Opinion
NUMBER 13-16-00049-CV
03-09-2016
IN RE STATE FARM LLOYDS
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Benavides
Memorandum OpinionPer Curiam
Relator State Farm Lloyds ("State Farm") filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the above cause through which it contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant summary judgment and dismiss the underlying property damage case because the insurance claims submitted by the real party in interest, Winston Lizcano, had been resolved through a contractual appraisal process. This Court requested and received a response to the petition for writ of mandamus from Lizcano, who asserts that State Farm has an adequate remedy by appeal and that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant summary judgment because the appraisal process did not extinguish his causes of action. The Court further received a reply to the response from State Farm.
Mandamus is an "extraordinary remedy, not issued as a matter of right, but at the discretion of the court." In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). "Mandamus relief is proper to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is no adequate remedy by appeal." In re Frank Motor Co., 361 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding); see In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 135-36; Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable that it amounts to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it clearly fails to correctly analyze or apply the law. In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d at 888; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840. Mandamus will not issue "when the law provides another plain, adequate, and complete remedy." In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135-36). Stated otherwise, mandamus should not issue to correct grievances that may be addressed by other remedies. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840.
In determining whether appeal is an adequate remedy, we consider whether the benefits outweigh the detriments of mandamus review. In re BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 244 S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 135-36. In Prudential, the Texas Supreme Court held that the requirement of an "adequate" remedy on appeal is not subject to simple categories or bright-line rules and, instead, "is simply a proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential considerations that determine when appellate courts will use original mandamus proceedings to review the actions of lower courts." 148 S.W.3d at 136-37. The test "is practical and prudential." Id. at 136. Whether an appellate remedy is "adequate" so as to preclude mandamus review depends heavily on the circumstances presented and is better guided by general principles than by simple rules. Id. at 137. Thus, mandamus is a remedy not restricted by "rigid rules" that are "necessarily inconsistent with the flexibility that is the remedy's principle virtue." Id. at 136; see In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 372 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
A complete analysis of the adequacy of appellate remedies requires consideration of the degree to which "important substantive and procedural rights" are subject to "impairment or loss." In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 136. While mandamus review of "incidental, interlocutory rulings" which are "unimportant both to the ultimate disposition of the case at hand and the uniform development of the law," would interfere with trial court proceedings and add expense and delay to the process, mandamus review of "significant rulings in exceptional cases" could be necessary:
Mandamus review of significant rulings in exceptional cases may be essential to preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss, allow the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and spare private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.Id. Courts should consider "the impact on the legal system" in determining whether mandamus relief is appropriate. Id. at 137. Mandamus is a proper vehicle for this Court to "correct blatant injustice that otherwise would elude review by the appellate courts." In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 374; see In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 138.
However, "an appellate remedy is not inadequate merely because it may involve more expense or delay than obtaining an extraordinary writ." Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840; see In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d at 136; In re Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 139 S.W.3d 669, 670 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). Thus, "standing alone, delay and expense generally do not render a final appeal inadequate." In re Gulf Exploration, L.L.C., 289 S.W.3d 836, 843 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); see, e.g., In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. 2014) ("In light of the conflict of interest and prejudice that we have noted above, we conclude that mandamus relief is appropriate to spare the parties and the public the time and money spent on fatally flawed proceedings."); In re State, 355 S.W.3d 611, 614-15 (Tex. 2011) ("We believe that the circumstances of this case also make the appellate remedy inadequate because of the enormous waste of judicial and public resources that compliance with the trial court's order would entail."). As succinctly observed by one of our sister courts:
Although in any case in which a trial court has committed error that might result in reversal on appeal, it could be argued that the parties and the public should be spared the time and expense of awaiting correction of the error on appeal, to conclude that mandamus review is available in any situation where a trial court may have committed reversible error would be to fundamentally alter our system of trial and appeal.In re City of Dallas, 445 S.W.3d 456, 462 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, orig. proceeding); see also In re Jackson, No. 07-15-00429-CV, 2015 WL 8781272, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 11, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op. per curiam).
In this case, State Farm seeks review of an order denying summary judgment. Mandamus is generally unavailable when a trial court denies summary judgment, no matter how meritorious the motion. In re United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 314 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d at 465-66. This is so because "trying a case in which summary judgment would have been appropriate does not mean the case will have to be tried twice." In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d at 465-66. Only extraordinary circumstances will justify granting mandamus relief when a trial court erroneously denies a motion for summary judgment. In re United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d at 314. In United Services Automobile Ass'n, the supreme court concluded that extraordinary circumstances merited relief from the denial of a motion for summary judgment where one trial already had been conducted in a forum that lacked jurisdiction and a second trial on a claim barred by limitations "would thwart the legislative intent that non-tolled TCHRA claims be brought within two years." Id.
