MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

JAMES M. BENTIVEGNA, JUDGE.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves petitions to terminate the parental rights to Sydney J. and Loretta Y. On November 30, 2004, the Department of Children and Families (DCF or department) filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of the respective biological parents Taneka Y. (respondent mother) and John Doe (respondent father). The department alleges the following grounds for termination of the parental rights of the respondent mother: failure to rehabilitate and no ongoing parent-child relationship. The department alleges the following grounds for termination of the parental rights of the respondent father: abandonment and no ongoing parent-child relationship.

On December 12, 2004, the mother was served in-hand with the termination petitions. Counsel was appointed. A guardian ad item was appointed for the mother after the court found she was not competent. The mother also has a limited guardian appointed through the probate court. The father, John Doe, was served by publication on March 18, 2005. John Doe, father, was defaulted for failure to appear. On May 4, 2005, the court terminated the parental rights of John Doe father, on the ground of abandonment. On April 5, 2005, the parties agreed to proceed to trial without any further inquiry into the mother's competency. The mother's case was tried to the court on May 4, 2005. The petitioner called the following witnesses: Sharon Bryan (DCF worker) and Betsy Palmer-Ehrenfield (Kid Safe). The respondent mother and the attorney for the minor child did not call any witnesses. The respondent mother did not testify. Numerous exhibits were admitted into evidence including many by stipulation. The court took judicial notice of the prior proceedings and orders including the hearings held on November 19, 2004 and January 13, 2005.

ISSUES CT Page 9467-d

The court's function as the fact finder "is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 508 A.2d 769 (1936). The court may consider both direct and circumstantial evidence. In re Cheyenne A., 59 Conn.App 151, 158-59, 756 A.2d 303, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940, 761 A.2d 759 (2000); see also In re Juvenile Appeal (85-2), 3 Conn.App. 184, 193, 485 A.2d 1362 (1985). "The same evidence certainly can establish more than one ground for termination." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 16, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993). The standard of proof in neglect cases, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is "properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394, 440 A.2d 952 (1981); Practice Book § 32a-3. In a termination action, the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. Practice Book § 32a-3. "The burden of persuasion . . . in those cases requiring a showing of clear and convincing proof is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist." Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Assn., 170 Conn. 520, 537, 368 A.2d 125 (1976).

"It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony." In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). "It is the quintessential CT Page 9467-e function of the fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to believe or disbelieve any expert testimony. The trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of an expert offered by one party or the other." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 782, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). "Although expert testimony may be accorded great weight when it is offered, there is no requirement for expert testimony in termination of parental rights cases." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jeisean M., 270 Conn. 382, 400, 852 A.2d 643 (2004).

The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction of the matter, notice of the proceeding was provided, and no action is pending in any other court affecting the custody of the children. After due consideration the court finds in favor of the petitioner and hereby terminates the parental rights of the respondent mother.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The following facts and procedural history are proved by clear and convincing evidence.

Sydney J.

The child, Sydney J., was born on March 14, 2000. Sydney J.'s biological father is listed as John Doe. Ronnie S. and Anthony J. were names given by the mother as putative fathers, but they were ruled out as biological fathers through paternity testing. On February 6, 2003, Sydney J. was removed from the mother's care on a ninety-six hour hold and was placed in her current foster home. Sydney J. was removed due to the child being exposed to substance abuse, domestic violence and inappropriate caretakers. On February 10, 2003, the court granted an order of temporary custody for Sydney J., which was sustained on February 14, 2003. On June 10, 2003, the court found that the mother was not competent to stand trial, and it was unlikely that she would be restored to competency. Attorney Gore was appointed as guardian ad litem for the mother on August 28, 2003. On October 20, 2003, Sydney J. was adjudicated neglected (as alleged) and committed to the care and custody of DCF. On September 13, 2004, the court maintained the commitment.

On February 14, 2003 and October 20, 2003, the respondent mother was ordered to comply with specific steps including keep all appointments set by or with DCF, keep your own whereabouts known to DCF, participate in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals, submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, submit to random drug CT Page 9467-f testing, comply with recommended service providers, cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing, sign releases, secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income, no substance abuse, no involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system, comply with conditions of probation or parole, consistently and timely meet and address the child's needs, immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to ensure that the change does not compromise the health and safety of the child, and visit the child as often as DCF permits. On September 13, 2004, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that reunification efforts were no longer appropriate as to Sydney J.

