessment of the degree to which a parent has, or has not, achieved rehabilitation in the context of a child protection case. The Appellate Court has repeatedly confirmed that, "[i]n determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether those factors were included in specific expectations ordered by the court or imposed by the department. See In re Michael M., 29 Conn. App. 112, 125, 614 A.2d 832 (1992); see also In re Migdalia M., [ supra, 6 Conn. App. 206]." (Emphasis added.) In re Vincent D., 65 Conn. App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001).

This court concludes that Nannette has not corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment of her child. The clear and convincing evidence reveals that from 10/28/02 and continuing through the time of trial, Nannette has not been available to take part in her children's lives, and, based on her propensity to commit criminal acts, abuse substances and abrogate her child-rearing duties to MGM and others, she will never be consistently available for her children. She is far too occupied with abusing substances, committing crimes and serving time for her lawless acts. The credible evidence in this case clearly and convincing shows that she has never been a consistent resource for her children in the past, nor has she ever consistently supported her children or consistently provided care for these children. When one also considers the high level of care, patience and discipline that these children's needs and special needs will require from their caregivers, it is patently clear that Nannette is not in a better position to parent Vintia, LaToya and McKale than she was at the time of the neglect adjudication and still remains without the qualities necessary to successfully parent her daughters and her son. Effectively, she was no better able "to resume the responsibilities of parenting at the time of filing of the termination petition than [she] had been at the time of [Vintia, LaToya and McKale's] commitment." In re Hector L., supra, 53 Conn. App. 367. Given the ages, sensibilities, needs and special needs of the children involved, and given Nannette's failure to correct her deviancies, it would be unreasonable to conclude that she will be able to achieve rehabilitation from her substance abuse, criminal behavior and parenting deficits, so as to be able to serve as a safe, responsible parent within a reasonable time.

The court has considered the various programs that the respondent mother has participated in while incarcerated. It is appropriate that she seek to rehabilitate herself, and the court gives her credit for attempting to do so. Unfortunately, for Vintia, LaToya and McKale, the respondent mother's efforts are "too little, too late," even though she has availed herself of many of the programs offered by DOC at her facility. Every time that she has obtained substance abuse treatment, she has returned to a life of substance abuse and crime. These problems have prevented her from raising any of her children. These children need a parent able to effectively care for them now. They need a parent who can provide constant parental care and guidance in these formative years.

Nannette has denied being aware of the sexual abuse and depravity inflicted upon LaToya through the auspices of the MA Guitania. However, due to her own substance abuse, criminal recidivism and frequent incarcerations, Nannette had clearly and convincingly deprived herself of the opportunity to protect her daughter from the physical, sexual and mental abuse, as well as being unable to protect all 3 of her children from the unsavory elements and influences found in the MGM's home. In fact, the clear and convincing evidence shows that Nannette exposed LaToya to her own substance abuse issues by purchasing drugs while together.

Additionally, the argument can be made that Nannette has exposed all of her children to her substance abuse in utero, since all were born positive for drugs.

Vintia, LaToya and McKale especially need a parent who can safeguard them from the predatory forces both within and outside the family constellation.

Additionally, these children cannot wait further for Nannette to complete her prison sentence and be released. Even if she is released to a halfway house in 12/04, it will be months or possibly years before Nannette proves herself sufficiently so as to be able to safely assume custody and guardianship of her children. Unfortunately, these children cannot wait for Nannette to show that she will not relapse into substance abuse and criminal recidivism upon release, as she has done in the past. They cannot wait for Nannette to show that she has rehabilitated herself and is ready to assume her maternal role.

It is fundamental that "in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 384. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proved that Nannette has failed to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B).

The petitioner has alleged that Chester, John Doe and Lemuel's parental rights should be terminated because they have failed to achieve rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). Applying the requisite legal standards, and construing the statute in accordance with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this issue in favor of the petitioner.

As Vintia, LaToya and McKale have been adjudicated neglected, the critical issue for this court is whether these respondent fathers have achieved rehabilitation sufficient to render any of them able to care for their child.

In deciding the failure to rehabilitate issues, the court is aware that the evidence in this case does not reflect that specific steps were ever imposed upon Chester, John Doe and Lemuel, who failed to appear on the neglect and TPR plea dates and were defaulted. Where, as here, one of the grounds for the TPR petition is based upon § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i), however, our courts have determined that the use of specific steps is not requisite to assessment of the degree to which a parent has, or has not, achieved rehabilitation in the context of a child protection case. The Appellate Court has repeatedly confirmed that, "[i]n determining whether a parent has achieved sufficient personal rehabilitation, a court may consider whether the parent has corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment, regardless of whether those factors were included in specific expectations ordered by the court or imposed by DCF. See In re Michael M., 29 Conn. App. 112, 125, 614 A.2d 832 (1992); see also In re Migdalia M., [ supra, 6 Conn. App. 206]." (Emphasis added.) In re Vincent D., 65 Conn. App. 658, 670, 783 A.2d 534 (2001).

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that Chester, John Doe or Lemuel have yet to achieve a sufficient "level of rehabilitation . . . which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his child's life]." In re Sarah Ann K., supra, 57 Conn. App. 448. See In re Daniel C., 63 Conn. App. 339, 354, 776 A.2d 487 (2001); In re Ashley S., supra, 61 Conn. App. 665. First, the credible evidence in this case, presented through the credible evidence and testimony at the TPR trial, clearly and convincingly establishes that none of the respondent fathers have achieved § 17a-112(j)(3)(B) rehabilitation. The court credits the DCF reports and the testimony which showed that none of the respondent fathers have done anything towards achieving their rehabilitation.

The credible evidence establishes that Chester and John Doe have shown little or no interest in either Vintia or LaToya. Their sole contribution to these children, with the exception of several visits by Chester with Vintia in North Carolina, has been in the submission of the genetic material necessary for these children's conception.

Although the court finds that Lemuel has been almost as irresponsible as his above-named confreres, the court also finds that his position is somewhat different from that of Chester and John Doe. In his case, the clear and convincing evidence shows that Lemuel knew of the existence of his son McKale and did know this information, by his own admission, since McKale was approximately 1 year old.

McKale was born on 4/14/92.

The failure of the respondent fathers to show interest in their child during the period of time up to this trial is clearly grounds for concluding that none of them have achieved statutory rehabilitation. The children were placed in DCF custody on 7/26/01 and 8/10/01. For most of these children's lives prior to that date, they were under the guardianship of the MGM or others. Chester and John Doe have never contacted DCF and have never inquired about the health or welfare of their child. Lemuel has seen McKale but twice in his life. He has made no attempt to involve himself in his son's life or show concern about him. Lemuel could not be bothered to attend paternity tests that DCF had arranged for him in his then hometown of Baltimore.

Neither Chester, John Doe nor Lemuel have sent their child any cards or gifts since they have been in DCF custody, nor have they displayed a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of their children. They have never provided physical care or financial support for their child. They have never offered a plan for the care of their child.

Despite the services that were available to be offered, Chester, John Doe and Lemuel have failed to demonstrate that, within a reasonable time considering their child's ages and needs, they could assume a responsible position in their child's lives.

Despite the services that were available to be offered, the respondent fathers have failed to demonstrate that, within a reasonable time considering their child's ages and needs, they could assume a responsible position in their child's life.

Vintia, LaToya and McKale have been in foster care since 7/01 and 8/01. For most of these children's lives prior to that date, they were under the guardianship of the MGM or others. This guardianship period was not in the children's best interest, based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented. The respondent fathers were not available for their child in their years of greatest need.

Continued foster care is detrimental to the children's development; they now require a permanent, safe home.

This court concludes that neither Chester, John Doe nor Lemuel have corrected the factors that led to the initial commitment of Vintia, LaToya and McKale, as far as each father is concerned. The clear and convincing evidence reveals that from 10/28/02 and continuing through the time of trial, Chester, John Doe and Lemuel have not been available to take part in their child's life, and, based on their propensity to ignore the very existence of their child, they will never be consistently available for them. This is especially true in the case of Lemuel, who has known of his child's existence since McKale was 1 year old, but has still ignored him. When one also considers the high level of care, patience and discipline that Vintia, LaToya and McKale's needs and special needs will require from their caregivers, it is patently clear that neither Chester, John Doe nor Lemuel are in a better position to parent their child now then they were at any other time in these proceedings and remain without the qualities necessary to successfully parent Vintia, LaToya or McKale. Effectively, they were no better able "to resume the responsibilities of parenting at the time of filing the termination petition than [they] had been at the time of [Vintia, LaToya and McKale's] commitment." In re Hector L., supra, 53 Conn. App. 367. Given the ages, sensibilities and needs of the children involved, and given Chester, John Doe and Lemuel's failure to correct their individual deviancies, it would be unreasonable to conclude that any one of these fathers will be able to achieve rehabilitation from their failure to involve themselves in their child's life, their gross apathy and their parenting deficits so as to be able to serve as a safe, responsible and nurturing parent within a reasonable time.

