Opinion
No. 2-960 / 02-0606.
Filed March 12, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, MARY J. SOKOLOVSKE, Judge.
Ronald Cerwick appeals from the order granting Cally Cerwick's motion to dismiss Ronald's application to enforce certain provisions of the parties' dissolution decree. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Paul Deck of Deck Deck, Sioux City, for appellant.
Jeffrey Myers, Sioux City, for appellee.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and ZIMMER and HECHT, JJ.
Ronald Cerwick appeals from the order granting Cally Cerwick's motion to dismiss his application to enforce certain provisions of the parties' dissolution decree. We reverse and remand.
I. Background facts and proceedings.
On February 26, 1998, a decree was entered dissolving the marriage of Ronald and Cally Cerwick. Among other things, the decree awarded Cally the parties' acreage and mobile home, but required her to list the property for sale with a real estate broker for $60,000. If the property was not sold within seventy-five days, a public auction was to be held within 120 days following the entry of the decree. The proceeds of the sale were to be applied in the following order: (1) the customary sale expense, (2) the balance due title holders, (3) to pay off debts of either party that was a lien on the property, (4) $15,000 to Cally, and (5) the balance to be divided equally between the parties.
Ronald appealed this decree. The Iowa Supreme Court, per Ronald's request, granted a stay of the sale of the property subject to the condition he pay the $450 per month contract payment on the property and that he file with the clerk of district court a bond in the amount of $1000 insuring he comply with the forthcoming ruling. The court of appeals subsequently affirmed the decree.
Based on Ronald's subsequent failure to pay the real estate contract payments, the district court granted Cally's demand for the bond. It ordered that judgment should be rendered on the bond and directed the clerk to pay Cally the $1000 bond deposited by Ronald. On August 14, 2000, the district court ruled on Ronald's application for order to show cause. The court noted Cally had decided she would prefer to keep the acreage and had made no efforts to sell the property as required in the decree. It ordered her to, within twenty days of the entry of the order, list the acreage for sale and upon sale distribute the proceeds as set forth in the dissolution decree. Cally responded by listing the property for sale, and notified the court that she had made an offer to purchase the property herself for $60,000.
On January 22, 2001, Ronald sought another order to show cause why Cally should not be held in contempt, based on the claim she had failed to satisfy the liens on the property and divide the proceeds remaining from the sale of the property. On February 19, 2001, Ronald moved to modify the decree in several respects and on March 28, 2001, the motion came on as one for an accounting. The court denied the modification but ordered Cally to report on the current status of the sale and the liens on the property. Cally responded by filing a report with a closing statement prepared by Feauto Real Estate Auction Services which noted no proceeds remained for distribution to Ronald after the payment of the real estate contract balance and liens against the property.
On July 10, 2001, Ronald filed an application seeking an order requiring Cally to disburse proceeds from the sale of the acreage. Cally moved to dismiss this application claiming all issues relating to the dissolution were final and the court lacked jurisdiction to hear Ronald's application. The court granted the motion to dismiss. It first concluded that although Ronald was notified of the closing of the sale of the property to Cally and the proposed closing statement, he failed to object. Second, the court noted that Ronald's application further challenged a support award then on appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court in a separate, but related, case (case number 028257). Finally, the court appears to have credited Cally's argument the "file was closed in February 2000" and thus precluded further review. The court subsequently denied Ronald's motion to enlarge, correct, or amend its findings. Ronald appeals.
Case number 028257, which has now been resolved on appeal, involved an order requiring Ronald to pay Cally $300 per month in spousal support under Iowa Code chapter 236 (1995). Ronald contended on appeal that he should have received a credit against that support obligation because he cohabitated with Cally while the protective order was in effect. This court affirmed the district court's denial of such a credit. See In re Marriage of Cerwick, No. 01-1176 (Iowa Ct.App. August 14, 2002).
The parties repeatedly refer to this as a "Rule 175(b) motion." We assume they actually reference a "Rule 179(b) motion," now codified as Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2).