Sydney J. is doing well in foster placement where she is placed with her sister, Loretta Y. She is currently in preschool fulltime. She has a nurturing relationship with her foster mother. She is reported to be meeting all of her developmental milestones. Her immunizations are up-to-date, and her pediatrician has reported no concerns.

Sydney J. had visits with her mother from the time she was removed until the present. During most of the visits, Sydney J. has demonstrated positive feelings toward her mother.

Loretta Y.

The child, Loretta Y., was born on November 26, 2003. Her biological father is listed as John Doe. The mother identified one putative father, Ronnie S., but he was ruled out through paternity testing. On December 1, 2003, after the mother tested positive for cocaine at Loretta Y.'s birth, Loretta Y. was removed on a ninety-six hour hold and placed in foster care by DCF. On December 5, 2003 the court granted an order of temporary custody for Loretta Y., which was sustained on December 12, 2003. In April 2004, she was moved to a legal risk foster home where she was placed with her sister, Sydney J. On September 13, 2004, Loretta Y. was adjudicated neglected (denied proper care and attention) and committed to the care and custody of DCF. On December 21, 2004, the child's commitment was maintained. On February 1, 2005, the court granted the petitioner's motion to cease visitation between Loretta Y. and the mother because of the child's adverse reactions to the visits and the mother's continued use of cocaine.

On December 5, 2003, and September 13, 2004, the respondent mother was ordered to comply with specific steps including keep ail appointment set by or with DCF, keep your own whereabouts known to DCF, participate in parenting, individual, and family counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals, accept and cooperate with in-home support CT Page 9467-g services referred by DCF, submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, submit to random drug testing, cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing, sign releases, secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income, no substance abuse, no involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system, immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to ensure that the change does not compromise the health and safety of the child, and visit the child as often as DCF permits.

Loretta Y. has adjusted well to her foster placement where she lives with her sister. Prior to being removed, she was exposed to trauma associated with domestic violence and exposed to cocaine in-utero. She is currently meeting all her developmental milestones, and there are no current medical concerns.

Since being removed, Loretta Y. had supervised visits with her mother along with Sydney J. Starting in late July 2004, Loretta Y. began to cry frequently during the visits and was difficult to console. As a result, the department filed a motion to cease visitation on October 14, 2004. After hearing evidence, the court suspended the mother's visits with Loretta Y. on December 21, 2004. The department's motion to cease visitation was later granted on February 1, 2005.

Taneka Y.

Taneka Y. was born on November 23, 1979. She was a special education student and failed to graduate from high school. She has no employment history. She is supported through government assistance: Section 8 for housing, SSI for learning disability, Social Security from her deceased father, and Food Stamps.

Taneka Y. has never been in the military. She does not have a criminal record, but she has a history of law enforcement intervention for domestic violence incidents between 2002 and 2004.

She began using alcohol approximately nine years ago and cocaine in 2000. She has continued to abuse both alcohol and cocaine on a regular basis, which was confirmed by numerous positive drug tests for cocaine. During her pregnancy with Loretta Y., she used both cocaine and alcohol and tested positive for cocaine use when she delivered Loretta Y. in 2003.

Taneka Y. has never been married. She has had two long-term relationships, one with Ronnie S. and the other with Anthony J. Although she has named these men as fathers to Loretta Y. and Sydney J., both men CT Page 9467-h were ruled out as biological fathers through paternity testing. Taneka Y. has not named any other putative fathers for the children. On August 8, 2003, Ronnie S. was arrested for Assault 3rd for a domestic violence incident in which he physically assaulted Taneka Y., while she was pregnant with Loretta Y. The incident occurred after he found her naked in bed, smoking crack, with another male companion. After Ronnie S. was released from prison in May 2004, Taneka Y. re-engaged in a relationship with him. On December 27, 2004, he was arrested again for a domestic violence incident involving Taneka Y. The mother has a history with the department dating back to November 2002. DCF first became involved with the family due to ongoing domestic violence between mother and her boyfriend, substance abuse, and mother leaving Sidney J. with inappropriate caretakers. On November 29, 2002, during a home visit, the mother was found to be under the influence while caring for Sydney J. On December 23, 2002, the mother tested positive for cocaine and was referred to intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment. She failed to follow through with the treatment and to submit to drug testing. On January 27, 2003, the mother admitted to the ADRC treatment program that she was using cocaine three to four times per week and drinking beer in the morning and at night. On April 22, 2003 her substance abuse counselor reported that the mother was not compliant with the HERS Program, Intensive Family Preservation, and ADRC.

