Opinion
05-23-00359-CV
03-18-2024
IN RE UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING, L.P.; UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING II, L.P.; UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING III, L.P.; UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING IV, A MARYLAND REIT; UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING INCOME FUND V, A MARYLAND REIT; UNITED MORTGAGE TRUST, A MARYLAND REIT; UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING LAND OPPORTUNITY FUND, L.P.; AND UNITED DEVELOPMENT FUNDING LAND OPPORTUNITY FUND INVESTORS, L.L.C., Relators
Original Proceeding from the County Court at Law No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-17-06253-C
Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Garcia
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS JUSTICE
In this original proceeding, relators (UDF) challenge the trial court's continuing exercise of jurisdiction. In May 2022, UDF filed a notice of nonsuit, and the trial court signed an order dismissing "the above-captioned case." In this original proceeding, UDF contends the trial court has improperly retained the case on its docket and is impermissibly treating real parties' counterclaim and March 2023 motion for sanctions as pending even though the May 2022 dismissal order is a final judgment and the trial court's plenary power expired in June 2022. UDF asks this Court to compel the trial court to dismiss the underlying case. After reviewing the petition, response, reply, and the record before us, we agree the May 2022 dismissal order is a final judgment and the trial court is continuing to take judicial action after expiration of its plenary power. Accordingly, we conditionally grant mandamus relief.
Relators are United Development Funding, L.P.; United Development Funding II, L.P.; United Development Funding III, L.P.; United Development Funding IV, a Maryland REIT; United Development Funding Income fund V, a Maryland REIT; United Mortgage Trust, a Maryland REIT; United Development Funding Land Opportunity Fund, L.P.; and United Development Funding Land Opportunity Fund Investors, L.L.C. We refer to relators collectively as UDF.
BACKGROUND
According to the underlying pleadings, relators are several Delaware LPs, a Delaware LLC, and several Maryland real estate investment trusts (REIT), which are part of a family of funds known as UDF that claim to provide investments in residential real estate. Real parties in interest (the Hayman Parties) are a collection of hedge-fund entities allegedly led by real party J. Kyle Bass. The Hayman Parties are allegedly in the business of short-selling stocks.
The real parties in interest are J. Kyle Bass, Hayman Capital Management, L.P., Hayman Offshore Management, Inc., Hayman Capital Master Fund, L.P., Hayman Capital Partners, L.P., Hayman Capital Offshore Partners, LP, and Hayman Investments, LLC. We refer to the real parties in interest collectively as the Hayman Parties.
I. Trial Court Proceedings
In 2017, UDF sued the Hayman Parties for business disparagement; tortious interference with a contract, with prospective contracts, and with prospective business relationships; and civil conspiracy. UDF alleged the Hayman Parties engaged in a "short and distort" scheme in which they spread false, damaging information about UDF to drive down the value of UDF stock and allow the Hayman Parties to recover a multi-million-dollar profit. UDF requested hundreds of millions of dollars in damages, exemplary damages, disgorgement, and a constructive trust.
On May 27, 2022, the Hayman Parties filed an Original Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment. Roughly ninety minutes later, UDF filed Plaintiffs' Notice of Nonsuit in which UDF gave "written notice of their nonsuit on all claims against [the Hayman Parties]" and stated they "hereby nonsuit all of [UDF's] claims against [the Hayman Parties] with prejudice and request that the Court enter an order dismissing all such claims with prejudice, each party to bear its own costs and attorney's fees."
On May 31, 2022, UDF filed Plaintiffs' Amended and Corrected Notice of Nonsuit, which stated the prior notice "incorrectly indicated a desire to nonsuit with prejudice." They again listed their claims against the Hayman Parties and stated they "hereby nonsuit all of [UDF's] claims against [the Hayman Parties] without prejudice and request the Court enter an order dismissing all such claims without prejudice, each party to bear its own costs and attorney's fees."
On May 31, 2022, the trial court signed an Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice (the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order). The order referenced UDF's "Amended and Corrected Notice of Nonsuit," listed UDF's claims against the Hayman Parties, and stated:
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the above-captioned case is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys' fees. All relief not granted herein is expressly denied.
On July 26, 2022, fifty-six days after the trial court signed the dismissal order, UDF filed a rule 91a motion to dismiss the Hayman Parties' counterclaim, "conditionally request[ing]" dismissal of the counterclaim. They never set the motion for hearing. In a footnote in their motion, UDF argued the "purported Counterclaim has not been lawfully filed and has no legal effect as a matter of law." UDF filed the motion to comply with any rule 91a deadline but did "not concede such deadline exists or that any further action is required in regards to the dismissal of such claims." They "conditionally" sought dismissal only if necessary.