These children need a parent able to effectively care for them now. They cannot wait for Nannette, Chester, John Doe or Lemuel to show that they have rehabilitated themselves and are ready to assume his or her parental role. It is fundamental that "in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent improved [their] ability to manage [their] own life, but rather whether [they have] gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." (Quotation marks and citation omitted.) In re Amneris P., supra, 66 Conn. App. 384. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this case, the court finds that the petitioner has proved that neither Nannette, Chester, John Doe or Lemuel has achieved rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B). To allow Nannette, Chester, John Doe or Lemuel further time to rehabilitate themselves, if that were possible, and assume a responsible position in the life of their children would clearly and convincingly not be in the best interest of Vintia, LaToya or McKale.

On 11/12/02, this court found that:

DCF had made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency plan; and

That further efforts to reunify the children with any of the respondent parents were not appropriate.

LACK OF ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)

The State has alleged that there is no on-going parent/child relationship between Nannette and her children LaToya and McKale. This means that, based on the evidence produced, that the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the children has not been established and to allow further time for the establishment of such parent/child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(D). Applying the requisite legal standards, and complying with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.

General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(D) provides for the termination of parental rights

where there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.

Section 17a-112(j)(3)(D)

". . . requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings fur the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only . . ." In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn. App. 595, 601-02, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999).

In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn. App. 525 (internal and external quotations omitted).

The clear and convincing evidence presented indicates the following:

Nannette has not provided care for the children since they were taken into DCF care on 7/21/01 and 8/10/01 respectively. Despite her testimony claiming that she cared for the child at various times when she was not using drugs, the overwhelming weight of the credible evidence indicates that it was the MGM or the Copelands who provided virtually all of McKale's care and that it was the MGM and Liz Paradise who provided virtually all of LaToya's care.

She has not provided any support for any of the children since they were taken into custody on the above-listed dates.

She has been unable and/or unwilling to adjust her circumstances to allow for her children to be returned to her care.

LaToya has negative memories of Nannette and does not trust her. She is afraid that if the respondent mother is released from prison, she and her siblings would be returned to her custody and Nannette would revert back to her old lifestyle and begin abusing substances again.

McKale's feelings with respect to Nannette are ambivalent at best. In her Intake Evaluation report dated 8/31/01, Connie Scott, MS, LMFT, LADC, Clinical Director, reported that McKale stated he went to live with MGM when he was 4 or 5 years old. McKale stated he could not remember what his mother looked like and reported that he did not know where she was. He reported having vague memories of his mother taking him on some type of outing. McKale considers MGM as his mother.

During visits with Nannette, neither child sought comfort or affection from her. LaToya is very guarded around her mother. Neither child seems to recognize her as their parent.

There has been no on-going parent-child relationship and to allow further time for the establishment or re-establishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the children.

Linda Doe, the present foster mother of LaToya, testified that LaToya seldom spoke of Nannette, while Iris Doe, the present foster mother of McKale, testified that McKale will not discuss Nannette nor speak her name. Both foster mothers testified as to their interest in adopting LaToya and McKale should they be legally freed for adoption.

Obviously, LaToya and McKale need families now, not later. To allow further time for Nannette to establish a parent/child relationship would be detrimental to their best interests. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this mater and applying the appropriate legal standards, the court finds that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between Nannette and her children LaToya and McKale

With regard to the allegations of no on-going parent/child relationship, the court has also considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances occurring through the close of trial for adjudicatory purposes. See Practice Book § 35a-7 (commentary).

The State has further alleged that there is no on-going parent/child relationship between Chester, John Doe or Lemuel and their child Vintia, LaToya or McKale. This means that, based on the evidence produced, that the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis, the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the children has not been established and to allow further time for the establishment of such parent/child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(D). Applying the requisite legal standards, and complying with § 17a-112(p), the court finds this matter in favor of the petitioner.

General Statutes § 17a-112(c)(3)(D) provides for the termination of parental rights

where there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.

Section 17a-112(j)(3)(D)

". . . requires the trial court to undertake a two-pronged analysis. First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop . . . In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance . . . The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent . . . Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only . . ." In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn. App. 595, 601-02, 722 A.2d 1232 (1999).

In re Jonathan G., supra, 63 Conn. App. 525 (internal and external quotations omitted).

The clear and convincing evidence presented indicates the following:

None of the respondent fathers have ever provided care for their child.

None of the respondent fathers have ever provided any support for their child.

None of the respondent fathers has been able and/or willing to adjust his circumstances to allow for his child to be returned to his care.

Chester has only seen Vintia a few times and has talked to her over the telephone. John Doe has never seen LaToya. Lemuel has only seen McKale twice, despite knowing that he was McKale's father since the child was 1 year old.

Neither Vintia, LaToya or McKale have any present or positive memories of their father.

Vintia, LaToya and McKale have been in foster placement since 7/01 and 8/01. They need safe, committed, responsible and firm caretakers. The respondent fathers' issues such as lack of visitation or interest and their obvious parenting deficits demonstrate their lack of capacity to develop an appropriate parental relationship with their child.

To allow further time for any of the respondent fathers to establish a parent/child relationship would be detrimental to Vintia, LaToya or McKale's best interests. Accordingly, based on the clear and convincing evidence presented in this matter and applying the appropriate legal standards, the court finds that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship between Chester, John Doe or Lemuel and his child Vintia, LaToya or McKale, respectively.

On 11/12/02, this court found that:

DCF had made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency plan; and

That further efforts to reunify the children with any of the respondent parents were not appropriate.

DISPOSITION

As the court has concluded that statutory grounds for termination exist, it next "must determine whether termination is in the best interests of the [children]." (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) In re Quanitra M., supra, 60 Conn. App. 103; see also In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511 and n15, 613 A.2d 478 (1992). In this dispositional phase the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events through the close of evidence. Practice Book 35a-9.

SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS

The court has made each of the seven written factual findings required by General Statutes § 17a-112(k) based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented at trial, and has considered the evidence relevant to each of these findings in deciding whether to terminate parental rights. See In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn. App. 528.

TIMELINESS, NATURE AND EXTENT OF SERVICES — § 17a-112(k)(1)

On 11/12/02, this court found that:

CT Page 13959 DCF had made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency plan; and

That further efforts to reunify the children with any of the respondent parents were not appropriate.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF offered Nannette case management services and visitation in order to facilitate reunification. The court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that Nannette did take advantage of various programs offered by DOC.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF was unable to offer Chester and John Doe services in order to facilitate reunification, due to their failure to come forth and identify themselves to DCF.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF was unable to offer Lemuel services in order to facilitate reunification, due to his failure to cooperate with DCF and make himself available for services. The court finds that the only service that Lemuel utilized was the paternity testing, that only after several attempts.

Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite the respondent mother with her children. In re Antonio M., supra, 56 Conn. App. 547; see also In re Sheila J., 62 Conn. App. 470, 480-82, 771 A.2d 244 (2001). The court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF was unable to make reasonable efforts to reunite the respondent fathers with their children, due solely to the respondent fathers' failure to make themselves known to DCF and to cooperate with DCF.

"Although [n]either the word reasonable nor the word efforts is . . . defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [r]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." (Internal quotation marks omitted, external citation omitted.) In re Mariah S., 61 Conn. App. 248, 255 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 934, 767 A.2d 105 (2001). Only "reasonable" efforts are required because "[i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." (Citation omitted.). In re Antony B., 54 Conn. App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999).

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has provided reasonable efforts in the past to reunify the children with the respondent mother. Those services were ordered in a timely manner and were appropriate for the circumstances at hand All parents were given ample opportunity to cooperate with those services in order to achieve a sufficient level of personal rehabilitation, but either failed to make themselves known to DCF, failed to take advantage of those services or were unable to take advantage of them.

This court will find by clear and convincing evidence that:

DCF had made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with the respondent mother;

DCF was unable to make reasonable efforts to reunify the children with the respondent fathers; and

That further efforts to reunify the children with any of the respondent parents are not appropriate.

REUNIFICATION EFFORTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LAW — § 17a-112(k)(2)

This court finds that the clear and convincing evidence in this matter proves that none of the respondent parents are presently able and/or willing to benefit from such reunification services as are contemplated by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

On 11/12/02, this court found that:

DCF had made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency plan; and

That further efforts to reunify the children with any of the respondent parents were not appropriate.

This court will find by clear and convincing evidence that:

DCF had made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with the respondent mother;

DCF was unable to make reasonable efforts to reunify the children with the respondent fathers; and

That further efforts to reunify the children with any of the respondent parents are not appropriate.

The court further finds that the respondent parents were either unable or unwilling to benefit from said reunification services.

COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS — § 17a-112(k)(3)

Regarding court-ordered specific steps, the court finds that the clear and convincing evidence shows that Nannette has made good faith efforts to undertake rehabilitative program while incarcerated. The testimony of DCF SW Boyd-Covington indicated that Nannette has utilized all available resources for rehabilitation while incarcerated.

The court further finds that the clear and convincing evidence shows that no specific steps were ordered for Chester, John Doe or Lemuel, due to their failure to make themselves available to DCF or to cooperate with DCF.

THE CHILDREN'S FEELINGS AND EMOTIONAL TIES — § 17a-112(k)(4)

The court finds that the following were proven by clear and convincing evidence:

Of the 3 children, Vintia has positive memories of Nannette. In his report of his evaluation of Vintia dated 8/4/03, Dr. Freedman wrote:

Vintia expressed a desire to return to her mother's care. However, she seemed to view her mother as a tragic figure, needing her help. Her view of this was that she would be mother's "rescuer," making sure she got more education, stayed off drugs, and did well. While this was well-meaning, because of her mother's poor record of abstinence, this responsibility could easily overwhelm a teenager, and leave her devastated and guilty if her mother relapsed again.

Vintia had positive feelings toward her mother. However, these had actually been sustained partly through her having a stable home elsewhere, with her maternal grandmother. This had shielded her from the repeated disappointments and troubled adults the other children had been exposed to. Planned reunification between [Nannette] and Vintia did not make sense.

DCF opines that Vintia has a relationship with Nannette, but that the child does not completely realize the true extent of her family's dysfunction.

Both LaToya and McKale do not have positive memories of their mother. They do not trust Nannette and do not have confidence that she will maintain sobriety upon her release from incarceration. LaToya does not wish to be reunited with her family and fears the MGM. McKale realizes that there are no appropriate family resources and has expressed a wish to be adopted by his present foster home.

AGE OF THE CHILDREN — § 17a-112(k)(5)

Vintia was born on 6/4/88 and is 15 years.

LaToya was born on 9/21/90 and is 13 years old.

McKale was born on 4/14/92 and is 11 years old.

PARENTS' EFFORTS TO ADJUST THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES — § 17a-112(k)(6)

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that none of the respondent parents have made realistic and sustained efforts to conform their conduct to minimally acceptable parental standards.

The court finds that the following were proven by clear and convincing evidence:

Nannette has been involved with DCF since the birth of Donquell, at the very least. She has undertaken rehabilitative measures on several occasions in the past. However, she has failed to maintain sobriety for any length of time and has failed to remain drug-free. Consequently, she has been frequently incarcerated as a result. She is presently finishing a 5-year jail term and will not be released for a substantial period of time. Her substance abuse and criminal recidivism has prevented her from raising any of her children.

Neither Chester, John Doe nor Lemuel has seen their child since Vintia, LaToya and McKale were taken into custody by DCF. Chester and Lemuel have seen their child infrequently throughout the years, while John Doe has never seen LaToya.

None of the fathers have made concerned efforts to establish a relationship with their child since the inception of this action in SCJM. Lemuel has made minimal efforts at best, and has failed to follow through with any of those efforts.

None of the fathers has sent cards, gifts, or letters to his child since the child has been in custody of DCF. They have failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of their child. None of the fathers have provided physical care, financial support or emotional support for their child. Only Lemuel has recently made any effort to keep DCF informed of his whereabouts. None of the fathers have inquired with DCF concerning the well-being of their child.

Given these parents' issues and gross deviations from safe, responsible and nurturing child care practices, tendering any of them additional time would not likely bring their performances, as parents, within acceptable standards sufficient to make it in the best interests of their children to be reunited with any of them. They have demonstrated clearly and convincingly that they are unable or unwilling to care for their children and provide them with the care and stability they need and deserve.

EXTENT TO WHICH THE PARENTS WERE PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHILDREN — § 17-112(k)(7)

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no unreasonable conduct by DCF, foster parents or third parties prevented Nannette, Chester, John Doe or Lemuel from maintaining a relationship with Vintia, Latoya or McKale, nor did the economic circumstances of any parent prevent such relationship, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system and DOC remained in effect.

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN — § 17a-112(j)(2)

The court is next called upon to determine whether termination of the parental rights of Nannette, Chester, John Doe or Lemuel would be in Vintia, Latoya or McKale's best interests. Applying the appropriate legal standards to the clear and convincing facts of this case, the court finds this issue in favor of the State of Connecticut and DCF.

The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, § 17a-112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, "by clear and convincing evidence . . . (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child."

"Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents . . . Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action. In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990)." (Quotation marks and internal citation omitted.) In re Steven N., 57 Conn. App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000). "[T]he question . . . to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship. That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child. See Practice Book § 33-5." In re Carissa K., 55 Conn. App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). "In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition." (Citation omitted.) In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn. App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441 (2000).

In determining whether termination of Nannette, Chester, John Doe or Lemuel's parental rights would be in Vintia, Latoya or McKale's best interests, the court has examined multiple relevant factors, including the children's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment; their length of stay in foster care; the nature of their relationship with their foster parents and biological parents; and the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn. App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn. App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., supra, 55 Conn. App. 816. In a matter such as this, the court is further called upon to balance Vintia, LaToya and McKale's intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with their biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

"[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider." (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) In re Savanna M., 55 Conn. App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).

Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that it is not in Vintia, LaToya and McKale's best interests to continue to maintain any legal relationship with either Nannette, Chester, John Doe and Lemuel.

Nannette has been mired in an ongoing cycle of substance abuse and criminal recidivism for over 16 years. She has undergone substance abuse treatment several times throughout the years, without any lasting sobriety. She is a convicted felon, with a criminal history as follows:

Welfare Fraud

Violation of Probation (4 counts)

Prostitution

Breach of Peace (2 counts)

Larceny in the 2nd Degree

Larceny in the 5th Degree (2 counts)

Larceny in the 6th Degree (9 counts)

Failure to Appear in the 2nd Degree (5 counts)

Criminal Impersonation

Robbery in the 3rd Degree

Criminal Mischief in the 3rd Degree

She is presently completing a 5-year sentence for Larceny in the 2nd Degree, running concurrently with a 3-year jail term for Violation of Probation. Initially, Nannette testified that she would be eligible for parole in 1/04 and would be released in 12/04. Subsequently, she testified that her maximum release date was 7/28/06, her estimated release date was 10/27/05 and that if she was released in 12/04, it would be to a halfway house.

By her own admission, the MGM has parented Nannette's children. The clear and convincing evidence shows that Nannette's relationship with Vintia, LaToya and McKale has been primarily a visiting relationship. The credible evidence shows that Nannette has seldom had these children under her care.

In addition to her substance abuse issues, Dr. Freedman opined that Nannette possibly had mental health issues as well:

[Nannette] showed borderline mental ability, as well as indications of substantial mental and emotional problems. She had been in a series of disturbed relationships throughout her adult life, and she had shown poor judgment in many ways.

By her abject failure to conquer her substance abuse problem, Nannette forfeited her right and privilege to be the parent to her children. She acknowledged this fact by relinquishing control of her children to MGM's infirm hands. Unfortunately, the weight of the evidence showed that MGM's custody of these children was marked by the children being exposed to low and unsavory company, including substance abusers, inadequate supervision, physical abuse, sexual experimentation and, in LaToya's case, gross sexual violation at the contrivance of Nannette's sister Guitana. Nannette's parental deficiencies resulted in the placement of these children in an unsuitable and dangerous atmosphere.

It should also be noted that evidence was received indicating that, during a period when Nannette was at liberty, she exposed LaToya to her substance abuse. LaToya indicated that she visited Nannette's apartment and found drugs in view there and that she accompanied Nannette to buy drugs.

The weight of the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that Nannette lacks the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfilling a valid parental role, and it is unlikely that any amount of time would be sufficient before she would be able to conform her behavior to such.

In reference to this issue, Dr. Freedman wrote:

[Nannette] showed poor prospects for rehabilitation to the level of maintaining abstinence after her release from prison.

Despite being given ample time in which to rehabilitate herself and to become a safe, responsible and nurturing parent to her children, Nannette has utterly failed to show any inclination towards success rehabilitating herself. The only tine that she does not abuse substances or commit crime is when she is incarcerated.

Nannette has clearly and convincingly shown that she lacks the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfilling a valid parental role, and it is unlikely that any amount of time would be sufficient before she would be able to conform her behavior to such.

In the case of the respondent fathers Chester, John Doe and Lemuel, the clear and convincing evidence shows that they have had little or no contact or involvement with their children.

As to Chester, the credible evidence indicated that he has visited with Vintia at best only a few times since her birth on 6/4/88. He has had only infrequent contact with her. Since she has been taken into custody by DCF, Chester has made no attempts to contact DCF to ascertain her well-being or to offer to be a resource for her. He has never provided physical care, nor financial or emotional support for his daughter.

John Doe has never had any contact with his daughter LaToya, having never visited her or acknowledged her presence. Since she has been taken into custody by DCF, John Doe has made no attempts to contact DCF to ascertain her well-being or to offer to be a resource for her. He has never provided physical care, nor financial or emotional support for his daughter.

Lemuel has had little contact with his son McKale throughout the years. Since McKale was placed in DCF's care on 8/10/01, Lemuel has had no contact with his son. He admitted to DCF SW Boyd Covington that he has only seen McKale twice in his life. Lemuel has never sent cards, gifts, or letters to his child since 8/10/01. Since McKale's placement in DCF foster care on 8/10/01, Lemuel has failed to pay child support or any other maintenance on behalf of McKale. Lemuel has never provided physical care or financial support for the child.

In view of the fact that McKale has no memories of his father, the court concludes that those visits have not been within the recent past.

Prior to the filing of the TPR petition, Lemuel had twice failed to submit to paternity testing that DCF had arranged for in his then hometown of Baltimore.

Although Lemuel did appear for some court proceedings, the totality of the clear and convincing evidence shows that he has failed to maintain interest in the well-being of his son McKale.

By their abject failures to participate in their child's life and cooperate with DCF, Chester, John Doe and Lemuel have clearly and convincingly shown that each of them lack the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfilling a valid parental role, and it is unlikely that any amount of time would be sufficient before any of the respondent fathers would be able to conform his behavior to such. Furthermore, the respondent fathers' performances since the adjudicatory date clearly and convincing shows each one lacks the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfilling a valid parental role. No amount of additional time will likely help Chester, John Doe or Lemuel to conform their behavior to such.

Based upon the respondent parents' behavior and performance so far, this court cannot foresee any of these respondent parents ever having the ability or the patience to be able to follow the regimen necessary for these children to maximize their abilities and achievements.

The clear and convincing evidence also shows that there are no viable relative resources for these children. The court will incorporate by references its previous remarks on this issue in this decision.

Finally, the court must address the arguments of Nannette's counsel concerning Dr. Freedman's report and his evaluation of Vintia. He wrote:

Because of her age, Vintia would be more likely to remain a long-term foster child than to be adopted. Either way, there would be no objection to limited maternal visiting, with some basic conditions. Whether her current foster parents or other adults were her caregivers, these adults should have discretion to allow such visits, and to monitor or restrict them as they felt necessary . . .

At 15 years of age, Vintia had strong emotional connection to her grandmother, and she also expressed caring feelings toward her mother. Trying to cut off contact with these relatives could cause more problems than it solved. Practically speaking, Vintia was perhaps too old for adoption to be important for her. Instead, a long-term foster care arrangement would probably meet her needs, and maternal visiting could be allowed in the future in a limited way. Because of mother's limited care of this child in the past, bringing Vintia for prison visits would probably not make sense. However, the two could exchange letters, and visit on a limited basis once mother was released.

Nannette's counsel argued that Dr. Freedman's opinion was justification not to terminate Nannette's parental rights, but to allow this child to remain in long-term foster care.

The children's attorney argued that the children wished to maintain some relationship with the respondent mother.

The GAL opined that the TPR and adoption was in the best interests of all 3 children. In disagreeing with Dr. Freedman, the GAL indicated that the children should be treated similarly and that Vintia needed the assistance and resources of the State to aid and protect her.