The mother is cognitively limited and has a limited guardian to help her manage her life. On January 15, 2004, maternal aunt, Charlotte W. was appointed as her limited guardian. In her role as limited guardian, Charlotte W. is responsible for assisting Taneka Y. in the areas of housing, comprehending educational, vocational, or behavioral programs, releasing clinical records and photographs, and arranging routine elective emergency medical and dental care. In addition, Charlotte W. is responsible for decision-making regarding programs needed and policies and practices affecting Taneka Y.'s well-being within the authority granted by the probate court. Charlotte W. is currently in charge of Taneka Y.'s finances and provides supervision of Taneka Y. in the community as well as making sure that she attends her appointments with service providers and visits with her children. Since the department became involved with the family, the mother has demonstrated a limited awareness of the issues that are currently impacting her life and her relationship with the children.

Her housing situation remains tenuous due to failing to pay utility bills and allowing inappropriate males to occupy her residence. Mother has allowed males who were not on her lease to move into her apartment even though her Section 8 housing requires that she be the sole occupant of her residence. Her utility bills have gone unpaid. At some point, CT Page 9467-i Charlotte W. instructed the mother to stay at the mother's maternal grandmother's apartment.

The court will provide additional facts, as needed, that are found by clear and convincing evidence.

ADJUDICATION Termination of Parental Rights

The court must now consider whether the petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence, that the parental rights of the respondent should be terminated. "In order to terminate a parent's parental rights under § 17a-112, the petitioner is required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1); (2) termination is in the best interest of the child; General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(2); and (3) there exists any one of the seven grounds for termination delineated in § 17a-112(j)(3)." In re Samantha C., supra, 268 Conn. 628.

Reunification

The first issue the court must address is whether DCF met its burden concerning reunification. The court must determine if "the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding is not required if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to subsection (b) of section 17a-110 or section 17a-111b that such efforts are not appropriate." General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(1). In accordance with § 17a-112(j)(1), "the department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ebony H., 68 Conn.App. 342, 348, 759 A.2d 1158 (2002).

"The standard for reviewing reasonable efforts has been well established by the Appellate Court. `Turning to the statutory scheme encompassing the termination of the parental rights of a child committed to the department, [§ 17a-112] imposes on the department the duty, inter alia, to make reasonable efforts to reunite the child or children with the parents. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be CT Page 9467-j adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.' . . . In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361, 776 A.2d 487 (2001)." In re Samantha C., supra, 268 Conn. 632. "[R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 349. The department has "a continuing duty to make reasonable efforts." In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 644, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934, 815 A.2d 136 (2003). But "[t]he department is required only to make `reasonable efforts.' It is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999). In addition, "making no efforts to reunify a parent and his or her child may be reasonable in certain circumstances . . ." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645.

"Reunification efforts generally consist of visitation and, where appropriate, other rehabilitative services such as evaluations, testing, counseling, therapy, education, medical care, parenting classes and housing assistance." In re Destiny Q., Superior Court, Child Protection Session at Middletown (November 19, 2001, Levin, J.). In evaluating the department's reunification efforts, the court may consider whether the department engaged the respondent, apprised him or her of the steps that had to be taken to achieve rehabilitation, and gave the respondent feedback on his or her progress in reaching that goal. In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645. The court may take into consideration whether the department met "its burden of making reasonable efforts to achieve reunification by engaging the respondent and making available services aimed at instilling in him [or her] healthy parental skills." Id., 647. The court may also assess whether "steps taken by the respondent presented the department with a window of opportunity during which reasonable efforts at reunification should have been made." Id., 644. The court may find that the efforts were reasonable even though the department made mistakes. In re Charles A., 55 Conn.App. 293, 297-98, 738 A.2d 222 (1999) ("The court is aware that [the department] has made mistakes in this case in failing to treat [the respondent] as a victim of domestic violence . . . These mistakes, however, do not defeat the proposition that reasonable efforts at reunification were made. In the first instance, counseling services were provided. Other, in home services were offered, but refused.") (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

In finding that DCF made reasonable efforts, the courts have given CT Page 9467-k careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case. See, e.g., In re Destiny D., 86 Conn.App. 77, 83-84, 859 A.2d 793, cert. denied, 272 Conn. 911, 863 A.2d 702 (2004) (department provided regular visitation, rehabilitative services, counseling and therapy for children, respondent's performance in rehabilitative programs was disappointing, including erratic attendance, resistance to treatment recommendations, and positive drug tests; respondent also refused to sign releases for a period of time, so department unable to make additional referrals); In re Jonathan C., 86 Conn.App. 169, 180, 860 A.2d 305 (2004) (department provided numerous referrals for services, facilitated visitation, and provided therapy for both respondent and children); In re Sheila J., 52 Conn.App. 470, 479, 771 A.2d 244 (2001) (department offered respondent services over several years, including substance abuse evaluation and treatment, parenting skills classes, domestic violence counseling, a family reunification program, a psychological evaluation, and visitation; but she failed to avail herself of or participate meaningfully in those services by failing to attend many visits, and denying the fact that she needed to participate in counseling); In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 362-63, 776 A.2d 487 (2001) (respondents participated in services but continually relapsed and resumed abusing substances and alcohol, so department declined to pursue goal of reunification after children were removed; "[t]he dissolution of this family resulted from the respondents' cycle of alcohol and substance abuse and not from the failure of the department to provide services and assistance."); and In re Ebony H., supra, 68 Conn.App. 350 (respondent's inability to overcome drug addiction and failure to comply with services "thwarted the department's efforts to reunify her and the child").

In the alternative, the court may also determine that the respondent was either unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. As previously noted, "[t]he department is required only to make `reasonable efforts' . . . [i]t is axiomatic that the law does not require a useless and futile act." In re Antony B., supra, 54 Conn.App. 476. Accordingly, the court may find by clear and convincing evidence that "the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with the children [, and] [t]he respondent's subsequent failure to take advantage of those efforts establish her [or his] inability or unwillingness to benefit from those reasonable efforts." In re Alexander T., 81 Conn.App. 668, 676, 841 A.2d 274, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 924, 848 A.2d 472 (2004).

In finding that a respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department's reunification efforts, the courts have given careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case. In re Jonathan C., supra, 86 Conn.App. 178 ("[t]hroughout the duration of the department's involvement with the family, the respondent demonstrated a CT Page 9467-l lack of cooperation and progress, and revealed an apathetic attitude toward the repeated and extensive reunification efforts that were made.") In making this determination, the court may consider whether "the respondent's positive step in participating in a treatment program demonstrated a degree of rehabilitation in itself." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645 (trial court reversed because department did not make reasonable efforts when it decided not to engage in further efforts based on its prior experiences with respondent, although respondent took steps and was in a position to benefit from services; respondent had successfully completed long-term inpatient substance abuse treatment and counseling for anger management and depression, and had attended regularly scheduled supervised visitation; there was no evidence of relapse in those areas). In addition, the court may consider whether the respondent "was unwilling or unable to formulate an appropriate plan for [child] . . ." Id. 647. "Expert testimony is not required to examine the respondent's history with the department and the trouble she has experienced in achieving rehabilitation to determine that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from the efforts of the department." In re Alexander T., supra, 81 Conn.App. 676.

The department's ability to provide services and visitation is limited when a respondent is incarcerated. "Because the respondent has at all times been in prison and in the custody of the commissioner of corrections, DCF was excused from providing her with reunification services other than visitation." In re Destiny Q., supra, Superior Court, Child Protection Session at Middletown; see also In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 57, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998) (together with other factors, the respondent's "frequent periods of incarceration prevented the petitioner from offering him services.") A respondent's imprisonment, however, does not, in and of itself, excuse DCF from providing her with visitation with her child. In re Hector L., 53 Conn.App, 359, 372, 730 A.2d 106 (1999); see also In re Roshawn R., supra, 51 Conn.App. 58-59. However, the department is unable to provide visitation if there is an outstanding protective order.

Finally, the department may meet its burden concerning reunification by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate. "Because this finding was made, the petitioner was not required to continue reunification efforts." In re Terrance C., 58 Conn.App. 389, 396, 755 A.2d 232 (2000). The court is not required to make a further reunification finding as to the respondent in the termination proceeding. In re Gary B., 66 Conn.App. 286, 290-91, 784 A.2d 412 (2001).

Reunification Efforts — Mother CT Page 9467-m

As to Loretta Y., the petitioner alleges that the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the mother, and the mother is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

The court must determine whether the department met its reunification burden as to the mother. The department has been involved with the mother since 2002. Over the last few years, DCF offered numerous services to the mother including substance abuse treatment, domestic violence counseling, visitation assistance, parent aide services, parenting classes, and case management. DCF referred the mother to a number of different service providers including St. Agnes Home Maternal Outreach Program, Project Empowerment, ADRC, HERS and Family Nurturing Program, DMR, Catholic Family Services, and Interval House.