The record reflects that by this time, UDF had a petition for writ of mandamus pending before the Supreme Court of Texas (No. 21-1010) in which they sought to obtain discovery from the Hayman Parties; UDF moved to dismiss that proceeding on December 7, 2022.
On August 18, 2022, the trial court sent a notice that a jury trial had been set in the case for January 31, 2023. This notice prompted numerous letters, hearings, and status conferences, and the filing of various briefs and motions. The parties disputed whether (1) the Hayman Parties' counterclaim was pending, (2) the trial court had lost plenary power, and (3) UDF had to file a motion to strike the counterclaim if the counterclaim was untimely and filed without leave of court.
On March 9, 2023, the Hayman Parties filed a motion for sanctions against UDF pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 13, 166, and 215; Chapters 9 and 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code; and the trial court's inherent powers. The Hayman Parties requested their costs of litigation, costs of discovery, and any other sanctions.
The sanctions motion was set for hearing on June 15, 2023, but this Court stayed all trial court proceedings on June 9, 2023.
Later that day, the trial court held a status conference and signed an Order of Dismissal Nunc Pro Tunc. In that order, the trial court referenced UDF's Notice of Nonsuit and UDF's claims against the Hayman Parties and then stated:
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the above-captioned case is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys' fees. All relief not granted herein is expressly denied.
On March 14, 2023, UDF filed a motion to strike, asking the trial court to strike the Hayman Parties' counterclaim and motion for sanctions and to administratively close the case. UDF argued the trial court had lost plenary jurisdiction thirty days after it signed the May 31, 2022 dismissal order. The following week, the Hayman Parties filed a response to UDF's motion to strike combined with a request for the trial court to vacate a February 1, 2021 sanctions order. In late March 2023, UDF filed a reply, arguing the trial court lacked authority to do anything other than close the case.
In April 2023, the trial court held a hearing on UDF's motion to strike and signed an order denying the motion on April 13, 2023. This original proceeding followed.
II. Petition for Writ of Mandamus
In their petition, UDF asks this Court to compel the trial court to dismiss the underlying case. UDF argues mandamus is proper because the trial court is continuing to exercise jurisdiction after losing plenary power. UDF generally asserts the following arguments:
(1) Although Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 states a nonsuit does not dispose of an adverse party's pending claim for affirmative relief, the Hayman Parties' counterclaim was not "pending" when UDF filed its nonsuit. The deadline to file amended pleadings in the trial court's scheduling orders was August 21, 2021. But the Hayman Parties did not file their counterclaim until May 27, 2022, and did not file a motion for leave to file as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 63. Under rule 21(f)(5)(B), an e-filed pleading that requires leave of court is not "deemed filed" until the date leave is granted. Because the Hayman Parties did not request or obtain leave of court, the counterclaim was not filed and thus was not "pending" on May 27, 2022.
(2) Even if the Hayman Parties' counterclaim was pending on May 27, 2022, it did not seek "affirmative relief." The Hayman Parties' declarations merely denied UDF's tort claims. And the Texas Declaratory Judgments Act may not be used merely as a way to obtain otherwise impermissible attorneys' fees.
(3) Even if the counterclaim was a pending claim for affirmative relief, the trial court lost plenary power on June 30, 2022, thirty days after the May 31, 2022 dismissal order. The dismissal order was a final judgment that disposed of the entire case. Even if dismissal of the entire case was
in error, the Hayman Parties failed to appeal that error and lost their claim.
It is not necessary for the disposition of this original proceeding for us to resolve UDF's first two arguments. Assuming without deciding the Hayman Parties' counterclaim was a pending claim for affirmative relief that survived UDF's May 27, 2022 Notice of Nonsuit, we agree with UDF that the May 31, 2022 dismissal order was a final judgment and the trial court's plenary power expired on June 30, 2022.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mandamus will issue if a relator establishes a clear abuse of discretion for which there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). However, judicial action taken after a trial court's plenary power expires is void. In re Dansby, 583 S.W.3d 838, 840 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2019, orig. proceeding). In such instances, a relator need not show an inadequate remedy by appeal. In re Vaishangi, Inc., 442 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
APPLICABLE LAW
UDF had the right under rule 162 to take a nonsuit at any time until UDF had introduced all evidence other than rebuttal evidence. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 162; In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). A nonsuit terminates a case from the moment the motion is filed. Epps v. Fowler, 351 S.W.3d 862, 868 (Tex. 2011). Generally, a trial court has no discretion to refuse to sign an order of dismissal once a notice of nonsuit has been filed. Bennett, 960 S.W.2d at 38. The signing of a dismissal order, not the filing of a notice of nonsuit, is the starting point for determining when a trial court's plenary power expires. Id. Appellate timetables also run from the date the trial court signs the dismissal order. Id.
