Opinion
No. 3-163 / 02-1073.
Filed June 25, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Mark D. Cleve, Judge.
Linda Meloy appeals the district court's denial of her application to modify the child support provisions of the parties' decree. AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
Roger Huddle of Weaver Huddle, Wapello, for appellant.
James Hoffman, Davenport, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vogel, JJ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Linda Meloy appeals the district court's denial of her application to modify child support provisions of the decree dissolving her marriage to David Meloy.
Two children were born to the marriage: Robert, born April 18, 1984, and Marissa, born January 28, 1987. The parties' dissolution decree, filed September 4, 1997, allowed the parties to continue the living arrangement they had commenced on January 17, 1997. On January 17, 1997, the parties moved into a duplex they had built for the purpose of effectuating joint physical care of the children. Linda and the children lived in one side of the duplex, and David lived in the other. Doors connecting the duplex units allowed the children easy access to both parents.
The relevant child support provisions of the decree provide:
(1) Both parties recognize that the best interests of the children are met by the active involvement of both parents. In agreeing to this joint physical care arrangement, the parties do not want to imply that it would be appropriate to deprive the children of support to which they would be otherwise entitled in order to maintain their accustomed lifestyle. Therefore, in light of his currently higher income, David agrees to pay to Linda, for the support and maintenance of the children, the sum of $1275 per month for each and every month beginning with September 1, 1997, through the date the younger child graduates from high school or reaches age 19, whichever occurs first; at which time, David will continue to pay Linda, for the support and maintenance of the younger child, the sum of $900 per month for each and every month beginning with the month following the date the younger child graduates from high school or reaches age 19, whichever occurs first, through May 31, 2006. The support payment will be due on the first day of each month.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph 5(D)(1) above, if, as a result of an act, omission, election, or choice by Linda, the parties' younger child does not live in the Duplex or other residence with David until she is at least age thirteen and one-half, (a) the amount of child support payable by David after the parties' older child graduates from high school or reaches age 19, whichever occurs first, shall be no more than the amount payable under the child support guidelines for one child, and (b) David shall not be obligated to pay any child support after the younger child graduates from high school or reaches age 19, whichever occurs first.
Subsection 5(D)(1) of the decree obligates David to pay Linda child support of $1275 per month from September 1, 1997 until Marissa graduates from high school (anticipated May 2005) or until she turns nineteen (January 28, 2006), whichever occurs first. The amount remains constant even when Robert graduates from high school and is no longer living at home. The amount is reduced the month following the earlier of Marissa's high school graduation or nineteenth birthday, and David is then obligated to pay $900 per month through May 31, 2006.
Subsection 5(D)(2) of the decree provides for a change in child support obligations if as a result of Linda's actions, Marissa does not live in the duplex or other residence with David until Marissa is thirteen and one half years old (July 28, 2000). Should conditions trigger the application of this provision, the child support obligation would change following Robert's high school graduation (anticipated May 2002) or nineteenth birthday (April 18, 2003). The amount of David's child support would then conform to the Iowa Child Support Guidelines and would not extend past the earlier of Marissa's high school graduation or nineteenth birthday.
Linda's attorney added a handwritten note on the settlement agreement adopted by the court. It said:
The parties recognize that the additional extended child support paid by David deviates from the child support guidelines but agree that the additional child support will assist the children with educational expenses and provide them with a better standard of living and that the additional child support is in the best interest of the children and will do justice between the parties under the special circumstances of this case.
On October 17, 1999, David moved out of the duplex, citing the worsening conflict between him and Linda and its harmful effects on the children. On February 7, 2000, David filed an application to modify the decree seeking an order regarding custody and visitation as a result of the change of residence. On June 2, 2000, the court entered a consent order modifying the decree. The court continued the joint legal custody of the children, granted Linda primary physical care, and established a visitation schedule for David.
On September 24, 2001, Linda filed an application to modify the decree seeking an increase in child support. In his answer filed October 26, 2001, David denied the allegations in the application and argued that subsection 5(D)(2) of the settlement agreement controlled. Linda argued that the equitable doctrines of estoppel and laches prevented David from raising subsection 5(D)(2) of the settlement agreement.
On June 12, 2002, the court ruled on Linda's application, resulting in this appeal. The court found that Linda was not prejudiced by David's delay in raising the settlement agreement provision reducing his support obligation because the reduction in the child support contemplated in subsection 5(D)(2) would not occur until Robert graduated from high school, which occurred in May of 2002 (the month the hearing took place in district court). Consequently, the court applied subsection 5(D)(2). The court found that David's moving out of the duplex was a result of an "act, omission, election, or choice by Linda" and proceeded to apply the Iowa Child Support Guidelines to the parties' financial situation. The court concluded David's child support obligation for Marissa was $1075 per month.
Despite the parties' stipulation that they wished to extend the health insurance provisions of the decree to cover the children while attending college, the court found "it is appropriate to impose the requirements for uncovered medical expenses set forth in Iowa Child Support Guidelines Rule 9.10." The court also resolved the parties' obligations for Robert's college expenses, which are not at issue here.
On appeal, Linda contends:
(1) The trial court erred in not barring David's application of the "reduction" provisions of his child support obligation by application of the doctrine of estoppel, and
(2) The trial court erred in modifying the parties' agreement regarding medical expenses for their children.II. Standard of Review.
Our scope of review in this equitable action is de novo. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4. In equity cases, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, the court gives weight to the fact findings of the district court, but is not bound by them. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( g).
III. Child Support.
With respect to the child support issue, Linda does not dispute the court's analysis of David's income. Rather, she contends David should be required to pay child support for two children when only Marissa is still at home and make support payments for two years beyond Marissa's high school graduation. She argues the doctrines of equitable estoppel and estoppel by acquiescence should have barred David from applying the settlement agreement provision which reduced his child support obligation.
We first examine the equitable doctrines Linda asserts bar David from reducing his child support obligation. Equitable estoppel needs to be proven "by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence." Johnson v. Johnson, 301 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Iowa 1981). The four elements follow:
(1) a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) a lack of knowledge of the true facts on the part of the actor; (3) the intention that it be acted upon; and (4) reliance thereon by the party to whom made, to his prejudice and injury.
Id. (citing Farmers Mechanics Sav. Bank v. Campbell, 258 Iowa 1238, 1247, 141 N.W.2d 917, 922 (1966)). Each case in which equitable estoppel is raised "must be decided in light of its surrounding facts and circumstances." Id. (citing Johnson v. Pattison, 185 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Iowa 1971)).
Linda does not identify any false representation or concealment of material facts on David's part. Nor does she demonstrate how she was allegedly prejudiced or injured by David's assertion that subsection 5(D)(2) of the settlement agreement controlled the situation when the reduction that takes place in 5(D)(2) would not occur until Robert graduated from high school (the month the trial court held the hearing on this issue). This equitable doctrine is based upon "the idea that one who has made a certain representation should not thereafter be permitted to change his position to the prejudice of one who has relied upon it." Johnson, 301 N.W.2d at 754 (quoting Holsteen v. Thompson, 169 N.W.2d 554, 558 (Iowa 1969)). Linda has not established that David changed his position or that Linda relied on David's changed position to her detriment. We accordingly find that equitable estoppel does not bar David from asserting subsection 5(D)(2) of the parties' settlement agreement.
Linda also alleges that estoppel by acquiescence bars David's reliance on subsection 5(D)(2) of their settlement agreement. The elements of this doctrine include "(1) a clear and definite oral agreement; (2) proof that plaintiff acted to his detriment in reliance thereon; and (3) a finding that the equities entitle plaintiff to [the] relief." In re Marriage of Harvey, 523 N.W.2d 755, 756-57 (Iowa 1994). Linda does not point to any oral agreement upon which she relied to her detriment. Furthermore, estoppel by acquiescence applies "where a person knows or ought to know that he is entitled to enforce his right or to impeach a transaction, and neglects to do so for such a length of time as would imply that he intended to waive or abandon his right." Anthony v. Anthony, 204 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Iowa 1973) (applying doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence where plaintiff knew of her right to child support for seventeen years before she pursued it) (citations omitted) overruled by statute on other grounds, see Harvey, 523 N.W.2d 756. David moved out of the duplex on October 17, 1999, which was before Marissa turned thirteen and one half years old (July 28, 2000). David was still responsible for paying child support for both children until the earlier of Robert's high school graduation (which occurred in May of 2002) or nineteenth birthday (April 18, 2003). The fact that David did not raise the reduction provision from October 1999 until October 2001 does not imply that he waived or abandoned his right to do so because even at the time he raised the reduction provision, he was still obligated to pay child support for two children for another seven months when it was anticipated Robert would graduate from high school. This is unlike the Anthony case where seventeen years elapsed before the party asserted her rights. We find estoppel by acquiescence does not apply.