The department's efforts were thwarted by the mother's continued substance abuse, cognitive limitations, domestic violence history and inadequate parenting skills. The mother refused to cooperate with many services and failed to benefit from the services she did participate in. She has demonstrated a limited understanding of the issues that are currently impacting her life and the life of her children. Substance abuse treatment has proved to be ineffective as she has continued to abuse cocaine and alcohol. She has continued her involvement with men who have criminal records, substance abuse histories and domestic violence issues. Under these circumstances, the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with the child, but the mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.

As to both children, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with the children, and the mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts. Therefore, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Department has met its burden as to reunification efforts. CT Page 9467-n

Statutory Ground

Each statutory basis set out in General Statutes § 17a-112(j) is "an independent ground for termination." In re Baby Girl B., 224 Conn. 263, 293, 618 A.2d 1 (1992). The petitioner is required "to prove by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the specific statutory bases for termination has been established." In re Baby Girl B., supra, 224 Conn. 293. In the present case, the termination petition as to the mother alleges abandonment, parental failure to rehabilitate, and no ongoing parent-child relationship. § 17a-112(j)(3).

Failure to Rehabilitate — Mother

DCF alleges that the respondent mother has failed to rehabilitate herself after the children were adjudicated as neglected in a prior proceeding. Under this statute, the court may grant the petition if it finds by clear and convincing evidence [ inter alia] that "child has been found by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b-129 and has failed to achieve such degree or personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i). On July 19, 2004, the child was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of DCF.

The personal rehabilitation element of the statute must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(E). Personal rehabilitation, as used in the statute, refers to the restoration of a respondent to a constructive and useful role as a parent. In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 203, 504 A.2d 533 (1986). The parent's compliance with the court-ordered expectations entered at the time of the neglect adjudication is relevant but not dispositive to the rehabilitation finding. In re Luis C., 210 Conn. 157, 168-9, 554 A.2d 722 (1989). "The court, in proceedings to terminate parental rights . . . considers the specific steps issued in the order as a measure of the degree of `personal rehabilitation' . . . The specific steps are also considered `fair warning' of the potential termination of parental rights in subsequent proceedings pursuant to § 17a-112." In re Jeffrey C., 64 Conn.App. 55, 61-62, 779 A.2d 765 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Conn. 189, 802 A.2d 772 (2002). "Indeed, the failure to comply with specific steps ordered by the court typically weighs heavily in a termination proceeding." In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572, 584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003). "The failure to articulate expectations or to convey them to the respondent, CT Page 9467-o however, does not in and of itself preclude a finding of failure to rehabilitate . . . [the statute] does not provide that in order to achieve personal rehabilitation a parent must meet the expectations of a court as ordered pursuant to a commitment hearing . . . [N]or have our courts required an articulation of expectations or strict compliance thereto as a condition precedent to a finding of failure to rehabilitate." (Citations omitted.) In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 125, 614 A.2d 832 (1992).

"[T]he statute requires the trial court to analyze the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable `within a reasonable time.' There may be instances in which the evidence does not establish that parental rights should be terminated under this section, despite the fact that continuing support programs for the parent may be suitable or even necessary." In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. 167. The statute "requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation she has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her child's life." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999). "Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than `any' rehabilitation . . . Successful completion of the petitioner's expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the petitioner's claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation . . . [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue . . . Thus, even if a parent has made successful strides in her ability to manage her life and may have achieved a level of stability within her limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within a reasonable period of time, she could assume a responsible position in the life of her child." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 254-55, 829 A.2d 855 (2003). "Thus, the trial court's inquiry requires the determination of both the present and past status of the child, and obtaining a historical perspective of the respondent's child caring and parenting." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Galen F., 54 Conn.App. 590, 594, 737 A.2d 499 (1999).

Based on the evidence introduced at trial, it is clear that Taneka Y. has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would put her in a position to resume the role of an effective parent of the CT Page 9467-p children.

Throughout the department's involvement, the mother was given fair warning as to what conduct was required, or must have been avoided, in order to prevent termination of her parental rights. See In re Samantha C., supra, 268 Conn. 631. On numerous occasions, the mother was advised by the court and the department that she needed to address her issues relating to substance abuse, parenting skills, domestic violence, and housing.