When there is no traditional trial on the merits, no presumption arises regarding finality of a judgment. Crites v. Collins, 284 S.W.3d 839, 840 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam). A judgment is final if it either "actually disposes of every pending claim and party" or "clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and parties, even if it does not actually do so." Patel v. Nations Renovations, LLC, 661 S.W.3d 151, 154 (Tex. 2023) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) (citing Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001)). The judgment at issue here falls under the second category.
Intent to render a final judgment is demonstrated by a "clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case." Bella Palma, 601 S.W.3d at 801 (quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205). In such instances, we must take the order at face value; otherwise, finality phrases would serve no purpose. In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 828 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). A clear and unequivocal statement of finality must be given effect even if a review of the record would undermine finality. Bella Palma, 601 S.W.3d at 801 .
Moreover, "[i]f the judgment clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and parties, the assessment is resolved in favor of finding finality, and the reviewing court cannot review the record." Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 154.
A trial court may express its intent to render a final judgment by describing its action as final, a disposition of all claims and parties, and appealable. Id. at 155. This standard provides an outline of several statements that, while insufficient when standing alone, together form a clear indication of finality. Id. Although no magic language is required, merely stating an order is "final" or "appealable" is not enough. Bella Palma, 601 S.W.3d at 801. Similarly, the inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause-a statement that "all relief not granted is denied" or essentially those words-standing alone, is not enough. Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 155. But a combination of these or similar statements can provide a basis for determining a judgment is final. Id.
"If the order contains a 'clear and unequivocal' finality phrase disposing of the entire case, the order is final, and the failure to actually dispose of all claims and parties renders the order erroneous but not interlocutory." Id. at 155-56 (emphases added); see also Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206 ("[A]n order that expressly disposes of the entire case is not interlocutory merely because the record fails to show an adequate motion or other legal basis for the disposition.") (emphasis added).
DISCUSSION
I. The May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order is a Final Judgment.
The May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order refers to UDF's amended notice of nonsuit and UDF's claims against the Hayman Parties, but then it dismisses the entire case:
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the above-captioned case is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorneys' fees. All relief not granted herein is expressly denied. [Emphasis added.]
By dismissing "the above-captioned case," not just UDF's claims or UDF's case against the Hayman Parties, the trial court included "a 'clear and unequivocal' finality phrase disposing of the entire case." See Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 155-56 (emphasis added). The inclusion of language ordering each party to bear its own costs and attorney's fees and denying all other relief further shows the trial court's intent to dispose of the entire case. The May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order unambiguously disposes of the entire case. We, therefore, conclude the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order contains a clear and unequivocal statement of finality and is a final judgment that disposed of the entire case, including the Hayman Parties' counterclaim.
Because the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order was a final judgment, the trial court's plenary power expired on June 30, 2022. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b. Nothing happened in the case between May 31, 2022, and June 30, 2022; neither party filed a post-judgment motion or a notice of appeal during the court's plenary period. As a result, even if the trial court's summary dismissal of the Hayman Parties' counterclaim was erroneous, the Hayman Parties lost their counterclaim by failing to appeal the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order. See Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 156 ("A party who is uncertain whether a judgment is final must err on the side of appealing or risk losing the right to appeal.") (quoting Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 196); Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 827 ("Since Elizondo waited more than thirty days to contend that the order improperly disposed of his other claims, he has lost them. Though jarring for Elizondo, this outcome reflects Lehmann's reasoning and comports with this Court's subsequent application of Lehmann's finality tests.").
II. The Hayman Parties' Arguments are Without Merit.
The Hayman Parties do not contend the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order contains any ambiguity. Instead, they argue the order does not state with any clarity, unmistakable or otherwise, that it is a final judgment as to all claims and parties. According to the Hayman Parties, the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order was not a final judgment, the trial court still has plenary power, and their counterclaim is still pending. We address and reject each of those arguments below.