Cases following this decision have exemplified the supreme court's holding that only extraordinary circumstances will justify mandamus review of orders denying summary judgment. See, e.g., In re Ooida Risk Retention Relators Grp., Inc., 475 S.W.3d 905, 913 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus review of the denial of an insurer's motion for summary judgment on a claimant's breach of contract claim); In re S.T., 467 S.W.3d 720, 729 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus review of an order denying summary judgment regarding paternity in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship because "issues involving the rights of parents and children should be resolved expeditiously, and delay in such cases often renders appellate remedies inadequate); In re ConocoPhillips Co., 405 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus review of the denial of a partial motion for summary judgment in a class action); In re Robison, 335 S.W.3d 776, 783 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (granting mandamus review of order denying motion for summary judgment where "an almost four-year-old personal injury cause of action has been put on hold while the parties litigate an unenforceable settlement agreement" and otherwise, "all parties, including both the trial court and this Court, will be forced to endure the delay, cost, and expense of both the litigation and inevitable appeal of nothing more than an unenforceable oral settlement of the abated personal injury cause of action"); see also In re Chang, No. 13-15-00352-CV, 2015 WL 5895197, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Oct. 8, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (denying mandamus review of "claims on the merits" regarding the recovery of actual and exemplary damages); In re TCPSP Corp., No. 13-14-00159-CV, 2014 WL 2721679, at *1 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi Mar. 18, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op. per curiam) (denying mandamus review of order denying relator's motion for partial summary judgment); In re Thuesen, No. 14-13-00243-CV, 2013 WL 1499598, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 11, 2013, orig. proceeding) (mem. op. per curiam) (denying mandamus review of order denying motion for partial summary judgment); In re Piper Aircraft, Inc., No. 13-12-00329-CV, 2012 WL 1899694, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 23, 2012, orig. proceeding) (mem. op. per curiam) (denying mandamus review of orders denying traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment); In re Johnson, 04-12-00220-CV, 2012 WL 1431391, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 25, 2012, orig. proceeding) (per curiam mem. op.) (denying mandamus review of orders denying traditional and no evidence motions for summary judgment); In re AMF Inc., No. 14-11-01011-CV, 2012 WL 253984, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 26, 2012, orig. proceeding) (per curiam mem. op.) (denying mandamus review of order denying motion for summary judgment in asbestos multi-district litigation cases).
In this case, State Farm contends it is entitled to summary judgment because Lizcano's claim has been "fully and finally resolved by complete payment of the appraisal award" and payment of the appraisal award has extinguished Lizcano's contractual and extra-contractual causes of action. State Farm asserts that the trial court "improperly denied [its] right to resolve this dispute conclusively and exclusively by appraisal," and if it is forced to proceed in the trial court, its "contracted-for right to end the matter by way of appraisal and not by litigation will be forever lost because [it] will have already been subject to the continued costly litigation," which "cannot be remedied by appeal and may be repeated in hundreds of other cases."
Appraisal provisions can be enforced by mandamus. In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404, 405, 412 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding). However, the parties do not cite, and we have not found, any case suggesting that the denial of a motion for summary judgment on the effect of a completed appraisal on contractual and extra-contractual claims is subject to review by mandamus. We note that an appraisal determines only the amount of loss, without resolving issues such as whether the insurer is liable under the policy. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 195 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding); Sec. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Waloon Inv., Inc., 384 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Fraiman, 514 S.W.2d 343, 344-45 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ); see also Hartford Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. Teachworth, 898 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Ooida Risk Retention Relators Grp., Inc., 475 S.W.3d at 913-14.
Reviewing the specific circumstances of this case, both legal and factual, we conclude that relator has not shown that extraordinary circumstances justify granting mandamus relief in this case. See, e.g., In re United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 307 S.W.3d at 314. Deferring review of the trial court's order denying summary judgment until after the rendition of a final judgment in this case will not skew the proceedings, potentially affect the outcome of the litigation, or compromise the presentation of relator's defense in ways unlikely to be apparent in the appellate record. See In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 136. Moreover, review at this stage would not offer needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments. See id. The fact that there could potentially be a waste in time and money in proceeding to trial without correction of alleged error at this stage of the proceedings is not, without more, indicative that mandamus review is merited. See id. Further, to the extent that relator urges us to conclude that mandamus is merited because of the "thousands of hail cases" pending, some of which involve appraisals, we note that the adequacy of an appeal depends on the facts involved in each case, rather than categorical determinations. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that this case does not present the exceptional circumstances that would cause the benefits of mandamus review to outweigh the detriments. Based on the facts of this case, to hold otherwise would expand the use of mandamus review beyond principles that the supreme court has identified as justifying mandamus review. In short, relator has an adequate remedy by appeal, if necessary, after a final judgment is signed in the underlying case.
The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus and the response, is of the opinion that State Farm has not established its right to extraordinary relief. Accordingly, we DENY the petition for writ of mandamus. All other motions are dismissed as moot.
PER CURIAM Delivered and filed the 9th day of March, 2016.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) ("When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so."); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).