On February 14, 2003, October 20, 2003, December 5, 2003, September 13, 2004, the respondent mother was ordered to comply with specific steps including keep all appointment set by or with DCF, keep your own whereabouts known to DCF, participate in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals, submit to substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations regarding treatment, submit to random drug testing, comply with recommended service providers, cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing, sign releases, secure and/or maintain adequate housing and legal income, no substance abuse, no involvement/further involvement with the criminal justice system, comply with conditions of probation or parole, immediately advise DCF of any changes in the composition of the household to ensure that the change does not compromise the health and safety of the child, and visit the child as often as DCF permits.

To assist the mother in addressing her issues, DCF offered numerous services to the mother including substance abuse treatment, domestic violence counseling, visitation assistance, parent aide services, parenting classes, psycho-educational groups, and case management. DCF referred the mother to a number of different service providers including St. Agnes Home Maternal Outreach Program, Project Empowerment, ADRC, HERS and Family Nurturing Program, DMR, Kid Safe, Catholic Family Services, and Interval House.

Due to the mother's cognitive limitations, which were aggravated by her substance abuse, she had problems understanding what was required for her to assume a responsible position in the life of the children. She was unable to formulate a plan for herself and the children. The department tried working with the limited guardian to address the mother's cognitive limitations without much success. The department made a referral to DMR, but the mother failed to follow through with the referral and did not sign the necessary releases so that DMR could access her records. Overall, the mother was not motivated to comply with the services necessary to reunify with the children. CT Page 9467-q

Her serious drug addiction detracted from her ability to make good decisions and to act in an appropriate and responsible way that would allow her to be a safe and productive parent for her children. The mother failed to comply with and benefit from the recommended substance abuse treatment. On April 2, 2003, December 30, 2003, June 28, 2004, November 17, 2004, and January 6, 2005, Taneka Y. signed or received treatment plans that provided that she would attend services designed to address her substance abuse problem. She failed to comply with the treatment plans. She failed to keep numerous scheduled appointments and the programs were not able to contact her to reschedule her appointments. Between 2003 and 2004, Taneka Y. had the opportunity to participate in the HERS Program which provided individual, parenting, anger management and other psycho-educational groups for women at risk for substance abuse. She did not benefit from their programming due to sporadic attendance. Although other referrals were made for substance abuse treatment between 2003 and 2005, including ADRC and the Family Nurturing Program, she failed to comply with the treatment recommended and did not make any progress in addressing her issues. Since the commitment of her first child, Sydney J., in October 2003, the mother has not been able to remain sober for an extended period of time and has relapsed repeatedly. She has tested positive for cocaine use numerous times between February 2003 and April 2005.

She has demonstrated limited parenting skills during visits with her children. During many of the visits, the mother would appear uninterested in interacting with the children and would need to be encouraged to engage the children. Her visits with Sydney J. began soon after the child's removal and continued until the present. During the visits, Sydney J. has demonstrated warm feelings towards her mother and has interacted positively with her mother. However, on several occasions, the mother has required redirection around appropriate parent-child interaction especially in conversations with Sydney J. Her visits with Loretta Y. began soon after the child was removed and continued until December 2004. Starting in late July 2004, Loretta cried repeatedly during the visits, and the mother was not able to console the child. On at least one visit, on July 27, 2004, the visit was ended early because the child's crying was so bad. Although the mother was referred to a number of programs for parenting education/counseling including Kid Safe, HERS Program, and the Family Nurturing Program, the mother failed to make progress toward the identified treatment goals. During the time Bryan supervised the case, the worker did not see any improvement in the mother's parenting skills. Overall, the mother failed to demonstrate sufficient progress toward improving her parenting skills.

The mother failed to keep her whereabouts known to the department. On CT Page 9467-r many occasions from April 2004 through April 2005, Bryan had difficulty contacting the mother either at her apartment or by phone.

During the department's involvement, the mother has continued to be involved with males with criminal records, substance abuse issues, and domestic violence histories. These relationships have put the mother at risk for domestic violence. To address these concerns, on November 18, 2003, a referral was made for her to attend Hartford Interval House; but she failed to follow through with the services. Her failure to address her domestic violence issues has also jeopardized her Section 8 eligibility.

The Court can also consider rehabilitative efforts subsequent to the filing of a petition (11/30/04) in determining whether the parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child within a foreseeable period of time. Practice Book § 35a-7; In re Amber B., 56 Conn.App. 776, 785, 746 A.2d 222 (2000).

From December 2004 to February 2005, Taneka Y. submitted to drug screens at the ADRC. She tested positive for cocaine on December 13, 2004 and February 24, 2005. One drug screen, on January 20, 2005, tested as diluted. She missed other drug screens. During this period, she was abusing substances even though she was participating in the ADRC Program, the Family Nurturing Program, and the HERS Program. On December 15, 2004, the mother was referred to ADRC for a substance abuse evaluation. When she was evaluated on December 20, 2004, intensive outpatient treatment was recommended. A referral was made to the Family Nurturing Program, but the mother and the guardian failed to contact the Family Nurturing Program. On April 4, 2005, Taneka Y. was discharged from the ADRC Outpatient Counseling Center because of multiple no shows for random urine screens. On April 7, 2005, a meeting was held at DCF with service providers to reassess the mother's needs because she was still abusing substances and was not benefiting from treatment. A recommendation was made for inpatient treatment at the Salvation Army. On April 14, 2005, the mother was admitted into The Salvation Army long-term treatment program. When she was admitted into the program, she tested positive for cocaine. She is expected to remain in the program for a minimum of six months to a year.

After the petition was filed, the mother had visits with the children at Kid Safe. During a visit on December 8, 2004, both children cried when the mother tried to interact with them. Visits with Loretta Y. were suspended by the court on December 21, 2004, due to Taneka Y.'s positive cocaine screens and Loretta Y.'s adverse reaction towards the mother during the visits. Visits with Sydney J. continued at Kid Safe, but the CT Page 9467-s mother often had problems interacting with the child and engaging the child in inappropriate conversation.

Even if it could be argued that the mother has made some progress toward rehabilitation, considering the age and needs of the children, it is not of such a degree that would allow this court to find that she could be a responsible parent within a foreseeable period of time. She has not made sufficient progress addressing her substance abuse, poor parenting skills, and domestic violence concerns. The mother has not gained the ability necessary to care for the particular needs of the children. She would need a substantial period of time addressing her issues before she could assume the role of a responsible parent. In re Sheila J., supra. 62 Conn.App. 481.

The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the children, the mother could assume a responsible position in the lives of the children. As to Sydney J. and Loretta Y., the court finds that the petitioner has proved the ground of failure to rehabilitate. C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(i).

No Ongoing Parent Child Relationship — Mother

In addition, the department alleges the additional ground of no ongoing parent-child relationship. The petitioner must prove that "there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child, and to allow further time for the establishment or re-establishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child." C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).

In the adjudicatory phase, the petitioner must establish (1) that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists; and (2) the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop. In re Jonathon G., 63 Conn.App. 516, 525, 777 A.2d 695 (2001). No ongoing parent-child relationship "contemplate[s] a situation in which, regardless of fault, a child either has never known his or her parents, so that no relationship has ever developed between them, or has definitively lost that relationship, so that despite its former existence it has now been completely displaced." In re Juvenile Appeal, (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 646 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979). "In either case, the ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or CT Page 9467-t feelings for the natural parent." In re Juvenile Appeal, (Anonymous), supra, 177 Conn. 670. "[T]he phrase `feelings for the natural parent' refers to feelings of a positive nature." In re Juvenile Appeal (84-6), 2 Conn.App. 705, 709, 483 A.2d 1101 (1984), cent. denied, 195 Conn. 801 (1985). "The feelings of the child are most important in determining whether a parent-child relationship exists." In re Jonathon G., supra, 63 Conn.App. 526.

Based on the evidence introduced at trial, it is clear that Loretta Y. has no ongoing parent-child relationship with her mother. The mother's visits with Loretta Y. were not productive towards establishing a positive, parent-child relationship. The child's adverse reactions to the visits demonstrated a lack of a positive connection or bond with the mother. The child does not recognize the mother as her parent in that she would not seek comfort from or go to the mother to have her needs met. The child does not have positive feelings for the mother. Under the circumstances, the mother is unable to develop a positive relationship with the child in the foreseeable future, It would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop.

As to Loretta Y., the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists, and the allowance of further time for the establishment of such a relationship with the mother would harm the interests of the child. Therefore, the court finds that the petitioner has proved this ground for termination as to Loretta Y. under C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).

As to Sydney J., it is clear that the child has an ongoing parent-child relationship with her mother. The mother's visits with the child were productive towards establishing a somewhat positive, parent-child relationship. Sydney J. has warm feelings towards her mother and interacts positively with her mother during visits. Therefore, the court finds that the petitioner has failed to prove this ground for termination as to Sydney J. under C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D).

DISPOSITION

"In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the respondent's parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112(k)]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Vanna A., 83 Conn.App. 17, 26, 847 A.2d 1073 (2004). "The factors, however, serve simply as guidelines CT Page 9467-u to assist the court in its determination of the child's best interest, and each factor need not be proven by clear and convincing evidence." In re Victoria B., supra, 79 Conn.App. 258-59. "The judicial authority may admit into evidence any testimony relevant and material to the issue of the disposition, including events occurring through the close of the evidentiary hearing, but no disposition may be made by the judicial authority until any mandated social study has been submitted to the judicial authority. Said study shall be marked as an exhibit subject to the right of any party to require that the author, if available, appear for cross-examination." Practice Book § 35a-9.

These criteria and this court's findings are as follows.

(1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.

The mother has been provided with ample services to facilitate the return of the children. The services were appropriate and were offered on a timely basis and were made available to the respondent. The mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from services.

(2) Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

The department has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family.

(3) The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which the parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.

The terms of the court orders addressed to the mother are described above. The department has fulfilled its obligations to the mother. The mother has failed to fulfill her obligations under the court orders.

(4) The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.

CT Page 9467-v

Loretta Y. has little, if any, positive feelings toward the mother, but she appears to be bonded with and has significant emotional ties with the current foster mother, with whom she has lived since April 1, 2004.

Sydney J. has positive feelings towards her mother and interacts with her mother during her visits. She also has positive feelings and appears bonded with her foster mother, with whom she has lived with since February 10, 2003. She refers to her biological mother as "Taneka" and her foster mother as "mommy."

(5) The age of the child.

Sydney J. is 5 years old. Loretta Y. is 1 1/2 years old.

(6) The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to: (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.

The mother has made little effort to adjust her circumstances to permit the children to safely return to her care.

(7) The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

The mother has not been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, the unreasonable act of any other person, or by the economic circumstances of the parent.

BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD

The court must now address the issue of whether termination of the CT Page 9467-w respondent mother's parental rights is in the best interest of the children. This is part of the dispositional phase of a termination proceeding. In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 511, 613 A.2d 748 (1992) ("the determination of the child's best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights have been established by clear and convincing evidence"). The court can consider all events occurring through the close of the dispositional hearing. Practice Book § 35a-9. The Appellate Court has "consistently held that to allow a child to languish in foster care is not in the child's best interest." In re Drew R., 47 Conn.App. 124, 131, 702 A.2d 647 (1997).

Sydney J. was removed from the mother's care on February 6, 2003, while Loretta Y. was removed on December 1, 2003. The children have specialized needs that require continued attention. Given their ages and needs, the children require a caretaker that will be consistently available to meet their emotional, physical, and medical needs. A sense of stability and safety is required for the proper care and guidance of the children. The children deserve a chance for a safe, stable upbringing. The children are doing well in the foster home where they have been placed together since April 2, 2004. The children recognize the foster family as their family, and they have a nurturing relationship with the foster mother. The foster mother is stable and permanency is paramount to the children's development. The foster mother has expressed a willingness to adopt the children. Removal of the children from the foster home would cause harm to the children's well-being.

The respondent mother has significant issues that impact on her ability to be a good parent. She has failed to make sufficient progress in addressing her issues relating to substance abuse, domestic violence, parenting skills, and safe housing. Her cognitive limitations are aggravated by her continued substance abuse. The mother's lack of commitment towards being reunified with her children is evidenced by her failure to fully comply with recommended services over the years. She has failed to fulfill her parental responsibilities to the children and is unable to provide the children with a sense of stability and safety. The respondent is not in a position to meet the needs of the children in the foreseeable future. To delay or disrupt a permanent placement for the children while the mother continues to work on resolving her issues, with no clear end in sight, is not in the best interest of the children.

Based upon the foregoing findings, and having considered all the evidence and the statutory considerations, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the children's best interest to terminate the parental rights of the respondent mother. CT Page 9467-x

JUDGMENT

The petition is granted and judgment may enter terminating the parental rights of Taneka Y. (respondent mother). Previously, on May 4, 2005, the court terminated the parental rights of the father, John Doe, on the ground of abandonment.

It is further ordered that Commissioner of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent for Sydney J. and Loretta Y. The Commissioner is to file with the court no later than thirty days following the date of judgment, a written report toward a permanent plan for the children. The department is ordered to file additional reports as required pursuant to C.G.S. § 17a-112(o).

The court further finds that the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plan of termination and adoption.

As to Attorney Saegaert's request to withdraw, she must comply with Practice Book Section 35a-21 before she may withdraw from the case.

BY THE COURT:

Bentivegna, J.