Opinion
W.C. No. 4-389-907.
August 21 2007.
FINAL ORDER
The claimant seeks review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Stuber (ALJ) dated May 30, 2007 that denied the claimant's request for medical benefits in the form of taxi vouchers. We affirm.
The ALJ's pertinent findings of fact are as follows. The claimant suffered an admitted industrial injury on May 6, 1998, and as a result is wheelchair-bound. The claimant has a valid driver's license and owns a motor vehicle. The claimant drives to and from his medical appointments and the insurer reimburses the claimant for his mileage expenses. The claimant owns a cell phone and feels safer having the cell phone with him when he drives. He has never had to use it for an emergency situation, but wants the phone in case he has such an emergency. The claimant had earlier sought an order to compel the respondents to provide a cell phone and its related services as a medical benefit. On January 11, 2007 we reversed an order that had directed the respondents to provide a cell phone and services. The claimant then filed an application for hearing requesting that the insurer provide taxi vouchers for his medical appointments. The ALJ concluded that the preponderance of the evidence failed to demonstrate that taxi vouchers were reasonably necessary for the claimant to obtain medical treatment to cure or relieve the effects of his work injury.
On appeal the claimant contends that the ALJ erred in not ordering the respondents to provide taxi vouchers. The claimant argues that he does not feel safe operating his motor vehicle without a cell phone and since the respondents have not provided him with a cell phone the respondents must provide other transportation in the form of taxi vouchers. We disagree.
The claimant had the burden of proving that the taxi vouchers were a reasonable and necessary medical expense needed to cure or relieve the effects of the injury. Section 8-42-101(1)(a), C.R.S. 2006; Lerner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 865 P.2d 915 (Colo.App. 1993). In Sigman Meat Co. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 761 P.2d 265 (Colo.App. 1988), transportation expenses incident to authorized medical treatment were found to be recoverable. The determination whether services qualify under this test is one of fact. See City County of Denver v. Industrial Commission, 682 P.2d 513 (Colo.App. 1984); Atencio v. Quality Care, Inc.791 P.2d 7 (Colo.App. 1990). If the findings of fact entered by the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence we may not alter them. Section 8-43-301(8), C.R.S. 2006.
As we understand the claimant's argument, he asserts that at the present state of these proceedings he is unable to transport himself to medical appointments because the respondents are not providing cell phone service as a medical benefit. Because that service is incident to his medical treatment, he argues, the respondents must now provide some alternative mode of transportation to the claimant's medical appointments. However, these conclusions do not necessarily follow from the previous orders entered in these proceedings. In our previous order entered we noted that in Cheyenne County Nursing Home, v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 892 P.2d 443 (Colo.App. 1995), the court denied the request of a wheelchair restricted quadriplegic for a stair glide to obtain access to her basement during dangerous tornado weather. The court concluded that the stair glide provided no therapeutic benefit and that benefits designed to increase the claimant's peace of mind were beyond the scope of the Workers' Compensation Act. In light of the decision in Cheyenne County Nursing Home the peace of mind created by the cell phone does not compel a decision by the ALJ that the respondents must provide taxi vouchers merely because they are not paying for the claimant's cell phone. ALJ Stuber was not compelled to conclude that the cell phone was incident to the claimant's obtaining medical treatment, and that the respondents' refusal to provide that service required them to provide taxi service instead. As the ALJ found, the claimant is presently transporting himself to medical appointments. The claimant has not arranged to have a transcript prepared and included in the record on appeal and therefore we must presume that the ALJ's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Nova v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 754 P.2d 800 (Colo.App. 1988). Because the ALJ's finding that the claimant presently has satisfactory transportation to his medical appointments is supported by the factual record, we may not disturb the ALJ's conclusion that it was not reasonable or necessary for the respondents to provide another mode of transportation in the form of taxi vouchers.
The claimant cites Bogue v. SDI Corporation, Inc., 931 P.2d 477 (Colo.App. 1996), arguing that in that case the respondents were not required to provide a wheelchair accessible van only because they provided other transportation to medical appointments. In our view the claimant has misinterpreted the holding in Bogue. In that case the court of appeals relied on Cheyenne County Nursing Home and denied a wheelchair-accessible van to a quadriplegic claimant because the van did not provide therapeutic medical relief from the symptoms of the industrial injury. As in the present case, the Bogue court concluded that avoiding risks associated with the claimant's exposure to inclement weather while waiting for public transportation does not render the specialized van sufficiently related to the claimant's physical condition to be a compensable medical apparatus. Here again the risk the claimant seeks to avoid by having a cell phone does not compel a decision by the ALJ that the respondents must provide taxi vouchers.
The ALJ found that the claimant has his own transportation, that he owns a cell phone, and that the insurer has been reimbursing him for mileage expenses. The ALJ found that the preponderance of the evidence failed to demonstrate that taxi vouchers were reasonably necessary for the claimant to obtain medical treatment to cure or relieve the effects of his work injury. We perceive no basis on which to interfere with the ALJ's finding.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ's order dated May 30, 2007 is affirmed.
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS PANEL
________________________________________ Thomas Schrant
________________________________________ Curt Kriksciun
RANDY ROBERTSON, HORIZON DR, COLORADO SPRINGS, CO.
VINCAM STAFF ADMINISTRATORS, C/O: ADP TOTALSOURCE, SUNSET DR., MIAMI, FL.
WESTERN GUARANTY FUND, Attn: MICHAEL KRAMISH, S. BELLAIRE ST STE 408, DENVER, CO.
ALEXANDER RICCI, Attn: WILLIAM ALEXANDER, ESQ., AUSTIN BLUFFS PKWY, CO. SPRINGS, CO, (For Claimant).
MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY CARPENTER, Attn: C. ADAM FOSTER, ESQ., DENVER, CO, (For Respondents).