Opinion
No. COA15–929.
01-19-2016
In the Matter of T.D.V., C.L.V.
Mercedes O. Chut, for Petitioner–Appellee. Jeffrey William Gillette, for respondent-appellant mother. Blackburn & Tanner, by James E. Tanner, III, for respondent-appellant father. Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, L.L.P., by Jackson Wyatt Moore, Jr. and Lauren H. Bradley, for Guardian ad Litem-appellee.
Mercedes O. Chut, for Petitioner–Appellee.
Jeffrey William Gillette, for respondent-appellant mother.
Blackburn & Tanner, by James E. Tanner, III, for respondent-appellant father.
Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, L.L.P., by Jackson Wyatt Moore, Jr. and Lauren H. Bradley, for Guardian ad Litem-appellee.
Opinion
Appeal by respondent mother and respondent father from order entered 12 May 2015 by Judge Betty J. Brown in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 December 2015. Guilford County, Nos. 12 JT 40, 13 JT 88.
GEER, Judge.
Respondent mother and respondent father (“respondent parents”) appeal from the trial court's order terminating their parental rights with respect to their children, T.D.V. (“Tanya”) and C.L.V. (“Caitlyn”). The trial court concluded for both respondent parents that grounds to terminate their parental rights existed under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1) (2013) (neglect) and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(3) (willful failure to pay cost of care). The trial court also concluded that the ground of dependency, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(6), existed as to respondent mother.
For ease of reading and to protect the privacy of the children, we use the pseudonyms “Tanya” and “Caitlyn” throughout this opinion.
On appeal, respondent parents only challenge the portion of the trial court's order determining that grounds for termination of parental rights existed; they do not contest the trial court's conclusion that termination was in the best interests of the children. We hold that competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact, which in turn support the trial court's conclusion that grounds existed under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1) to terminate respondent mother's and respondent father's parental rights due to neglect. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order as to both respondent parents.
Facts
Respondent parents are the biological parents of Tanya (born 11 April 2012) and Caitlyn (born 18 July 2013). On 13 April 2012, the Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) filed a petition alleging that Tanya was a neglected and dependent child. The court, with respondent parents' consent, adjudicated Tanya to be dependent in an order entered 27 June 2012. Caitlyn also entered DHHS custody at birth, and on 18 July 2013, DHHS filed a juvenile petition alleging that she was also a neglected and dependent child. Caitlyn was adjudicated dependent on 16 September 2013, again with respondent parents' consent.
The trial court noted that in May 2014, DHHS was formed as a result of the merger of the Guilford County Department of Social Services and the Guilford County Department of Public Health.
The 13 April 2012 juvenile petition relating to Tanya stated that Tanya never went home from the hospital after her birth because DHHS received a report that respondent mother had a history of mental health problems and was not taking any medication. Her medical records showed a diagnosis of Schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, chronic medication non-compliance, and Type 2 diabetes. She had an involuntary psychiatric hospitalization in October 2009 and was admitted to High Point Regional Hospital for psychiatric reasons in September and November 2011. Both times, caregivers recommended voluntary psychiatric hospitalization, which respondent mother declined. Respondent mother also had a diagnosis of borderline intellectual functioning, did not live independently, and had difficulty meeting her own needs.
Respondent father was incarcerated at the time of Tanya's birth. Respondent mother and respondent father have never been married and did not reside together at the time the petition was filed. By 31 May 2012, the date of the adjudicatory hearing, respondent mother had moved out of her mother's house to be with respondent father. Respondent parents did not have stable housing and were living together in homes of friends. Neither respondent had gainful employment. Respondent mother received Social Security Disability Income (SSDI), and respondent father worked odd jobs and reported that he was going to apply for SSDI due to his mental health issues and diabetes.
The permanent plan for Tanya initially was reunification, but after multiple status review orders and continuances, a permanency planning order was entered on 27 March 2013 changing the permanent plan to adoption. With respect to Caitlyn, the court also initially ordered a permanent plan of reunification, but subsequently entered an order changing Caitlyn's permanent plan to adoption.
