Opinion
1 CA-MH 11-0065
12-20-2011
IN RE SHARON D.
C. Kenneth Ray II, P.C. By C. Kenneth Ray II Attorneys for Appellant Sheila Polk, Yavapai County Attorney By Martin James Brennan, Deputy County Attorney Attorneys for Appellees
NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY
NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c);
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication - Rule 28, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
Cause No. P1300MH980005
The Honorable Jennifer B. Campbell, Judge
AFFIRMED
C. Kenneth Ray II, P.C.
By C. Kenneth Ray II
Attorneys for Appellant
Prescott
Sheila Polk, Yavapai County Attorney
By Martin James Brennan, Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Appellees
Camp Verde NORRIS, Judge
¶1 After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the superior court found by clear and convincing evidence appellant was, as a result of a mental disorder, persistently or acutely disabled, in need of psychiatric treatment, and unwilling or unable to accept voluntary treatment. Accordingly, the court ordered appellant to undergo a combination of inpatient and outpatient treatment not to exceed 365 days ("treatment order").
¶2 On appeal, appellant argues we should vacate the treatment order because, in violation of her constitutional confrontation and due process rights, the court admitted into evidence a letter addressed to the court from the medical director of the mental health agency accepting the treatment plan proposed by the two physicians (employed by a different mental health agency) who had evaluated her for purposes of involuntary treatment. Exercising de novo review, we disagree. In re MH 2008-002393, 223 Ariz. 240, 243, ¶ 11, 221 P.3d 1054, 1057 (App. 2009) (appellate court reviews constitutional claims de novo).
In the superior court, appellant's principal objection to the court's admission of the letter was grounded on hearsay. Appellant, however, sufficiently suggested the court should have excluded the letter based on confrontation and due process grounds to preserve these issues for appeal.
¶3 Confrontation rights are guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The clause expressly applies to criminal proceedings. See U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . ."). Mental health commitment proceedings are, however, civil actions. In re MH 2008-001752, 222 Ariz. 567, 569, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 1024, 1026 (App. 2009). Although both the United States Supreme Court and the Arizona Supreme Court have recognized the need for procedural due process in civil commitment hearings, neither court has held the confrontation clause applies to such proceedings. Indeed, our supreme court has explicitly explained, "a civil commitment proceeding should not be constitutionally 'equated to a criminal prosecution' because the state is not acting in a punitive manner." In re MH-2008-000867, 225 Ariz. 178, 180-81, ¶ 8, 236 P.3d 405, 407-08 (2010) (internal citation omitted). Thus, we reject appellant's argument admission of the letter violated her confrontation rights.
¶4 A person involved in a civil commitment proceeding is, nevertheless, entitled to procedural due process protections pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 181, ¶ 9, 236 P.3d at 408; see also In re MH 2004-001987, 211 Ariz. 255, 259-60, ¶ 20, 120 P.3d 210, 214-15 (App. 2005). As our supreme court has recognized, In re MH-2008-000867, 225 Ariz. at 181, ¶ 10, 236 P.3d at 408, the appropriate test to determine whether a person involved in a civil commitment proceeding has been afforded appropriate procedural due process is the one set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). Under Mathews, we consider three factors when determining "specific dictates of due process" in a civil proceeding:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.Id. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903.
¶5 Here, the superior court's admission of the letter passes constitutional muster under the Mathews test. First, although the interest at stake in a mental health civil commitment proceeding is significant -- involving the potential deprivation of liberty -- the letter does not bear directly on whether appellant was in need of psychiatric treatment and unwilling or unable to accept voluntary treatment. Instead, the letter provided the court with information regarding the availability of appropriate care and treatment as recommended by the evaluating physicians. Indeed, at the civil commitment hearing, witnesses "shall testify as to placement alternatives appropriate and available for the care and treatment of the patient." Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 36-539(B) (Supp. 2011). Second, admission of the letter did not increase the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty. Quite the contrary. As noted, the letter provided the court with necessary information regarding the availability of appropriate care and treatment. Also, requiring the medical director of the proposed treatment to appear in court to verify he or she had approved the treatment plan the evaluating physicians proposed would not have provided appellant with any significant, additional procedural safeguards. Third, requiring the medical director to appear at the hearing would be costly -- in time and money -- as appellee points out.
This is especially true here. After the superior court admitted the letter, appellant could have secured the appearance of the author of the letter at the continued hearing in the matter.
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¶6 Finally, although appellant has not squarely argued on appeal the letter was inadmissible hearsay, giving her the benefit of the doubt, however, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting her hearsay objection. The legislature has statutorily created, defined, and regulated rights, and has established the burden of proof for civil commitment, and the requirements are substantive in nature. In re Pinal Cnty. Mental Health No. MH-201000076, 226 Ariz. 131, 133, ¶ 11, 244 P.3d 568, 570 (App. 2010). As part of this statutory scheme, the legislature has authorized witnesses to "testify as to placement alternatives appropriate and available for the care and treatment of the patient." A.R.S. § 36-539(B). As worded, the provision suggests witnesses can testify to placement options that will be implemented by others.
¶7 Further, A.R.S. § 36-539(B) also states the patient's "clinical record" may be "presented in full or in part as evidence at the request of the court, the county attorney or the patient's attorney." The civil commitment statutes broadly define "records" as "all communications . . . that relate to patient examination, evaluation or behavioral or mental health treatment." And "records" also include medical records prepared by a health care provider. A.R.S. § 36-501(41). The letter was thus a qualifying record under the civil commitment statutes and admissible. See also A.R.S. § 36-539(D) (rules of evidence applicable in civil commitment proceeding if not inconsistent with statutory procedures).
¶8 The superior court did not, therefore, violate appellant's due process rights in admitting the letter.
¶9 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's involuntary mental health treatment order.
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PATRICIA K. NORRIS, Judge
CONCURRING:
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MICHAEL J. BROWN, Presiding Judge
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PHILIP HALL, Judge