Because we find the equitable defenses Linda raises fail, we proceed to analyze whether the reduction provision in fact should be applied. The fighting issue in this analysis is whether David's move from the duplex was a "result of an act, omission, election, or choice by Linda." Linda doesn't agree with the trial court's finding that David's move was precipitated by her conduct; however, she does not attempt to prove the contrary. The trial court's findings on this issue include the following:
The evidence is replete with instances in which Linda entered David's portion of the duplex, both before and after he finally obtained locks for the doors, for the purpose of looking for evidence of David's relationship with his then girlfriend and now fiancée. On some such occasions Linda snooped through David's caller ID to determine whom he was communicating with, and on another occasion she opened one of his telephone bills to obtain the same information. On another such excursion she tore up a valentine card David had purchased, and in another instance she actually took a sweater and other personal items which she presumed belonged to the girlfriend, and left them with a note on the front door of the girlfriend's apartment. In yet another incident she either took a piece of mail from David's mailbox or discovered it during one of her forays into David's duplex unit, and wrote disparaging comments on the card.
On several occasions Linda made inappropriate sexual references about David in front of the children, and it appears that she was the major precipitant of disputes which occurred in the children's presence and which were disturbing to them. Linda also left notes with and made other communications to the girlfriend, which include a "bill" requesting that the girlfriend perform work around the duplex unit in exchange for spending time there. Those direct contacts resulted in a criminal prosecution against Linda, apparently for harassment, which resulted in a deferred judgment and an order which prohibits Linda from having any contact with the girlfriend. Linda also physically assaulted David on more than one occasion, and intentionally damaged his personal property.
There are numerous other disturbing incidents involving Linda which are reflected in the evidence, all of which are largely undisputed by Linda. What is of even greater concern to the Court is that Linda apparently still believes that she was justified in engaging in all of these acts "to protect her children."
The Court also determines that David was credible in his contention that he tried to remain as long as possible in the duplex arrangement for the sake of the children, and that he did not move until the situation became untenable both for the children and for him. In sum, the Court finds that Linda's behavior was so intolerable as to constitute reasonable grounds for David to leave the arrangement for purposes of subparagraph 5(D)(2) of the agreement between the parties.
The trial court's findings on this issue are abundantly supported by the record, and we adopt them as our own. We find David's move from the duplex was a result of Linda's actions. Neither party disputes the trial court's analysis of the financial information submitted to the court or the application of the Iowa Child Support Guidelines to the financial information. Finding no reason to deviate from the trial court's conclusion on the matter, we affirm its result.
IV. Medical Expenses.
The settlement agreement provides that Linda will maintain health insurance for each child until he or she graduates from high school or turns nineteen, and David will pay for all uninsured medical, dental, or similar expenses. At the modification hearing, the parties stipulated that they wished to extend the duration of their agreement on the children's health insurance coverage and responsibility for uninsured medical expenses through college, rather than cease when each child graduated from high school. In the modification ruling, the court ordered Linda to maintain the children's insurance coverage through college and ordered that
the first $250.00 of any medical, dental, orthodontic, optical, prescription or other health-related expenses for Marissa which are not covered by the insurance shall be paid by the Petitioner [Linda], and any such amounts incurred after the first $250.00 shall be paid 30% by the Petitioner and 70% by the Respondent.
On appeal, David continues to agree with the parties' stipulation that he would pay for all uninsured medical expenses while the children attend college. Based on our de novo review, we find no reason not to honor the parties' stipulation with respect to medical expenses. We therefore reverse the trial court on this issue.