Opinion
2018 CJ 1403
02-25-2019
STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF C.B. AND B.M.
C. Glenn Westmoreland Sherman Q. Mack Albany, Louisiana Counsel for Appellant D.B.-Mother Michael B. Forbes Hammond, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee State of Louisiana Kimberly Avery Livingston, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee Department of Children and Family Services Mark Semien Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Appellees C.B. and B.M., Minor Children Rebecca Davis Lee Livingston, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee T.M.-Father
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION ON APPEAL FROM THE TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NUMBER J-13865, DIVISION I, PARISH OF LIVINGSTON
STATE OF LOUISIANA HONORABLE BLAIR D. EDWARDS, JUDGE C. Glenn Westmoreland
Sherman Q. Mack
Albany, Louisiana Counsel for Appellant
D.B.-Mother Michael B. Forbes
Hammond, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana Kimberly Avery
Livingston, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee
Department of Children and Family
Services Mark Semien
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Counsel for Appellees
C.B. and B.M., Minor Children Rebecca Davis Lee
Livingston, Louisiana Counsel for Appellee
T.M.-Father BEFORE: WELCH, CHUTZ, AND LANIER, JJ.
Disposition: AFFIRMED.
CHUTZ, J.
This appeal is taken from a judgment of a district court sitting as a juvenile court that terminated the parental rights of the mother of two minor children. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
D.B. is the biological mother of C.B. (age 6) and B.M. (age 4). On July 7, 2014, D.B. was validated by the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) for neglect of C.B. for inadequate shelter and dependency. At that time, D.B. admitted to substance abuse and was incarcerated for a parole violation. On May 23, 2016, she was again validated for neglect of C.B. and B.M., who were placed in the care and custody of DCFS. After D.B. completed substance abuse treatment, and the children were returned to her care in November 2016, and the case was closed.
The initials of the parties will be used in this opinion to protect the privacy of the minor children involved. See Uniform Rules - Courts of Appeal, Rules 5-1(a) and 5-2.
Approximately seven months after D.B. regained custody of C.B. and B.M., DCFS again removed the children from her care on June 15, 2017, due to allegations of neglect and dependency. It was reported that D.B. had left the children in the care of a friend six months earlier. Because the friend was about to be arrested, the children were left without a caregiver. C.B. and B.M. were placed in foster care.
A case plan for D.B. was finalized on July 24, 2017, with a permanency plan of reunification and a concurrent goal of adoption. Among other requirements, the case plan required D.B. to: pay $100.00 per month for the children's support; discontinue use of illegal substances, submit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow the clinic's recommendations; submit to a mental health evaluation; obtain safe housing for the children; obtain employment adequate to meet the children's needs; submit to an anger management evaluation and follow the resulting recommendations; and attend parenting classes.
Following a case review on December 5, 2017, the district court signed a permanency judgment determining that a permanent plan of adoption was in the children's best interest. The record contains no indication that D.B. had completed any of the requirements of the July 2017 case plan at that time, other than visiting with the children and maintaining contact with DCFS. Although she purportedly began substance abuse treatment on several occasions, she either quit or was asked to leave due to rule violations.
On January 3, 2018, DCFS filed a petition seeking to terminate D.B.'s parental rights and certify C.B. and B.M. as free and eligible for adoption. After the petition for termination was filed, D.B. satisfied several of the requirements of her case plan, including completing anger management and parenting classes, obtaining employment, and finding suitable housing for the children. She also made payments of $100.00 toward the children's care in March and April 2018. Additionally, she began a substance abuse program in January 2018, although she had not completed the program when the termination hearing was held on June 12, 2018. D.B. also had not completed the required mental health evaluation by that time.
Following the termination hearing, the district court rendered an oral ruling terminating D.B.'s parental rights and freeing C.B. and B.M. for adoption pursuant to La. Ch. C. art. 1015(4)(i), (5), and (6). The district court signed a written judgment in accordance with its oral ruling on July 10, 2018. D.B. now appeals.
In its petition to terminate, DCFS also sought to terminate the parental rights of T.M., the biological father of C.B. and B.M. The district court's July 10, 2018 judgment terminated T.M.'s parental rights, as well as those of D.B. T.M. did not appeal the judgment terminating his parental rights.
LAW
The permanent termination of the parent-child legal relationship is one of the most drastic actions the State can take against its citizens. State ex rel. A.T., 06-0501 (La. 7/6/06), 936 So.2d 79, 82. Parents have a natural, fundamental liberty interest to the continuing companionship, care, custody and management of their children, warranting great deference and vigilant protection under the law. Due process requires that a fundamentally fair procedure be followed when the State seeks to terminate the parent-child legal relationship. State ex rel L.B. v. G.B.B., 02-1715 (La. 12/4/02), 831 So.2d 918, 921. However, a child has a profound interest, often at odds with those of parents, in terminating parental rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term and continuous relationships found in a home with proper parental care. In balancing these interests, the interests of the child are paramount over that of the parent. State ex rel. L.B., 831 So.2d at 921.
Louisiana Children's Code article 1015 provides the statutory grounds for which a court may involuntarily terminate the rights and privileges of a parent. A two-pronged inquiry must be made in parental termination proceedings. First, the State must establish by clear and convincing evidence every element of at least one ground for termination under La. Ch.C. art. 1015. La. Ch.C. art. 1035(A); State ex rel. L.B., 831 So.2d at 922. Second, but only after a ground for termination is established, the juvenile court must determine whether the termination is in the child's best interest. State ex rel. L.B., 831 So.2d at 922; see also La. Ch.C. art. 1037(B).
To prove a matter by clear and convincing evidence means to demonstrate that the existence of a disputed fact is highly probable, that is, much more probable than its nonexistence. In re Succession of Fisher , 06-2493 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/19/07), 970 So.2d 1048, 1054.
Moreover, the manifest error standard is applicable in reviewing the factual findings of the juvenile trial court in determining whether the requirements of Article 1015 have been satisfied. State ex rel. K.G., 02-2886 (La. 3/18/03), 841 So.2d 759, 762; State ex rel. B.J., 00-1434 (La. App. 1st Cir. 7/27/00), 767 So.2d 869, 872. Therefore, before the juvenile court's findings may be reversed, an appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the court's findings and the record establishes they are clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous). State ex rel. A.T., 936 So.2d 79 at 82-83; State ex rel. B.J., 767 So.2d at 872.
DISCUSSION
In her sole assignment of error, D.B. contends the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights based on its conclusion that DCFS proved grounds for termination under La. Ch.C. art. 1015(4)(i), (5), and (6) by clear and convincing evidence. She argues this conclusion was manifestly erroneous in view of the substantial progress she had made on her case plan, completing most of it, and the fact that the termination hearing was held less than one year after the children were placed in DCFS custody. She further argues that even if DCFS did establish one of the statutory grounds for termination under Article 1015, it failed to also prove termination was in the children's best interest. In particular, she contends that termination of her parental rights was not in C.B.'s best interest given the closeness of their relationship.
One of the grounds for termination of parental rights provided by La. Ch.C. art. 1015 is:
(5) Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical custody of a nonparent, or the department, or by otherwise leaving him under circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid parental responsibility by any of the following:
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(b) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent has failed to provide significant contributions to the child's care and support for any period of six consecutive months. [Emphasis added.]
The record herein clearly establishes D.B. made no significant contributions to her children's support from the time they came into DCFS custody in June 2017 until the petition for termination was filed on January 3, 2018, a period in excess of six consecutive months. D.B. does not, in fact, claim to have made any significant contributions to her children's support until she made $100.00 payments in March and April of 2018. These payments occurred not only well after the petition to terminate was filed, but also after the occurrence of a consecutive six-month period without D.B. making any significant contributions to her children's support.
D.B. offers no explanation or justification for her failure to contribute to her children's support from June 2017 until March 2018. In brief, she merely asserts that the only case plan adopted by the court that she was ordered to comply with was part of a case review and permanency judgment dated December 5, 2017, which was less than thirty days before the petition to terminate was filed. She also reiterates that she made $100.00 contributions to her children's care in March and April of 2018.
We find no merit in D.B.'s contentions, which appear to ignore both the natural obligation imposed upon her by La. C.C. art. 224 to support her children and the case plan she signed on July 24, 2017 requiring her to pay $100.00 per month for her children's support. See Toups v. Toups , 97-0620 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/8/98), 708 So.2d 849, 850 (a parent's obligation to support his children is a primary, continuous obligation, which is not excusable except for fortuitous events); Rosenbloom v. Bauchat , 94-2346 (La. App. 4th Cir. 4/26/95), 654 So.2d 873, 876, writ denied, 95-1312 (La. 9/1/95), 658 So.2d 1266 (a parent's obligation to support his children is an obligation imposed by law). The district court did not err in finding DCFS established grounds for termination of D.B.'s parental rights under Article 1015(5)(b) by clear and convincing evidence due to her failure to contribute to her children's support for any period in excess of six consecutive months. The support payments D.B. made after the termination petition was filed cannot cure her abandonment of C.B. and B.M. under La. Ch.C. art. 1015(5)(b), which provides that abandonment occurs when a parent "has failed to provide significant contributions to the child's care and support for any period of six consecutive months." (Emphasis added.) See State in Interest of J.R., 11-351 (La. App. 5th Cir. 12/13/11), 84 So.3d 623, 630; State ex rel. A.D.S., 04-0250 (La. App. 4th Cir. 9/29/04), 888 So.2d 913, 917-18.
It is only necessary for one ground for termination to be established. State in Interest of ML , 95-0045 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 830, 832. Because we find the grounds of abandonment due to nonsupport is clearly established by the record, it is unnecessary to consider the other grounds for termination found to exist by the district court. Accordingly, we pretermit any issues raised by D.B. regarding additional grounds for termination under Article 1015(4) & (6). --------
We also find no error in the district court's determination that the termination of D.B.'s parental rights was in C.B. and B.M.'s best interest. In explaining its ruling, the district court gave the following oral reasons for judgment:
I have been on this case for years. And I understand the traumatic experience that [DB] has, herself, endured. However, I will say that she has had ample opportunity to work case plan after case plan. And, certainly, if she would have come to the court or come to DCFS in an effort and asking help and - I can honestly say I would certainly have wanted the agency to support and lend every kind of assistance we could have.
However, under 1015(5), (6), and (4), I do not believe that it is in the children's best interest to be on this roller coaster for the rest of their lives. And I do believe that if this continues and if the children go back to the custody of their mother and if her rights are not terminated, that this will be a continuous cycle for the rest of these children's lives. That the behavior change, that it will change for a small period of time in their lives. But then when the people [DCFS] walk away, that their lives, again, will then go back to this, this traumatic cycle. And I do not believe that [the] children should have to live in this type of environment, that all of the changes that happen in [DB's] life happen at the twelfth hour. And that all of these changes that have occurred, all of these things that have been done were after the termination [petition was] filed. And the law says that it doesn't count after that. And I know it counts in [DB's] life. And I want it to count in this baby's life that she's carrying now.
But for it to [be] a quarter of [CB's] life and almost a half of [BM's] life [in foster care], I mean, you know, these children deserve a chance to be happy. And I don't think it's in the best interest of [CB] and [BM] .... And I know that [CB] is hanging on that his Mom is going to get it together. And what happens when he goes back again and it all falls apart? And then he has to go into foster care again. And then he hinges on any little hope, any little glimpse of light. And so his life becomes this toxic circle, and it gets bad and then it gets good. And then that's what [her] children's life becomes ... this roller coaster.
And so, today, -- I hate this. This is the worst part of what I do. But I want [DB] to get this right. I don't want to have to do this. But today it's what's in the best interests of [CB's] life and what's in the best interest of [BM's] life. And I have to terminate the rights of ... [DB] and free these two boys for adoption today.
And with that, I want to say that I do want to support [DB]. I do want her to have a stable life at some point. I do want her to get this together and hopefully have a solid life for her child that she is carrying. But I cannot -- I've been down this road with this for years. And I do want these children to have a chance of being successful and being whole. And they have 2 great homes that they will have an opportunity to be safe and to know what it's like to be stable. ...
Although the record reflects that C.B. and D.B. had a close relationship, it also reflects that C.B., as well as B.M., have experienced repeated neglect and instability while in D.B.'s custody. C.B. was five years old at the time of the termination hearing and had been in DCFS's custody for approximately seventeen months of his life. DCFS validated allegations that D.B. neglected him on three separate occasions between 2014 and 2017. At the time of the termination hearing, B.M. was three years old and had been in DCFS custody approximately one-half of his life. Following the return on the children to D.B. in November 2017, she had custody of them for only approximately seven months before DCFS again removed them from D.B. due to neglect and dependency. Moreover, while D.B. had made progress on her case plan by the time the termination hearing was held, nearly all of the progress occurred after the petition to terminate was filed in January 2018. Prior to that point, D.B. had failed to make any significant efforts to comply with the case plan, which is a negative reflection on her commitment to change for the sake of her children. Considering the circumstances, particularly the district court's long familiarity with D.B. and her pattern of improving, then relapsing into her former behavior, we cannot say the district court erred in concluding it was in C.B. and B.M.'s best interest to terminate D.B.'s parental rights in order to allow the children an opportunity to be adopted into stable and nurturing families.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons assigned, the district judgment terminating D.B.'s parental rights and freeing C.B. and B.M. for adoption is affirmed. D.B. is to pay all costs of this appeal.
AFFIRMED.