In re T.P.

Full title: In re T.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE…

Court: Court of Appeal of California, Third District

Date published: Mar 3, 2006

136 Cal.App.4th 1461 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)

39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729

Opinion

No. C048686

February 27, 2006 As modified March 3, 2006 CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION^_

_ Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 976.1, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of the Facts and part I of the Discussion.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Sacramento County, No. JV102121, Kenneth G. Peterson, Judge.

Jackie Menaster, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, and Wanda Hill Rouzan, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MORRISON, J.

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found that T.P., a minor, had possessed cocaine (Health Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). The minor was declared a ward of the court and was committed to the Sacramento County Boys Ranch. The commitment was stayed pending his compliance with probationary conditions. The court also imposed a $50 laboratory fee pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.5.

On appeal, the minor contends (1) the lack of corroboration of accomplice testimony requires reversal of the wardship order, and (2) the laboratory fee is inapplicable in juvenile court proceedings. We disagree with the minor's first claim but agree with the second.

FACTS^_

_ See footnote, ante, page 1461.

Sacramento Police Officer Daniel Monk stopped a vehicle driven by J.M. for a traffic violation. The minor was in the front passenger seat and T.S. was in the rear seat. Officer Monk questioned the youths individually and J.M. told him that T.S. possessed drugs. Officer Monk searched T.S. and found a baggie of cocaine inside his shoe. T.S. testified that as Officer Monk stopped the vehicle, the minor told T.S. that the minor had drugs in his possession and placed a baggie on the floorboard of the back seat near T.S.'s foot. Not wanting the drugs by near foot, T.S. picked up the baggie and placed it inside his shoe. J.M. testified that as the vehicle was being stopped, the minor pulled the baggie from his pocket, gave it to J.M. and J.M. gave it back to the minor. At T.S.'s request, the minor then gave T.S. the baggie and T.S. put it inside his shoe. J.M. told the officer the baggie was inside T.S.'s shoe.

DISCUSSION I^_

_ See footnote, ante, page 1461.

The minor claims that the only evidence connecting him with the baggie of cocaine came from the uncorroborated testimony of T.S. and J.M., each of whom was an accomplice. In adult court, Penal Code section 1111 precludes conviction of a crime based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.¹ However, as the minor recognizes, the California Supreme Court has held that Penal Code section 1111 does not apply to juvenile wardship proceedings. ( In re Mitchell P. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 946, 949 ( Mitchell P.).) Arguing that the reasons underlying the Supreme Court's ruling in Mitchell P. are no longer viable, the minor seeks an opinion from "this court in urging the California Supreme Court to overrule its previously issued opinion in Mitchell P." As the minor sees it, the reasons supporting the Mitchell P. holding are (1) since judges, as opposed to juries, are more critical of accomplice testimony, they are more likely to accord the testimony the appropriate weight; (2) adults are exposed to greater punishment than juveniles; and (3) the purpose of the juvenile court system is rehabilitation. The first reason is no longer valid, the minor claims, because juvenile courts now frequently sustain petitions where the only evidence consists of uncorroborated accomplice testimony; the second reason is invalid because "juveniles are routinely committed to the California Youth Authority for misdemeanor offenses and minor felonies"; and the third reason lacks validity because, "[a] finding that a minor is a delinquent ward of the juvenile court may now be used as a `strike' prior to double an adult's sentence or commit him to prison for twenty-five years to life." Without any supporting cases or statistics, it is utter speculation to conclude that because juvenile courts sustain petitions based solely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, this must mean that the court was uncritical of that testimony or that it failed to accord it appropriate weight. Similarly, the minor offers no support for his conclusion that juveniles are "routinely" committed to the California Youth Authority for misdemeanor offenses and minor felonies. Finally, the fact that some juvenile adjudications may qualify as "strike" priors in adult court, has no bearing on dispositional proceedings in juvenile court where three-strike sentencing is inapplicable. Consequently, in addition to our being bound by the holding in Mitchell P., supra, 22 Cal.3d 946, the minor has provided no reason for us to question its continuing validity.

II

(1) The juvenile court imposed a $50 laboratory fee pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.5. This section requires imposition of a $50 fee for any individual convicted of specified offenses, including possession of cocaine. Since juveniles are not convicted of criminal offenses (Welf. Inst. Code, § 203 ["An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose"]), the minor does not, as the People agree, come within the scope of section 11372.5. Hence, the order imposing the fee must be reversed.

DISPOSITION

The order of the juvenile court imposing a $50 fee pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.5 is reversed. The order of the juvenile court committing the minor to the Sacramento County Boys Ranch is affirmed.

Sims, Acting P.J., and Nicholson, J., concurred.