Opinion
No. 65378-4-I.
Filed: April 18, 2011.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-3-02651-1, Gregory P. Canova, J., entered April 20, 2010.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Dwyer, C.J., concurred in by Grosse and Cox, JJ.
Ryan Lurie appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to enforce the decree resulting from the dissolution of his marriage with his former wife Christine Olivieri. Because granting Lurie's motion would have amounted to an improper modification of the decree, the court correctly denied it. We affirm.
I
Lurie and Olivieri dissolved their marriage in 2007. Neither party was represented by counsel. They entered an agreed decree of dissolution by using handwritten additions to a standard form. The list of separate property awarded to Lurie in the decree included "his vehicle, the house, share time equally with the 2 dogs." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 2. Property awarded to Olivieri included "her car, $33,000 from mutual funds. $17,000 + interest in 2009 from the house." CP at 3. Provisions on the form for liabilities to be paid by the husband and the wife had boxes checked next to "[d]oes not apply" and a location providing a hold harmless provision was left unchecked and unmarked. CP at 3, 4.
In 2010, Lurie filed a pro se motion to enforce the decree. He sought an order requiring Olivieri to execute a quitclaim deed to him relinquishing any interest in the house. Although he had lived in the house since the dissolution, he also requested an order requiring her to reimburse him for half of all mortgage payments he had made, a total amount of $27,300, and to continue to make half of the mortgage payments in the future. Lurie acknowledged in his motion that he had not paid Olivieri any portion of the $17,000 or interest listed under property she was to receive, explaining that he regarded that provision as ambiguous as to whether it should come from sale or refinancing of the house, neither of which had occurred. Olivieri objected to Lurie's motion.
Lurie sought other relief pertaining to the shared time with the dogs, but he has not raised any argument based on the trial court's ruling in that regard in this appeal.
A court commissioner denied Lurie's motion, concluding that to obtain the relief he requested would require a separate action or proceeding to reopen the dissolution. Lurie's subsequent motion to revise the commissioner's ruling was denied by a superior court judge.
Lurie appeals.
II
Interpretation of a dissolution decree presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Thompson, 97 Wn. App. 873, 877, 988 P.2d 499 (1999). If a decree is unambiguous, there is nothing for the court to interpret. In re Marriage of Bocanegra, 58 Wn. App. 271, 275, 792 P.2d 1263 (1990). If the order is ambiguous, the reviewing court applies the general rules of construction applicable to statutes, contracts, and other writings to ascertain the intent of the court that entered the decree. Thompson, 97 Wn. App. at 878. A writing is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two different, reasonable interpretations. McDonald v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 119 Wn.2d 724, 733, 837 P.2d 1000 (1992).
A court may clarify an ambiguous decree, but may not modify it unless circumstances justify reopening the judgment. Thompson, 97 Wn. App. at 878. Modification occurs when rights given to a party are extended, or reduced, beyond the scope originally intended; in contrast, clarification merely defines rights already given. Thompson, 97 Wn. App. at 878.
Lurie first argues that the trial court erred by failing to order Olivieri to execute a quitclaim deed to the former marital residence. He contends that he was entitled to this relief because the decree unambiguously awarded him the residence, unencumbered by any limitation. We disagree.
At the very least, the decree was ambiguous in this respect because of the use of the language "from the house" in referring to the $17,000 and interest that Olivieri was to receive "in 2009." CP at 3. Where possible, we must construe a writing to give meaning and effect to every word. Stokes v. Polley, 145 Wn.2d 341, 346-47, 37 P.3d 1211 (2001). "An interpretation of a writing which gives effect to all of its provisions is favored over one which renders some of the language meaningless or ineffective." Wagner v. Wagner, 95 Wn.2d 94, 101, 621 P.2d 1279 (1980)). Moreover, "[w]here one construction would make a contract unreasonable, and another, equally consistent with its language, would make it reasonable, the latter more rational construction must prevail." Byrne v. Ackerlund, 108 Wn.2d 445, 453-54, 739 P.2d 1138 (1987). Construing the decree as Lurie sought would be unreasonable and improper because it would effectively render the language "from the house" and "in 2009" meaningless and would leave Olivieri without an effective mechanism for obtaining the yet unpaid $17,000. The trial court correctly denied Lurie's motion because granting it would have resulted in an improper modification of the decree by reducing Olivieri's rights.
We note that none of the decrees in the cases on which Lurie relies contained equivalent language to this language in the decree here.
Lurie takes issue with several of the court commissioner's oral comments in denying his motion. Those contentions are irrelevant to our review, however, because the appeal is taken from the superior court judge's denial of the motion to revise. In re Marriage of Williams, 156 Wn. App. 22, 27, 232 P.3d 573 (2010) (when an appeal is taken from an order denying revision of a court commissioner's decision, appellate courts review the decision of the judge, not the commissioner).
We likewise find no error in the denial of Lurie's motion as to the mortgage obligations. The decree was silent regarding any marital debts or obligations. Any right Lurie would have to require Olivieri to contribute to payments he has made on the mortgage would not arise from any particular term of the decree that he could enforce. Rather, addressing the mortgage as an obligation left undivided in the decree will either require reopening the entire decree or filing a separate action. C.f. In re Marriage of Molvik, 31 Wn. App. 133, 135-36, 639 P.2d 238 (1982) (vacate decree or file separate action to address undistributed community property); In re Marriage of Monaghan, 78 Wn. App. 918, 929, 899 P.2d 841 (1995) (adjudicating rights in property not disposed of in the decree requires an independent equitable partition action); Devine v. Devine, 42 Wn. App. 740, 743, 711 P.2d 1034 (1985) (same).
Regardless of which of these methods is used, we note that the trial court in such a proceeding would have the duty to reach an equitable result, which would necessarily require consideration of multiple factors, including that Lurie has had the benefit of being the sole occupant of the home since the time of the decree and that he delayed making any request that Olivieri contribute to the mortgage payments for years after the decree was entered.
Lurie and Olivieri both request attorney fees on appeal. They each represent themselves before this court, however, and neither identifies any relevant authority justifying the award of costs or fees in these circumstances. We deny both requests.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: