Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. Nos. OJ06004835, OJ06004836
SIMONS, J.
R.R. and his sister N.R. (Minors) appeal from orders of the Alameda County juvenile court entered after the six-month review hearing in their juvenile dependency case. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e).) Minors object to two aspects of the orders—(1) the juvenile court’s demand that Minors return from their current placement in Russia to Alameda County for further evaluation (Transportation Order) and (2) the juvenile court’s reservation of jurisdiction (Order Reserving Jurisdiction) to determine whether reunification services for H.R. (Father) shall be deemed to commence only upon Minors’ return from Russia. (See generally Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5.) Because we conclude that Minors’ challenges to the orders are not currently fit for judicial decision and are therefore unripe, we will affirm the orders without prejudice to Minors’ right to raise their challenges should these issues become ripe in the future.
All undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Father cross-appeals from the juvenile court’s findings that he received reasonable reunification services, that the return of Minors would create a substantial risk of harm to them, and that Minors’ current out-of-home placement is “necessary and appropriate.” We conclude that these findings are supported by substantial evidence and affirm them.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This appeal is the second of three appeals pending in this court that arise from an ongoing juvenile dependency proceeding. In this case, we summarize only those facts relevant to the issues before us in the present appeal. For a full understanding of the facts, however, we will occasionally be required to discuss the record in Father’s first appeal, taken from the juvenile court’s March 28, 2007 dispositional order in In re R.R. et al. (No. A117698 [pending]), and we take judicial notice of the record in that case. (See In re Gina S. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1078, fn. 2, citing Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)
Initial Detention, Jurisdiction, and Disposition Proceedings
On September 12, 2006, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (the Agency) filed a petition in Alameda County juvenile court alleging that Minors came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), because their mother, Nina R. (Mother), had disappeared on or about September 3, 2006, and because Father had made death threats to Mother and had threatened Minors’ safety in the past. The Agency removed the children from Mother’s home, and on September 18, 2006, the juvenile court ordered the children detained pending a hearing on the Agency’s jurisdictional allegations. The jurisdictional hearing began on September 28, 2006.
In October 2006, Father was arrested and charged with murdering Mother. Father is incarcerated in a maximum security unit at Santa Rita jail, and he is currently on trial for the murder of Mother.
Four days after the filing of the Agency’s initial petition, Minors’ maternal grandmother, I.S. (Grandmother), arrived in the United States from her home in Russia. On December 5, 2006, the Agency submitted a request to the juvenile court, seeking approval for Grandmother to take Minors to Russia for the Christmas holidays. The listed departure date was December 23, 2006, and the return date was January 7, 2007. On December 11, 2006, the juvenile court approved the request. Grandmother did not return Minors from Russia as required.
After extended jurisdiction and disposition hearings, on March 28, 2007, the juvenile court sustained the Agency’s fourth amended petition, brought under section 300, subsections (b), (c), and (g). The juvenile court ordered Minors removed from parental custody and committed them to the custody of the Agency. The court further ordered the children placed with Grandmother, and it denied Father’s request for in-person visitation, limiting his contact to letters to be screened by the child welfare worker and then forwarded to Grandmother. Father then filed a timely appeal from the dispositional order, which is now pending before this division in In re R.R. et al. (No. A117698 [pending]).
Six-Month Review Hearing
A contested six-month review hearing began on June 1, 2007, before a different judicial officer than had presided over the dispositional hearing. The new judge expressed some concern about Grandmother’s failure to return Minors from Russia in accordance with the terms of the Agency’s initial request. The juvenile court stated: “I’m not here to award or punish. The concern I have and the difficulty is . . ., I have to know what the whole history is here. The issue has been litigated. I need to see that. So I will probably need to look at transcripts. But if I were clear, I will be honest the first impression . . . and I see that there is a court order that the maternal grandmother return the children by January 7th, and she didn’t and she decided to be the superior court judge in this case and not return them, that disturbs me.”
The court continued: “What disturbs me is that I don’t like it when people don’t follow court rules. I think the kids are in Russia because the grandmother decided ‘I am not returning them.’ ” The court then asked the parties to provide more information about the case and to address a number of issues, including whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction to order the return of the children from Russia.
In a minute order issued out of the presence of the parties on July 12, 2007, the juvenile court ordered all parties to address the following issues “with substantiating documentation: [¶] 1. The current emotional, physical, mental and emotional status of the minor children. [¶] 2. Any impediments to the minor children coming to the United States at this time to attend a Juvenile Court Hearing in Oakland, California. [¶] 3. Visitation between father and children, either face to face or telephonic. [¶] 4. The impact of the children living in Russia at this time on the father’s ability to reunify with the children. [¶] 5. Update on father’s compliance with the case plan. [¶] . . . [¶] 8. Why the children, who are dependents of the Alameda County Juvenile Court, should not return to Alameda County. . . . [¶] 9. The impact, if any, of the maternal grandmother’s violation of the court’s Ex Parte Order filed December 14, 2006 authorizing the maternal grandmother to travel with the children to Russia . . . from December 23, 2006 with a return date of January 14th, 2007. [¶] 10. The reasons that the court should or should not order the children to return to live in Alameda County and how an order by the court to return the children to Alameda County is in the best interests of the children or why an order allowing the children to continue to live in Russia is in the children’s best interest.”
The review hearing resumed on July 27, 2007. The Agency filed an Addendum Report that same day, and it addressed many of the above issues, including the question of Minors’ travel to the United States. The Addendum Report stated: “In regards to the minors coming to the United States, [the Russian case worker] has informed the undersigned that plans are in place for [Grandmother] and [R.R.] to visit in September 2007 as related to the criminal trial only.”
At the hearing, the court expressed concern about whether it could properly evaluate Minors’ situation given their placement in Russia. The juvenile court explained: “What is bothersome to me, and this is totally focused on the children right now, is the children are dependents of this court. I am the one that is supposed to be supervising these children through this court. They are dependents of this court, yet they are in Russia. Now what bothers me is not that they are in Russia, per se, but I have not had a chance to set eyes on them. [¶] Everything has been filtered through Russia and that causes me a little bit of concern. So my concern and what frustrates me in my mind a lot, is when do I get to see these kids? . . . When do I as the juvenile court judge get to see these kids who have been placed under my custody? When do I get to make sure that everything is, in fact, fine with these kids or not fine with these kids? That is my concern. . . . That is complicated by the fact that the grandmother did violate a court order. That bothers me.”
The August 10, 2007 Orders
The juvenile court continued the six-month review hearing to August 10, 2007, for decision. On that date, the court made its statutory six-month findings and orders under section 366.21, subdivision (e). Among other things, the juvenile court ordered: “The Agency is to return the child to Alameda County, California, on or before September 5, 2007. The maternal grandmother shall cooperate in the return of the child to Alameda County. The Court expects the maternal grandmother to pay the cost of transportation. If the maternal grandmother does not pay the transportation, the Agency is to advance the cost and the grandmother is to reimburse the Agency. At that time the child shall be assessed by the assigned Child Welfare Worker and an independent child psychologist to be appointed by the Court.”
The juvenile court memorialized its August 10 orders in an order after hearing filed on August 17, 2007. Since the juvenile court’s order is generally effective upon its pronouncement in open court (In re Alyssa H. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1254), we will refer to the orders on appeal as the “August 10 orders.”
The juvenile court also “reserve[d] jurisdiction to determine if reunification services for the father shall be deemed to initiate commencing when the child is returned from Russia.” The court ordered the parties to submit names of qualified child psychologists for consideration as potential appointments, and ordered the psychologist to be appointed to render a written opinion as to the following: “The current emotional, physical, mental and psychological well-being of the child. Whether it would be in the best interest of the child to have any contact other than the currently allowed letter writing, with the father and/or paternal grandparents. Whether a conjoint therapeutic session(s) with the minor child, father and a qualified mental health professional would be appropriate at this time and, if so, the parameters of said conjoint therapeutic session(s).”
The court ordered the Agency to “assess the following once the minor is returned to Alameda County: The current emotional, physical, mental and psychological well-being of the child. Whether the minor child shall continue to be placed with the maternal grandmother, and if not, what is the appropriate placement for the child at this time. Assuming continued placement with the maternal grandmother, whether the child should continue to live in Russia considering the best interests of the child and the current plan for the father. Whether contact between the child and the father and/or paternal grandfather, in addition to the current letter writing, would be in the best interest of the child. The current case plan of the father.”
The juvenile court further stated that it intended at the next progress report hearing, then calendared for October 19, 2007, to interview the children in chambers in the presence of counsel for all parties. The court ordered the interview reported but stated that the children would not be required to appear in open court unless their counsel so wished. In its August 10 orders, the juvenile court stated that it expected the following issues to be addressed at the October hearing: “The placement of the child including whether or not the child should return to live in Russia. [¶] The case plan in this matter. [¶] Visitation between the child and father and/or paternal grandparents. [¶] Commencement date for services provided and/or offered to the father. [¶] Receipt of the report from the independent child psychologist. [¶] Any other relevant issues related to the dependency issues in this case and the best interest of the child that are appropriate.”
Both the Agency and Minors filed appeals from the orders, and requested a temporary stay which the juvenile court denied. On August 29, 2007, the Agency and Minors requested that this court issue a temporary stay and a writ of supersedeas to preserve the status quo pending determination of the merits of their appeal. On August 30, 2007, we issued a temporary stay of the order directing the Agency to return Minors to Alameda County by or before September 5, 2007. On September 14, 2007, we issued a writ of supersedeas staying the Transportation Order pending resolution of the merits of this appeal, set an expedited briefing schedule on the merits of the appeal, and set the matter for oral argument.
On September 20, 2007, cross-appellant Father filed a timely notice of appeal from the section 366.21, subdivision (e) findings and orders entered on August 10, 2007.
DISCUSSION
Minors and Father appeal separate aspects of the juvenile court’s August 10 orders.
I. Minors’ Appeal
Minors challenge two aspects of the juvenile court’s August 10 orders: (1) the Order Reserving Jurisdiction to determine the commencement date of reunification services; and, (2) the Transportation Order directing the Agency to return Minors to Alameda County. Minors contend that these orders, “and all those dependent upon them, are void, in excess of jurisdiction, and an abuse of the [juvenile] court’s discretion.” We will address each of these contentions in turn.
A. Father’s Appeal Did Not Divest the Juvenile Court of Jurisdiction to Act
Minors contend that the August 10 orders are in excess of the juvenile court’s “jurisdiction” because the orders address certain issues that were adjudicated at the March 28, 2007 disposition hearing. In Minors’ view, Father’s pending appeal from the dispositional order in In re R.R. et al. (No. A117698 [pending]) divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction to enter further orders relating to the matters embraced by Father’s appeal, absent a proper section 388 petition or other showing of changed circumstances. We disagree.
Although Minors refer simply to “jurisdiction” in their briefs, we are here concerned with subject matter jurisdiction, which “ ‘relates to the inherent authority of the court involved to deal with the case or matter before it.’ ” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 196, quoting Conservatorship of O’Connor (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1087.)
Minors’ jurisdictional argument is misconceived. It is true that in appeals from ordinary civil actions, under Code of Civil Procedure section 916, “ ‘the trial court is divested of’ subject matter jurisdiction over any matter embraced in or affected by the appeal during the pendency of that appeal. [Citation.]” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 196-197.) But juvenile dependency cases are special proceedings that are generally governed by their own rules and statutes. (Nickolas F. v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92, 115.) In such cases, Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7, not Code of Civil Procedure section 916, governs appeals from judgments or orders “which award, change, or otherwise affect the custody, including the right of visitation, of a minor child . . . in an action filed under the Juvenile Court Law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.7; In re Nicholas H. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 260.) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7, the filing of an appeal does not stay juvenile court proceedings as to those provisions of the judgment or order that affect custody or visitation. “Since [Father’s] appeal[] did not stay the juvenile court proceedings, the fact that the [appeal is] pending did not limit the juvenile court’s jurisdiction . . . .” (In re Nicholas H., at p. 261; accord, In re Natasha A., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 38-39 [juvenile court retained jurisdiction to conduct review hearings during pendency of appeal of dispositional order].) Thus, contrary to Minors’ arguments, Father’s appeal in In re R.R. et al. (No. A117698 [pending]) did not divest the juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction to take further action on the issues embraced in that appeal.
In this case, the dispositional order adjudging Minors to be dependent children “necessarily changed and affected legal custody; in this case, it changed and affected visitation as well.” (In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 39.)
Nor was the juvenile court’s power to act dependent upon the filing of a petition under section 388, because the court had an additional source of statutory authority on which to draw. Section 385 provides: “Any order made by the court in the case of any person subject to its jurisdiction may at any time be changed, modified, or set aside, as the judge deems meet and proper, subject to such procedural requirements as are imposed by this article.” (Italics added.) In Nickolas F., the Fourth District concluded that section 385 provides the juvenile court the power “to change, modify or set aside its prior orders sua sponte.” (Nickolas F. v. Superior Court, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 116.) Nickolas F. held that the authority granted by section 385 allows a juvenile court to “reconsider the substance of a previous order the court considers to have been erroneously, inadvertently, or improvidently granted.” (Nickolas F., at p. 116; see also In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1297.) Minors’ arguments concerning the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction are, therefore, not well taken.
B. The Juvenile Court’s Orders Do Not Violate Principles of Res Judicata
Minors next contend that the August 10 orders must be reversed because they violate principles of res judicata. According to Minors, in the absence of a section 388 petition and a showing of changed circumstances, res judicata bars Father “from relitigating during the six-month [review hearing] issues necessarily determined at disposition in the same case.” We disagree.
As Witkin explains, the doctrine of res judicata has a double aspect. (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Judgment, § 281, p. 821.) “The rule of claim preclusion, [citation], is that a party ordinarily may not assert a civil claim arising from a transaction with respect to which he has already prosecuted such a claim, whether or not the two claims wholly correspond to each other. The rule of issue preclusion, sometimes referred to as collateral estoppel, [citation], is that a party ordinarily may not relitigate an issue that he fully and fairly litigated on a previous occasion.” (Id., § 282, at p. 822.) Thus, issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, is one aspect of the concept of res judicata. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341, fn. 3.)
We reject Minors’ issue preclusion argument for a number of reasons. Minors frankly admit in their opening brief that “the juvenile court in this case concededly did not change the prior orders.” This seems to be simply another way of saying that, at the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court did not make any determination that was inconsistent with what had been decided at disposition. And if there is no inconsistency between the two orders, then issue preclusion logically would not apply.
In any event, issue preclusion does not apply in this case. Assuming that the August 10 orders could somehow be construed as inconsistent with the dispositional order, and then further assuming that issue preclusion may be based upon an earlier order entered in the same action, it is apparent that the doctrine would not bar the lower court’s action in this juvenile dependency proceeding. The ongoing nature of dependency proceedings and the changing circumstances with which the juvenile court may be confronted will often require that the court revisit matters decided earlier in the case. Thus, in Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, a case on which Minors rely, the court held that principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar the modification of a dispositional order by means of a section 388 petition. (Sheila S., at p. 879.) In essence, the court held that the express statutory authority granted to the juvenile court by section 388 trumped any principles of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or equitable estoppel. (Sheila S., at p. 879.) Here, as we explained in part I.A., ante, section 385 granted the juvenile court express statutory authority to modify or set aside its prior orders if it found that they had been erroneously, inadvertently, or improvidently entered. (See Nickolas F. v. Superior Court, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 116.) As a result, even if issue preclusion were applicable to the situation before us, it would not prevent the juvenile court from modifying its previous orders.
C. Minors’ Challenge to the August 10 Orders Is Not Ripe
Minors next contend that the juvenile court abused its discretion in entering those portions of the August 10 orders that (1) require Minors’ return to Alameda County for evaluation (Transportation Order) and (2) “reserve” the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to determine “if reunification services for the father shall be deemed to initiate commencing when the [children return] from Russia” (Order Reserving Jurisdiction). Father argues that neither of Minors’ challenges is ripe for judicial review. We conclude that Minors’ two challenges present different ripeness issues and analyze them separately.
1. General Ripeness Principles
In a recent opinion, we explained that ripeness analysis requires us to “evaluate two questions: the fitness of the issue for judicial decision and the hardship that may result from withholding court consideration.” (Security National Guaranty, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 402, 418, citing Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 171.) In examining the first of these questions, the issue’s fitness for judicial decision, we have noted that “[e]ven when parties have clearly adverse positions, the posture of a case may require a court to speculate about unpredictable future events in order to evaluate the parties’ claims. [Citations.]” (PG&E Corp. v. Public Utilities Com. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1217.) If the parameters of the controversy have not yet been defined in a concrete factual setting, “the issues are not yet appropriate for meaningful appellate review.” (Id. at p. 1218.) Similarly, if the decision for which review is sought is too tentative or preliminary, appellate courts will withhold their consideration until a truly final decision is reached. (E.g., In re Jacob S. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1019 [argument that finding of adoptability was unsupported by substantial evidence unripe where issue of adoptability would not be finally determined until future hearing], superseded by statute on another point as stated in In re Ramone R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350-1351.) Deciding such speculative or hypothetical controversies would contravene the “fundamental concept” behind the ripeness doctrine, i.e., “that the proper role of the judiciary does not extend to the resolution of abstract differences of legal opinion.” (Pacific Legal Foundation, at p. 170.)
On the other hand, issues that are purely legal in nature are more likely to be considered fit for judicial decision. Thus, in Security National, we held ripe a purely legal challenge to the California Coastal Commission’s statutory authority to make a particular determination. (Security National Guaranty, Inc. v. California Coastal Com., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 418.) The reason that entirely legal issues are often fit for immediate judicial consideration is straightforward. Controversies involving the proper construction of a particular law often present only questions of statutory interpretation “upon which the facts in [the] case will have little bearing.” (Hayward Area Planning Assn. v. Alameda County Transportation Authority (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 95, 103.) Since the courts bear the final responsibility for interpreting the law (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 11, fn. 4), and the “ ‘legality vel non’ ” of a court or an agency’s action “will not change from case to case or become clearer in a concrete setting,” no purpose is served by withholding judicial review of such matters. (Security National, supra, at p. 418, quoting National Ass’n Home Buil. v. U.S. Army Corp. (D.C. Cir. 2006) 370 U.S. App.D.C. 137, 142.)
2. Minors’ Arguments Regarding the Transportation Order Are Not Ripe for Judicial Review
In their challenge to the Transportation Order, Minors focus their argument on the claim that the order “unnecessarily threaten[s Minors] with losing their maternal caregiver again, within a year of losing their mother,” and is fatally inconsistent with the court’s finding that the current placement is “necessary and appropriate.” The primary thrust of this argument appears to be that the Transportation Order is “designed to create a basis for modifying” the current placement of Minors in Grandmother’s custody. Minors nevertheless admit, as they must, that “the juvenile court in this case concededly did not change the prior orders.” (Italics added.)
Minors’ arguments rest on conjecture about what the juvenile court might order at some unspecified future date and about the effects that this future order may have on them. Thus, for example, Minors speculate that the juvenile court might order them returned to their father’s custody and then Minors attempt to predict how they would react to such a hypothetical, future decision. But we cannot foretell what placement decision the juvenile court will eventually reach on the basis of the evaluations ordered. Until the evaluations occur, and the juvenile court actually issues an order based upon them, we are unable to determine whether that placement decision is appropriate. Simply stated, “the issues are not yet appropriate for immediate judicial resolution.” (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 172.)
Such speculation would seem particularly unfounded in light of the juvenile court’s determination that Minors’ out-of-home placement is “necessary and appropriate” and its finding that return of the children to parental custody “would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the children.”
In arguing that Minors’ fears regarding a change in placement were triggered by the Transportation Order, Minors mention in their briefing that compliance with that order will be highly disruptive. “The foreboding implications of [this disruption] would not have been lost on [R.R.] or [N.R.], who are bright, hypervigilant children.” We do not understand Minors to be arguing that the extent of the disruption, itself, undermines the court’s authority to order an evaluation. And, in fact, the source and breadth of that authority is never discussed in the briefing. In any event, Minors do not develop any such argument in their briefing. “We will not develop [Minors’] arguments for them, and therefore decline to reach” this issue. (Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1; see In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994 [appellant “must raise claims of reversible error or other defect” and “ ‘present argument and authority on each point made’ ” (italics added)].)
D. The Order Reserving Jurisdiction Is Not Presently Ripe for Judicial Review
In paragraph 11 of its August 17, 2007 order after hearing, the juvenile court stated that “[t]he court reserves jurisdiction to determine if reunification services for the father shall be deemed to start after the [children return] from Russia.” Minors argue on appeal that this was error.
Minors’ argument is that the juvenile court had no authority to reserve jurisdiction to determine whether reunification services for Father should be deemed to commence on the date that Minors return from Russia. Minors contend that this portion of the order under review actually reflects two separate determinations by the juvenile court—the first implicit, the second explicit. According to Minors, the implicit determination was that the juvenile court “had the authority to ‘deem’ that a reunification period commenced upon a date other than that set forth in the governing statute, section 361.5.” The second, explicit determination was that the juvenile court “would determine on October 19, 2007 whether the reunification period in [these cases] should be deemed to commence upon the children’s return from Russia.” Minors concede that the second determination is unripe, but they argue that we may review the first determination at this time. On the merits, Minors assert that the juvenile court’s order contradicts the plain terms of section 361.5, which establishes both when the period of reunification services begins and the maximum length of time in which such services may be provided. (See § 361.5, subd. (a)(1).)
Father argues Minors are requesting a purely advisory opinion based on hypothetical facts. Father also argues that Minors misread the juvenile court’s order. He contends the order is properly construed as a statement that the court would later entertain argument on whether it had the authority to deem that the reunification services period began on a date other than that set forth in section 361.5. We agree with Father’s interpretation of the order: the trial court has not yet determined that it may reset the reunification period, but has reserved its decision on this issue. Thus, Minors challenge a decision that has not yet been made, and we reject that challenge as premature. (In re Jacob S., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1019.)
II. Father’s Appeal
In his cross-appeal, Father contests three findings made by the juvenile court at the six-month review hearing. Father contends that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings that: (1) reasonable reunification services had been provided; (2) the return of Minors would create a substantial risk of harm to them; and (3) placement of Minors in Grandmother’s home was “necessary and appropriate.” We address these contentions below. As Father acknowledges, we review the juvenile court’s findings for substantial evidence. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971.) Under this standard, our power to assess the evidence begins and ends with a determination of whether there is any substantial evidence that will support the conclusion of the juvenile court. (Ibid.)
A. Father Received Reasonable Reunification Services Under the Circumstances of His Incarceration
Father’s principal complaint concerning the adequacy of reunification services is that the juvenile court did not permit him to have visitation with his children. The juvenile court limited Father’s contact with his children to letters. Father contends that it was error to deny him visitation with his children because there was insufficient evidence that visitation would be detrimental to Minors. We disagree.
First, we reject Father’s contention that the record lacked evidence that visitation with Father would be harmful to Minors. As set out in the Agency’s May 2007 status review report and its July 2007 addendum report, at disposition the juvenile court had adopted the Agency’s fourth amended petition and had found, among other things, that Minors were at risk of serious emotional damage as a result of Father’s conduct. In particular, the juvenile court found that Father had forcibly attempted to remove his daughter from Mother’s home by grabbing her by the stomach and pulling her away from Grandmother. During that incident, Father had pushed Grandmother, and his daughter became hysterical and had to be taken to the emergency room for treatment. Father had also frightened his son prior to the son’s having surgery by telling the boy that he would need anesthesia for the surgery, that people die from anesthesia, and that “there is a lot of blood involved.” Father’s comments so frightened his son that the child had to be taken to therapy at Stanford before he could have surgery. The reports also noted the juvenile court’s findings that Father had been physically and verbally abusive to Mother in front of the children. Moreover, the Agency’s addendum report noted that Minors’ only reaction to Father’s letters was to ask where their mother was. The Agency’s assessment was that “face to face or telephonic contact would be detrimental to [Minors’] mental and emotional stability.”
The record thus contained evidence from which the juvenile court might find that visitation with Father would be harmful to Minors. Although reasonable reunification services must be provided to an incarcerated parent unless the juvenile court determines that those services would be detrimental to the child (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1)), visitation services need be ordered only in cases where they are “appropriate.” (§ 361.5, subd. (e)(1)(C).) We cannot say, based on the record before us, that the juvenile court’s order regarding visitation was unsupported by substantial evidence.
Father also asserts that the reunification services provided to him were “meager,” even taking account of his incarceration. He acknowledges, however, both that “because [he] was in trial at the time, he could not participate in [the services offered], on the advice of his lawyers” and that he was ineligible for most of the programs offered at Santa Rita jail due to his maximum security status. The Agency’s addendum report bears this out. It states that Father refused to participate in the psychological evaluation offered to him and that he declined to complete homework assignments, claiming that this would violate his Fifth Amendment rights. In addition, the report explains that although Santa Rita jail offers programs in parenting, domestic violence, and anger management, these programs are not available to inmates in maximum security.
Of course, under the facts of this case, section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1) would have permitted the juvenile court to deny Father reunification services entirely. (See Edgar O. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 13, 17-19 [upholding denial of reunification services to father incarcerated and awaiting trial on charges of murdering children’s mother].)
In the circumstances, it cannot be said that there was no evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that reasonable reunification services had been provided. In this case, the record shows that the Agency: (1) referred Father for psychological evaluation at Santa Rita jail; (2) provided him with both parenting literature for incarcerated parents and his case plan; (3) gave Father self-addressed stamped envelopes for communication with the Agency and contact with Minors; (4) contacted officials at Santa Rita jail to determine the programs or other services in which Father might be able to participate; and (5) made itself available to Father by mail and telephone to discuss case plan requirements. (Cf. Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1012-1013 [reasonable services not offered to incarcerated parent where it was undisputed that agency made no effort to determine whether any services were available to incarcerated father].) Neither the Agency nor the juvenile court may be blamed if the correctional institution where Father is incarcerated deems him ineligible for certain services due to his maximum security status. (See Mark N., at p. 1013 [social services agencies cannot tell prison officials how to run their institutions].) This is especially true in a case such as this one, where Father has chosen not to take part in such services as are available.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Findings That Return of Minors Would Create a Substantial Risk of Harm and That Placement with Grandmother Is Necessary and Appropriate
Father combines in one argument his challenges to the juvenile court’s findings that return of Minors would create a substantial risk of harm and that Minors’ current placement with Grandmother is necessary and appropriate. The focus of Father’s argument against these findings is his claim that the information that the juvenile court is receiving from Grandmother and from the child welfare authorities in Russia is somehow suspect and untrustworthy.
Before addressing Father’s contentions, we emphasize again the limited scope of our review. In a juvenile dependency case, “[w]e do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate the weight of the evidence. Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record most favorably to the juvenile court’s order, and affirm the court’s order even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion. [Citations.]” (In re Christopher L. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1333.) “Conflicts in the testimony which are subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment. It is the exclusive province of the trial judge . . . to determine the credibility of witnesses and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.]” (In re E.L.B. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 780, 788.)
Here, the juvenile court’s finding that return of Minors would be detrimental was based on the information contained in the Agency’s report, including the fact that Father had failed to make substantial progress in complying with his case plan. The Agency’s status review report noted that because Mother’s whereabouts were unknown and that Father remained incarcerated, Minors would continue to be placed out of the home. The Agency concluded, and the juvenile court appears to have agreed, that Father “has to first be released from jail and then obtain and complete the services [in] the case plan before consideration for placement could be made.” Father does not contest these facts. As a consequence, we cannot say that the juvenile court’s determinations regarding detriment and the propriety of Minors’ current placement were unsupported by substantial evidence.
While Father argues that the information that the juvenile court is receiving from Russia is untrustworthy, the juvenile court has thus far declined to make such a finding. In fact, at its July 27, 2007 hearing, the juvenile court asked, “the information from Russia is it trustworthy or not? I’m not saying either way.” Father makes much of a later statement by the juvenile court that it had no independent way of knowing how Minors are doing because Grandmother had not returned Minors from Russia and because “everything is filtered from that country.” Although it is true that the juvenile court expressed its intention to determine for itself how Minors were faring, it did not state that it found the information it was receiving from Russia unreliable.
Father speculates that the information provided by Grandmother and the Russian authorities cannot be considered reliable “given the patently obvious conflicts of interest attending them.” But he does not identify what these conflicts of interest might be, nor does he point to any evidence in the record demonstrating that either Grandmother or the Russian authorities have provided inaccurate information to the juvenile court. If such information exists, Father has not brought it to our attention. In the end, Father’s attack on the juvenile court’s determinations simply asks us to give no weight to the evidence compiled by the juvenile court and the Agency merely because some of the information comes from sources Father considers to be biased. But questions regarding the credibility of information and the weight to be accorded to particular evidence are for the juvenile court to decide. (In re Christopher L., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1333.) Because we review the juvenile court’s determinations only for substantial evidence (ibid.), we must reject Father’s challenge to the lower court’s findings that return of Minors would create a substantial risk of harm and that Minors’ current placement with Grandmother is necessary and appropriate.
DISPOSITION
In Minors’ appeal, we affirm the juvenile court’s August 10 orders without prejudice to Minors’ right to raise their objections in the future should the issues become ripe. In Father’s cross-appeal, the juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
We concur JONES, P.J., NEEDHAM, J.