A. The May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order is a final judgment.
The Hayman Parties first argue the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order is not a final judgment because UDF did not request dismissal of the Hayman Parties' counterclaim and the order does not expressly dismiss the counterclaim. They maintain the trial court merely granted UDF's notice of nonsuit. Although we agree the trial court did not expressly refer to the Hayman Parties' counterclaim in the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order, we do not agree the trial court merely granted UDF's notice of nonsuit. The notices of nonsuit stated UDF "hereby nonsuit[s] all of [UDF's] claims against [the Hayman Parties] with [or without] prejudice and request[s] that the Court enter an order dismissing all such claims with [or without] prejudice, each party to bear its own costs and attorney's fees." But the trial court did more than dismiss UDF's claims against the Hayman Parties; it dismissed "the above-captioned case."
The Hayman Parties, however, assert the "above-captioned case" referred only to UDF's claims against the Hayman Parties because the order's caption identified UDF as "Plaintiffs" and the Hayman Parties as "defendants." The caption did not identify the Hayman Parties as counter-plaintiffs. The Hayman Parties cite no authority to support this argument, and we find the argument unavailing. The "above-captioned case" included the cause number and not just the case style. Further, the case style the Hayman Parties placed on their counterclaim matches the case style of the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order. The counterclaim's caption referred to UDF as the plaintiffs and the Hayman Parties as the defendants; it did not include a case style in which the Hayman Parties referred to themselves as counter-plaintiffs and to UDF as counter-defendants.
Moreover, the Hayman Parties' argument erroneously focuses on only one of the two ways in which a judgment is final: whether the order actually disposes of all claims and parties. Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 154. As this Court and the Supreme Court of Texas have acknowledged, a judgment that does not follow a conventional trial on the merits, as in this case, need not actually dispose of every party and claim before the trial court in order to be final and appealable so long as it includes "'clear and unequivocal' indicia of finality.'" Black v. Nunez, No. 05-23-00003-CV, 2023 WL 3595357, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 23, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 155-56. As discussed above, the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order contains clear and unequivocal indicia of finality.
The Hayman Parties next argue the trial court had no power to summarily dismiss their counterclaim without a motion or hearing. They contend no one moved for or requested dismissal of the Hayman Parties' counterclaim and there had been no hearing on any such request. As such, the Hayman Parties insist the counterclaim remains pending and the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order is not a final judgment. But this argument addresses whether a summary dismissal of the Hayman Parties' counterclaim was erroneous; it does not address the finality of the judgment itself. By dismissing "the above captioned case," the trial court arguably granted more relief than requested in the notice of nonsuit. Such an order may be reversible, but it is not interlocutory. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 204. An "order may lack a basis in law," but that does not make the order ambiguous. Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 828. "Error is not the same as ambiguity." Id. A party who is uncertain about whether a judgment is final must err on the side of appealing or risk losing its right to appeal. Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 156; Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 829; Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200. The Hayman Parties did not appeal from the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order. As a result, they lost the right to appeal whether the summary dismissal of the counterclaim was erroneous.
The Hayman Parties also assert additional arguments that rely upon (1) statements made by the trial judge at various hearings and status conferences expressing the judge's view that the counterclaim was still pending and (2) various actions taken by UDF in the trial court and in a now-dismissed original proceeding filed in the Supreme Court of Texas. These arguments are without merit. Again, we may not review anything beyond the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order to determine if that order is a final judgment when, as in this case, the order contains clear and unequivocal statements of finality. See Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 828 ("[A] reviewing court confronting an order that includes a finality phrase cannot look at the record. Instead, it must take the order at face value.").
For these reasons, we reject the Hayman Parties' arguments asking us to conclude the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order is not a final judgment.
B. The Hayman Parties contend Rule 162 preserves their counterclaim.
Next, the Hayman Parties argue Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 preserves their counterclaim and, at a minimum, gives the trial court and this Court discretion to treat their counterclaim as a motion for sanctions that survived UDF's nonsuit. They contend the "the trial court must be granted an opportunity" to exercise its discretion to treat their counterclaim as a motion for sanctions. The Hayman Parties further argue their counterclaim survives a nonsuit under rule 162 even if it is not construed as a sanctions motion. We reject these arguments for two reasons.
First, the Hayman Parties are misapplying Rule 162. That rule provides:
At any time before the plaintiff has introduced all of his evidence other than rebuttal evidence, the plaintiff may dismiss a case, or take a nonsuit, which shall be entered in the minutes. Notice of the dismissal or non-suit shall be served in accordance with Rule 21a on any party who has answered or has been served with process without necessity of court order.
Any dismissal pursuant to this rule shall not prejudice the right of an adverse party to be heard on a pending claim for affirmative relief or excuse the payment of all costs taxed by the clerk. A dismissal under this rule shall have no effect on any motion for sanctions, attorneys' fees or other costs pending at the time of the dismissal, as determined by the court.Tex. R. Civ. P. 162. The Hayman Parties construe Rule 162 to mean any dismissal order entered pursuant to a notice of nonsuit may not summarily dismiss a pending motion for sanctions or counterclaim for attorney's fees and costs. We reject this interpretation of Rule 162.
Rule 162 does not govern our determination of whether the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order is a final judgment; Rule 162 concerns the effect of UDF's notice of nonsuit. The Hayman Parties' argument that their counterclaim (whether it is construed as a motion for sanctions or not) survives the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order under rule 162 conflates two distinct issues: (1) the issue of whether a dismissal order that merely grants a plaintiff's nonsuit extinguishes another party's pending motion for sanctions or pending counterclaim, and (2) the issue of whether a dismissal order is a final judgment and erroneously dismisses another party's pending counterclaim or motion for sanctions. See Crites, 284 S.W.3d at 841 (holding a dismissal order was not a final judgment when it (1) disposed of only plaintiffs' claims against defendant and did not unequivocally express an intent to dispose of all claims and parties and (2) did not actually dispose of defendant's pending motion for sanctions; thus, a subsequent order denying sanctions was the final order).
Rule 162 permits a trial court to hold hearings and enter orders affecting costs, attorney's fees, and sanctions, even after notice of nonsuit is filed, but only while the trial court retains plenary power. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Estate of Blackmon ex rel. Shultz, 195 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); Bennett, 960 S.W.2d at 38. A trial court has discretion to defer signing a dismissal order to allow a reasonable amount of time to hold hearings on matters that are collateral to the merits of the underlying case. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston, 195 S.W.3d at 101. But as noted above, if a dismissal order is a final judgment, then the signing of the dismissal order is the starting point for determining when a trial court's plenary power expires. Bennett, 960 S.W.2d at 38. Once plenary jurisdiction expires, a trial court may not sanction counsel for pre-judgment conduct. Id.
Here, the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order is a final judgment. Thus, regardless of whether the Hayman Parties' counterclaim is a pending claim for affirmative relief, a counterclaim for attorney's fees and costs, or a motion for sanctions, the trial court lost jurisdiction to award any relief, such as attorneys' fees and costs, or to impose sanctions after its plenary power expired on June 30, 2022. Any issue about whether the Hayman Parties' counterclaim should have survived the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order (as a motion for sanctions or as a counterclaim) is moot. The May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order may be erroneous, but that does not make it interlocutory. See Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 155-56.
Second, the Hayman Parties cite no authority to support their assertion that we "must" give the trial court an opportunity to treat the Hayman Parties' counterclaim as a sanctions motion. Moreover, the trial court expressly stated at the March 9, 2023 status conference that the Hayman Parties' May 27, 2022 pleading "asks for attorneys' fees, not sanctions." The trial court, thus, already considered and rejected the Hayman Parties' argument.
We reject the Hayman Parties' arguments and agree with UDF that the May 31, 2022 Dismissal Order is a final judgment, and the trial court's plenary power expired on June 30, 2022. The trial court, however, is continuing to treat the Hayman Parties' counterclaim as pending by setting the case for trial and issuing orders as if there is no final judgment. The trial court has abused its discretion by continuing the case after expiration of its plenary power.
THE MARCH 9, 2023 DISMISSAL ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC
We also briefly address the March 9, 2023 Dismissal Order Nunc Pro Tunc (the Nunc Pro Tunc Order). The Hayman Parties assert the trial court corrected a clerical error in the Nunc Pro Tunc Order when it changed the dismissal from "without prejudice" to "with prejudice." UDF, in contrast, insists the Nunc Pro Tunc Order is void because the amendment corrected a judicial error. UDF did not ask this Court to determine whether the Nunc Pro Tunc Order was void because it corrects a judicial rather than clerical error, and it is not necessary for the disposition of this original proceeding for this Court to resolve that question. The pertinent inquiry here is whether the May 27, 2022 Dismissal Order is a final judgment. We, therefore, express no opinion on whether the Nunc Pro Tunc Order corrects a judicial or clerical error.
To the extent the Hayman Parties raised any other arguments we do not address in this opinion, we construe such arguments as being responsive to arguments raised by UDF that are not necessary to the disposition of this original proceeding.
CONCLUSION
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by continuing the case after expiration of its plenary power. Accordingly, we conditionally grant relators' petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to designate the case as closed. See In re Anderson, No. 01-20-00123-CV, 2020 WL 4873550, at *5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 20, 2020, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). We are confident the trial court will comply, and the writ will issue only if the trial court fails to do so.