II. Scope of review.
Our review of this equitable proceeding is de novo. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4; In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1993).
III. Discussion.
We conclude the district court based its dismissal on three basic grounds. First, it held the then-pending appeal in case number 028257 denied the court jurisdiction because Ronald's application specifically referred to support allowance figures challenged in the appeal. Second, the district court appears to have concluded the real estate transaction ordered by the dissolution decree was "final," such that Ronald was estopped to further litigate his entitlement to receive proceeds from the sale of the residential real estate. Third, the district court determined that although Ronald was notified of the closing of the property and the proposed closing statement, he did not challenge it. We will address each of these in turn.
A. Effect of appeal in case number 028257. We first address whether the appeal in case number 028257 denied the district court jurisdiction to hear claims raised in Ronald's application. Although both generally related to the dissolution of the parties' marriage, the appeal in case number 028257 and Ronald's application which is now before us were brought in separate actions.
As a general rule, a district court loses jurisdiction of the merits of a controversy once an appeal is perfected. State v. Brooks, 630 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Iowa 2001); Shedlock v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 534 N.W.2d 656, 658 (Iowa 1995). An exception to this rule, however, permits the district court to retain jurisdiction over disputes that are collateral to the subject matter of the appeal. Id. This exception exists to expedite the resolution of disputes in cases where collateral matters commonly surface during appeals. Shedlock, 534 N.W.2d at 658. We thus ask whether Ronald's application in this case asked the court to "decide differently the issues concluded by [the judgment in case number 028257]?" See Franzen v. Deere Co., 409 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Iowa 1987).
We conclude the matters raised in Ronald's application were "collateral" to those then pending on appeal in case number 028257. Shedlock, 534 N.W.2d at 658. The appeal in case number 028257 involved a request for credit against Ronald's support obligation based upon his cohabitation with Cally during a time when a protective order between the parties was in effect. Ronald's application now before us on appeal, on the other hand, involves a request to enforce the decree entered dissolving the parties' marriage and directing the sale of certain property. Thus, the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter.
B. "Finality" of the case. In granting the motion to dismiss, the district court apparently accepted Cally's argument that, in the absence of a prior, timely appeal in this case, the distribution of the real estate proceeds was final. We disagree. A district court retains jurisdiction after appeal or a final order to enforce the judgment, but does not have the authority to revisit and decide differently the issues concluded by that judgment. See Franzen, 409 N.W.2d at 674. In other words, after a court's final ruling or appellate review, the district court retains inherent power to enforce the judgment but not to render a new judgment. See In re Mariage of Hoffman, 515 N.W.2d 549, 551 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994).
Accepting for the sake of argument Cally's assertion the real estate transaction ordered by the dissolution decree was "closed" or "final," we must determine whether Ronald's application asks the court to enforce the judgment, rather than render a new judgment. We believe Ronald's application should be construed as seeking enforcement of the portions of the decree calling for the sale of the property and distribution of sale proceeds according to an express formula. Therefore to the extent the application sought such relief, and the court failed to reach its merits, we conclude the court erred.
C. Estoppel. Finally, we find no merit to Cally's assertion that Ronald is somehow barred from undertaking further proceedings to enforce the decree because he failed to challenge the realtor's notice of closing in a timely manner. We find no legal or factual bases supporting estoppel as a ground for the district court's dismissal ruling. We conclude the district court erred to the extent it relied on this proposition in dismissing Ronald's action.
IV. CONCLUSION.
We conclude the district court did have jurisdiction to hear and decide Ronald's application requesting enforcement of the dissolution decree. We reverse and remand this case to the district court to permit the district court to adjudicate the merits of Ronald's application to the extent it seeks enforcement of the dissolution decree's formula for distribution of the real estate sale proceeds. We of course express no opinion as to the merits of Ronald's assertion that the proceeds of the real estate sale were not distributed in conformity with the decretal formula.