Opinion
No. 337038
09-14-2017
In re L. STEMPIN, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Ottawa Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 14-077521-NA Before: TALBOT, C.J., and O'CONNELL and CAMERON, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent mother appeals as of right the trial court order terminating her parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist) and (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case began after respondent left the minor child without care or supervision on three occasions for extended periods of time. On the first occasion, the minor child and his half-brother were found alone in a hotel room. On the second and third occasions, respondent left the two children at the Holland Rescue Mission without supervision. After these incidents, the minor child was placed with his paternal grandparents. On July 18, 2014, respondent was adjudicated after she pleaded to the allegations in the petition. Respondent's case progressed slowly thereafter. During some reporting periods, respondent missed parenting visits due to lack of transportation. Respondent also tested positive for marijuana on numerous occasions. Eventually, it appeared that respondent was improving, and on April 1, 2016, the trial court returned the minor child to respondent's care, though it retained jurisdiction. The trial court ordered respondent to continue with her service plan and not allow her suspected boyfriend, Otto Berens, to have contact with the minor child. Berens had a criminal history and was on the Central Registry.
The half-brother was placed with his father, and respondent's parental rights as to that child are not at issue. --------
While the minor child was in respondent's care, the caseworker requested daycare information to ensure that the minor child had care while respondent was at work. Respondent provided a list of daycares, but the caseworker discovered that the minor child was not enrolled at any of the listed daycares. In less than a month, the minor child was re-removed after the trial court concluded that Berens had been caring for the minor child while respondent was at work in violation of the trial court's order. When the caseworker attempted well-child visits, no one would answer the door, though the television was on, the lights turned on and off, and there was noise inside the house. When the caseworker did visit the home, the minor child's half-brother informed the caseworker that Berens was there. Following the second removal, the trial court allowed respondent's visits to be unsupervised, but it required respondent to provide her caseworker a visitation plan for her visits with the minor child. However, respondent failed to follow the plans that she gave to the caseworker, and her visits were eventually ordered to be supervised. For the remainder of the case, respondent failed to participate in drug tests and failed to appropriately parent the minor child during supervised visits. On February 7, 2017, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g).
On appeal, respondent does not contest that the trial court properly terminated her parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g). Rather, respondent argues that termination was not in the minor child's best interests. We disagree.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews for clear error a trial court's decision regarding whether termination is in the child's best interests. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209; 661 NW2d 216 (2003) (citation omitted). "A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re LaFrance, 306 Mich App 713, 723; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). "[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). "Appellate courts are obliged to defer to a trial court's factual findings at termination proceedings if those findings do not constitute clear error." In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 90; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). Deference should be given to the "trial court's special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses." In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009).
III. ANALYSIS
"[T]he focus at the best-interest stage" is on the child, not the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to it to determine a child's best interests. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). In doing so, it may consider such factors as
the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home. [In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations omitted).]Other considerations include "the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich App at 714. The trial court may also consider the length of time the child was in foster care or placed with relatives, and the likelihood that "the child could be returned to her parent's home within the foreseeable future, if at all." In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).
Here, respondent's bond with the minor child was not strong, in large part because he spent the majority of his life outside of respondent's care. In 3½ years since the minor child's birth, respondent only provided 8 months of care. This lack of a bond supports a finding that termination was in the minor child's best interests. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42.
Likewise, respondent's lack of parenting ability supports that termination was in the minor child's best interests. Although not many details are provided in the lower court record, the caseworker testified at the termination hearing that respondent failed a parenting class. Further, during respondent's supervised parenting time, after the minor child was removed a second time, respondent was unable to properly parent the minor child. Rather than deciding when the minor child would eat or use the restroom, respondent let the young child make those decisions, which led to the minor child being hungry and wetting his diaper after their visits.
Moreover, respondent continually failed to provide proper care for the minor child. Respondent lied to her caseworker that the minor child was in daycare, and she even provided the caseworker with contact information for daycares that had never seen the minor child. Respondent also allowed inappropriate individuals around the minor child, namely Berens, even allowing him to care for the minor child on at least one occasion. Although respondent denied that Berens cared for the minor child, the trial court determined that respondent was not a credible witness and that Berens was caring for the minor child on the night of the well-child check in April 2016. Respondent has not presented any argument as to why we should not defer to the trial court's determination regarding her credibility, In re HRC, 286 Mich App at 459, nor why the trial court's finding was clearly erroneous, In re Rood, 483 Mich at 90. Also, respondent was unable to follow the visitation plans that she gave to the caseworker during her unscheduled visits, which led the trial court to change her visits to supervised. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by concluding that respondent had a lack of parenting ability, which supports its conclusion that termination was in the minor child's best interests. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42.
Respondent was also not in compliance with her case service plan. Besides allowing Berens around the minor child, respondent did not comply with multiple drug screens throughout the case. Although respondent obtained a medical marijuana card after the case commenced, she was still required to participate in drug screens to ensure that she was not using other illicit substances. Respondent consistently failed to participate in drug screens, and, at times, she even actively avoided the screener that came to her home. Moreover, respondent did not follow her unsupervised visitation plans, and on multiple occasions, the case worker was unable to locate respondent during scheduled parenting visits. Respondent's failure to comply with her case service plan supports that termination was in the minor child's best interests. In re White, 303 Mich App at 714.
Additionally, the minor child's current placement was better suited to provide the child with permanence, stability, and finality. See In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42. The child had been in the care of his paternal grandparents for nearly three years at the time of termination. This long stay supports the finding that termination was in the minor child's best interests. See In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-249. During the course of those three years, respondent continually struggled to follow her case service plan and provide the minor child with the care that a young child needs. In contrast, there were no reported problems while the minor child was in his grandparents' care, which supports the fact that they are better suited to provide him with the stability he needs. See In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42. This case lasted for nearly three years, and at no point during those three years was respondent able to show that she was capable of providing a suitable home for the minor child by complying with her case service plan. This makes it unlikely that she would be able to do so in the foreseeable future. See In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 248-249. In contrast, the minor child's grandparents were able to provide him with a suitable home for all of that time. The minor child's grandparents also indicated that they were willing to adopt the minor child if respondent's rights were terminated. Both the possibility of adoption, see In re White, 303 Mich App at 714, and the grandparent's ability to provide permanency and finality, see In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42, support that termination was in the minor child's best interests.
Lastly, although the minor child was in a relative placement, which would tend to weigh against termination, the trial court addressed the placement and concluded that whatever time was reasonable to allow respondent to work towards reunification had since passed, and that the only way to ensure permanence for the minor child was through termination. Accordingly, we are not firmly and definitely convinced that the trial court erred by concluding that termination was in the minor child's best interests even though he was in a relative placement.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron