Opinion
No. 05-16-00617-CV
07-18-2016
IN RE ANTHONY R. SANDERS, Relator
Original Proceeding from the 296th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 296-56252-2012
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang-Miers, Fillmore, and Schenck
Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers
This original proceeding arises from the trial court's issuance of temporary child support orders in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR) that is subject to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA"). Relator, father of a nine-year old child who is the subject of the SAPCR, contends the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue the temporary support orders and erroneously denied Relator's plea to the jurisdiction. Father requests we direct the trial court to vacate the trial court's temporary orders for child support, vacate the order denying his plea to the jurisdiction, and enter an order dismissing mother's SAPCR petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We conditionally grant relator's petition for writ of mandamus.
The plea to the jurisdiction was styled "First Amended Special Appearance Challenging Personal Jurisdiction, Plea to Jurisdiction, and Request for Court to Decline Jurisdiction." We do not address the merits of the special appearance as we do not have mandamus jurisdiction over denials of special appearances and the special appearance is moot in light of our determination that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.
Background
Father and mother's child was born while they were married and living in Colorado. In 2008, father and mother divorced in Colorado. In early 2012, mother and the child moved to Texas. Father contends his residence has remained in Colorado at all times since the divorce. In early 2014, father and mother entered into a stipulated order in Colorado addressing custody and certain expenses related to the child.
In October 2015, mother filed a SAPCR in Texas seeking to require father to pay child support. Father filed an answer asserting that, pursuant to UIFSA, the Texas trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear mother's petition to modify child support because father still lived in Colorado. The trial court overruled father's objection to the court's jurisdiction by written order and verbally ordered father to pay monthly medical and child support for the child. Father sought mandamus relief from the written order denying the plea to the jurisdiction and the verbal child-support order. We denied that petition because, at that time, there was no conflicting written order concerning either child support or custody. See In re Sanders, No. 05-16-00332-CV, 2016 WL 2935754, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 17, 2016, no pet. h.)(mem. op.).
On May 25, 2016, the trial court signed temporary orders that require father to pay $500.00 per month in child support and $100.00 per month for reimbursement of health insurance premiums as additional child support, and ordered father and mother to each pay 50% of all unreimbursed health-care expenses. This original proceeding followed.
Applicable Law
Mandamus Standard
To obtain mandamus relief, father must show that the trial court has abused its discretion and that he has no adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
Mandamus is generally proper when a trial court acts outside its jurisdiction, which makes the judicial act void. In re Office of Atty. Gen., 264 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (orig. proceeding). The existence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. In re Martinez, 450 S.W.3d 157, 161 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (orig. proceeding). Despite the general requirement that no adequate remedy by appeal exists for mandamus relief to be granted, mandamus will issue to vacate a void order. In re Office of Atty. Gen., 264 S.W.3d at 805.
UIFSA
UIFSA applies when a party seeks to modify a child support order rendered by another state. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.408(a) (West 2015). A party seeking to modify a support order from another state must establish jurisdiction pursuant to UIFSA. In re T.L., 316 S.W.3d 78, 83 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). UIFSA was designed to "maintain a 'one-order-at-a-time world,' ensuring that only a single controlling support order exists and is enforced consistently among the states." Office of Atty. Gen. of Tex. v. Long, 401 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Tex. App.—Houston 2013, no pet.). UIFSA achieves the goal of a single, controlling support order through the concept of "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction." Id.
UIFSA has been adopted by all fifty states; it is codified in Chapter 159 of the Texas Family Code. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 159.001-901; Office of Atty. Gen. of Tex. v. Long, 401 S.W.3d 911, 912-13 (Tex. App.—Houston 2013, no pet.). --------
Consequently, "once a trial court with jurisdiction renders a support decree, that trial court is the only court authorized to modify the support decree as long as it retains jurisdiction." In re Martinez, 450 S.W.3d at 161-62 (emphasis added) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.205). A trial court "retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction as long as at least one person affected by the decree—the obligor, the obligee, or the child—still resides in the rendering state, or the parties consent 'in a record or in open court' to alter jurisdiction." Id. at 162.
Analysis
Father, as an original obligor under the Colorado support decree, is a person affected by the Colorado decree who still resides in Colorado and did not consent to alter jurisdiction. As such, Colorado retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over support orders if the Colorado orders constitute support orders. See In re Martinez, 450 S.W.3d at 161-62. Mother attempts to avoid UIFSA by arguing that the Colorado order is not a support order under UIFSA because it did not require either party to pay a specific amount of child support each month. We disagree. UIFSA defines "support order" as:
a judgment, decree, order, decision, or directive, whether temporary, final, or subject to modification, issued in a state . . . for the benefit of a child, a spouse, or a former spouse, which provides for monetary support, health care, arrearages, retroactive support, or reimbursement for financial assistance provided to an individual obligee in place of child support.COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5-102(23) (West 2015); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.102(28). The term "support order" may also include "related costs and fees, interest, income withholding, automatic adjustment, reasonable attorney's fees, and other relief." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5-102 (West 2015); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.102(28).
Here, although the Colorado order provided that neither party was obligated to pay monthly child support, the order requires both parties to split all expenses for the child equally, including medical expenses, health insurance costs, and reimbursement for costs incurred for the child's extracurricular activities. Those types of expenses are expressly included in the UIFSA definition of "support order" because they provide for "health care" and "reimbursement for financial assistance provided" for the child's other expenses. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5-102(23) (West 2015); see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.102(28); In re Sanders, No. 05-16-00332-CV, 2016 WL 2935754, at n.1 (describing those expenses as "items that relate to support of the child").
Because the Colorado court had previously issued support orders and father remained a Colorado resident, the Colorado court has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over modifications of those support orders and is the only court authorized to modify the support orders. See In re Martinez, 450 S.W.3d at 161-62. The Texas trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to render any support orders regarding these parties and it abused its discretion by granting the temporary support orders. See In re Hattenbach, 999 S.W.2d 636, 639 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, no pet.) (If a state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under UIFSA, courts have no discretion but to follow the jurisdictional requirements of the statute.). Additionally, even if mother's interpretation of the Colorado orders was correct, that would not divest the Colorado court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over future support orders because that court retains jurisdiction over custody and possession. See Medrick v. Rutherford, No. 05-00-01102-CV, 2001 WL 840609, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 26, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (sister court that has jurisdiction over the parties in establishing custody and possession retains continuing jurisdiction over issue of child support even though sister state court did not initially award child support).
Conclusion
Mandamus relief is warranted when a trial court issues an order beyond its jurisdiction. In re Sw. Bell, 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000); In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998). Under UIFSA, the Colorado court maintained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over support orders in this case. As a result, the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify the support order and issue temporary support orders. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to vacate the May 25, 2016 temporary orders, vacate the March 1, 2016 order denying the plea to the jurisdiction, and dismiss mother's SAPCR case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to issue the orders as directed herein within ten days from the date of this Court's order. The temporary stay previously granted by this Court will remain in effect until the trial court vacates the temporary orders and the order denying the plea to the jurisdiction and dismisses the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Since we assume the trial court will comply with this opinion, we direct our clerk not to issue the writ of mandamus unless information is received that the district court has not so complied.
Writ of mandamus conditionally granted.
/s/ Elizabeth Lang-Miers
ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
JUSTICE 160617F.P05