Opinion
J-S63016-15 No. 1928 EDA 2015 No. 1933 EDA 2015 No. 1934 EDA 2015 No. 1935 EDA 2015
11-23-2015
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.S., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.J., MOTHER IN THE INTEREST OF: M.S., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.J., MOTHER IN THE INTEREST OF: C.S., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.J., MOTHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered May 12, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 18 OCA 2015 Appeal from the Order Entered May 12, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 19 OCA 2015 Appeal from the Order Entered May 12, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 20 OCA 2015 Appeal from the Order Entered May 12, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 21 OCA 2015 BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., MUNDY, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:
Appellant, A.J. (Mother), appeals from the May 12, 2015 orders involuntarily terminating her parental rights to four children, C.S., M.S., S.S.1, and S.S.2 (collectively, the Children). After careful review, we affirm.
C.S., a female, was born in January 2006, M.S., a male, was born in November 2007, S.S.1, a female, was born in February 2009, and S.S.2, a female, was born in September 2013. As two of the children have the initials S.S., we have elected to refer to the older daughter as S.S.1, and the younger daughter as S.S.2. Mother's rights to five other biological children have also been terminated; however, those children are not the subjects of this appeal.
In its opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), the orphans' court fully and correctly set forth the factual and procedural history of this case, which we adopt herein. See Orphans' Court Opinion, 7/22/15, at 1-9.
On May 12, 2015, the orphans' court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Mother and B.S. (Father) pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On June 11, 2015, Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), which this Court consolidated sua sponte. See generally Pa.R.A.P. 513.
Father did not file notices of appeal, and he is not a party to this appeal.
We note that the Guardian Ad Litem, at the conclusion of the termination hearing, recommended the involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights to the Children. N.T., 5/4/15, at 86-87.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for our review.
1. Whether the [orphans'] [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental rights of Mother, where there was no clear and convincing evidence that established statutory grounds for termination of parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and where termination does not serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the [C]hildren?Mother's Brief at 4.
Our review is guided by the following well-settled law.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's decision, however, should not be reversed merely because the record would support a different result. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Instantly, we conclude that the trial court properly terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows.
This Court need only agree with any one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), along with Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Therefore, in light of our disposition as to Section 2511(a)(2), we need not consider Mother's arguments with respect to Section 2511(a)(1). We further conclude that termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5) and (8) was not proper because Mother was incarcerated at the time of the Children's placement. See In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1200 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (stating that Section 2511(a)(5) and (8) did not provide a basis for terminating the father's parental rights when he was incarcerated at the time of the child's removal from the mother's care); accord In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1123 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2010). --------
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b). "The grounds for termination [of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2),] due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties." In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
In In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012), our Supreme Court addressed the relevance of incarceration in termination decisions under Section 2511(a)(2). The S.P. Court held that "incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor, in a court's conclusion that grounds for termination exist under [Section] 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued incapacity of a parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence and that the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied." Id. at 828.
With respect to Section 2511(b), the requisite analysis is as follows.
Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, "Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child." In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 63.In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
On appeal, Mother argues that the record evidence does not support the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). Specifically, Mother asserts the orphans' court abused its discretion in finding that she "had not made sufficient efforts to secure appropriate housing and employment..." Mother's Brief at 9.
Upon careful review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans' court in terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). As such, we adopt the orphans' court's Rule 1925(a) opinion as dispositive of Mother's issue. See Orphans' Court Opinion, 7/22/15, at 24 (finding, in part, that "Mother has consistently been unable to obtain and maintain either suitable housing or employment. She has also continued to use drugs, was irregular with drug testing and appears to have manipulated the most recent [drug] screens she provided...")
With respect to Section 2511(b), Mother asserts the orphans' court abused its discretion because the record shows she "has continued love, protection and concern for [the C]hildren, and that the bond between Mother and [the C]hildren is very strong, and in her words 'unbreakable.'" Mother's Brief at 9-10.
Our Supreme Court has explained that, "the mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition." T.S.M., supra. Indeed, in considering the affection a child may have for his or her natural parents, this Court has held as follows.
[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child's feelings were the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who, after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent.... Nor are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the parent] and the children is sufficient in [and] of itself, or when considered in connection with a child's feeling toward a parent, to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the development of the child and its mental and emotional health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
This Court has also stated as follows.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should consider the importance of continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015), quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Instantly, upon careful review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans' court in terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). As such, we adopt the orphans' court's Rule 1925(a) opinion as dispositive of Mother's issue with respect to Section 2511(b). See Orphans' Court Opinion, 7/22/15, at 27 (finding, in part, that "there was some evidence of a bond between Mother and the Children", but that terminating Mother's parental rights would serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the Children).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the orphans' court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). See T.S.M., supra. Accordingly, we affirm the orphans' court's May 12, 2015 orders.
Orders affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 11/23/2015
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