The court held the first termination of parental rights (“TPR”) hearing with respect to Tanya in February 2014. In an order entered 8 April 2014, the court concluded that grounds existed to terminate both respondent parents' rights regarding Tanya pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1) (neglect) and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(2) (leaving a child in foster care for more than 12 months without making reasonable progress in correcting the conditions that led to removal). The court also found grounds to terminate respondent mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(6) (dependency).
The trial court ultimately concluded, however, that it was not in Tanya's best interest to terminate the parental rights of respondent parents based on the circumstances at the time of the 8 April 2014 order. The court noted that Tanya's placement with her foster mother was “a fine placement but not a great placement” and whether she would adopt Tanya was uncertain. In addition, Tanya had to be removed from the home of her previous foster mother in order to be placed with the current foster mother and Caitlyn, and Tanya had a very strong bond and attachment with her previous foster mother. Finally, there were many changes that occurred during the course of Tanya's case, including multiple social workers.
The trial court ordered both parents to continue with their case plans and stressed the importance of participating in their respective domestic violence programs and ending the domestic violence in their relationship. Further, the court emphasized the need for both respondent mother and respondent father to be honest and forthcoming with their service providers and maintain regular communication with the social worker. Finally, the court pointed to the need for each parent to obtain and maintain stable housing, and “[t]he need for drastic improvement by both parents within the next thirty (30) days.”
After a permanency planning review order entered 28 April 2014, in which the trial court concluded that the parents had not made adequate progress, DHHS filed motions seeking the termination of both respondent parents' parental rights as to Caitlyn and Tanya on 23 May 2014 and 6 October 2014, respectively. The court held a hearing on the motions on 26 and 27 January 2015.
Following the second TPR hearing, the court entered an order terminating the parental rights of both respondent parents on 12 May 2015. The trial court again concluded that grounds existed to terminate the parents' parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat § 7B–1111(a)(1) for neglect and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(3) for failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of the children's care. The court also concluded that additional grounds existed to terminate respondent mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(6).
The trial court made numerous findings of fact in the second TPR order, which included adopting the findings of fact from the first TPR order. Specifically, the trial court made the following findings of fact in support of its conclusion that grounds existed to terminate respondents' parental rights to both of their children.
The court found respondent mother receives Social Security Income, “although she does not know why.” The court found that respondent father worked for West End Ministries, making $9.00 an hour, and had been with West End Ministries for about seven years. On average, respondent father worked around 12 hours a week.
Further, from the beginning of their involvement with DHHS, respondent parents “intended to maintain their relationship as a couple in seeking reunification with the juveniles.” The court had informed them that this meant their progress would be judged as a couple, and both parents signed a joint service agreement to that effect on 9 May 2012 regarding Tanya, and Caitlyn was added once she was born. The service agreement contained requirements for both parents, including completing a Parenting/Psychological Evaluation, obtaining and maintaining stable housing, and developing appropriate parenting skills. In addition, it contained requirements specific to respondent mother regarding continuing with prescribed medications and therapy and participating in the Crossroads domestic violence program. It also required that respondent father complete a mental health assessment, become gainfully employed, and complete the Domestic Violence Intervention Program (“DVIP”).
The trial court noted that respondent mother finally acknowledged she was a victim of domestic violence in June 2014 during one of her last Crossroads sessions for domestic violence victims, but “that realization did not last long.” At the 24 July 2014 permanency planning hearing, respondent mother testified that she did not believe she had ever been a victim of domestic violence.
In addition, the court found that on 3 November 2014, the social worker made an unannounced visit to respondent father's home, and respondent father told the social worker that he and respondent mother had separated. The social worker requested that respondent father report for a drug screen, but he was reluctant. Respondent father admitted to the social worker that he had used marijuana on 31 October 2014. Subsequently, respondent father did not even attempt to complete a drug screen.
Respondent father called respondent mother on 3 November 2014, and he “was very angry with her, demanded to see her, and threatened to come to her apartment and break out her windows.” Respondent mother placed a 911 call and reported that she was worried that respondent father was coming to her residence, and she did not want him there because the relationship was over. Respondent mother did not, however, tell the 911 operator that respondent father had threatened to break out her windows. Respondent father was later arrested and charged with second degree trespass for going on the property where respondent mother's apartment was located. He claimed he was there because he transported respondent mother from the doctor's office.
The court further found that the social worker later checked the 911 logs for respondent parents' homes and discovered respondent mother's call on 3 November 2014. The social worker confronted respondent mother about the incident, and respondent mother told the social worker that respondent father had called her and demanded to see her. Although she refused, he continued to demand to see her. The court found that respondent father then threatened to come over to respondent mother's apartment and “break out her windows” and that respondent mother was afraid because of how angry he was.
Moreover, the court found that respondent mother was evicted on 11 December 2014. On 30 December 2014, Caroline Fields of Healthy Start terminated services with respondent mother because she had only made minimal progress in her parenting skills despite years of instruction. Respondent mother “actively resisted the services, openly refused to comply, and repeatedly stated she did not need the services.”
The court found that at the time of the second TPR, respondent mother was “currently without stable, adequate, and appropriate housing, after once again having been evicted due to her ongoing relationship with [respondent father] and the domestic disturbances that are a product of their relationship.” In addition, the court found that respondent father “has maintained stable housing since March 2014,” but that “his housing is not appropriate for the juveniles” and that he was currently living with respondent mother.
The court also found that both respondent parents willfully failed to pay a reasonable cost of care for both juveniles during the six months preceding the filing of the motion to terminate parental rights. DHHS incurred $6,182.16 in costs for the care of Tanya in the six months preceding the filing of the motion to terminate respondent father's parental rights, and $4,631.96 for the care of Caitlyn from 6 April 2014 to 6 October 2014. During the same time period, respondent father was under an order to pay child support for Tanya in the amount of $55.00 per month, which represents $50.00 for his basic, monthly support obligation and $5.00 for arrears. Respondent father made the following payments: $30.00 in May 2014; $40.00 in June 2014; $40.00 in July 2014; and no amounts in April, August, September, or October 2014. Respondent father was not under an order to pay child support for Caitlyn at any time, and he paid nothing towards Caitlyn's cost of care in the relevant time frame.
The court found that respondent mother did not pay any amount during the six-month period and that she had the ability to pay some amount more than $0.00 towards both Caitlyn and Tanya and failed to do so. The court also found that respondent father had the ability to pay some amount more than $0.00 towards Caitlyn's cost of care and willfully failed to do so and that the amount he actually paid for Tanya amounted to a willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of Tanya's cost of care.
The court concluded that both respondent parents' parental rights should be terminated pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1) for neglect and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(3) for willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of the children's care. In addition, the court found respondent mother's parental rights were subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(6). The court also ruled that it was in the juveniles' best interests to terminate the parental rights of both respondent parents. Respondent parents both filed timely notices of appeal to this Court from the 12 May 2015 order.
Discussion
The process for determining whether to terminate parental rights involves two steps. First, at the adjudicatory stage, “the petitioner has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds [for termination] listed in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111 exists.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C.App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002). We review the adjudicatory stage to determine “whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether those findings of fact support its conclusions of law.” In re C.C., J.C., 173 N.C.App. 375, 380, 618 S.E.2d 813, 817 (2005). “ ‘Clear, cogent, and convincing’ is an evidentiary standard that is stricter than ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ although not as high as the criminal burden of proof, ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ “ N.C. State Bar v. Talford, 147 N .C.App. 581, 587, 556 S.E.2d 344, 349 (2001) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109–10, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984)), aff'd as modified, 356 N.C. 626, 576 S.E.2d 305 (2003).
“If the trial court determines that grounds for termination exist, it proceeds to the dispositional stage, and must consider whether terminating parental rights is in the best interests of the child.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C.App. at 98, 564 S.E.2d at 602. Respondent parents do not, however, raise any arguments on appeal related to the best interests prong.
We first address respondent parents' arguments relating to the trial court's conclusion that grounds for termination existed under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1). Under this subsection, grounds for termination exist when “the court finds the juvenile to be ... a neglected juvenile within the meaning of G.S. 7B–101.” Id. As relevant to the present case, a juvenile is deemed to be neglected, pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–101(15) (2013), if the juvenile “does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's parent” or “lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare[.]”
The trial court made the following findings of fact relevant to its determination that grounds existed to terminate respondents' parental rights based on neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1):
56. The parents neglected the juveniles, the neglect continues to date, and there is a likelihood of the repetition of neglect if either juvenile was returned to either of the parents.
a. The conditions that led to removal of each of the juveniles constitute neglect of the juveniles by both parents.
b. The parents' neglect of the juveniles has been ongoing since removal and has continued between February 5, 2014 through the date this trial concluded, including the following:
(1) [Respondent parents] have cognitive and emotional deficits that adversely affect their ability to adequately and safely parent their children without twenty-four hour parenting supervision. Twenty-four hour parenting supervision is not a service provided in the State of North Carolina. There are no services which can remedy these conditions that have not already been made available to both parents.
(2) [Respondent mother] has mental health conditions, such as Schizoaffective Disorder, Depression with Psychosis, and Generalized Anxiety Disorder, that could be improved with psychotropic medication. However, [respondent mother] has refused to consistently comply with psychiatric services and recommended psychotropic medication.
(3) [Respondent father] did not take the initiative with his therapist, ... to work through his issues, participate in full disclosure with [his therapist], or take full advantage of the therapeutic opportunities to address the primary issues that led to removal.
(4) [Respondent mother] has continued to insist that she is not, and never has been, a victim of domestic violence, despite the ongoing domestic violence perpetrated against her by [respondent father] and despite the domestic violence education she received during the Crossroads program and from other service providers. Up through the date she testified on grounds during this trial, [respondent mother] has continued to engage in a repeating pattern of behavior that is typical for domestic violence victims in which she would seek assistance during or after a domestic violence incident with [respondent father], she would initially disclose the truth of what had occurred during the incident, she would subsequently retract her truthful statement and either assert that she was exaggerating or that she had not told the truth the first time, and thereafter she would minimize the incident of domestic violence. [Respondent mother] has engaged in this pattern, and continues to engage in this pattern, because she is a victim of domestic violence in her relationship with [respondent father], she loves [respondent father], she wants to protect [respondent father] from having to suffer the consequences of his actions, and she wants to continue in her romantic relationship with [respondent father] without interference from others.
(5) [Respondent father] has continued to perpetrate domestic violence against [respondent mother], including controlling [respondent mother's] activities and what she says to others, isolating [respondent mother] from others, and engaging in violent and aggressive behavior, such as threatening to break the windows in her apartment. Although [respondent father] has periodically made statements acknowledging that he has, in the past, engaged in conduct that falls within the category of domestic violence against [respondent mother], he inevitably resumes his pattern of minimizing his behavior, blaming others for his conduct, denying events that occurred, and attempting to hide his ongoing acts of domestic violence from others.
(6) [Respondent parents] have continually and intentionally been deceptive and dishonest with the Social Worker, the team, their respective service providers, and the Court as to important events that have occurred. Due to their failure to accurately and timely disclose critical information, [respondent parents] effectively prevented their respective service providers from being able to adequately and thoroughly assist them in remedying some of the conditions that led to removal, such as the domestic violence in their relationship.
(7) The relationship between [respondent parents] remains volatile and they are insistent upon continuing in their relationship with each other. Although [respondent parents] have not been prohibited from having a relationship with each other, they have both known from the outset of [Tanya's] removal that their continued relationship with each other was a barrier to reunification so long as the volatile interpersonal dynamics within their relationship continued. [Respondent parents] have consistently chosen to sustain their romantic relationship with each other over achieving reunification with their daughters. Although [respondent parents] have expressed that they want to reunify with their daughters, their actions clearly demonstrate that they are more committed to each other than they are to their children.
(8) [Respondent mother] is currently without stable, adequate, and appropriate housing, after once again having been evicted due to her ongoing relationship with [respondent father] and the domestic disturbances that are a product of their relationship. Although [respondent father] has maintained stable housing since March 2014, his housing is not appropriate for the juveniles. In addition, [respondent mother] is currently living with [respondent father].
(9) Since February 5, 2014, [respondent parents] demonstrated that they have the ability to learn from the domestic violence education they received given that each of them has been able to articulate what they learned. However, [respondent parents] failed to apply what they learned to their own lives and they failed to make the internal changes that are necessary to protect themselves and others around them from the effects of domestic violence.
c. There is a likelihood of the repetition of neglect by both parents as to both juveniles given that the parents' conditions have not significantly improved since the juveniles came into custody despite the substantial services that were made available to the parents during the last two years and nine months that the juvenile [Tanya] has been in foster care.
Respondent mother contends generally that these findings of fact were unsupported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Respondent mother also argues that another group of findings were based on inaccurate, incompetent, or hearsay evidence, but fails to make any specific argument to support this contention. Because respondent mother did not raise a hearsay objection at trial, she cannot raise that issue on appeal. See In re F.G.J., M.G.J., 200 N.C.App. 681, 693, 684 S.E.2d 745, 753–54 (2009) (holding that because “no objection on hearsay grounds was made by either parent at trial[,] ... any objection has been waived, and the testimony must be considered competent evidence”). In addition, respondent mother's conclusory challenges to findings of fact do not properly present the issue for review, as this Court explained in In re Appeal from Envtl. Mgmt. Comm'n, 80 N.C.App. 1, 18, 341 S.E.2d 588, 598 (1986):
Appellants instead take a broadened approach, arguing that all of the challenged findings are based on evidence which is either incompetent or so weak and speculative as to have no probative value.... [A]ppellants' general argument amounts to no more than a broadside request for this Court to wade through the voluminous record to determine whether any of the assignments of error has merit or whether any of the exceptions has a legal basis. This is ineffectual to present a question for our review.
We, therefore, limit our review to respondents' contentions that are properly supported by specific argument.
First, respondent parents both argue that the trial court erred by finding the ground of neglect because (1) neither Tanya nor Caitlyn was ever in respondents' care or under their supervision, and (2) the trial court failed to consider changes in circumstances. As this Court has explained:
In deciding whether a child is neglected for purposes of terminating parental rights, the dispositive question is the fitness of the parent to care for the child “at the time of the termination proceeding.” In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984) (emphasis omitted). “[A] prior adjudication of neglect may be admitted and considered by the trial court in ruling upon a later petition to terminate parental rights on the ground of neglect .” Id. at 713–14, 319 S.E.2d at 231. Termination may not, however, be based solely on past conditions that no longer exist. In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 248, 485 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1997). Nevertheless, when, as here, a child has not been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of time prior to the termination hearing, “requiring the petitioner in such circumstances to show that the child is currently neglected by the parent would make termination of parental rights impossible.” In re Shermer, 156 N.C.App. 281, 286, 576 S.E.2d 403, 407 (2003). In those circumstances, a trial court may find that grounds for termination exist upon a showing of a “history of neglect by the parent and the probability of a repetition of neglect.” Id.
In re L.O.K., J.K.W., T.L.W., & T.L.W., 174 N.C.App. 426, 435, 621 S.E.2d 236, 242 (2005).
Respondent parents contend that since there was no prior adjudication of neglect, the court improperly concluded that their parental rights could be terminated based on neglect. Respondent parents cite no authority requiring a prior adjudication of neglect as a prerequisite for termination of parental rights on that basis. Instead, as In re L.O.K. observed, a trial court can conclude that grounds for termination exist based on (1) a “history” of neglect, and (2) a probability of a repetition of that neglect. Id. The trial court's findings of fact, supported by competent evidence are sufficient to establish both a history of neglect and a probability of a repetition of that neglect.
Although respondent parents primarily focus on the trial court's findings of domestic violence, the trial court actually based its determination that the ground of neglect existed on multiple factors. The trial court first found that respondent parents both suffer from “cognitive and emotional deficits that adversely affect their ability to adequately and safely parent their children without twenty-four hour parenting supervision.” Further, the court found that “[t]here are no services which can remedy these conditions that have not already been made available to both parents.” These findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Respondent mother argues, however, that since this State does not offer 24–hour parenting supervision services, the trial court erred in relying upon the parents' need for those services. Respondent mother, however, mistakes the overall import of the court's finding. The court's finding is not based on the respondent parents' failure to participate in a program unavailable to them, but rather on the fact that neither respondent parent is capable of adequately parenting their children without 24–hour parenting supervision, and since no such service is available, this limitation on their ability to care for their children cannot currently be overcome. Moreover, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that respondent parents have not benefited from the programs that have been made available to them, further establishing the ground of neglect.
The trial court also found neglect due in part to respondent mother's “refus [al] to consistently comply with psychiatric services and recommended psychotropic medication[,]” which could improve her mental health conditions. A parent's lack of compliance with recommended mental health treatment can contribute to a conclusion of neglect. See In re E.T.S., 175 N.C.App. 32, 40, 623 S.E.2d 300, 304 (2005) (finding respondent's failure to follow through with mental health counseling supported conclusion of neglect).
The evidence amply supported the trial court's findings. The record indicates that the psychologist who performed the psychological examinations diagnosed respondent mother with mental retardation and concluded she would require “ongoing support to maintain some semblance of independent living”; she had a history of significant mental illness; she was never released from psychiatric care and treatment was ongoing; she lacked improvement from one-on-one parenting training; and she lacked progress in parenting skills, despite being provided with extensive services. Moreover, the record contains evidence that respondent mother chose to cease psychiatric treatment for a significant period of time and had just begun treatment again less than a month before trial. Respondent mother had not, therefore, demonstrated progress in addressing her mental health issues—one of the main conditions that led to the juveniles entering DHHS custody. In arguing that the trial court's findings were in error, respondent mother's reliance on different evidence and different inferences to be drawn from that evidence seeks to have us revisit the trial court's decisions regarding credibility and which evidence to give weight—decisions that rest solely with the trial court and that we may not reconsider on appeal.
With respect to respondent father, the trial court found that he did not take initiative with his therapist to work through his issues, failed to provide his therapist with full disclosure, and failed to take full advantage of the opportunities he was given to address the primary issues that led to the juveniles' removal. Again, the trial court's findings are fully supported by competent evidence. While respondent father was attending therapy as of the date of the TPR hearing, the court found, in a finding of fact not challenged on appeal, that respondent father was dishonest with his provider, Mr. Linder. Respondent father told Mr. Linder he was distancing himself from respondent mother, but then at trial testified that he and respondent mother were “in a relationship” and wanted to be together in the future. The record further indicates that even if respondent father had made some progress, he had not progressed in therapy to the point that he was released, nor had he completed his domestic violence classes. Accordingly, we find that respondent father has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in its findings regarding his mental health treatment.
The trial court also found neglect based on the ongoing domestic violence perpetrated against respondent mother by respondent father and respondent mother's continued insistence that “she is not, and never has been, a victim of domestic violence,” despite the domestic violence education she received. The court found that up through the date she testified during the second trial, respondent mother “continued to engage in a repeating pattern of behavior that is typical for domestic violence victims.” This behavior consisted of seeking help and initially disclosing truthfully what occurred during the incident, then later retracting her truthful statement and either claiming she was exaggerating or lying the first time, thereby minimizing the domestic violence incident.
In addition, the court found that respondent father had continued to perpetrate domestic violence against respondent mother, including controlling her activities and what she said to others, isolating her from others, and engaging in violent and aggressive behavior. Moreover, the court noted that respondent father, although he periodically made statements acknowledging his past conduct, “he inevitably resumes his pattern of minimizing his behavior, blaming others for his conduct, denying events that occurred, and attempting to hide his ongoing acts of domestic violence from others.”
In addition, the court, in finding of fact 56b(6), found that both parents “have continually and intentionally been deceptive and dishonest with the Social Worker, the team, their respective service providers, and the Court.” Respondent mother claims that was an inaccurate characterization of the social worker's testimony and argues that she and respondent father were less candid about their relationship because of the “immense pressure” from DHHS to end the relationship and the fear that their words would be twisted. But respondent mother cites no authority supporting her purported justification for lying to DHHS, and the court made numerous findings as to why her dishonesty hurt her, including the fact that it prevented her from getting treatment. Respondent mother lied about the domestic violence with respondent father, and the court found that as a result of that deception, respondents “failed to make the internal changes necessary to keep themselves and those around them safe from domestic violence.”
In further arguing that the domestic violence was not sufficient to warrant a finding of neglect, respondent parents focus solely on the time frame between the two TPR hearings. Yet, the trial court found a history of domestic violence. The court noted respondent father's prior convictions in 2010 for communicating threats and in 2012 for assault on a female. On 4 February 2013, respondent father threw a shoe at respondent mother and hit her in the face, and she had to receive medical treatment. In September 2013, respondent father had a verbal outburst while in Tanya and Caitlyn's presence and was verbally, mentally, and emotionally abusive towards respondent mother. On 18 November 2013, respondent father pinned respondent mother down and later tried to push her out the door of the residence. Respondent parents both tried to downplay the incident at the 12 December 2013 permanency planning review hearing. The trial court also noted multiple incidents of domestic disturbances in December 2013 and an incident in January 2014 between respondent parents. Finally, the court noted that, in general, respondent father was controlling, was emotionally and physically abusive towards respondent mother, and made derogatory comments to her on a regular basis.
Although respondent parents contend that the juveniles were never exposed to acts of domestic violence between the parents and were not harmed by such acts, this Court has recognized that domestic violence between parents creates an injurious environment for their children. See In re T.S., III & S.M., 178 N.C.App. 110, 113–14, 631 S.E.2d 19, 22–23 (2006) (finding domestic violence between mother and boyfriend including angry outburst in front of children constituted neglect). The trial court did not have to wait for actual harm to the children to occur, and it was reasonable for it to conclude that the children would be exposed to a substantial risk of harm-due to their exposure to domestic violence if returned to either respondent's care-and ultimately find that such risk of exposure constitutes neglect. Id.
The trial court further found that, as of the second TPR hearing, respondent parents were still denying that any domestic violence had occurred. Respondent parents do not address that denial on appeal. Rather, respondent parents ask us to find their testimony and evidence more credible than the evidence presented by DHHS. The trial court was, however, entitled to find, as it did, that the parents were not credible and to conclude that the version of events that the mother told the social worker was the truth. It was within the court's discretion to weigh the evidence, and based on credibility and other factors, determine what weight to give the differing testimony. See, e.g., Laughter v. Lambert, 11 N.C.App. 133, 136, 180 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1971) (finding that in bench trials, trial judges become both judge and juror and must consider and weigh all competent evidence).
Additionally, the trial court found as grounds for neglect that respondent mother was without stable, adequate, and appropriate housing at the time the court entered the second TPR order, and respondent father had no housing for his children at trial and never showed he could procure adequate housing without respondent mother's assistance. In support of this finding, the court found that respondent mother had a pattern of obtaining housing and then suddenly losing it, often because of the actions of respondent father. Moreover, respondent mother could not explain how she would budget her money for her children and did not even have proper budgeting skills to buy her own medicine at less than $2.00 per month. As for respondent father, the record indicates that during the times he stopped living in an apartment paid for by respondent mother's SSDI, he went back to renting the two-bedroom duplex he shares with a roommate.
We have found that the failure to provide such basic necessities as a stable living environment constitutes neglect. See, e.g., In re Adcock, 69 N.C.App. 222, 225, 316 S.E.2d 347, 349 (1984) (“[R]espondents' failure to provide a stable living environment ... [is] clearly evidence of neglect that cannot be ignored.”). The trial court could reasonably conclude, based on these findings, that respondent parents' housing was unstable and inadequate. Respondent mother asks us to ignore the appropriate standard of review and find her interpretation of the evidence more credible. This is not our role. Accordingly, we find the trial court's findings to be supported by the evidence.
Finally, the court found neglect because respondent parents demonstrated they have the ability to learn from the domestic violence education they received, yet both have “failed to apply what they learned to their own lives and they failed to make the internal changes that are necessary to protect themselves and others around them from the effects of domestic violence.” All of these findings, plus the ones not contested or adequately argued by respondent mother, clearly show that the trial court had a sufficient basis for concluding that respondent parents neglected Tanya and Caitlyn pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1).
Because we hold that the trial court properly found a sufficient basis for termination of respondent mother's parental rights under N .C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1), we need not address respondent mother's arguments as to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(3) and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(6). See In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C.App. 540, 546, 594 S.E.2d 89, 93–94 (2004) (“Having concluded that at least one ground for termination of parental rights existed, we need not address the additional ground ... found by the trial court.”). Similarly, because we find that the trial court also properly found a sufficient basis for termination of respondent father's parental rights under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1), we need not address his arguments as to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(3).
Conclusion
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusion that grounds existed under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–1111(a)(1) (neglect) to terminate both respondent parents' parental rights. Because respondent parents do not challenge the trial court's conclusion that termination of parental rights is in the children's best interests, we affirm the actions of the court below.
AFFIRMED.
Judges BRYANT and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).