Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. James C. McGuire, Judge. Super.Ct.No. J203534, Jennifer Mack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
Michael D. Randall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, and Danielle E. Wuchenich, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MILLER J.
OPINION
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying mother’s request for a bonding study. We affirm and find the court’s denial was amply supported by substantial evidence.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The minor, S.H., was the subject of a previous appeal by mother, Emma H. (E039802). She appealed, contending: (1) The court’s jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institution’s Code, section 300, subdivision (d), and its decision to not provide her reunification services were not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the court abused its discretion in terminating visitation; and (3) the ICWA notice was insufficient. We affirmed with the exception of issuing a condition reversal on the inadequate ICWA notice.
All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institution’s Code unless otherwise indicated.
In order to provide an appropriate factual background, we initially refer to and quote from the statement of facts in the opinion issued by this court in case No. E039802 on January 16, 2007:
“In May 2005, while living in a group home at Village of Childhelp located in Beaumont (where she had been voluntarily placed by mother purportedly because she suffered from ADHD), nine-year-old S.H. (born December 1995) revealed to a staff member that her father, Sheldon H. (father), had been sexually molesting her since his release from prison the previous November. Father had previously been convicted in Colorado of sexually assaulting a female child, two or three years old, and had been incarcerated for six years. Mother permitted him to return to the home, and when S.H. began home visits, all three slept together in the same bed. S.H. had initially reported that ‘when her mother falls asleep, that is when [father] molests her. She tries to get away from him, but he won’t let her.’ When interviewed by a social worker shortly thereafter, however, S.H. ‘credibly denied any form of sexual abuse.’ Mother also denied any sexual abuse by her husband. Two weeks later, S.H. admitted to a Childhelp therapist that she had not told the social worker the truth.
“Finally, in late July, S.H. disclosed to another social worker, in the presence of the Childhelp therapist, that father had abused her. According to the social worker, S.H. ‘presented as bright in intellect and credible. She defined hurt touch as “nasty” and bad touch as “touches you sexually.” When asked if anyone hurt/nasty touched her, she said her dad Sheldon. When asked if anyone bad or yucky touches her, she said her dad Sheldon.’ In August, S.H. underwent a forensic interview and evidentiary medical exam. Although the exam itself did not reveal sexual abuse, the interviewer found that S.H.’s disclosures were credible and that abuse had occurred.
“S.H. disclosed that father ‘touched her and hurt her with his fingers on her genital area, under the clothing, when in bed with her father and her mother’ during a Thanksgiving visit to her parents’ home in 2004. S.H. further indicated that this occurred on two other occasions during the Thanksgiving visit.”
“In late August 2005, a juvenile dependency petition was filed under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (d). The petition alleged that S.H. had been sexually abused by father, who ‘has a pattern of perpetrating child sexual abuse for which he has had extensive consequences and treatment, although he continues to sexually abuse, placing the child at risk for further sexual abuse.’ It further alleged that mother knew or should have known about the sexual abuse; that father suffers from substance abuse; and that the parents have a history of domestic violence which places the child at risk for severe harm.
“Apparently the only prior child welfare history for this family consisted of an allegation in 1996 that two-month-old S.H. suffered a severe burn to her scalp when mother, while preparing to give the baby a bath, left her on a box 12 to 14 inches from a wall heater in the bathroom. Upon the social worker’s report that the incident was due to mother’s negligence, the matter was dismissed at the jurisdictional hearing, with the family to voluntarily participate in services.”
“At the detention hearing, the court provided for mother to have supervised visitation with S.H., and for S.H. to have no contact with father. The court also ordered the parents not to discuss the case with S.H..”
“The social worker initially recommended reunification services for both parents. She had spoken to S.H., who said she is currently happy living at Childhelp, and although she wants to visit mother, she does not want to live with her. Her preference was to live in a level two group home, so that she could have ‘“more freedom.”’
“In late October, S.H.’s therapist at Childhelp reported that S.H. does not want to return home so long as father is there. S.H. disclosed to the therapist that mother was trying to convince her that it was an uncle who had abused her and was saying that S.H. cannot come home until father is cleared. S.H. indicated she was afraid to tell mother that she did not want to come home while father was there.
“By November, DCS had changed its recommendation to long-term foster care and, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6) and (b)(12), no reunification services for either parent. The recommendation was based on the fact that father had been convicted of assaulting a child with whom he had a trusted relationship and that he had admitted to a long history of sexually abusing relatives. The social worker also referenced the fact that mother, with awareness of father’s criminal history, ‘immediately upon his release allowed him inappropriate and unprotected contact with their daughter.’”
“A combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was ultimately held on January 9, 2006. Both parents executed a waiver of rights, with mother submitting the petition for decision on the basis of the social worker’s report, and father pleading no contest. At the request of the deputy county counsel and without objection by the parents, the court admitted into evidence the original report for the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing and two addendum reports, all prepared by the social worker. . . .
“No affirmative evidence having been offered on behalf of either parent, the court found allegations D4 and D5 to be true and made a finding that S.H. comes under section 300, subdivision (d).”
“The court . . . announced its ruling, indicating that it was adopting the social worker’s recommended findings. Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, the court found that reunification services need not be provided to mother pursuant to subdivision (b)(6) of section 361.5, in that there was clear and convincing evidence that the minor comes within section 300 ‘as a result of severe sexual abuse through manipulation of [her] sexual organ for sexual gratification, ’ and that services would not benefit the minor. The court also ordered no visitation for mother ‘in that visits are detrimental to the minor.’ Finally, the court found that the ICWA was not applicable.”
On July 10, 2006, a post permanent plan review hearing was held. The court found “that custody by the parents continues to be detrimental to minor and minor’s welfare and best interests require that custody continues to be taken from parent and that return of the minor to parent at this time would create a substantial risk of detriment to the physical/emotional well-being of minor.” The court set a 366.26 hearing to consider: (1) termination of parental rights, and (2) the most appropriate permanent plan.
Mother requested that prior to the 366.26 termination of parental rights hearing the court order a bonding study. She argues that the minor was “not bonded where [she was] at, but [was] in fact, bonded to her.” Counsel for both DCS and the minor opposed the mother’s request. The juvenile court denied the bonding studying. The within appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The juvenile court has significant latitude in ruling on a request for a bonding study and the court’s decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1341.) “The applicable standard of review is whether, under all the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s action, the juvenile court could have reasonably refrained from ordering a bonding study.” (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
Initially we note, as the appellate court explained in In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1339, “There is no requirement in statutory or case law that a court must secure a bonding study as a condition precedent to a termination order.” Mother contends, however, that without the bonding study she would not be able to prevent her daughter’s adoption, and establish the “‘parental benefit exception.’” Mother made her request for the bonding study on the date set for the 366.26 hearing.
“Bonding studies after the termination of reunification services would frequently require delays in permanency planning. Similar requests to acquire additional evidence in support of a parent’s claim under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) could be asserted in nearly every dependency proceeding where the parent has maintained some contact with the child. The Legislature did not contemplate such last-minute efforts to put off permanent placement. [Citation.] While it is not beyond the juvenile court’s discretion to order a bonding study late in the process under compelling circumstances, the denial of a belated request for such a study is fully consistent with the scheme of the dependency statutes, and with due process.” (In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1197, fn. omitted.)
In Lorenzo C., the court explains the reasons why a request for a bonding study, made at a 366.26 hearing, is considered prejudicially untimely. They state: “There is no requirement in statutory or case law that a court must secure a bonding study as a condition precedent to a termination order. In addition, although the preservation of a minor’s family ties is one of the goals of the dependency laws, it is of critical importance only at the point in the proceeding when the court removes a dependent child from parental custody [citation]. Family preservation ceases to be of overriding concern if a dependent child cannot be safely returned to parental custody and the juvenile court terminates reunification services. Then, the focus shifts from the parent’s interest in reunification to the child’s interest in permanency and stability.” (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1339-1340, fn. omitted.)
As in Lorenzo C., the mother’s request, herein, occurred long after the juvenile court had removed S.H. from her mother’s custody and terminated reunification services. A further delay in the establishment of a permanent plan for the minor mitigates against the time it would take to perform a bonding study at this late date. On this basis alone the juvenile court was well within its discretion to deny a bonding study.
Mother also contends the juvenile court should have continued the 366.26 hearing to allow S.H. to “express her position on [mother’s] bonding study request . . . .” Mother supports her argument by referring to section 399 and Ansley v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 477, 490, 491. However, neither makes any reference to a bonding study nor have a legal applicability to the facts herein.
In addition, though, we find the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the bonding study based upon the lack of a sufficient relationship between the mother and the child. “The kind of parent-child bond the court may rely on to avoid termination of parental rights under the exception provided in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) does not arise in the short period between the termination of services and the section 366.26 hearing. ‘The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. [¶] At the time the court makes its determination, the parent and child have been in the dependency process for 12 months or longer, during which time the nature and extent of the particular relationship should be apparent.’ [Citations.]” (In re Richard C., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197.)
Based upon a review of the record the relationship between mother and S.H. did not warrant the performance of a bonding study. S.H., while residing in a group home at Village of Childhelp, reported in May of 2005 that her father had been sexually molesting her. He had been convicted of sexually assaulting a female child and incarcerated for six years. When he returned home, mother allowed all three of them to sleep in the same bed. S.H. indicated that when mother fell asleep father molested her. In August 2005 a section 300 juvenile dependency petition was filed. The petition alleged, among other things, that S.H. had been abused by her father and that mother knew or should have known of the abuse. At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, held on January 9, 2006, the juvenile court denied mother reunification services and visitation. The court found that reunification services would not benefit the minor and that visits by mother would be detrimental to the minor. In February 2006 S.H. began to attend fifth grade at a “full time . . . regular school campus” as opposed to the “on-grounds school at her residential facility . . . .” She was successfully mainstreaming into her new school setting. When told that she would not be receiving further visits from her mother, even though “initially” tearful, she indicated she would like to be part of a new family. She has been taken off all psychotropic medication. S.H. indicated an understanding of adoption and that she would like to be adopted by her current foster parent. Lastly, at the time of the 366.26 hearing, mother had not had any contact with S.H. for at least 10 months. Based upon mother’s lack of a stable and healthy relationship with S.H. since 2004 and her complete lack of contact with her over the previous 10 months, a bonding study would have provided insufficient, if any, evidence of a significant relationship.
We therefore conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to order a bonding study.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER Acting P. J., KING J.