DCF believes that TPR and adoption would be in all of the children's best interests.

This court has great respect for Dr. Freedman and his opinions. Nevertheless, the court believes that the best interest of all 3 children lie in TPR and adoption. Dr. Freedman points out that it would not be in Vintia's best interests to reunify with Nannette. However, he appears to believe that the influence of the rest of the family would be beneficial to Vintia. With this point, the court strongly disagrees. The clear and convincing evidence shows that there are not viable relative resources to aid any of these children. Additionally, the clear and convincing evidence shows that grievous harm has been done to these children and other children while reposing in the bosom of their family. Sadly, the best interests of these children and their safety require protection from their family.

Our courts have recognized that "long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development." In re Eden F., supra, 250 Conn. 709. Furthermore, "[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence . . ." when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children. In re Alexander V., 25 Conn. App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 930 (1992); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). The court is obliged to agree with the children's attorney and with the State and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that Vintia, LaToya and McKale are entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the period of uncertainty as to the availability of their biological parents as caretakers.

The State and DCF have recommended the TPR and adoption. There was absolutely no evidence to establish the unreasonableness of this request.

Having balanced Vintia, LaToya and McKale's intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with Nannette, Chester, John Doe or Lemuel, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that these children's best interests cannot be served by continuing to maintain any legal relationship to the respondent parents. Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313-14. Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the children contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Nannette, Chester, John Doe and Lemuel is in the best interest of the children Vintia, LaToya and McKale.

ORDER OF TERMINATION

WHEREFORE, after due consideration of Vintia, LaToya and McKale's sense of time, their need for a secure and permanent environment, the relationship they have with their foster parents, and the totality of circumstances; and having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights; and having concluded that the termination of the parental rights at issue will be in the children's best interests, the court issues the following ORDERS:

That the parental rights of Nannette M. are hereby terminated as to the children Vintia M., LaToya M. and McKale M.;

That the parental rights of Chester B. are hereby terminated as to the child Vintia M.;

That the parental rights of John Doe are hereby terminated as to the child LaToya M.; and

That the parental rights of Lemuel W. are hereby terminated as to the child McKale M.

That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for Vintia, LaToya and McKale for the purpose of securing an adoptive family or other permanent placement for them.

That a permanency plan shall be submitted within 30 days of this judgment, and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court, as required by law. That primary consideration for adoption of Vintia, LaToya and McKale shall be offered to their current foster parents.

By The Court,

TAYLOR, JUDGE.

In re Vintia M.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

FACTUAL FINDINGS

NANNETTE (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL, SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION)

CHESTER (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL, SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL CONDITION)

JOHN DOE

LEMUEL

VINTIA (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL STATUS OF THE CHILD AS REQUIRED BY CGS 45a-717(e)(1))

LATOYA (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL STATUS OF THE CHILD AS REQUIRED BY CGS 45a-717(e)(1))

McKALE (INCLUDES PHYSICAL, MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL STATUS OF THE CHILD AS REQUIRED BY CGS 45a-717(e)(1))

SIBLINGS

RELATIVES

ADJUDICATION

LOCATION AND REUNIFICATION EFFORTS

STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION — ABANDONMENT § 17a-112(j)(3)(A)

PARENTAL FAILURE TO REHABILITATE — § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)

LACK OF ONGOING PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP § 17a-112(j)(3)(D)

DISPOSITION

SEVEN STATUTORY FINDINGS

TIMELINESS, NATURE AND EXTENT OF SERVICES — § 17a-112(k)(1)

REUNIFICATION EFFORTS PURSUANT TO FEDERAL LAW — § 17a-112(k)(2)

COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS — § 17a-112(k)(3)

THE CHILDREN'S FEELINGS AND EMOTIONAL TIES — § 17a-112(k)(4)

AGE OF THE CHILDREN — § 17a-112(k)(5)

PARENTS' EFFORTS TO ADJUST THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES — § 17a-112(k)(6)

EXTENT TO WHICH THE PARENTS WERE PREVENTED FROM MAINTAINING A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CHILDREN — § 17-112(k)(7)

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN — § 17a-112(j)(2)

ORDER OF TERMINATION

In re Vintia M.

In re Vintia M.

Case Details

CitationsCopy Citation

Citations